
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
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AMERICAN
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HOMERIC OLYMPUS AND ITS FORMULAE*

Side by side in the Homeric text there exist two bodies of formulae, in one of which the collective home of the gods is named Olympus, in the other, Ouranos. Individual gods have other homes—Hades the underworld, Poseidon the sea, Zeus the sky—but there are only two names for the common home. The Olympus group of formulae is far the more extensive. It contains three formulae meaning "gods in Olympian homes" and has 18 for Olympus itself—location there and motion to and from. The Ouranos group has one formula meaning "gods in Ouranian homes," four for Ouranos itself (as divine home). The purpose of this paper is to set forth these facts and explain them. I shall argue that the Olympus group is the more extensive because it is the earlier: the epic tradition first domiciled the gods on Mt. Olympus and then transported them to the sky—or rather to a portion of the sky, named both Ouranos and Olympus. The divine mountain was never abandoned. But by Homer's time it had become the same as a place called Ouranos. This new place, Ouranos-Olympus, is occasionally even identified as the Thessalian-Macedonian mountain. But more often it is a spot much more remote: not on earth, not the same as the sky overhead, it is a third region whose nature and location are elusive.[1]

* The final state of this article owes a great deal to the careful scrutiny given it by Professor Gregory Nagy of Harvard University and Mr. Paul Vander Waerdt of Stanford University. My debt to Professor Nagy is partly suggested by the frequent occurrence of his name in the footnotes; what I owe Mr. Vander Waerdt is just as great, but defies specific acknowledgment in the text. It was he who put the vitally important book of Myron Luch (note 1 below) into my hands; his critique enabled me to restructure the piece and rewrite the final third entirely; and indeed almost every page owes something to his sense of style and logic. Valuable suggestions were made by Professor Nancy Rubin of the University of Georgia and the anonymous reader for *AJP*.

[1] On Olympus in Homer, see Mackrodt in Roscher's *Lexicon* II, 1 (1897–1902) 847–52 s.v. "Olympos," with references to earlier literature on 847–48; Georg Finsler, *Die Olympischen Szenen der Ilias* (Bern 1906); A. B. Cook, *Zeus* I (Cambridge 1914) 100–14; Myron Luch, *The Homeric Olympus* (Philadelphia 1925); M. P. Nilsson, *Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley 1932) 221–51; Johanna Schmidt, in *RE* 18.1 (1939) 875–310; W. Sale, "The Olympian Faith," *Greece and Rome* 19 (1972) 81–93.

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The definition of a formula has been subjected to a great deal of discussion recently.[2] Since my goal is comparative—to show that the formulaic way of saying "Olympus" was much more highly developed than the way of saying "Ouranos"—it would appear that any definition used consistently would work. But practically speaking, we require a definition clear enough and strict enough to assure us that we are applying the same criteria to each concept. At the same time, our definition must reveal the principles of extension and economy at work, for observance of these by a group of formulae is our best assurance that it is ancient.[3] Hence I have used Parry's definition, conservatively interpreted, only I have not tried to cope with the baffling phrase "*idée essentielle.*"[4] A *formula* for my purpose will be a group of words, repeated verbatim (except, occasionally, for different verb endings or particles); its occurrences will be widely enough separated as not to seem deliberate echo; it will always occur at the same point of the line under the same metrical circumstances. Thus, *ouranon eurun* is not one formula but two, depending on its position in the verse; *makron Olympon* is different from *eis makron Olympon; aipun Olympon* is different from *makron Olympon.*[5] Single nouns, or groups consisting of noun plus preposition, are not counted unless they also form part of a longer formula.

[2] See Benjamin Stolz and Richard Shannon, eds., *Oral Literature and the Formula* (Ann Arbor 1976) with bibliography. Of more recent modifications of Parry's definition (see note 4 below) I have found most persuasive that of J. B. Hainsworth (note 5 below). The very powerful idea of Gregory Nagy, that the formula preceded and determined the meter, should be mentioned here, though I do not think that it affects my results. See *Oral Literature* 239–57 and *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979) 1–3.

[3] See D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley 1959) 224–25 and following; G. P. Edwards, *The Language of Hesiod* (Oxford 1971) 40–55, with my review, *AJP* 94 (1973) 384–86.

[4] Milman Parry, *L'Épithète traditionelle dans Homère* (Paris 1928) 16, *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971) 13. Professor Nagy points out that even Parry's conservative definition allows for shifts in position in the line, whereas I do not; a repeated phrase in a different position in the line is for my purposes a different formula. My reason for being so rigid on this point is this: when the same word group shows up in two different places in the line, it reveals dramatically how economical the set containing it really is.

[5] This definition is quite properly criticized by J. B. Hainsworth in *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968) 30–39. Hainsworth protests that formulae can be used in more than one position in the line, can be modified (by adding prepositions, say), and can be separated. In the comparisons, I have given figures arrived at both by the Parry definition and by accepting mobility and certain modifications from Hainsworth. The reader should see my use of Parry's definition as an artifice, a device useful for showing to some extent *how* Hainsworth's flexible formulae illustrate the laws of economy and extension.

The totality of formulae which refer to a single thing ("sea, sky, Olympus, etc.") I shall call a formulaic *set*. This allows us to preserve "formula-type" for "expressions . . . which share a common metre, position and syntax"[6] and to avoid the term "formulaic system," which has too many meanings. A *member* of the set means a distinct formula within the set, not a mere occurrence: type, not token. Finally, we shall be looking at expressions for the *collective divine* home. "Olympus" is almost always used of that home, but *ouranos* often refers to the natural sky above us without any suggestion that the gods, collectively, live there. In the "O-set" and "U-set" below are counted only cases where the formulae refer to this collective divine home. The sky *qua* sky, the mountain *qua* mountain, either place as the home of Zeus alone—these are not included.

To determine the implications of our formulaic analysis for the pre-history of the divine home in the epic tradition, we need to do more than examine formulae. After setting out the formulaic evidence, I shall turn to the Homeric concept of Olympus-Ouranos, in order to show that this is indeed a single place. After that I shall show that the mountain home must have come first, that Olympus-Ouranos was a relatively late concept. In the Appendices, I have put line references for the formulae, and subsidiary arguments for the priority of Olympus as the home of the gods.

The Formulae

We shall be dealing chiefly with four formulaic sets: formulae meaning "gods in Olympian homes" (the OG-set); those which mean "Olympus" (the O-set); the one which means "gods in heavenly (Uranian) homes" (the UG-set); and those which mean "Ouranos" (the U-set). We may begin by examining the members of each of these, beginning with the OG-set. I shall state numbers of occurrences in the tables below, and give the textual references in Appendix I.

The *OG-set* has three members for certain:[7]

OG–1: Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες (13X)
OG–2: θεοὶ τοὶ (-ῶν οἵ, etc.) Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν (10X)
OG–3: ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ (4X)

[6] Hainsworth (note 5 above) 8.

[7] I have omitted Ὀλύμπιοι ἦλθον (2X) as being vague and not implying residence, but this may well be too cautious. See note 14 below on θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες, which I have omitted from the UG-set.

All three formulae say about the same thing and are metrically nearly equivalent, all falling after the third trochee. Yet they are not freely interchangeable. OG-1 and OG-3 are metrically the same, in that they can be preceded by a short vowel plus consonant; they differ from OG-2, which must be preceded by a vowel. But OG-3 means "all the Olympian gods" and could be replaced by OG-1 only when the word πάντες occurs in the preceding half-line. OG-2 serves regularly as a noun in all cases. OG-1 is usable as an adjective and as a noun when OG-2 will not fit. OG-3 is always used when the poet wants the implied emphasis (e.g., 8.451, "all the Olympian gods could not turn me . . ."). Thus, though there are a few places where OG-1 might replace OG-3, there would be loss of meaning: the principle of economy is observed.

Twice we have the half-line: θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον. It is obviously an extended formula, if it is a formula at all: in both places it is possible, in one preferable, to construe κατὰ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον with the verb and not with θεοί.[8] Accordingly I have put this formula in the O-set.

The *O-Set* is much fuller. It has 18 members (15 if we include with μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον the use of these words after a preposition, 13 if we also discount occurrences of αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον and Οὐλυμπόνδε in different places in the line).[9] It is convenient to divide the set syntactically and then subdivide it metrically. In this way, the extensiveness and economy of the set becomes fully visible.

O-1. Olympus in the accusative of the end of motion (28X):
  a. After the bucolic diaeresis
    1. With initial consonant: μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον (3X).
    2. With initial vowel: Οὐλυμπόνδε (2X, both times preceded by ἐλεύσεται in an extended formula).
    3. With initial vowel: αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον (2X, both times in the extended formula, ἵκ- θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον).

Observe that O-1a2 and O-1a3 overlap and seem to violate the principle of economy. But the same words, Οὐλυμπόνδε and αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον, do *not* overlap when they are used to make the O-1g formulae (see below).

[8] The passages are *Il.* 15.21, "The gods raged throughout Olympus" or "The gods throughout Olympus raged," and *Od.* 24.351, "Lo, surely you gods still reign on great Olympus," which is preferable to "Surely you gods throughout Olympus still exist."

[9] See Hainsworth (note 5 above) 38c, 35. I have omitted *Il.* 11.715–18.167, perhaps wrongly, as too detailed and too specific to be usable as a formulae. Probably we need a new category, "semi-formulae," for this and other doubtful cases.

b. After the hephthemimeral caesura:
   1. After a consonant: ἐς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον (4X).
   2. After a long vowel, to avoid shortening in hiatus: πρὸς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον (4X, always in the extended formula ἀπέβη πρὸς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον).
c. After the third trochee:
   1. θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον (see a3 above; not included in the total).
   2. With different structure: ἐλεύσεται Οὐλυμπόνδε (see a2 above; not included in the total).
d. After the penthemimeral caesura: μέγαν Οὐρανὸν Οὔλυμπόν τε (1X only, but the formula recurs in the nominative, see O-4 below; I have of course counted this also as an Ouranos-formula).
e. After the second trochee, before the bucolic diaeresis: Ὄλυμπον ἀγάννιφον (1X, cf. O-3c).
f. After the first choriamb: πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἴσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες (2X).
g. After the first foot, before the third trochee:
   1. Before a consonant: Οὐλυμπόνδε (5X, preceded by a form of εἶμι (*ibo*) or ἦλυθον; cf. O-1a2 above).
   2. Before a vowel: αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον (1X, doubtful, but see O-1a3 above).
h. Whole line: ὀφρ' ἐς Ὄλυμπον ἵκωμαι ἵν' ἀθανάτων ἕδος ἔστιν (2X). This is an extended formula; with it we may include the initial half-line ἡ δ' ἄρ' Ὄλυμπον ἵκανε (1X).

The poet who wanted to speak of a god's going to Olympus was incredibly well equipped to do so.

O-2. Olympus as the place from which (15X)
   a. Olympus in the ablative:
      1. After the third trochee:
         1.1 After a consonant: ἀπ' αἰγλήεντος Ὀλύμπου (1X, two more where the divine home is not meant).
         1.2 After a vowel: κατ' Οὐλύμπου νιφόεντος (1X; I do not include this in the final tally, but cite it as the metrical alternative for the preceding formula).
      2. After the first trochee, before the third trochee: ἀπ' Οὐλύμποιο (4X, twice preceded by ἦλθον [-ες]).

3. Whole line: βῆ ῥα (δὲ) κατ' Οὐλύμποιο καρήνων ἀίξασα (7X; . . . χωόμενος κῆρ 1X).

b. Other formulae:

1. After the hephthemimeral caesura:

1.1 After a consonant, to make position: ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο[10] (2X, in the extended formula Ἥρη δ' ἀίξασα λίπεν ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο).

1.2 Permitting elision, ἕδος Οὐλύμποιο (1X; not counted, but cited for the same reason as O-2a1.2 above).

The relative lack of different formulae in this subset is explained by the existence and extensive use of the whole line formula O-2a3, and by the existence of two complementary formulae, U1 and U2 (see below).

O-3. Olympus as place where (10X)

a. Whole line: ἀκροτάτῃ κορυφῇ πολυδειρέδος Οὐλύμποιο (3X).

b. After the hephthemimeral caesura:

1. κατὰ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον (2X, in the (?) extended formula θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον).

2. πτυχὶ (-ας) Οὐλύμποιο (2X).[11]

c. Here we may put, not as distinct formulae, the locative and objective instances of three formulae cited above: μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον (1X), Ὄλυμπον ἀγάννιφον (1X), ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο (1X).

O-4. Olympus in the nominative (3X). Here we find, not as distinct formulae, just two instances, both of which we have seen in the accusative:

a. μακρὸς Ὄλυμπος (1X).

b. μέγας Οὔρανος Οὔλυμπός τε (2X).

This gives us a total of 18 distinct formulae (13, discounting added prepositions and occurrences in differing position) used 56 times; adding in the OG formula, we have a grand total of 21 (16) formulae used 83 times.[12]

[10] Note as a modification Οὐλύμποιο ἀπὸ ῥίου (*Il.* 14.154) (Hainsworth [note 5 above] 38a, c).

[11] Note the modifications πολυπτύχου Οὐλύμποιο (*Il.* 8.411) and ἀπ' Οὐλύμποιο πολυπτύχου (*Il.* 20.5) (Hainsworth [note 5 above] 37h, 38c).

[12] If we subtract O-1g2, on the grounds that αἰπὺν Ὄλυμπον occurs only once in this position, we have 17 formulae in the O-set, but still 13 after discounting occurrences in different positions.

If Parry's arguments about the development of the formulaic style are correct, the O-set is a formulaic set of great antiquity, used in Homer to speak of Olympus as the home of the gods.[13] It is not clear, though, whether it was always used of the home of all the gods. Suppose that Olympus were at one time the home of Zeus alone (as Ida is one of his homes in the *Iliad*). The formulae of coming and going, O1 and O2, could have been used of *his* comings and goings, or of gods coming to and going from his home, not theirs. Thus the formula Ἴδην δ' ἵκανον πολυπίδακα μητέρα θηρῶν is used of Hera's horses as she goes to visit Zeus (*Il.* 15.151, cf. 8.47, 14.283). How many of our Olympus formulae imply the home of all the gods?

Certainly the three OG formulae do: they mean nothing if the gods do not live on Olympus. And this set is in itself sufficiently flexible and economic to suggest a considerable period of development. Of the O-formulae there are four extended formulae necessitating Olympian homes for all gods: O-1c, O-1f and O-1h, and O-3b1. The presence in O-1c and O-1h of the formulary phrases ἀθανάτων ἕδος and θεῶν ἕδος used naturally of Olympus suggests a certain antiquity for the idea of Olympus as home of all the gods. On the other hand, the fact that Olympian homes are implied only by extended O-formulae suggests that such homes came later in the tradition. Let us attempt no decision yet.

We pass now to the formulae identifying Ouranos as the home of the gods (UG- and U-sets). The UG-set has just one formula:[14]

UG: οἵ/τοὶ οὐρανον εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν (18X)

[13] See M. Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971) 18–19, 314, 329–30. On pp. 104–05 Parry warns that "the systems of noun-epithet formulae do not always show an extension and simplicity (economy) capable of proving them traditional in their entirety. Often we have the proof for a set of formulae without having it for each element." Olympus is not a common noun, but like common nouns it cannot be given a wide variety of attributes (as heroes can) and cannot be part of a Parry formulaic series or have demonstrable generic epithets. We should therefore say that the O-set is traditional *qua* set. As such, it is incredibly economical (only one overlap), and it is very extensive, at least in the accusative.

[14] I have not included θεοὶ Οὐρανίωνες (6X), because, like Ὀλύμπιοι ἦλθον (note 7 above), it is vague and does not imply residence. Granted, in our *Iliad* (except perhaps in 5.898) and *Odyssey* it probably means "gods who live in Ouranos." But in *Il.* 5.898 it may mean "children of Ouranos," and it might have meant it before Homer. By omitting *both* of these formulae we help preserve a statistical balance. Still, in order that the omission not weaken the conclusion, I have rested the argument's weight chiefly in the O- and U-sets. I should also mention θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισιν, occurring in *Il.* 6.129, 131. The second of these instances (6.131) is obviously an echo, not a formulaic repetition. But

This follows the third trochee, like the OG formulae: οἵ is used, of course, after a preceding consonant or long vowel/diphthong, τοί after a short vowel to avoid hiatus. UG is always used as an adjective, preceded by θεοὶ, ἀθάνατοι or τις θεός. It is thus not interchangeable with OG-1, which can be and usually is used as a noun (always in the *Odyssey*), nor with OG-3, which cannot have θεοί or any other definite noun as antecedent (it will have the unexpressed verbal subject, or ἄλλοι πάντες or τις). Nor is it interchangeable with OG-2, which is usually used as a noun in an oblique case. The UG and OG formulae complement each other.

The U-set (where "Ouranos" means the divine home) has just four formulae:[15]

U-1: Οὐρανόθεν καταβᾶσ(α) (4X). This ablative formula does not compete with any of the O place-from-which formulae, since it occupies initial position. Here, too, we can sense that the formulae have been created with an eye to supplementing each other.[16]

---

might we not count ἐπουρςνίοισι θεοῖς (*Il.* 6.527) and ἐπουράνιος θεός (*Od.* 17.484) as Hainsworth modifications? We might, but I think we must be consistent and follow the criteria set out initially—that to be counted a formula must be precisely repeated at least once.

[15] Note ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν (*Il.* 5.867), which is a modification to the Ou-formula ἰδὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν (below p. 11). *Il.* 5.867 in full is "to Diomedes, Ares φαίνε' ὁμοῦ νεφέεσσιν ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν, following a meteorological simile. The word *ouranos* here may therefore mean only the natural sky. On the other hand, ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν by itself could have been used of Heaven. But in the absence of other instances it must be omitted. I have also left out κλέος οὐρανὸν ἵκει, though it may well refer to the home of the gods. It need not; it could mean Zeus' home, or it could be an even vaguer metaphor. Nor could it, as such, be used of a god. οὐρανὸν ἵκει by itself could but the fact is that it is not; it cannot be included. On οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκανει, see below, p. 11.

[16] The following ablatives deserve comment, though all violate the rule against counting single words or single nouns with preposition:

a. Οὐρανόθεν (*Il.* 1.195, 208): in context, 208 is an echo of 195, not a formulaic repetition.

b. ἐξ Οὐρανόθεν (*Il.* 8.19, 21). This is an obvious example of echoing.

c. ἀπ' Οὐρανόθεν (*Il.* 8.365, once only; but 3X of the natural sky).

In the O-set I included single words and single nouns with a preposition only when they occurred in longer divine-home formulae and would have been counted anyway. This phrase does in fact occur in a longer formula, but this formula can only be used for the natural sky (*Od.* 11.18, 12.381, of the sun). Such a formula is not comparable to O-2a1.1, which can be freely used of mountain or divine home.

U-2: ἐξ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος (2X; 1X a doubtful accusative).[17] This falls after the penthemimeral caesura, and thus overlaps with none of the O place-from-which formulae.

U-3: = (O-1d = O-4 above).

U-4: εἰ δέ τις ἀθανάτων γε κατ' οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας (2X). This whole line may be an extension of the ablative κατ' οὐρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας, which is grammatically distinct from any O formula.

This is a meager-looking set, and even if we were to pad it out with a few of the very doubtful phrases mentioned in the notes, we should have but 5 or 6 formulae, with 12 or 13 occurrences, about one-third the extent and a quarter the occurrences of the O-set.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that U-1 and U-2 (and perhaps the end of U-4) exist in order to fill a significant metrical gap in the O-set. And this means that the O-set was the first to be developed, which in turn strongly suggests that, in the history of the epic, the gods were thought of as living on Olympus before they came to have heavenly homes. That the O-set was developed first is intuitively obvious from its much greater size and from its elegant metrical flexibility and economy.[18] Such a set takes a long time to evolve; the U-set, because it is far more sparse, needed much less time. The historical conclusion—that mountain homes were conceived of before heavenly homes—is perhaps more intuitive than obvious, but I suspect that most scholars have thought it correct. Still, we must remember that much of the O-set could have evolved during a time when Zeus alone lived on Olympus, before there was a collective divine home.

It looks *prima facie* as if the U-set were created to complement the O-set by filling a gap in the ablative formulae; or as if, at the time when the idea of a celestial divine home was born, it could be expressed easily by creating ablative formulae, since there were few ablative formulae in the existing O-set. This of course implies that a celestial home is compatible with—presumably identical with—a mountain home, and we

[17] The accusative is *Il.* 19.128: μή ποτ' ἐς Οὐλυμπόν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα. The last two words alone break the line precisely in half and are thus not a formula. But with an immediately preceding εἰς, we get a formula, used elsewhere of the natural sky. As it stands in our text, it cannot be counted, and though we all know that the poet *could* have used εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα of Ouranos the divine home at any point, he did not. Instead, he used O-1d = U-3.

[18] Intuitively obvious, as Professor Nagy remarks to me, is not the same as certain. But the reductio in Appendix 2 below should at least bring us closer to certainty.
of year (4.8.24–25; e.g., ἐκ δὲ τούτου, μετὰ τοῦτο; on such expressions see Ryder [note 13 above] 165–66).

shall see later that Olympus and Ouranos were indeed identified. Before we do, we must consider an objection to our argument so far. The U-set looks small, but was it always so small? Perhaps the formulae which in Homer's day were confined to the natural sky overhead were once used of a celestial home.[19] (In setting out these formulae I shall use the abbreviation *Ou* to distinguish them from the U-set.)

The Ou-set: Accusative end of motion:

1. After the bucolic diaeresis:
   a. οὐρανὸν ἵκει (-ε, -εν) (6X).
   b. οὐρανὸν εἴσω (regarding εἴσω as an adverb: 3X).
   c. οὐρανὸν εὐρύν (used as direct object, but obviously usable as end-of-motion; 1X, but cf. Ou-6).
2. After the hephthemimeral caesura: εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρύν (6X).
3. After the third trochee: πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα (1X, but cf. οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα 1X [*Il.* 19.128] and Ou-5).
4. After the third trochee and before the final verb: πρὸς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν (ἄερθεν) (1X, but cf. Ou-6).
5. After the penthemimeral caesura: εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα (3X).
6. After the penthemimeral caesura and before the final verb: εἰς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν (ἱκάνει) (1X, but cf. Ou-2 and κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει, 2X, and ὁ μὲν οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει [*Od.* 12.73].[20]
7. Between the first foot and the third trochee:
   a. οὐρανὸν εὐρύν (1X, but cf. Ou-1c).
   b. οὐρανὸν ἵκεν (3X).

[19] I have not set out the arguments which show that *ouranos* sometimes refers to the natural sky overhead and sometimes to the celestial home, which is not the same as the natural sky. See, for instance, Luch (note 1 above) 104–07 and *passim;* Sale (note 1 above) 84. The most obvious distinction is between those places where *ouranos* cannot be identified with Olympus (see the Ou-set following) and those where it must be (pp. 14–19 below).

[20] The phrases cited in parenthesis, with ὁ μέν and κλέος, cannot be counted among the formulae which might once have been used of Ouranos as heaven. The phrase with ὁ μέν occurs only once. I do not think that a god can have *kleos.* That a mortal's *kleos* should reach the divine home specifically (and not just divine ears, vaguely) is a notion we cannot read into the earlier tradition. On the other hand it would be so easy to substitute a word for a god or for "god" into the *kleos* formula that one hesitates to omit it from the count, even though we are committed to counting only what occurs. Also, we are not counting the words οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει by themselves, since they break the line exactly in half and are therefore not a formula. We are not counting οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα either, for the same reason, but this phrase is represented in the set via Ou-3 and Ou-5. One feels that οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει should not be ruled out of the picture by converging technicalities; hence I have counted it in one of the totals.

8. Initially:
   a. οὐρανὸν εἰσανιών (1X, but cf. οὐρανὸν εἰσανιδών 2X).
   b. οὐρανὸν ἐς πολύχαλχον (2X).
   N.B. The phrases οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα and οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκανει, by themselves, are not formulae since they break the line precisely in half.[21]

We have a total, counting κλέος οὐρανόν εὐρὺν ἱκάνει, of 13 formulae (7 if we eliminate varying prepositions, the preceding κλέος, and different position); the O-1 group of accusatives end-of-motion contain 12 formulae (7 if we eliminate varying prepositions and different position); the numbers are almost identical. Certainly the Ou-set is well developed and ancient. But as we shall see, these potential end-of-motion formulae *are* the Ou-set; they are the only formulae used by Homer of the sky overhead which might once have been used of the home of the gods. And in these accusative formulae the point of view is the earth; the sky is indeed overhead. They are formulae to express a mortal vision and hardly suggest divine activity. There is no reason to think these formulae ever did anything that they do not do in Homer, who uses them of sun, savor, clouds, light, fame, and prayer. Prayer and savor (and perhaps fame) reaching to the heavens may imply a divine presence in the sky, usually Zeus, once Apollo (*Il.* 1.317), but not a god's going there. Still, we must acknowledge that the formulae *could* have been used of gods ascending to Ouranos.

Place from which: I cannot find a single ablative formula used by Homer of the sky which might once have been used of the home of the gods except U-2 above (see note 16 above on οὐρανόθεν and ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν). Not that there are no ablatives: the night formula (*Od.* 5.294, etc.), the sun formula (*Od.* 11.18, 12.381), the αἰθήρ formula (*Il.* 8.558 = 16.300), and the plain formula (*Il.* 8.21, 23.189). But all obviously entail the natural sky and could not be used of divine homes.

Locative: Again, I cannot find a single formula which might once have referred to the homes of the gods. The dative οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι in *Il.* 4.44 depends on ὑπό and necessarily entails the natural sky. To conjecture the independent formula ἐν (e.g., οὐρανῷ ἀστερόεντι) is to do what we avoided in constructing the O-set, into which phrases which "look like" or might have been formulae were not admitted.

[21] The phrase κλέος οὐρανὸν ἵκει (2X) suggests itself as an independent formula for the same reasons as the *kleos* formula in note 20 above. But I have not put it into the total, on the grounds that, without κλέος it shows up twice (Ou-1a and Ou-7b) while with κλέος it cannot be used of a god.

The absence of ablative and locative formulae is very striking. There is no formulaic way to say "in the celestial home," and for "from the celestial home" we have only U-1 and U-2 (and perhaps the end of U-4). If there were others, they disappeared. And here we reach the heart of the puzzle: why should they disappear? The *concept* of Ouranos as a divine home did not disappear. Why should the poets have preserved this concept and stamped out the formulae which express it?[22]

We shall return to this matter below. For the moment let us accept the tale which *prima facie* the evidence tells; what we say later will confirm it. From their virtual equivalence in numbers of accusative formulae, we infer that the O-set and Ou-set were developed at very roughly the same remote period. During this time Olympus but not Ouranos was treated as the divine home, in the sense that Zeus, at least, was regarded as living there, as leaving it and returning to it. The other gods, who earlier had their homes in the human world or in nature, are sooner or later in the evolution of the O-set translated to Olympus. If this happened sooner, the large number of coming-and-going formulae referred to their leaving and coming *home;* if later, to their visiting Zeus.[23] Once they receive Olympian homes, the OG-set begins to develop. Since this set is fuller than the UG-set (even counting the formulae I excluded in note 14), it is probable that the concept of Olympian homes preceded the entrance of the concept of celestial homes (for *all* the gods) into the epic tradition. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that there are four members of the O-set which imply homes for all the gods, and at most one member of the U-set which does this. (Nothing we have said affects the date of the concept of Zeus living alone in Ouranos, unattended and seldom visited by the other Olympians.) When

[22] Professor Nagy points out that *words* can disappear through substitution, while the meaning is retained; would not the same be true of formulae? Possibly—but there are large differences between formulae and words. A formula is thoroughly artificial, constructed to serve a particular poetic need. Ideally it is unique; to replace it would ordinarily require labor, to be sure that the need was entirely satisfied. But let us grant that this could occasionally happen. Can we suppose that it would happen, at random, to *all* the needed locative and ablative formulae? Professor Nagy's projected work on Homeric synonymity will deal with such questions.

[23] We recall the argument touched on above (p. 9) that the members of the O-set which refer to Olympus as the collective home are extended formulae and therefore later, from which we might infer that the collective home itself is later. (See below p. 17.) The difficulty is that combining "going to Olympus" with "Olympus as collective home" leads to an idea which cannot be *said* except in a longer formula. At a time when only simple O-formulae existed, poets may have thought of Olympus as the collective home but not yet have had the means to say it.

celestial homes for all the Olympians were first conceived of, the UG-set evolved and some members of the Ou-set were used to help form a U-set.

The fact that the U-set was constructed to complement the O-set, and the UG-set to complement the OG-set, means that when the celestial home entered the tradition, it was regarded as identical with the Olympian home. The formulae are adjusted to one another in order that there may be additional ways to refer to the same place. This is a critically important fact for all sorts of reasons—religious, historical, literary. It is important for formulae as well. If Olympus and Ouranos, *qua* divine home, are not the same or virtually the same, then we would expect the U-set to have many more formulae and some which compete with the O-set. We would not expect the going home of the gods to be expressed exclusively by O-1 formulae. Since the identification of Olympus and Ouranos is essential if we are to make any sense out of the tradition, we must now turn to a literary analysis of Homer's text in order to show that by his time, at least, the two were, indeed, virtually identical.[24]

Ouranos-Olympus

There are three passages in which Homer wants us to think of Olympus as the mountain in Thessaly: *Il.* 14.225–30, where Hera goes from Olympus to Pieria, Emathia, the Thracian mountains and Athos and eventually Lemnos; *Od.* 5.50, where Hermes, on his way from Olympus to Ogygia, stops briefly in Pieria; and *Od.* 11.315–16, where the Aloades pile Ossa on Olympus and Pelion on Ossa in an effort to reach Ouranos, where the gods are. In two other places Olympus is a physical mountain, not specifically Thessalian: *Il.* 13.242–43, where Zeus is said to be wont to hurl the thunderbolt from Olympus; and *Il.* 16.364–65, where Zeus is thought of as sending a cloud from Olympus

[24] Luch (note 1 above) shows, at elaborate length and usually convincingly, that Olympus is ordinarily not merely the Thessalian mountain, but an idealized place (e.g., 98–100, 124–44). This place is virtually identical with Ouranos (e.g., 117–18, 163), though Luch feels that the poet also distinguishes the two, fluctuating from one to the other (223). Luch feels that Ouranos is the true home, Olympus a literary device. He does not mean that the gods in fact have two collective homes (which would be preposterous) but that the poet uses now one home, now the other. Whatever the merits of this last point, Luch's is a good book, the best thing I have read on the subject, whose neglect is as undeserved as it is universal.

to *ouranos* from the *dios aithēr*.[25] I do not understand the physics of this latter passage, but surely Aristarchus was right to say that Olympus is here the mountain. And the most obvious piece of evidence that Olympus never entirely lost its association with the physical mountain is the presence of certain epithets and nouns in the O-set: *agannīphos, aipus, karēnōn, akrotatēi koruphēi, rhion.*

Yet the home of the gods is more than, and other than, a physical mountain. We feel this most clearly when Olympus is bound closely together with Ouranos, as in the formula O-1d (= O-4b = U-3). This formula is first used when Thetis ascends from the sea to plead with Zeus at the end of *Iliad* 1: "and early in the morning she rose up to great-Ouranos-and-Olympus [O-1d]; and she found the son of Cronus seated apart from the others, on the highest peak of rocky Olympus" (497–99). That Thetis went first to the sky and only then to Olympus is not probable. Homer would not express that sequence in such a compressed way in an ordinary narrative passage. And when the formula is used later, in the nominative, it *cannot* have such sequential force. Ouranos and Olympus are in some sense the same place.[26]

[25] The *aithēr* appears to lie between earth and *ouranos* in *Il.* 2.458: the *aiglē* comes to heaven through the *aithēr*. In 14.288 the tallest fir tree on Ida reaches the *aithēr:* this would appear to put the *aithēr* below *ouranos*, unless the passage is very hyperbolic. On the other hand, Zeus dwells in *aithēr, Il.* 2.412, 4.166; in 14.256–58 the *aithēr* appears to be the home of the gods. And in 15.192 Zeus is allotted *ouranos en aitheri kai nephelēisin*, where *aithēr* appears to be a meteorological condition of *ouranos*. But in 16.364–65 I still do not understand what is meant by sending a cloud out of the *aithēr* into the *ouranos*. See Luch (note 1 above) 96–98. Whatever the difficulties of the passage, the terms *ouranos, aithēr, nephelos,* and *Olympon* are obviously used in a physical sense.

[26] Luch (note 1 above) says that the editors and commentators think that in *Il.* 19.129 and in the phrase μέγαν οὐρανὸν Οὔλυμπόν τε (*Il.* 1.497) the two places *cannot* be identical: "The tautology would certainly be too strong" (91). Nilsson, on the contrary, cites the phrase in *Il.* 1.497 as evidence *for* the identity (note 1 above, 229, on which page "Athena" is a slip for "Thetis"). J. Schmidt (note 1 above) thinks that the phrase does not *necessarily* identify the two. She also thinks that in 19.129 Ouranos and Olympus are definitely different, but this cannot be. Zeus vows that Ate shall never come again to Οὔλυμπόν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα (129). Then he hurls her from οὐρανός (130). Surely this is to hurl her out of Olympus as well: the scene has been set in Olympus (114). (See also below, pp. 16–17). Apart from this, how do scholars picture Ate as living before her demotion? What does it *mean* for her—for her, of all beings—to occupy both Olympus and Ouranos if these are not the same? Professor Nagy adds: "Words with distinct meaning in some formal/functional contexts can converge as synonyms in other contexts. By 'converge' I mean that you can find either one or the other. But the poet may also display *both* alternatives in a given context. In such instances, X καὶ Y does not imply that X and Y are different: rather, καί proudly proclaims that X *is* Y in this context" (personal communication).

We encounter this nominative use in *Iliad* 5 and 8, in a repeated description of the gates of the Horae:

> And the self-impelled [*?automatai*] gates of Ouranos groaned, which
> the Horae keep
> To whom is [*sic*] entrusted great Ouranos and Olympus
> Both to open the dense cloud and to close it to.
>
> (5.749–51 = 8.393–95)

The singular verb in 5.750 = 8.394 makes it clear, as Leaf says, that Ouranos and Olympus "if not identical are at least closely connected."[27] We feel a priori that Olympus lies on one side of the gates, or on both, and the analysis which follows of the full parallel passages reveals that in fact it lies on both sides. We are not as well informed on the location of Ouranos, but it must be on one side or the other, or on both, so wherever we decide to put it, it will be identical with, or at least overlap, Olympus. Let us examine the geography of these passages more closely.[28]

In both books, Hera and Athena begin a journey earthward from one side of the gates. This starting point is not named, but in it Hera keeps her horses, and in it is the threshold (*oudos*) of Zeus, where Athena finds it convenient to change her clothes. In Book 5 the goddesses make their way through the gates, and on the other side they find Zeus, "sitting on the highest peak of rocky Olympus" (5.754). "It seems clear," says Leaf, "that the poet . . . regarded the summit of Olympos as a half-way stage between heaven and earth" (note on 5.753–54). Indeed it does, though we cannot jump at once to the view that Ouranos is the clear-cut name of the starting-point and Olympus the clear-cut name of the half-way stage. For the parallel passage in Book 8 was obviously composed with Book 5 in mind (or vice versa); 8.381–96 are all identical with lines from 5.719–52; and in Book 8 we find that the starting-point is named Olympus.

[27] Walter Leaf, *The Iliad* I (London 1900) on 5.730. Luch (note 1 above) says what needs to be said against the theory that the *reason* for the identity of mountaintop and sky is the thrusting up of the former into the latter (111–17). Whatever the reason, the gods *have* Ouranian and *have* Olympian homes, and they must be identical.

[28] These passages are chosen because their analysis depends on no particular theory of the composition of the *Iliad*, and because the results are so decisive. Any scholar, from radical Unitarian to rabid Analyst, will concede that one of these episodes was composed with the other in mind: they are as like as any two extended passages in Homer. And if we follow this lead and put them side by side, the conclusion that Olympus and Ouranos are identical is inescapable. Luch's discussion is here very weak (92–95); he is writing a PhD dissertation and on this occasion lets his scholarly predecessors push him around.

In Book 8 the goddesses, arrived at the gates, are thwarted by Iris, who meets them "at the entrance to the gates of many-folded Olympus" (8.411) and tells them that Zeus has interposed. Hera capitulates, "turns back" her horses (432), ties them up in the mangers, leans the chariot against the walls (*ercopia* 435), and with Athena sits on her golden couches amidst the other deities.

These mangers are obviously the place where Hera prepared the chariot at the starting point of both journeys, and the golden couches are obviously located in the home of the gods. And immediately we read that Zeus, who had been at Ida, drove to *Olympus* (439). There he took his golden throne, and "great Olympus trembled under his feet" (445), and there he taunts Hera and Athena (447 ff.). Olympus is the name—or *a* name—for the starting-point. Evidently "Olympus" names both sides of the gates of the Horae. This gives us the picture:

Olympus	‖	*Olympus*
Starting-point	‖	"Half-way" stage
Mangers, threshold	‖	Zeus sitting on a peak, alone
Couches, throne	‖	

Gates

About Ouranos the poet is not so precise, but since it must be on at least one side of the gate, it must overlap Olympus to that extent. Now, however, we have a right to bring in the UG formula and say that Ouranos must refer to the left-hand side of the gates. The gods have homes in Ouranos. Perhaps it refers to the right-hand side as well, for there is no compelling reason, as we shall see presently, to insist that the right-hand Olympus must be a terrestrial mountain.

"Ouranos" and "Olympus" refer to the same place in other parts of the *Iliad*. In 19 Zeus swears an oath that Ate shall never come back to Olympus and starry Ouranos (129), and he hurls her out of starry Ouranos (130). Surely, as he does so, he is also throwing her out of Olympus: Olympus and Ouranos are the same, the place where Ate has hitherto been dwelling. In Book 1 Athena descends from Ouranos, "for Hera sent her" (195). After inspiring Achilles, Athena goes "to Olympus, to the home of Zeus, to be among the other deities" (220–21). Obviously Athena has returned to where she came, to the place in which Hera gave her the order to descend. In this place is the palace of Zeus; here Athena will be "among the other deities." Again, in *Iliad* 24 Thetis goes to Ouranos (97), where she sits next to Zeus, among the other gods, and Zeus tells her that she has come "to Olympus" (104). In all of these

places, it must be stressed, Ouranos-Olympus is the home of the gods collectively, of all the Olympian gods and not merely Zeus.

Returning now to the end of *Iliad* 1, where Thetis goes to "great Ouranos and Olympus" (497), we find a picture which, though less precise, is perfectly harmonious with that in Books 5 and 8. Zeus is sitting apart from the other gods, "on the highest peak of rocky Olympus" (499), just as he is in 5. He assents to Thetis' plea, "Olympus is shaken" (530), Thetis leaps from Olympus (532), and then Zeus goes to his house, to be amidst the other gods, Ouranian gods (570), "all the ones who are on Olympus" (567). No gates are mentioned; we are left free to consider the entire region "great Ouranos and Olympus," but it certainly does no violence to the picture to suppose that Zeus does pass through gates on his way home.

We saw above that "Olympus" can name a terrestrial mountain that is clearly not the same as Ouranos (above p. 13); *Il.* 16.364–65 makes the distinction in so many words). The converse is obviously the case as well: *ouranos* is often the sky overhead, the physical sky in which no divine homes are to be seen. There is one passage in particular which distinguishes the sky, *ouranos,* from the abode of the gods and which merits closer attention. In *Iliad* 15 Poseidon is complaining that Zeus should not have the authority to order him from battle, that he and Zeus and Hades are brothers, that when the lots were shaken, he himself drew the sea, Hades the misty place, and Zeus "broad *ouranos* in *aithēr* and clouds" (192). For "earth and great Olympus are common to all" (193). Ouranos is here clearly not the home of the gods, but the sky overhead, sometimes seen as *aithēr,* sometimes as cloudy. Olympus *is* the home of the gods: 193 means "the place of mortals and the place of gods are common to all." And Olympus is clearly not the mountaintop, which everyone knows to be the domain of Zeus, to be far from "common to all," and least of all to Poseidon and Hades. (It will not do to say that since Poseidon is mistaken in his claim to equal authority, he is just as wrong in his perception of his own domain. He himself has said that the sea is his; it is common knowledge that it is his. And Poseidon, by claiming that as god of the sea he has an equal share in mountaintops, would be making himself not merely mistaken, but ridiculous.) Olympus is here our Ouranos-Olympus, a different thing from a terrestrial mountain, a different thing from the visible sky.

This threefold distinction among sky, mountain, and Olympus-Ouranos, abundantly proved by evidence drawn from all over the *Iliad,* is helpful to an understanding of two other passages in Homer. In *Il.*

8.23–26, Zeus speaks of drawing up all the gods, together with earth and sea, upon a golden cord, which he would then bind about the *rhion Olympoio*. Zenodotus atheticizes (as Leaf notes) "on the obvious ground that the earth could not be suspended to a peak of Olympus, which is a part of itself. It is clear that the poet of these lines has entirely lost the . . . conception of Olympos as a mountain in Thessaly, and follows the later mythology which removed it from earth to heaven."[29] Surely Leaf is right; Homer is here talking about Olympus-Ouranos. Let us remember, though, that we have not yet defined the ontological status of the mountainous Olympus on the other (right-hand) side of the gates of the Hours, the other side from the divine home. Is it really a terrestrial mountain, or is it more nearly a "mountainous" part of Olympus-Ouranos? Certainly in 8.25–26 it would be useful to be able to conceive of a peak in this mysterious half-montane, half-heavenly place, a rock horn about which Zeus could tie the golden cord.

The second passage is *Od.* 6.42–45:

> . . . the seat of the gods enduring forever
> It is not shaken by winds, nor ever wet
> With rains, and snow does not come near,
> But clear and cloudless its sky lies open
> And over all of it the white ray runs.

No Greek mountain was ever like this. It is true that the *top* of Thessalian Olympus could seem to thrust beyond the clouds and into the *aithēr*, but it is certainly windy, rainy, and snow-covered. Homer seems to be saying, "Here is a mountain, yet no mountain." There is the tone of a vision of transcendence, of revelation of the changeless world of Being, to this passage. But let us be careful and say merely that the *Odyssey* is putting Olympus-Ouranos before our eyes.[30] Yet to the extent that it is a mountain, it ought to include the mountainous right-hand side of the gates, which will therefore be a more-than-earthly mountain.

[29] Leaf (note 24 above) note on 8.23–26. See also Luch (note 1 above) 93–94.

[30] "Few passages have called forth as much discussion" as these lines, says Luch, whose own discussion (124–41) is not brief. It is useful, however, for demolishing the criticism which would try to make the description fit physical fact, make it un-Homeric, rob it of imaginative power. Luch is clear that Olympus in this passage is the same as Ouranos (158–59). Of course, we run some risk in implying that the two Homeric epics share such precise religious concepts as Olympus-Ouranos.

The reader will have observed ere now that I have made no attempt to say what Olympus-Ouranos is.[31] Nor is it really practicable to do so here. We would need to analyze the meaning of the gates of the Horae, the "Hours" or "Seasons"; are they beings who symbolize time and watch over the boundary between nature and the timeless?[32] We would need to know why the gates are "thick cloud," when both Ouranos and the top of Olympus are beyond the clouds.[33] We would need to know why the *Odyssey* speaks of a mountain that is no mountain, reminding us of Milton's "darkness visible" and Shelley's Burning Fountain, contradictory language used of supernatural eternal realms.[34] It is sufficient here to think of Olympus-Ouranos as a distinct place, perhaps part of the sky remote from the poet's glance, which seems to retain montane features. Perhaps it is only the place for divine homes to the left of the gates. Perhaps it also includes the mountainous region to the right.

The Sequence of Events

Now that the identification of Olympus and Ouranos is secure for Homer, we may turn to the whole question of the relative dates of Olympian and celestial homes, using formulaic evidence together with whatever else we find useful. We begin with Olympus itself. The Greek word may have *meant* "mountain"; the Greek language usually used it to refer to a terrestrial mountain.[35] Both poems remind us of this by

[31] In an earlier paper I asserted that it was transcendent, beyond space and time; see "The Olympian Faith," *Greece and Rome* (1972) 81–93. The argumentation of this earlier paper was not always clear, and I did not take sufficient account of the possibility that *ouranos* when identified with Olympus refers to some remote *part* of the sky and not necessarily a supernatural realm. Nonetheless, the concept of Olympus-Ouranos is at the very least well on the way to evolving into the Parmenidean Realm of Being and Plato's World of Forms.

[32] That Hours or Seasons should be at home in the sky presents no problem to any amateur astronomer; that they are on a boundary is hard to account for unless the gates lead from the natural to the supernatural.

[33] The fact that such a cloud *is* a creaking gate virtually forces a symbolic interpretation upon us. Perhaps the cloud represents the transition from ordinary light to the supernatural radiance of Olympus.

[34] The contradictions entailed by Olympus-Ouranos are many: the mountain that is not a mountain (*Od.* 6.42–45, see above); the mountain identical with the sky; a collection of homes, reflecting human civilization, on a remote mountaintop or in the sky; objects of bronze and gold, earthly substance, in the sky beyond the clouds.

[35] See Nilsson (note 1 above) 236–37.

letting the home of the gods coalesce with the Thessalian-Macedonian Olympus on two occasions. The O-formulae remind us by retaining epithets appropriate to a mountain. But Olympus, at least in the epic tradition, is almost always a *divine* mountain. It is the home of Zeus and sooner or later of so many of the gods of his generation. As Zeus' home it is very old, for the O-set of formulae is old, and that set has no function except to refer to where gods are, where they are going or coming from, and where Zeus lives. We can therefore claim great antiquity for the picture of the high god living in this sacred mountain, attended by other deities who may be visiting him or who may live with him. As Nilsson says, "the gods, other than Zeus, really dwell originally neither on Olympus nor in the Heavens. . . . Zeus, the one who alone was originally the Olympian, has lifted them up to his dwelling place."[36]

The sky as a home for Zeus is not demonstrably later than Olympus. Apart from our formulae, he is living there, perhaps attended by other gods, in about half a dozen Homeric passages. Poseidon mentions the fact in *Il.* 15.192. We have the formula αἰθέρι ναίων (*Il.* 2.412, 4.166); *aither* is not the same as *ouranos,* which may be cloudy (15.192), but it is surely not a different realm. Agamemnon groans to Zeus "looking to broad *ouranos*" (3.364); others pray to him holding their "hands up to the gods" and looking to *ouranos* (7.177–79; cf. 7.200–02). Nestor prays to Zeus "reaching with his hand to starry *ouranos*" (15.372). None of these citations proves any very great age for Zeus' celestial home; they show only that it was thoroughly familiar to Homer. Zeus must have dwelt in the sky before the other gods though. He belongs there, as weather god or as father of gods and men; the others do not, certainly not collectively, except through their relationship to him.

Olympus and the sky are homes of Zeus, and there is no reason why he cannot have a home in each simultaneously, without our being required to identify them. Zeus also dwells in Dodona (*Il.* 16.233; Achilles prays to Dodonian Zeus, using the word *naiōn*), and his shrine on Ida, Gargaros, is treated as a home in the formula Ἴδηθεν μεδέων (*Il.* 3.276, 3.320, 7.202, 24.308; and see 24.291, "Idaean Zeus, who looks habitually [*te*] down on all the Troad"). Dodona and Ida are not identical with each other, or with Ouranos or Olympus. Similarly, Poseidon lives in the sea and on Olympus (*Il.* 15.190, where he says that he ναιέμεν on the sea; for Olympus, *Il.* 15.193, *Od.* 8.322).

The gods collectively, however, are another matter. Can we really suppose that the poets provided them with two distinct cities to live in?

[36] Nilsson (note 1 above) 230–31.

Of course, the Greeks in general can have done just this: some people may have put the gods on Olympus, some in Heaven, some even in both places at once. It is not the Greeks in general who concern us, though, but the epic tradition. A collective dwelling place is in some sense supernatural: divine homes on a mountaintop or in the sky cannot be ordinary homes, they must belong to a trans-human realm. Two such locations, each equipped with the formulae to preserve them, seems an absurd superfluity. Once both places, Olympus and Ouranos, were regarded as homes for the divine aggregation, the tendency will have been to do what Homer does and treat the two as the same.

At first sight Luch appears to take the opposite point of view: actual belief in Homer's time put the gods in the sky, Homer's literary needs put them on Olympus, and both ideas are present in both poems.[37] Of course, Luch thinks that Homer is very far from trumpeting this distinction (187); it is, after all, not easy for us even to discover it. If Olympus and Ouranos are somewhat different in Homer, they are also somehow the same and will almost certainly be the same whenever the city of the gods is simultaneously located on them both. "A heavenly abode," Luch puts it, "presented under the names οὐρανός and Ὄλυμπος" (161). In Homer, and in any coherent poetic predecessor, there must be one such abode, not two.[38]

A state of things in which the gods *dwell* in Ouranos but make *visits* to Zeus on Mt. Olympus is also very implausible. We understand how, in the *Iliad*, Zeus can live with the other gods in Ouranos-Olympus and receive visitors on Mt. Ida. Ida is near to and felt to be overlooking the battlefield. Zeus naturally spends time in his home there, and naturally the gods visit him. But why, in the tradition of the Trojan War epic, would Zeus be spending time on Olympus if he and the other

[37] See note 23 above.

[38] If this point is not accepted—if two distinct dwelling places for the gods collectively is admissable—which one probably came first? Naturally the *prima facie* evidence of the O- and U-sets is that Olympus did. But let us hypothesize the contrary. The poets have given the gods a city in the sky; now they give them another, on Mt. Olympus. The obvious question arises, Why Mt. Olympus? What is there about this mountain, remote from the Trojan plains, that suggests itself as the proper spot to locate the second divine city? (Unless, of course, the tradition preserved its memory as an ancient collective home, but this contradicts the hypothesis we are investigating.) Olympus is high and splendid, but so is Parnassus, so are the others. If, on the other hand, Olympus were the first to house the gods collectively, we can better understand how celestial homes might have been created in addition. The mountain in Thessaly-Macedonia can have come to seem not only too far away, but too specific: why should the common home be located just there? Is not the sky which overlooks us all a more appropriate region?

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gods live in the sky? The center of interest, the locus of almost all human activity, is the Troad. Why would the other gods be going to the remote Mt. Olympus to visit Zeus?[39] Why can he not talk to them in Ouranos, where *ex hypothesi* they all live? This, I think, is the crux of the matter: Olympus is of no use to the epic tradition, except as the home of the gods or as a meeting place (if they have no common home).

The converse—the gods live on Olympus and visit Zeus in the sky—is a little more attractive. It at least suits the overall hypothesis which we shall vindicate, that the Olympian homes came first. It might be thought that a celestial meeting place—the sky over Troy—would be convenient since it overlooks the battlefield. But that is the role played by Mt. Ida, and there is no reason to think that Ida did not always play this role. Ouranos as a meeting place in the Trojan epic tradition is not an easy concept to defend.

Four possibilities therefore exist for the sequence of events leading to Ouranos-Olympus: (1) either the Olympian homes came first, followed by Ouranos-Olympus; or (2) the Ouranian homes came first, Ouranos-Olympus second; or (3) Ouranos-Olympus was born all at once; or (4) there were two traditions, one for Olympian and one for Ouranian homes, which coalesced some time before Homer. We have already seen that the first of these is much the most likely (above, pp. 9–10). All the others founder on the relative poverty of the U-set and richness of the O-set. That they do indeed founder can be demonstrated in detail, but rather than weary the reader who accepts the fact intuitively, I have deferred the demonstration to the second appendix.

Early on, then, the gods were regarded as dwelling on Mt. Olympus, and the OG set began to evolve. Then the idea of celestial homes appeared, reinforced by the fact that Zeus dwelt in Ouranos as well as Olympus, and Ouranos-Olympus was imagined. When this step was taken, the U-set and UG-sets emerged, but only to complement the already existing O-set and OG-sets and to fill in metrical gaps left by the latter.[40]

[39] There are mountains named "Olympus" other than the Thessalian: see Nilsson (note 1 above) 235–36; A. B. Cook (note 1 above) 100. Homeric Olympus is Thessalian, as we have seen, and there is no reason to think that any other Olympus figured in the epic tradition. But suppose it did; suppose that the poets once located Olympus in Mysia. The argument in the text remains: why should the gods visit Zeus on Olympus, wherever it is, and not Ouranos, where they all live? Or Ida, where Zeus watches over the battle?

[40] The Ouranian homes, weak in formulae, cannot antedate Homer by a period of any great length. Does the greater age of the Olympian homes force us to reject the efforts of Luch and Finsler to associate Homer individually with the Olympian scenes? I see no

It may well be that the O-set goes back to an earlier stage than the concept of collective homes. It may have been used first to refer to visits made by the gods to Zeus' home on Olympus. We think of Olympus as being useful only as a place to house the gods collectively. But it would also have been useful as a place for Zeus to meet with his subordinates—provided that no other common home existed where these meetings could occur. One feature of our formulae seems to support this view. The members of the O-set which speak of Olympus as the home of the gods are all extended formulae. Extended formulae develop later than the formulae they extend from; Olympus the home thus seems later than Olympus the meeting place. But I remain fearful of this argument. No simple formula is capable of saying "to [from, in] Olympus, where the gods live." Before the formulae were extended, poets may have thought of Olympus as the home without having a formulaic way of saying so.

To try to go beyond the relative dating given us by the formulae is risky, but some conjectures seem intuitively likely. The epic probably began its development on the Greek mainland in Mycenaean times and first dealt with the Trojan War shortly after the fall of Troy, in the latter half of the 13th century. Around the same time, the epic tradition was undergoing a phase of influence, linguistic and cultural, from Thessaly and the proto-Aeolic dialect of mainland Greece.[41] Probably the concepts of Olympus as meeting place and collective home arose, simultaneously or consecutively, in Thessaly. That, after all, is where much of Olympus is. We can therefore give these concepts a date before the Ionian migration (± 1000), but greater precision is denied us. Since it is Zeus' living on Olympus which makes Olympian homes possible, the tradition will have embraced that idea still earlier in its Thessalian phase. (Whether Zeus also dwelt in Ouranos at this time cannot be determined—it seems a plausible guess.) Nilsson thinks that the structure of the city of the gods is founded on the Mycenaean state.[42] His arguments are not wholly compelling, but his position is attractive: the absolute authority of Zeus over the other gods does not reflect what we know of the aristocratic polity of the Ionian cities, nor the loosely structured aristocracy of the Trojans, nor even the relative freedom of

reason why: the O-set implies that Olympian scenes existed long before Homer, but it says nothing whatever about what took place in them.

[41] See the concluding discussion in A. Hoekstra's remarkable book, *Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes* (Amsterdam 1965) 148–53.

[42] Nilsson (note 1 above) 239–51.

the Achaean *basilees* to challenge Agamemnon. But it does seem consistent with what we know of the power of the Mycenaean king within his own hegemony.

When the epic had fully established itself on the Asia Minor coast, the idea of Zeus dwelling in the sky might be expected to grow stronger. Mt. Olympus was not only remote in space but must have had less meaning as a center for godhead. Zeus has other homes, other mountains; indeed when people in the *Iliad* pray to him they often both look upward and also speak of Zeus as ruling from Ida. Eventually it became attractive to think of Olympus as somehow in the sky, no doubt very far away. And with that, the idea of the celestial home, Olympus-Ouranos, was born.

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APPENDIX 1

Formula	*Occurrences*
OG-1 (13X)	*Il.* 1.18; 2.13, 30, 67, 484; 5.383; 11.218; 14.508; 15.115; 16.112
	Od. 3.377; 20.79; 23.167
OG-2 (10X)	*Il.* 5.404, 890; 13.68; 24.427
	Od. 6.240; 8.331; 12.337; 14.394; 18.180; 19.43
OG-3 (4X)	*Il.* 1.566, 5.877, 8.451, 18.429
O-1a1 (3X)	*Il.* 2.48, 5.398
	Od. 20.73
O-1a2 (2X)	*Il.* 1.425, 8.12
O-1a3 (2X)	*Il.* 5.367, 868
O-1b1 (4X)	*Il.* 1.402; 8.410; 15.79; 18.142
O-1b2 (4X)	*Il.* 24.468, 694
	Od. 10.307; 15.43
O-1c = O-1a3	
O-1d (1X)	*Il.* 1.497
O-1e (1X)	*Il.* 1.420
O-1f (2X)	*Il.* 1.494; 21.518
O-1g1 (5X)	*Il.* 1.394; 15.133; 20.142; 21.438; 24.104
O-1g2 (1X)	*Il.* 15.84

Formula	*Occurrences*
O-1h (3X)	*Il.* 5.360; 8.456; 21.505
O-2a1.1 (1X)	*Il.* 1.532; cf. *Il.* 13.243
	Od. 20.103
O-2a1.2 (1X)	*Il.* 18.616
O-2a2 (4X)	*Il.* 7.25, 35; 16.93; 20.5
O-2a3 (8X)	*Il.* 1.44; 2.167; 4.74; 7.19; 22.187; 24.121
	Od. 1.102; 24.488
O-2b1.1 (2X)	*Il.* 14.225; 19.114
O-2b1.2 (1X)	*Il.* 24.144
O-3a (3X)	*Il.* 1.499; 5.754; 8.3
O-3b1 (2X)	*Il.* 15.21; *Od.* 24.351
O-3b2 (2X)	*Il.* 11.77; 20.22
O-3c *makron Olympon*	*Il.* 8.199
Olympon aganniphon	*Il.* 18.186
rhion Oulympoio	*Il.* 8.25
O-4a (1X)	*Il.* 15.193
O-4b (2X)	*Il.* 5.750; 8.394
UG (18X)	*Il.* 20.299; 21.267
	Od. 1.67; 4.378, 479; 5.169; 6.150, 243; 7.209; 11.133; 12.344; 13.55; 16.183, 200, 211; 19.40; 22.39; 23.280
U1 (4X)	*Il.* 11.184; 17.545
	Od. 6.281; 20.31
U2 (2X)	*Il.* 6.108; 19.130
(accusative)	*Il.* 19.128
U3 = O-1d = O-4b	
U4 (2X)	*Il.* 6.128; *Od.* 7.199
Ou-1a (6X)	*Il.* 8.192; 12.338; 14.60
	Od. 9.20; 15.329; 17.565
Ou-1b (3X)	*Il.* 8.549; 11.44; 16.364
Ou-1c (1X)	*Od.* 5.303
Ou-2 (6X)	*Il.* 3.364; 5.867; 7.178, 201; 19.257; 21.272
Ou-3 (1X)	*Od.* 11.17
Ou-4 (1X)	*Il.* 8.74
Ou-5 (3X)	*Il.* 15.371
	Od. 9.527; 12.380
Ou-6 (1X)	*Il.* 21.522
(*kleos*)	*Od.* 8.74; 19.108
(*ho men*)	*Od.* 12.73

Formula	*Occurrences*
Ou-7a (1X)	*Il.* 15.192
Ou-7b (3X)	*Il.* 1.317; 17.425; 19.362
Ou-8a (3X)	*Il.* 7.423; 16.232; 24.307
Ou-8b (2X)	*Il.* 5.504
	Od. 3.2

APPENDIX 2
The Priority of Olympus

In the text we saw that four possibilities seemed exhaustive: the Olympian homes came first; or the Ouranian; or they arose simultaneously; or they coalesced from different traditions.

If different traditions did indeed come together, they were made to complement each other, and the Ouranian tradition made the adjustment, as we infer from the much smaller size of the U-set. Practically speaking, the poets of the Olympian tradition took over what for them was a new idea and made it theirs. The logic of this possibility is therefore not very different from that of any new idea entering the tradition. But let us note one or two points. If there were separate traditions, both the O-set and the U-set can have been highly developed, and presumably were. (In a single tradition this can hardly have happened, since we then cannot explain the demolition of the U-set together with the retention of the idea of Ouranian homes—see above p. 9 and below p. 27). It is therefore surprising that the U-set contains one formula, U-2, which appears to be developed from the Olympian tradition's ablative Ou-formulae. (Could U-2 have developed independently in both traditions?) It is also obscure to me why the U-set is not fuller. The O-2 place-from-which set, together with the ablatives U-1, U-2, and U-4, has only seven formulae. The O-1 accusative set has 12—an imbalance which suggests that there was room for more departure formulae. If a rich U-tradition already existed, why did it not fill this lacuna? It is certainly far easier to suppose that we are seeing the skimpy U-set in the process of coming into being, rather than being destroyed.[43] Thus, if there really were two separate traditions, the U-set was not well-developed in the Ouranian tradition, which would mean

[43] Consider too the phrases I omitted from the U-set, discussed in note 15: I expect that here we are seeing phrases in the process of becoming formulae.

that the idea of Ouranos as the collective divine home is later than Olympus.

The second possibility, that there was a single tradition (with regard to divine homes) and that the Ouranian homes came first, is even less attractive. We have already glanced at one objection: if the concept of these homes really was earlier, it must have had an extensive U-set to refer to it. What became of that set? An Ouranian home requires formulae. The gods lived in the sky, they visited the battlefield, they came and went, so there had to be coming-and-going formulae. Why did so many of these formulae vanish?

Let us imagine a generation of poets who wanted to oust Ouranos from its eminence. Perhaps they felt that Olympus had an aura of mystery owing to its remoteness from the plains before Troy. We think of the divine mountain of *Od.* 6.41–46, snowless, cloudless. Perhaps, as Luch and Finsler suggest, poetry wanted Olympian scenes to convey a particular literary or religious point of view. Perhaps—but why then did poets vigorously preserve the memory of Ouranos? Why did they continue to use the words *Ouraniones* and *Epouraniones?* Why did they continue to employ the UG-set, while abandoning most of the U-set?

Conversely, why do we have so many O-formulae? We have seen that the tradition would not have tolerated two distinct homes for the gods collectively. When Olympus was put forward as the divine home, it must have coalesced with Ouranos. In our *Iliad,* U-set formulae are used to refer to Ouranos-Olympus. If there was once a fuller U-set, its members could very well have been used in this way. Why then go to the immense trouble of constructing the O-set?

The O-set was actually the product of several generations. To suppose that it replaced a preexisting U-set is to suppose a step-by-step replacement, a working through of at least three generations (75 years) of bardic animosity toward Ouranian homes. As each new O-formula was created, a U-formula was dropped until the situation existing in Homer's time was arrived at. But during these very years, Ouranos-Olympus remained the name of the divine home, and the surviving U- and UG-formulae were used to refer to it. The U-set remained quite usable—usable as it is in Homer. But for three quarters of a century or more, people preferred to dismantle it and evolve an O-set.

This spectacle of oral poets determined to retain the concept of celestial homes but dedicated to the elimination of formulae to refer to them is very unattractive. Moreover, the hypothesis that Ouranian homes

came first runs into another snag. How do we explain the choice of Olympus as the place to supplement, or even replace, it? We cannot do what Finsler and Luch did and say that Olympus was still remembered as an ancient collective divine home. That contradicts the hypothesis. We have to conjecture that it was remembered only as an old home of Zeus and somehow happened to be chosen for the task of challenging the primacy of Ouranos. Why was it chosen? (Why, for that matter, was it remembered?)

Scholars such as Luch and Finsler, who believe that Ouranian homes were popular and traditional and the Olympian homes of Homer personal and idiosyncratic, do not hold that Homer strove to replace the tradition. Far from it: Luch finds the gods "more in heaven" (118) and "essentially . . . dwellers of heaven" (114), and his arguments for this are powerful.[44] The text of Homer supports him, but its formulae do not. And the explanation for this is obvious: the concept of Ouranian homes was more recent, and though the poet accepted it enthusiastically, he did not yet have extensive formulaic means of expressing it.

There seems little else that need be said against the virtually untenable opinion that Ouranian homes preceded Olympian. The third possibility, that neither came first, that both were simultaneously fitted out with homes for the gods, is no more probable. It too founders on the fact that the O-set is so full and the U-set so meager. If Ouranos and Olympus, or Ouranos-Olympus, came forth simultaneously as a dwelling place, we would expect as many U- and UG-formulae as O- and OG-formulae.

This reductio leads to a confirmation of the fourth possibility, the priority of Olympian homes.

[44] Luch (note 1 above) 188–91, e.g.; Finsler (note 1 above) 54–55. Luch sees the purpose of the Olympus scenes as burlesque (200); Finsler sees them as denying the goodness and justice of the gods (54). Finsler's analytic arguments were enormously influential upon the essentially (if stammeringly) Unitarian separatist Luch (201). Finsler is out of favor now, for his analytic sins, but *Olympischen Szenen* is filled with sensitive readings and powerful insights.

SAPPHO'S CONSOLATION FOR ATTHIS, fr. 96 LP

Sappho's song of consolation for Atthis (fr. 96) begins by reminding Atthis of the joy which her beauty and song had inspired in the friend who is now absent. There follows a corresponding compliment to Atthis's absent friend, who is now in Lydia:

> νῦν δὲ Λύδαισιν ἐμπρέπεται γυναί-
> κεσσιν ὥς ποτ' ἀελίω
> δύντος ἀ βροδοδάκτυλος †μήνα†
>
> πάντα περρέχοισ' ἄστρα· φάος δ' ἐπί-
> σχει θάλασσαν ἐπ' ἀλμύραν
> ἴσως καὶ πολυανθέμοις ἀρούραις·
>
> ἀ δ' ἐέρσα κάλα κέχυται, τεθά-
> λαισι δὲ βρόδα κἄπαλ' ἄν-
> θρυσκα καὶ μελίλωτος ἀνθεμώδης.
>
> Now she stands out among Lydian women
> As, when the sun has set,
> The rose-fingered moon
>
> Surpasses all the stars, and light
> Spreads out to the salty sea
> And the fields thick with flowers,
>
> And the lovely dew pours down, and
> Roses blossom, and the delicate antherisk,
> And the flowering lotus. . . .

The beauty of this simile, which dominates the poem, has been universally admired. But the relevance of the simile to the rest of the poem has been much debated. The simile begins by comparing the absent woman to the moon, and the Lydian women to the stars around it. So far its connection to the poem is obvious. At this point, however, it seems to break away from its surroundings. The lines which follow do not correspond to anything in the situation of the poem, although the light of the moon reaching over the sea and fields, the dew, and the blossoms together make up one of Sappho's loveliest passages. In fact, the picture is so lovely that some have been content to accept it as unrelated to its context, as "a gem . . . for which the consolation of

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Atthis is nothing but the setting."[1] Most readers of Sappho, however, seek an explanation for the simile's passing beyond the bounds of the immediate situation, and there have been many attempts to prove that the scene is more closely connected to the rest of the poem than it first appears to be.

According to one interpretation, the moon is actually to be compared with the woman in every detail; thus, as the moon nourishes the dew, the girl gives life to all around her.[2] Another suggests that the natural scene is simply another example of the beauty which Atthis' beloved possesses, which points to the universality of this beauty.[3] The most prevalent interpretation of the simile sees in the imaginary moon and night the real moon and the real night which the parted lovers pass in longing for each other.[4] The problem with all of these readings of the passage is the fact that the text itself simply does not lend support to any of them. There is nothing to connect Atthis with the landscape created by the simile, and any interpretation which sees this landscape as a bridge between Atthis and her friend must be discarded for this reason.[5] And as Page notes, "The transition at the beginning of the simile is gentle, at the end abrupt."[6] It ends with a return to Atthis' friend, wandering forlornly, and this lonely woman who is described immediately following the natural scene has no apparent place in it.

Two recent suggestions take notice of the distance at which the simile stands from the woman in Lydia. Carey suggests that the simile serves to distance the listener's mind from the emotional subject at hand, and so acts as a comfort to Atthis by appealing to reason.[7] This brings up an important consideration. The poem is intended to console Atthis, and the best interpretation of the simile will point out its relevance to attaining this consolation. But Carey's "appeal to reason" seems a very cold comfort, and his assertion that this landscape is

[1] D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 95. D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (New York 1967) 279–80, compares the simile to Homeric similes which are extended beyond the immediate situation for the sake of their own decorative development.

[2] C. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1961) 195.

[3] G. Kirkwood, *Early Greek Monody* (Ithaca 1974) 119.

[4] So U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913) 54; A. Turyn, *Studia Sapphica* (Eos suppl., 1929) 59–65; W. Schadewaldt, *Sappho* (Potsdam 1950) 121; R. Bagg, "Love, Ceremony, Daydream in Sappho's Lyrics," *Arion* 3.3 (1964) 61; H. Saake, *Zur Kunst Sapphos* (Paderborn 1971) 169–70; T. McEvilley, "Sapphic Imagery and Fragment 96," *Hermes* 101 (1973) 273–74; et al.

[5] So also Page (note 1 above) 93–95, who disposes of these and other theories.

[6] Page (note 1 above) 93.

[7] C. Carey, "Sappho fr. 96 LP," *CQ* N.S. 28 (1978) 366–71.

totally without emotion needs to be reconsidered, for an examination of the erotic connotations of such a landscape suggests that it had powerful emotional implications. Macleod has proposed that the simile has two aspects, that the moon is meant to exemplify the woman's beauty, but that it also stands in contrast to her in two respects: the moon gives light while she wastes away, and the moon's light is omnipresent, while she is separated from her beloved.[8] Macleod's study of specific contrasts between the moon and the woman points the way to a larger contrast. The usual associations of all the images evoked by this simile suggest that Sappho uses not only the moon but the natural scene as a whole as a foil to the situation of the women as described in the poem. This use of contrast is in accord with Sappho's use of nocturnal nature imagery in other poems, and, in this poem, it furthers Sappho's purpose of consolation.

The most extended description of a natural scene in Sappho is contained in fr. 2, whose resemblance to the landscape in fr. 96 has often been noted.[9] In fr. 2, Sappho describes an ἔναυλος ἄγνος with an apple grove, altars, cool water, roses, and a field blossoming with spring flowers. This setting is created in anticipation of a visit from a goddess—Aphrodite, the goddess of love. Sappho is not alone in her association of flowering fields with love. Our earliest description of the ἱερὸς γάμος of Zeus and Hera takes place in a flowering meadow, and the setting for their union is so similar to the setting which evolves from the simile in fr. 96 that Sappho's words may reflect it (*Il.* 14.347–51):

> Under them the divine earth sent forth fresh grass,
> And dewy clover, and crocus and hyacinths
> Thick and soft, which held them up from the ground.
> On this they lay together and they covered themselves with
> A fine golden cloud, and glistening dew fell down.

Both scenes are dominated by a variety of blossoming plants, including clover, and in both scenes the emphasis on fertility and growth is furthered by the sprinkling of dew.[10]

[8] C. W. Macleod, "Two comparisons in Sappho," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 15 (1974) 217–20.

[9] E.g., B. Gentili, "La veneranda Sappho," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 2 (1966) 53; McEvilley (note 4 above) 268; W. Elliger, *Die Darstellung der Landschaft in der griechische Dichtung* (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 15) (Berlin 1975) 188. On the association of Aphrodite and meadows, see also Hesiod, *Theogony* 194–95.

[10] Greek literature contains many other descriptions of love-making in flowery meadows, including the scene in the Cologne Epode of Archilochus, which has focused

Sappho's understanding and use of flowers in an erotic context is illustrated not only in fr. 2, but also in fr. 94, a poem of consolation, as is fr. 96. But in fr. 94, Sappho speaks not to the woman who has been left behind, but to a woman whose own departure is imminent. Sappho comforts her by bidding her to remember their past pleasures together, and she describes in loving detail the things they did together in their private and public life. The description begins with the flowers her friend wore:

> Many garlands of violets
> And roses and . . .
> You put on by my side
>
> And many woven necklaces
> Made of flowers
> . . . around your soft neck.

Then, after a stanza telling of the perfume with which her friend anointed herself, she reminds her friend that she "loosed her longing for maidens on a soft bed."[11]

The emphasis given to flowers in this passage with a specific reference to love-making is consonant with the common association of flowers and love. As it occurs in a poem of consolation, it suggests that Sappho's description of blossoming plants in the simile of fr. 96, also a poem of consolation, is intended to evoke a similar erotic context. But whereas fr. 94 concentrates on the past, and accomplishes its consolation by replacing the present with happier memories of togetherness, in fr. 96 the focus is on the present.[12] The landscape created by the simile

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much scholarly attention on the erotic associations of flowery places. See, e.g., J. Van Sickle, "The New Erotic Fragment of Archilochus," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 20 (1975) 140; J. Henderson, "The Cologne Epode and the Conventions of Early Greek Erotic Poetry," *Arethusa* 9 (1976) 159–79 and the references cited there. Motte's listing of the passages in Greek literature which make use of such a setting for divine unions is 4½ pages long (*Prairies et jardins de la Grèce antique* [Brussels 1973] 208–12). Of particular significance for the interpretation of Sappho's landscape as erotic is Aeschylus fr. 125 Mette, lines 20–26, which describes the union of Ouranos and Gaia, symbolized by the rain which falls from Ouranos and brings about the growth of plants and trees, much like Sappho's dew. See Motte, pp. 219–23, for this and other references.

[11] ἐξίης πόθον, "Disposed of it by indulging it," Page (note 1 above) 79. For the particular appropriateness of flower images to the erotic world of Sappho's maidens, see E. Stigers, "Retreat from the Male," *Ramus* 6 (1977) 90–98.

[12] However, the words reminding Atthis of her friend's admiration when they were together (vv. 3–5) recall the past. Perhaps the complete poems each had more of a balance of past and present.

may be similar to one in which Atthis and her beloved shared in the mysteries of love, in whatever way these were known to Sappho and her friends. Unlike fr. 94, however, there is nothing in this description which would call to Atthis' mind specific times that she spent with her lover.[13] The landscape exists in the present, the time of Atthis' loneliness, and there is nothing which connects her with the scene. Indeed, the usual function of such a landscape, the use of a flowering place as a soft ground for love-making, would only make Atthis feel more distant from it, as it furnishes such a contrast to her own state of loneliness. After the words describing lush blossoms, she probably expected to hear of the entrance of someone who belongs in such a setting, as in fr. 2, in which the description of a similar setting is followed by the appearance of Aphrodite. How lonely must Atthis feel now that she is reminded that the rest of the world still shares in pleasures in which she no longer has a place! But the expected entrance of lovers or epiphany of Aphrodite does not come to pass. Instead, Sappho breaks off her simile and returns to the woman with whom it began, and the lush flowers are replaced by her lone figure:

> But wandering back and forth she remembers
> Gentle Atthis with longing,
> Her tender mind is eaten away. . . .

Like Atthis, this figure stands in contrast to the landscape which preceded. Her solitude is juxtaposed with the erotic union suggested by the landscape, and her frailty as a mortal woman, accentuated by the description of her as "eaten away" with longing for her distant lover, is juxtaposed with the divine associations of a flowering landscape, a landscape suitable for the presence of a goddess (as in fr. 2).[14] The contrast serves to emphasize her solitude.

The interpretation of the scene extending from the simile as erotic and as a foil to the human situation is supported by the use of the moon as the object of comparison from which the scene unfolds. We are told that Sappho described the amorous Moon and her beloved

[13] Indeed it is far from certain that the landscape is intended to remind Atthis of a specific place, as suggested by Perrotta (*Saffo e Pindaro* [Bari 1935] 66–67 [reprinted Messina-Firenze 1967, 77–78]). And Gentili's statement (note 9 above, 53) that fr. 2 describes the same real setting is equally uncertain, since the only specific features shared by the two descriptions are roses.

[14] The landscape is also attractive to gods, as attested by numerous literary examples of gods who come to such a blossoming landscape to make love; see, e.g., Hesiod, *Theogony* 278–79, *H. hom. Dem.* 1–18, and the references in Motte (note 10 above).

Endymion (199 LP), and in two extant poems she uses the divinities which make up the night sky as a foil to human experience. In one poem, Sappho sets her own solitude against the unions of the divinities who make up the night sky (168B Voigt):[15]

> The moon has sunk,
> The Pleiades have set, it is the middle
> Of night, time goes by
> And I lie down alone.

Sappho looks up at the night sky, and sees the Pleiades, Selene sinking to join her lover Endymion, perhaps the Night itself in its embrace with Earth. All that she sees is representative of the normal rhythm of nature and all a reminder that she, a woman alone, does not share in the blessings of the night. The contrast between her solitude and the rest of nature intensifies her loneliness.

In another poem, Sappho contrasts a child's departure from her mother in the evening with the return of other creatures to the fold (fr. 104a):[16]

> Hesperus, you who bring all that light-giving Dawn scattered,
> You bring the sheep, you bring the goat, [but] you take the
> child from her mother.

The sense of the poem depends on an etymological play connecting Ἕσπερος with the verb ἐσφέρειν, "to bring in." The usual function of the evening star, the gathering home of the animals who scatter among the hills at dawn, is emphasized by the repetition of the verb. The child's departure is shown to be in violation of the normal order of things; she stands isolated from the rest of nature.

In these poems, as in fr. 96, the human figures are affected by loneliness or departure. As they are set against the background of the

[15] Lobel and Page do not accept this poem as Sappho's, but see D. Clay, "Fragmentum Adespotum 976," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 119–29, to whom I am indebted for my interpretation of the poem and understanding of Sappho's use of the nocturnal landscape. The μέν/δέ antithesis which is so clear in this poem is not found in fr. 96 because the lonely woman is only contrasted with the flowering landscape at the end of its description and is involved with it in the simile at its beginning.

[16] This song was most likely intended to be sung at a wedding, at the point when the bride was preparing to leave her parents' home (cf. Catullus 62). In the second line of my translation, I accept Bergk's emendation of ὄποιον (Etym Gen. B) to ὅπου, and Pisani's interpretation of this as an adverb of separation ("Zu Sappho 104 LP, 120 D," in *ΜΝΗΜΗΣ ΧΑΡΙΝ, Gedenkschrift für P. Kretschmer* II [Wien 1957] 80; see also J. Clay, "Sappho's Hesperus and Hesiod's Dawn," *Philologus* 124 [1980] 302–05).

night sky and the activities associated with it, they appear to be not only lonely, but isolated in their loneliness. In fr. 96, Sappho extends this technique by which she emphasizes the solitude of the human situation so that it is not just the divinities of the night, but the natural world in a more general sense, which forms the contrast to loneliness. The rest of the world continues in its normal cycles, oblivious to the painful inconstancy of human relationships.

This is the technique by which Sappho emphasizes solitude and loneliness; it remains to explain why she chooses to make use of it in fr. 96. In this poem, Sappho has the role of *consolatrice* for Atthis, who is desolate at the departure of her beloved.

Sappho's use of a moonlit landscape as a foil to Atthis and her friend furthers her purpose of consolation by emphasizing that Atthis is not alone in her distress. The vision which Sappho gives her of her beloved still sharing in her emotions is intensified by the implication that they alone feel as they do, while the rest of the world continues in the normal rhythms of life. Thus the contrast with the world of nature, as it is shared by both women, brings them closer together. Atthis' greatest fear at her friend's departure was undoubtedly that her friend would forget her. Indeed, with the comparison of her friend to the moon, and the development of the simile into a landscape suitable for love-making, the association of her beloved with an erotic landscape in the present time may have intensified her fears. But when Sappho describes her beloved wandering alone, grief-stricken, Atthis is assured that no one has taken her place. And in this stanza, the last one which is preserved well enough to be comprehensible, Atthis' name appears, assuring her of her continued presence in her friend's memory, and the two women are united in sound as well as sense.

The occasion for such a song of consolation can be reconstructed plausibly in accordance with the function of Sappho's circle as demonstrated by Calame in his study of the initiatory function of maidens' choruses.[17] We may understand Sappho's position to be that of the woman who prepared for adulthood the maidens whom she calls ἔταιραι (fr. 160), and who are described by the Suda as μαθήτριαι (253 Voigt). As sexual initiation was a primary element of the maidens' passage to womanhood, to prepare them for their sexual role as wives, some of the maidens of Sappho's circle were inducted into sexuality through a homosexual relationship with Sappho and also through erotic bonds

[17] C. Calame, *Les choeurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* I (Rome 1977) 367–72, 427–32.

with other members of the group.[18] These relationships were destined to dissolve as each girl reached the culmination of her passage to adulthood (marriage), and Sappho and the members of her circle must have known the sadness of many farewells. Sappho's role as *consolatrice* can be seen as another facet of her role as an intermediary between her ἑταῖραι and Aphrodite, goddess of sexual love, a role which resulted in her self-identification with this goddess.[19] Like Aphrodite, whose suffering at losing her beloved Adonis is dramatized in two fragments by Sappho (140, 168), Sappho herself suffered the pain of separation, and as Aphrodite consoles Sappho in her ode to Aphrodite (1 LP), Sappho performs the function of consoling the maidens of her circle. Fr. 96 bears witness to her delicate skill in dealing with the emotional problems of their separations as well as to the delicate beauty of her poetry.

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[18] On the sexual bonds between the leader and selected members of her group, see Calame (note 17 above) II, 94–95. It is clear in fr. 96 that Sappho's ἑταῖραι also conceived erotic bonds among themselves, as suggested also by the flattering descriptions spoken to each other by the members of the chorus in Alcman's Partheneion (1.70–76 *PMG*).

[19] On Sappho's self-identification with Aphrodite, see G. Nagy, "Phaethon, Sappho's Phaon, and the White Rock of Leukas," *HSCP* 77 (1973) 175–77. I discuss this subject further in a forthcoming essay.

THRASYBULUS AND CONON: A RIVALRY IN ATHENS IN THE 390s B.C.*

The rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus in the 390s B.C. has excited considerable scholarly interest in recent years, just as it is likely to have once captured the attention of the ancient Athenians. In one view, the old fifth century quarrel between moderate and radical democracy separated the two men; in another, the staunch Hellene Thrasybulus rejected Conon for his alliance with Persia.[1] This paper will argue that neither view is correct; instead, the likeliest explanation of their hostility is a combination of personal factors. A factional rivalry of nearly 20 years' standing and the extraordinary success of each man's earlier career left neither Thrasybulus nor Conon willing to subordinate himself to the other by 393. This paper will also argue that the evidence for political enmity in the 390s between the two men is stronger than is usually thought.

Consider the high drama of the quarrel between Conon and Thrasybulus: the protagonists were no ordinary Athenian politicians. Two ancient opinions may be consulted. First, Pausanias on Thrasybulus:

> Thrasybulus son of Lycus [was] in every way the best of famous Athenians, whether they lived before or after him. I shall pass by the greater number of his achievements, but the following will suffice to bear out my assertion. He put down what is known as the tyranny of the Thirty, although he set out from Thebes with only sixty men at first. He persuaded the Athenians, who were torn by factions, to be reconciled and to abide by their compact.[2]

Now, Demosthenes on Conon:

> It was just after the return of the exiled democrats from the Piraeus, when our city was so weak that she had not a single ship. Conon, who was a

*The author wishes to thank A. Bernstein, D. Kagan, A. Mayor, and J. Ober for suggesting many improvements on an earlier draft.

[1] The most recent discussions are P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche* (Wiesbaden 1980) 118–35; G. Cawkwell, "The Imperialism of Thrasybulus," *CQ* 26 (1976) 271, n. 13; C. Pecorella Longo, *"Eterie" e gruppi politici nell'Atene del IV secolo a. C.* (Florence 1971) 58; S. Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.," *CP* 63 (1968) 257–67; R. Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon, and Athenian Imperialism, 396–386 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967) 95, n. 2.

[2] Paus. 1.29.3. Adapted from the Loeb Classical Library translation of W. H. S. Jones, *Pausanias, Description of Greece*, vol. 1 (New York 1918) 155.

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> general in the Persian service and received no prompting whatever, defeated the Lacedaemonians at sea and taught the former dictators of Greece to show you deference. He cleared the islands of their military governors and after he came here he restored our Long Walls. He was the first to make the hegemony of Greece once more the subject of dispute between Athens and Sparta. Indeed, he has the unique distinction of being thus mentioned in his inscription: "Whereas Conon freed the allies of Athens." . . . His contemporaries not only granted him immunity but set up his statue, in bronze, making him the first man so honored since Harmodius and Aristogeiton. For they felt that he too, in breaking up the Spartan empire, had ended no petty tyranny.[3]

Both men achieved success and fame; both were liberators. Had they cooperated in the 390s, Athens could only have benefited. Yet the very talents that each man possessed may have been the impediments to collaboration. To the normal ambition of any politician in any society add the particularly ferocious drive of the Athenians, and it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Athens was not big enough for two liberators.

Were there not other, substantive issues separating the two men? To answer this question, one must consider the historical background. In the years after Thrasybulus in 403 led the restoration of democracy in Athens, the city could do little but watch as Sparta consolidated its rule in Greece and then in 399 invaded Asia Minor to liberate the Hellenes from Persia. Two years later, however, in 397, the news came that Persia was building a war fleet. The name of the admiral was electrifying: Conon, an Athenian citizen.[4]

The next move was Athens'. In winter 396–395, the Athenian Demaenetus proposed to the council to take a state warship and sail secretly to Conon with Athenian volunteers. According to rumor, the council approved the plan. The news got out before Demaenetus could leave, and there was an uproar in Athens because he threatened to bring down Spartan punishment. The leader of the opposition to this treachery was Thrasybulus—he convinced the assembly to inform the Spartans of Demaenetus' action. In the end, Athens and Sparta made common cause against Conon.[5]

[3] Dem. 20.68–70. Adapted from the Loeb translation of J. H. Vince, *Demosthenes*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass. 1970) 537–39.

[4] Persia's fleet: Philochorus, *FGrH*, 328F144–45; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1–2. (Unless otherwise noted, all references *infra* to Xenophon are to the *Hellenica*.) For the date see D. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1978) 141, n. 4.

[5] *HOxy.* 1.1–3. I follow the dating of R. Seager (note 1 above) 95, n. 2. *Contra*, I. A. F. Bruce, *A Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge 1967) 66–72.

But in summer 395, when Theban ambassadors came to Athens proposing alliance, Thrasybulus did not inform Sparta. Rather, he presented his Theban friends with the assembly's acceptance.[6]

As others have argued, prudence (which required a land army like Thebes') and propaganda (Thebes was a more palatable ally than was Persia) explain Thrasybulus' change.[7] It has not been noticed, however, that personal motives may have also played a part in Thrasybulus' thinking. He knew and trusted the Thebans, who had offered him refuge in 403, while Conon, as will soon become clear, had never been his friend. A cynic might add that only in a land campaign, where he could count on a command, could Thrasybulus hope to win glory for himself.[8]

In the next few months Thrasybulus gave further proof of his true attitude toward the Spartans by leading Athenian troops against them in Boeotia and the Corinthia. Neither campaign succeeded.[9] Better news came from Asia Minor—better for Athens if not Thrasybulus. Off the coast of Cnidus in August 394, Conon and the Persian fleet crushed Sparta's navy. There was no one to stop them in 393 when they sailed back to Greece, raiding and looting Spartan allies on the way. Finally, in summer, Conon arrived in Athens with a victorious navy and a Persian subsidy to rebuild Athens' walls.[10]

Conon was the man of the hour. The cities of Ionia, ever alert, exchanged statues of Lysander for images of the hero of Cnidus. Conon's native city outdid them with an epigraphic honor, as Demosthenes records (*supra*), and two statues: Demosthenes' bronze, erected in the Agora near the precinct of Zeus the Liberator, and a second (presumably

[6] Xen. 3.5.16; Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 11.

[7] Prudence: Seager (note 1 above) 98, n. 21; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca 1979) 179. Propaganda: *HOxy.* 11.1, 13.1–5; Xen. 3.5.3–5; cf. Bruce (note 5 above) 51–52; Hamilton, 180–81, 202. Perhaps Agesilaus' victory at Sardis in spring 395 also influenced Thrasybulus by raising fears of Sparta's growing power. *HOxy.* 6.4–6, Xen. 3.4.21–25; cf. Hamilton, 202–04; Seager (note 1 above) 98.

[8] Thrasybulus in Thebes: Paus. 9.11.6.

[9] Haliartus (Boeotia): Lys. 14.4, 16.13–14; Xen. 3.5.16–25; Dem. 18.118; Polyb. 30.18; Diod. 14.81.1–3; Strabo 9.30; Plut. *Lys.* 28–30; Paus. 3.5.3–5, 9.32.5.

Nemea River (Corinthia): Lys. 16.14–15; Xen. 4.2.9–23; Plato *Menex.* 245e; Dem. 20.52–53; Diod. 14.82.10, 83.1–2; Strabo 8.6.25.

Coronea (Boeotia): Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15–21; *Ages.* 2.6–16; *Anab.* 5.3.6; Diod. 14.84.1–2; Plut. *Ages.* 18–19; Polyaenus. 2.1.3, 5, 19; Nepos *Ages.* 4.5; Frontinus 2.6.6; Strabo 9.2.29.

[10] Xen. 4.3.11–13, 8.1–12; Isoc. 4.142, 5.62–64, 9.55–56; Diod. 14.83.4–7, 84.3–5, 85.1–4; Nepos *Conon* 2–5; Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 107; W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, vol. 2 (Berkeley 1974) 120. Date: see note 13 below.

marble) on the Acropolis. In addition, the city granted Conon immunity from taxation.[11]

Conon was more than generous in return. Using some of his own fortune as well as Persian money to rebuild Athens' walls, he offered employment to the poor. In the Piraeus, Conon sponsored a new temple to Aphrodite, goddess of Cnidus. Finally, he underwrote a festival liturgy (*hestiasis*) for the entire citizenry—a remarkable act, considering that the liturgy was usually restricted to one's own tribe.[12]

Conon used his prestige to buy influence and power during the year of his stay in Athens (mid-393 to mid-392).[13] He sent embassies to Dionysius of Syracuse, to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, and perhaps to Chios, as well as a subsidy to the mercenary corps established at Corinth. Conon used the Persian fleet to collect money from the islands. A further sign of his prominence is the fact that the Persians attributed the power Athens built up at the King's expense during this year to Conon's influence.[14]

How did Thrasybulus fare in Conon's Athens? Like Sherlock

[11] Ionia: Dem. 20.71; Paus. 6.3.16; G. Dittenberger, ed. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*[3] (Leipzig 1915–24) no. 126. Athenian statues: Dem. 20.70–71; Isoc. 9.57; Aesch. 3.243; Paus. 1.3.1–2; Nepos *Timoth.* 2.3.; Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 128. Taxation: Dem. 20.71. Inscriptions: Dem. 20.69. A bronze statue of Conon's benefactor, King Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, was erected next to Conon's bronze at the same time. Isoc. 9.57; cf. D. M. Lewis and R. S. Stroud, "Athens Honors King Evagoras of Salamis," *Hesperia* 48 (1979) 192–93 with nn.

[12] Employment: Xen. 4.8.10; Diod. 14.85.2–3. Personal contribution: J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) 509. Aphrodite temple: Paus. 1.1.3. *Hestiasis:* Athenaeus 1.3d. Cf. *RE* 8 (1913) 1315. For a general discussion of Conon's wealth and expenditures see Davies, 508–509.

[13] Conon reached Athens in 393, sometime between late spring and late summer (Xen. 4.8.7–10; Diod. 14.85.1. For the difficulty of dating Conon's return more precisely see Lewis and Stroud [note 11 above] 187). He left Athens for negotiations at Sardis, probably in mid-392. For the latter date and scholarly debate about it, see G. Cawkwell (note 1 above) 271, n. 13; R. Seager (note 1 above) 105, n. 92; T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (London 1965) 165–90, and the earlier literature cited there.

[14] Embassy to Dionysius: Lys. 19.19. Embassy to Tiribazus (Sardis): Xen. 4.8.12–16. Mission to Chios: An ancient tradition states that Isocrates went to Chios to help it draft a democratic constitution (Ps. Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 837B). Details of Isocrates' biography place the mission in the late 390s (Münscher, "Isokrates," *RE* 9 [1916] 2170). Isocrates taught Conon's son, Timotheus (Isoc. 15.101). Might not the father have chosen Isocrates as one of those who τὰς τε νήσους . . . Ἀθηναίοις εὐτρεπίζοι (Xen. 4.8.12)? Subsidy to Mercenaries: Androtion, *FGrH*, 324 F 45 = Philochorus *FGrH*, 328 F 150; Harpocration s.v. Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Persian charges: Xen. 4.8.16. On Conon's career in Athens in 393–92, see K. J. Beloch, *Die Attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 118–19; R. Sealey, "Callistratos of Aphidna and His Contemporaries," *Historia* 5 (1956) 182–83; G. Barbieri, *Conone* (Rome 1955) 130–50; Pritchett (note 10 above) vol. 2, 120, n. 21.

Holmes' dog who barked in the night, Thrasybulus in 393–392 is remarkable for his silence. At least the sources, full of Thrasybulus for the years before 393 and after 392, hardly mention him in this period.[15] The one possible exception is a reference in a work that may come from the time of Conon's ascendancy, Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae.* Yet even this reference speaks for Thrasybulus' impotence: "Thrasybulus is angry because he is not called upon."[16]

Did Thrasybulus lose power because Conon took it from him or had Thrasybulus already ruined himself by his failure in battle in 394?[17] Probably both factors obtained: defeat in battle was a blow for Thrasybulus, and Conon rubbed salt in the wound. Two points that demonstrate this have received insufficient attention. First, a remark in Aristotle's *Rhetoric:* "Conon used to called Thrasybulus a man of bold [or rash] counsel [*thrasus boule*]."[18] That Aristotle knows of Conon's remark means that Conon expressed his opinion of Thrasybulus, probably in public; that Aristotle uses the imperfect tense means that Conon expressed his opinion more than once. Further, while neither the surrounding context in the *Rhetoric* nor the word itself demonstrates praise or blame, *thrasus* usually has a negative connotation (*LSJ* s.v. *thrasus*). Hence, it is likely that Conon charged Thrasybulus with rash judgment.[19] Conon could have made the remark at any time in his

[15] Beloch (note 14 above) 119; Sealey (note 14 above) 183; S. Perlman (note 1 above) 263.

[16] Aristoph. *Eccles.* 202–03:

Σωτήρια παρέκυψεν, ἀλλ' ὀργίζεται
Θρασύβουλος αὐτὸς οὐχὶ παρακαλούμενος.

Salvation peeked out, but Thrasybulus
Is angry because he is not called upon.

For the text see P. Moraux, "Trois Vers d'Aristophane (*Assemblée des Femmes,* 201–203)," *Mélanges Henri Grégoire* 12 (1952) 328, n. 2; R. G. Ussher, *Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford 1973) xxiv–xxv, 103. For a different interpretation, based on textual emendation, see R. Seager (note 1 above) 107, n. 111. It is difficult to date the play precisely. The best estimates place it at the Dionysia or Lenaea in one of the years from 393 to 390. See V. Coulon and H. Van Daele, *Aristophane,* vol. 5 (Paris 1930) 5; Ussher, xxi, nn. 2–3, xxv; Seager (note 1 above) 106–07; P. Funke (note 1 above) 168–71.

[17] Thrasybulus ruined himself: Seager (note 1 above) 99. Conon's reputation eclipsed Thrasybulus': Sealey (note 14 above) 183. Both factors were involved: Funke (note 1 above) 126, n. 67.

[18] Arist. *Rhet.* 1400 b 20:

Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει.

[19] Moraux (note 16 above) 341, n. 4, suggests that the remark means to charge Thrasybulus with cowardice at the Nemea (cf. Lys. 16.15). Funke (note 1 above) also cites this remark as evidence of hostility.

career, which began in the fifth century, but he probably made it after Cnidus, when he was important enough to be remembered for his *mots*.

The second point concerns provocative speculation about past alignments. As Beloch points out, by 393 the rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus had been smouldering since the last decade of the fifth century. Its origin can be found in the spark of so much controversy in Athens in that period; namely, Alcibiades, who sometimes seemed Athens' best hope, sometimes its worst enemy, but always embodied the talent and drive admired by all Athenians.[20] In 411, at the lowest point of the Ionian War, Thrasybulus attached himself to Alcibiades, championing his recall from exile. Over the next few years, Thrasybulus, an insignificant trierarch, held fast to his friendship with the most famous man in Athens.[21] When Alcibiades succeeded, so did Thrasybulus; when Alcibiades fell from power, Thrasybulus fell too.[22]

In 411, Conon and Thrasybulus, both in their mid-thirties, were each beginning careers as generals in the Ionian War. They did not share an admiration for Alcibiades, however. Unlike Thrasybulus, Conon did not serve in Alcibiades' fleet, nor did Conon fall from power

[20] Beloch (note 14 above) 118–19.

[21] Thrasybulus' recall of Alcibiades: Thuc. 8.81. Thrasybulus' background: Save for the *domus nobilis* of Justin 5.9, nothing is known of Thrasybulus' family. It was wealthy enough to finance Thrasybulus' trierarchy, but the fortune might have been a recent one. Old Athenian fortunes were based on land, but at least part of Thrasybulus' property was liquid, as his losses to the Thirty show (Isoc. 18.23; cf. Davies [note 12 above] 41, 240). Hence, Thrasybulus' name may have meant little to most Athenians in 411. While unselfish, patriotic motives no doubt led him to support Alcibiades, ambition may have played a part too—ambition to share in the established name and reputation of Alcibiades' family. Thrasybulus' loyalty to Alcibiades: J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade* (Paris 1940) 293, 316, 327; A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont, 411–407 B.C.," *JHS* 73 (1953) 3–4.

[22] In 408, both men were elected generals (Xen. 1.4.11). In 407, after Alcibiades' failure at Notium, neither man secured reelection (Xen. 1.5.16). In 406, when Thrasybulus had to fight for his life after Arginusae, one of his main opponents was Thrasyllus, an enemy of Alcibiades (Xen. 1.7.16–17, 1.2.12–13) One of Thrasybulus' supporters was the orator Archedemus, associated with Alcibiades' family through Alcibiades' son (Xen. 1.7.2; Aristoph. *Frogs* 416; Lys. 14.25; Eupolis frg. 71, T. Kock, ed. *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1880–88).

In 411–407 Thrasybulus served with Alcibiades in the Thrace-ward and was loyal to the Hellespontine fleet. In this period Athens' generals were divided into two groups: those chosen officially by the democracy in the city and those serving in a quasi-official capacity at the sanction of the Hellespontine fleet under Alcibiades. See Xen. 1.1.12, 1.4.9–10; Diod. 13.49.1, 3, 64.3, 72.1–2; Andrewes (note 21 above) 3–4, 6–7.

with Alcibiades. In fact, Conon was sent out to replace Alcibiades after the battle of Notium. Thrasybulus and Conon therefore were not likely to have been friends in the late fifth century.[23]

Nor is it likely that the two had reconciled their differences in 393. When Conon brought Adeimantus, another of the generals at Aegospotami, to trial in that year, perhaps Thrasybulus understood it as "strictly business"; after all, Conon wanted to deflect charges about his own role in the battle.[24] Yet Thrasybulus may well have taken offense, for Adeimantus, like himself, was an old and close friend of Alcibiades. Were Thrasybulus and Adeimantus themselves friends in 393? Perhaps, for one year earlier they had at least a common link, the son of their old chief Alcibiades. In 395–394 a client of Lysias prosecuted the son of Alcibiades for military misconduct. The prosecutor turned his fire on other Athenians too: among others, he named Adeimantus and the board of generals of that year. The members of the board were not named individually, but the audience would know its most prominent member—Thrasybulus.[25]

Conon's choice of Adeimantus as scapegoat does not bespeak a desire to build bridges to Alcibiades' old friends. Thrasybulus would have had greater reason to trust Conon had he blamed Aegospotami on, for example, deserters or untrustworthy mercenaries.[26]

To sum up, Conon's expressed judgment of Thrasybulus and his prosecution of Thrasybulus' old comrade in arms permit the presumption of enmity between the two men. Two reasons for this enmity have been proposed: a clash of ambitions and an old factional quarrel based largely on personal rivalry. Personal rivalry, however, is sometimes a sign of a more profound clash of principle. Was this true of the quarrel between Thrasybulus and Conon?

Scholars have offered a number of explanations. Some see a broad philosophical dispute between Conon and Thrasybulus, a dispute over

[23] Birth dates: Davies (note 12 above) 240, 507. Conon's appointment after Notium: Xen. 1.4.10.

[24] Xen. 2.1.30–32; Diod. 13.106.6; Dem. 19.161.

[25] For Adeimantus' friendship with Alcibiades, see And. 1.16, Xen. 1.4.21. The two were fellow demesmen of Scambonidae (Kirchner, *PA*, 202, 600). For the prosecution of 395–394, see Lys. 14.38, 22; 15.1–2; 16.15; Plut. *Lysander* 29; Paus. 3.5.4. Lys. 14.15 supplies the date of the prosecution. Its reference to a military expedition that saw no fighting fits the Athenian campaign of Haliartus. See R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus*, vol. 1 (London 1876) 257–58; F. Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, vol. 1: *Von Gorgias zu Lysias* (Leipzig 1887) 488–89; L. Gernet and M. Bizos, *Lysias, Discours*, vol. 1 (Paris 1955) 221.

[26] Deserters: Diod. 13.106.

the kind of empire Athens should seek. Others posit disagreement over the Athenian constitution: Conon was a radical democrat, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades moderates.[27]

The first theory need not be discussed here; others have weighed it and found it wanting. Thrasybulus was no less an Athenian imperialist than Conon.[28] The second has attracted adherents from the 19th century to the 1970s, but it too may be rejected.[29]

"Moderate democrats" and "radical democrats" are not terms found in the ancient sources; they are modern constructs. The Greeks spoke rather of two broad groups: for example, the "many" versus the "few" or the "common people" and the "wicked" versus the "best people" and "good."[30] In classical Athens, the many enjoyed the political power afforded them by democracy; state pay guaranteed their participation in government. The few wanted to reduce the power of the many. In 411 and 404 the few resorted to an extreme expedient: oligarchy. This was no longer an option in the 390s, but the few still had their rallying cries—for instance, opposition to ecclesiastic pay.[31]

Judged by these criteria, Conon and Thrasybulus were not opponents. Both had connections with each political group. Thrasybulus' ally Alcibiades had called in 411 for a moderate oligarchy, the Five Thousand, but Thrasybulus seems to have supported Alcibiades in spite of, not because of, this. According to Thucydides, Thrasybulus in 411 saw Alcibiades as Athens' only hope of winning Persian support

[27] S. Accame argues that Thrasybulus stood for a program of moderate imperialism, for an Athens mindful of its allies' rights. Conon, on the other hand, advocated the oppressive policies of a Cleon. See Accame, *Ricerche*, 241–53; "Il problema della nazionalita greca nella politica di Fericle e di Trasibulo," *Paideia* 11 (1956) 250.

Both 19th and 20th century writers imagine a conflict between Conon, a radical democrat supported by the democratic masses (*HOxy.* 1.3) in 395, and Thrasybulus, architect of reconciliation with oligarchy in 403. See E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. 5 (Stuttgart 1958) 241–42; Beloch (note 14 above) 119–20; Barbieri (note 14 above) 140–41; C. Pecorella Longo, "*Eterie*" 58.

[28] Accame's views are effectively refuted by Seager (note 1 above) 99, n. 34, 110–11; Perlman (note 1 above) 264–66; Cawkwell (note 1 above) 270, n. 6.

[29] See above, note 27.

[30] See for example Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 28; cf. Beloch (note 14 above) 2; A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1957) 130–31; W. R. Connor, *New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 88–89 with notes. For a critique of such terms as moderate and radical in analyses of Athenian politics, see O. Reverdin, "Rémarques sur la vie politique d'Athènes au V^e^ siècle," *MH* 2 (1945) 200–12; Connor, 5–9.

[31] Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* affords evidence of opposition to ecclesiastic pay in the 390s: 11.183–88, 206–07, 299–310, 380–82.

against Sparta. While Thrasybulus cannot be as readily associated with those champions of the many, Epicrates and Cephalus, as can Conon, by 403, at any rate, the hero of Phyle was no supporter of oligarchy.[32]

Much has been made in the literature of Conon's ties with "radical democrats." Epicrates and Cephalus staunchly supported Conon in 396, but this does not prove Conon shared their political views. They saw him as an instrument of revenge against Sparta. They are not recorded as asking his opinion of democracy.[33] In fact, Conon himself kept aristocratic company. Among his political friends were the Spartan *proxenos* Callias of Alopece and the blue-blooded father-in-law of Plato's Phaedrus. Conon, the guest-friend of the king of Salamis-in-Cyprus, was no leveler.[34]

So much for disputes over the empire or constitution of Athens. Another view of the nature of the conflict between Thrasybulus and Conon is proposed by G. Cawkwell. Cawkwell notices that after Conon's death, Thrasybulus returned to power in Athens. He raised a fleet of 40 ships, probably late in 391, and sailed to the eastern Aegean.[35] There he won Athens great prizes: alliances sworn with a dozen Greek cities (in

[32] Thuc. 8.81.2.

[33] For the scholarly literature, see above, note 27. *HOxy.* 1–2 records Epicrates' and Cephalus' support for Conon in 396–395 and the reason for it, the desire to go to war against Sparta. *Idem* refers to the group in the assembly in which Epicrates and Cephalus were prominent as "the democratic masses," οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί (1.3). Aeschines calls Cephalus "the man with the greatest reputation as a democrat," ὁ δοκῶν δημοτικώτατος γεγονέναι (3.194).

[34] On Callias' *proxenia* and his wealth see Xen. 6.3.2–6; Davies (note 12 above) 261–62. On his ties to Conon see Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12, *Mem.* 4.8.4; Plato *Crat.* 384a, 391b–c; Sealey (note 14 above) 182–83. Seager (note 1 above) 103, n. 79, is skeptical of the connection, but unnecessarily so, given the personal nature of ancient politics and the hatred for Alcibiades which Callias shared with Conon (see Ps. -And. 4.13–15). Conon long associated himself with the father-in-law of Phaedrus of Myrrhinus. Follower of Socrates, eponym of a Platonic dialogue, Phaedrus suffered exile in 415 for parodying the Mysteries and mutilating the Herms (Lys. 19.12–13, 15; Davies [note 12 above] 201). He was no radical or man of the people.

[35] For the date see Cawkwell (note 1 above) 271–75. Seager (note 1 above) 109, n. 27, prefers 390. Earlier writers argue for 389: Beloch (note 12 above) 125, 127, 345; *Griechische Geschichte*[2] vol. 3.1 (Berlin, Leipzig 1923) 90; 3.2, 224; W. Schwahn, "Thrasybulos," *RE* 6A (1937) 573; Accame (note 27 above) 133. Cawkwell's date removes several problems in the narrative, especially the hiatus between the failure of peace in 392–391 and Athens' resumption of war. In addition to the evidence Cawkwell marshalls, an omission by Xenophon strengthens his case: between descriptions of Sparta's missions in 392–391 and Thrasybulus' expedition, Xenophon uses none of his characteristic expressions of change of year (4.8.24–25; e.g., ἐκ δὲ τούτου, μετὰ τοῦτο; on such expressions see Ryder [note 13 above] 165–66).

Asia and the North Aegean) and two Thracian kings, and the prospect of another alliance with the Thrace-ward cities; a democracy in Byzantium; a 10 percent tax on ships in the Hellespont; 5 percent taxes in Thasos and Clazomenae; and the profits of various money-raising expeditions.[36]

Thrasybulus had thrown down the gauntlet to Persia; Conon had served Persia as admiral. Cawkwell notes the difference and concludes that the real bone of contention between Conon and Thrasybulus was Persia. He writes:

> . . . the issue between the two concerned relations with Persia. Both were resolved to restore Athens' imperial power, but their methods differed. Thrasybulus proceeded in 391/0 with his plans regardless of Persian feelings. Conon was more circumspect. Outwardly he was the liberator, as the inscription on his statue showed . . . ; clandestinely he was doing all he could to restore Athenian power, as the Spartan denunciation of him at Sardis suggested. . . . But Conon continued to believe in the necessity of the Persian friendship, and he remained a Persian admiral. . . .[37]

A different interpretation is, however, more likely. Had Conon lived to 391, he might have followed the same Persian policy as Thrasybulus. Conon may have served Persia but he served Athens first. He advised the Persians (c. 397), according to Isocrates,

> to make war on the Lacedaemonians not on land but at sea, thinking that if they should establish a land army and come out victorious by it, only the affairs of the continent [of Asia] would do well, but if they conquered at sea, all Greece would share this victory.[38]

Nepos puts it more bluntly: Conon wanted to increase the strength of his own land rather than the strength of the Persian king.[39]

Thrasybulus, for his part, was not an implacable enemy of Persia. In 411 he urged the Athenians to recall Alcibiades because of the Persian aid that might come with him. In 408–407 Thrasybulus helped negotiate the treaty of Chalcedon, a pact between Athens and the Great King. Even his aggrandizements of 391 and 390 would not rule out

[36] Xen. 4.8.26–31; Diod. 14.94.2–4; Dem. 20.59–60; *IG* II² 21 (=H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, vol. 2 [Munich, Berlin 1962] no. 258, pp. 185–87), 24 (=Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 110).

[37] Cawkwell (note 1 above) 276.

[38] Isoc. 9.55, cf. 9.52–57, 5.62–64.

[39] Nepos *Conon* 5.2: *potius patriae opes augeri quam regis maluit.* More specifically, Nepos adds, Conon wanted *ut Ioniam et Aeoliam restitueret Atheniensibus* (*ibid.*). Cf. Justin 6.3.

future cooperation. By rebuilding Athenian power, Thrasybulus risked offending Persia, but by failing to rebuild he would have risked losing the war against Sparta, the common enemy.[40]

All of Thrasybulus' actions, however advantageous to Athens, could be justified as part of the common effort. As Busolt pointed out long ago, the allies Athens made in 391 and 390 did not belong to a revived Delian League; they were partners in the war against Sparta.[41] Thrasybulus' impost on the Bosphorus and his 5 percent taxes could be represented as part of the war effort, as could his plundering raids on Lesbos or Aspendus.[42]

Persia seems to have accepted this interpretation, at least for a time. When Thrasybulus sailed to Asia in 391, as Xenophon reports, the Athenians found "cities in Asia favorably disposed on account of the King's being a friend [of Athens]."[43] Even after Thrasybulus' mission, the Spartans found to their distress that the Hellespontine cities favored the Athenians because "Pharnabazus was their friend."[44] In spite of all

[40] Thuc. 8.81.2; Xen. 1.3.8–9; Diod. 13.66.3; Plut. *Alc.* 31.1; M. Amit, "Le Traité de Chalcedoine entre Pharnabaze et les Stratèges Athéniens," *Ant. Cl.* 42 (1973) 436–57.

[41] G. Busolt, *Das zweite athenische Seebund* (Leipzig 1877) 673–75. In 391–390 Athens made allies of a dozen Greek cities in Asia and the northeastern coast of European Greece and with two Thracian kings (above, note 38). Between 395 and 393 Athens made alliances with Thebes (Xen. 3.5.16), Boeotia, Corinth, Argos, Locris, Leucas, Acarnania, Ambracia, the Thracian Chalcidice (Diod. 14.82.1–3; Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, nos. 101–03), Cos, Nisyros, Teos, Mitylene, Ephesus, Erythrae (Diod. 14.84.4) and possibly Eretria (Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 103; cf. P. Krentz, "Athens' Alliance With Eretria," *AJP* 100 [1979] 398–400; D. Knoepfler, "Sur une clause du traité de 394 avant J. C. entre Athènes et Erétrie," *AJP* 101 [1980] 462–69). In addition, the Greek cities of Asia that formed the Heracles coinage alliance of 394 (Byzantium Cnidus, Cyzicus, Ephesus, Iasus, Rhodes, Samos, and perhaps Lampsacus) may have all adhered to the anti-Spartan cause too. See Cawkwell, "A Note on the Heracles Coinage Alliance of 394 B.C.," *NC* 6th ser. 16 (1956) 69–75; Cawkwell, "The ΣΥΝ Coins Again," *JHS* 83 (1963) 152–54; contra J. M. Cook, "Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins," *JHS* 81 (1961) 67–72.

[42] Busolt (note 41 above) 675–76; see note 36 above. More recently, Seager (note 1 above) 105–13, interprets Thrasybulus' actions as a restoration of the Athenian empire, hostile to Persia. On the other hand, G. T. Griffith argues (convincingly, to me) that Thrasybulus' measures were merely part of the war against Sparta; their imperialistic tone was only wishful thinking by Athens See "Athens in the Fourth Century," in P. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1979) 128–33.

[43] Xen. 4.8.27:

τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεων διὰ τὸ βασιλέα φίλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι.

[44] Xen. 4.8.31:

αἱ ἄλλαι Ἑλλησπόντιαι πόλεις φίλου ἐντος αὐτοῖς
(sc. τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις) Φαρναβάζου εὖ ἔχοιεν.

Thrasybulus won for Athens at Persia's expense, Sparta did not think it worth the effort of wooing Artaxerxes until 388. By then, however, he had a new reason for tiring of Athens: under Thrasybulus' successors, Athens had begun to help two Persian enemies, Cyprus and Egypt.[45]

Thrasybulus, in sum, did not follow an anti-Persian policy any more than did Conon. Both men built up Athenian power at the risk of offending Persia, but neither wished for a complete break with Persia.[46]

Since alliance with Persia was not a source of discord between Conon and Thrasybulus, and neither was the Athenian empire or Athenian constitution, a process of elimination returns us to the issue of personality. Thrasybulus and Conon were enemies in the 390s first because neither man's personal ambition brooked a subordinate role, and second because 20 years earlier they had chosen differently on the issue of Alcibiades; each man had since accumulated a store of hostility to the other. While explanations of motive are always somewhat speculative, these seem to interpret the facts most naturally.

The rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus provides a reminder of the way politics worked in Athens. Not that policy or principle never moved the Athenians; they did, but policy and principle were never divorced from personal loyalty. Athenian society generated profound friendships and equally profound hatreds, and these were not set aside in the political arena. *Eris,* strife, was as powerful a goddess in classical Athens as she was in the Bronze Age on the plain before Troy.[47]

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[45] Antalcidas' mission to Artaxerxes: Xen. 5.1.6, 25. Chabrias' mission of aid to Evagoras of Cyprus in 388: Xen. 5.1.10. Cf. E. Costa, "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.," *Historia* 24 (1975) 40–56. By winter 389–388, the date of Aristophanes' *Plutus,* Athens had made alliance with King Acoris of Egypt, a rebel against Persia. See *Plutus* 178 and *schol.;* Bengtson (note 36 above) no. 236, 183–84.

[46] Seager (note 1 above) 107–08, argues on the basis of Aristoph. *Eccles.* 356 that Thrasybulus opposed the peace of 392–391. If Seager has interpreted the text and dated the play correctly—open questions both (note 16 above)—Thrasybulus' opposition might betoken hostility to Persia. On the other hand, what Thrasybulus objected to in the peace was perhaps not Athens' concessions in Asia to Persia, but its concessions in Greece to Sparta. On this peace see Andocides 3 and Philochorus, *FGrH,* 328 F 149a; for its date, see Cawkwell (note 1 above) 276, n. 25. For an argument counter to mine, see Cawkwell (note 1 above) 277.

[47] See the stimulating remarks on "Envy and the Spirit of Competition" in P. Walcot, *Greek Peasants, Ancient and Modern. A Comparison of Social and Moral Values* (Manchester, England 1970) 77–93.

THE CHARITESIA AT BOIOTIAN ORCHOMENOS*

The Charitesia, as the name indicates, were competitions in honor of the Graces. The cult of the Graces was quite prominent at Boiotian Orchomenos, and Pausanias (9.38.1) states that their sanctuary was the oldest in the city.[1] While athletic games were a feature of the festivities (*IG* 2^2.3160), the heart of the Charitesia, appropriately enough, was the musical and dramatic contests held under the presidency of an ἀγωνοθέτης (*IG* 7.3195).[2] In his recent and judicious study of the Charitesia, A. Schachter has suggested that the dramatic and musical components of the festival were held in the theater.[3] Although Pausanias does not mention a theater at Orchomenos,[4] one was discovered in 1972, which had been in use from the fourth century B.C. until later Roman times.[5] The theater is located at the eastern foot of Mt. Akontion between the Treasury of Minyas to the southwest and the church of the monastery of the Koimesis tes Theotokou (more simply known as the church at Skripou) to the northeast. The monastery is commonly thought to occupy the site of the sanctuary of the Graces.[6] The modest purpose of this note is simply to adduce an unpublished inscription from the theater at Orchomenos to support Schachter's hypothesis that the musical and dramatic competitions of the Charitesia were indeed held in the theater. Parts of another, likewise unpublished, inscription will be put forward to indicate that the dedication was made by an *agonothetes*.

* It is a special pleasure to thank Professor Theodoros G. Spyropoulos, currently Ephor of Sparta, for his generosity in allowing me to discuss these inscriptions. He kindly informs me that he will shortly publish a full treatment of them. Thanks are due also to several others, including Professor Stephen G. Miller, Director of the American School of Classical Studies; Caroline H. Buckler, who enlightened me about the architecture of the theater; and Professor Albert Schachter, who kindly gave advice on epigraphical matters. In view of the above, any remaining shortcomings of this note can only be attributed to me.

[1] Cf. J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* V (London 1898) 172–80.

[2] For the best and most recent treatment of the Charitesia, with full bibliography and literary and epigraphical *testimonia*, cf. A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia* I (London 1981) 140–44.

[3] Schachter (note 2 above) 144.

[4] For the possibility of a lacuna at 9.38.1, cf. H. Hitzig and H. Blümner, *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio* III.1 (Leipzig 1907) *ad loc.* (III.1.378).

[5] A detailed description of the theater has regrettably not yet been published. For preliminary notices, cf. H. W. Catling, "Archaeology in Greece, 1973–74," *Archaeological Reports* (1973–1974) 20; T. Spyropoulos, "Ἀρχαιότητες καὶ Μνημεῖα Βοιωτίας-Φθιώτιδος," *Deltion* 28 (1973) *Chronika* 258–59; "Εἰδήσεις ἐκ Βοιωτίας," *AAA* 6 (1973) 392–95.

[6] Frazer (note 1 above) 186–87; Hitzig and Blümner (note 4 above) 505.

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The first inscription reads ΧΑΡΙΤΕΙΣΙΩΝΤΟΛΟΓ (Χαριτεισίων τὸ λογ[εῖον]),[7] and as of 1983 still remained in the orchestra.[8] The inscription spans two architrave blocks of the theater, with the X beginning at the left margin of the first stone under three regulae. It continues on the second stone with the N. Between the two blocks, the regulae above the letters are equally divided. The combined length of the two blocks is 226.5 cm, with a height of 34 cm. The letters of the inscription are large and well formed, averaging 6 cm in height and width, all with serifs and well spaced. The broken-bar alpha suggests a date in Roman times, which agrees with the renewal of interest in the cult at that period.[9]

The architrave blocks are in the Doric order, of gray marble, with *anathyrosis* on their end-faces. The marble of these stones is identical with that of several pier-and-half-column fragments, the cuttings of which indicate that they were part of the colonnade of the *proskenion.* There is no doubt that this architrave comes from the theater and not, like many antiquities built into the wall of the church at Skripou, from some other structure. Clearly referring to the games, this is a dedicatory inscription, probably set up by a president of the games, on the analogy of *IG* 7.3195.1–2 (ἀγωνοθετίοντος τῶν Χαριτεισίων).

This interpretation is strengthened by the second inscription, also engraved on an architectural member of the theater. It exists in two large fragments. The first reads ΙΝΟΛΑΟΥΑΓΩΝΟΘΕΤ, with the initial Ι beginning immediately at the left-hand margin of the block, which is broken through the Λ. The upper left end of the block, finished in *anathyrosis,* is damaged and the right end broken. The letters average 6 cm in height and 6.5 cm in width. The lettering is hardly more than a deep scratch. The broken-bar alphas and serifs are prominent. The block is 279 cm in length and 41.5 cm in height.

The second fragment of this inscription reads ΜΝΤΕΣΤ. The stone is badly broken on the left side through the Μ, while the right end is dressed in *anathyrosis.* It measures 105 cm in length and 41.5 cm in height. The size and style of the lettering are identical with those of the first fragment, and the marble is the same. The top side of this block, which is roughly dressed, bears a mason's mark in the shape of a Γ, with the bars of equal length and capped by serifs.

[7] The restoration, λογ[εῖον], is recommended by similar dedications cited below, cf. notes 13–15.

[8] For the publication of 26 choregic monuments dedicated to Dionysos, 25 of them tripod bases, also found in the theater, cf. P. Amandry and T. Spyropoulos, "Monuments chorégiques d'Orchomène de Béotie," *BCH* 98 (1974) 171–246.

[9] Schachter (note 2 above) 141.

Both fragments adorn white marble architrave, or epistyle, blocks in the Ionic order. The epistyle has the usual three overlapping fasciae, with the central band carrying the inscription. The differences in marble and especially in lettering amply prove that this dedication is unrelated to that mentioning the Charitesia.

Although the second fragment of this inscription is too truncated to restore convincingly, enough is preserved of the first to indicate that it followed a common formula. Similar Boiotian inscriptions begin with the name of the *agonothetes,* followed by his patronymic, and a participle of ἀγωνοθετέω to indicate his presidency.[10] In this case, the name of the *agonothetes* is lost. His patronymic, ΙΝΟΛΑΟΥ, causes problems because the name seems to be otherwise unattested in Boiotia. A possible restoration is [Ἀμ]ινολάου, in view of the popularity at Orchomenos of names beginning with Ἀμιν-.[11] Hence, the best restoration is [. . . Ἀμ]ινολάου ἀγωνοθετή[σας]. At the very least, the second inscription provides evidence for the dedication of an *agonothetes* in this theater.

Neither of these inscriptions is a victor's list. They are both, owing to their presence on architectural members, connected with the theater. If one asks why an *agonothetes* would have chosen the theater as the object of his munificence, the most obvious answer is that the theater was the site of the competitions over which he had presided. Even greater weight can be given to this conclusion. J. M. Fossey has found a classical inscription (yet unpublished) apparently belonging to the theater at Orchomenos, listing the various dedications to Dionysos of an *agonothetes.*[12] Such theater dedications are common in Boiotia, as can be seen from the theater of the Amphiareion at Oropos. There an *agonothetes* dedicated the *proskenion* and *pinakes* to Amphiaraos.[13] Another architrave block from this theater bore an inscription dedicating the *skene* to Amphiaraos.[14] Nor was this custom peculiarly Boiotian. In Anatolia the theater at Patara bore a similar inscription on the *proskenion,* in which two different people took credit for dedicating the

[10] E.g., *IG* 7.3103.5, 4147.1; cf. also 3091.2.

[11] Cf. index of *IG* 7; the restoration was suggested by Professor Schachter in a letter of 12 December 1982. Several other possibilities also exist. Names beginning with Ἰνο- seem to be nonexistent in Boiotia.

[12] J. M. Fossey, *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia* (Diss.: Lyon 1976) 611.19, cited by Schachter (note 2 above) 180.

[13] Cf. E. Fiechter, *Das Theater in Oropos* (Stuttgart 1930) 15.

[14] Fiechter (note 13 above) 18; cf. *IG* 7.423.

proskenion, logeion, the eleventh step of the *diazoma,* and the awnings of the theater.[15]

In short, these inscriptions, so typical of Greek usage, prove that the musical and dramatic elements of the Charitesia were held in the newly unearthed theater at Orchomenos. This site was physically appropriate to these competitions, all the more so since the theater stood next to the sanctuary of the Graces, who were being honored.[16]

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Appendix: Unrelated Inscriptions

1. A seat in the *cavea* of the theater at Orchomenos bears the letters POΣ. The block, of gray limestone, is reused. The lettering is irregular, with small serifs. The P is slightly higher than the O, which in turn is slightly higher than the Σ. The letters average 14 cm in height and 13 cm in width.

2. In the yard of the church at Skripou is a funerary inscription bearing the name ΞΕΝΟΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ, broken after the final A.[17] The letters, with serifs, are 3.2 cm in height and 2.3 cm in width. The arms of the K begin well below the upright stroke. The bars of the alphas could almost be called broken, were they not rounded. Of gray marble, the stone is 106 cm in height and 53 cm in width. It is decorated with a cornice molding and a molded base.

3. Also in the yard of the church at Skripou is another funerary inscription, badly weathered. Carved on a block of gray marble adorned with a pediment and *akroterion* above the name, the inscription reads

ΚΑΠΩΝΧΑ
Ρ . . . [ΧΑ]ΙΡΕ

The stone is 145 cm in height and 48 cm in width. The letters of the first line, which are easily read, average 5.0 cm in height and 4.7 cm in

[15] Cf. C. C. Vermeule, *Roman Imperial Art in Greece and Asia Minor* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 272–73, who discusses this inscription and the implications of such dedications.

[16] These findings may also support Schachter's suggestion (note 2 above, 144) about the connections among Dionysos, the Homoloia, and the Charites at Orchomenos.

[17] For a Boiotian Ξενοκράτεα, see *IG* 7.1622, and for an example outside of Boiotia, *SEG* 2.310. For Ξενοκράτεια, neither from Boiotia, cf. *SEG* 23.333, 24.259.

width. The smaller letters of the second line, which average 2.5 cm in height and 2.0 cm in width, are quite faint. The letters of both lines exhibit pronounced serifs, all of them rather clumsy, and the Π in the first line is considerably elongated. Both alphas in the first line have the broken bar. The name Κάπων is very common in Boiotia.[18]

4. In a field immediately south of ancient Haliartos lies a funerary inscription, which reads

ΑΓ
ΑΘ
vacat

The inscription dates from the Roman Empire to judge by the broken-bar alphas. The stone is 99 cm in length, with a dressed frontal surface of 48 cm from the top. It is 35 cm in width and 30 cm thick. The letters average 9 cm in height. On the top surface of the stone is an odd cutting, perhaps for a funerary ornament.

Although an abbreviated name on a funerary inscription seems quite odd, there is no sign of lettering below the second line. Perhaps the stone has been reused. While the name Ἀγάθων is probably the likeliest restoration, too many other possibilities exist to allow certainty.[19]

[18] Cf. the index of *IG* 7, s.v. Κάπων, and *SEG* 3.368; 22.391, 410; 23.291; and P. Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (Paris 1982) 467.

[19] Cf. the index of *IG* 7, s.v. Ἀγάθων. The index reveals other names ranging from Ἀγαθά to Ἀγαθώνυμος.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HORACE, *ODES* 1.5*

Quis multa gracilis te puer in rosa
perfusus liquidis urget odoribus
grato, Pyrrha, sub antro?
cui flavam religas comam,

simplex munditiis? heu quotiens fidem
mutatosque deos flebit et aspera
nigris aequora ventis
emirabitur insolens,

qui nunc te fruitur credulus aurea,
qui semper vacuam, semper amabilem,
sperat, nescius aurae
fallacis! miseri, quibus

intemptata nites. me tabula sacer
votiva paries indicat uvida
suspendisse potenti
vestimenta maris deo.

The first three stanzas of *Odes* 1.5 present the reader with a number of questions. Who is the speaker, and what relationship does he have with Pyrrha? How does he know so much about her and the fate of her lover, whose identity appears to arouse the speaker's curiosity as much as ours? Is the conversation that is implied by the speaker's queries real, or is it imagined in soliloquy? The answers generally given to these questions have produced a critical consensus which may be summarized easily.[1] The reader learns in the last stanza that the speaker is Horace—at

* I am grateful to Professors David Ross, Richard Thomas, and David Porter and to the anonymous reader for *AJP* for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] See J. W. Mackail, "A Lesson on an Ode of Horace," *CR* 35 (1921) 2–7; S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace: A Critical Study* (New Haven 1962) 51–52, 66–69, 144–45; K. Quinn, "Horace as a Love Poet," *Arion* 2.3 (1963) 59–77; V. Pöschl, "Die Pyrrhaode des Horaz," *Hommages J. Bayet*, Coll. Latomus 80 (1964) 579–86; E. A. Fredricksmeyer, "Horace's Ode to Pyrrha (*Carm.* 1.5)," *CP* 60 (1965) 180–85; D. West, *Reading Horace* (Edinburgh 1967) 100–07; M. Putnam, "Horace's *Carm.* 1.5: Love and Death," *CP* 65 (1970) 251–54; H. P. Syndikus, *Die Lyrik des Horaz: Eine Interpretation der Oden* (Darmstadt 1972) Band I, 79–85 (= Impulse der Forschung, Band 6); R. O. A. M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets from Catullus to Horace* (Oxford 1980) 217–22; cf. R. Storrs, *Ad Pyrrham* (London 1959).

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least, Horace in his poetic persona—and that the poet was once like the *gracilis puer* in that he, too, sailed the seas of Pyrrha's love. This experience explains Horace's present interest in Pyrrha and in her latest victim, whose exact identity finally does not matter, and it explains the poet's ability wryly to predict the future of their affair. Whatever its precise nature, the conversation implied in the poem has been staged for the benefit of the readers, who are to imagine themselves as eavesdroppers on this conversation and as fellows with Horace in a kind of make-believe voyeurism.

Approaching the poem from the point of view established by this interpretive framework, critics have analyzed its imagery, tone, and other characteristics with great sensitivity and success. *Odes* 1.5 may, however, offer itself to be approached from other points of view as well, especially since Horace frequently provides several vantage points for those readers who are willing to contemplate subtle possibilities and to adopt perspectives at which he has only hinted. I will explore this poem from the vantage points suggested by certain literary conceits in it and by parallels between it and Roman painting. The perspectives that I will adopt, despite their apparent boldness, merely enhance the usual framework for interpreting the poem.

The ode's affinities to dedicatory epigrams have not gone unnoticed,[2] but its strict adherence to the form deserves closer attention than it has received, particularly in light of the relation between this poem and *Odes* 3.26, an undisputed dedicatory verse whose affinities to *Odes* 1.5 several critics have remarked upon.[3] The dedicatory epigrams in the *Palatine Anthology*, especially in Book 6, have several or all of the following characteristics: (1) the god is named; (2) reference is made to the place where the dedication has been placed, usually a god's temple; (3) the object which has been dedicated is cited and is often described in detail; (4) events or a story associated with the dedication are recounted, sometimes at length; and (5) the dedicator is named and sometimes a reason is given for the dedication (e.g., gratitude, retirement, desire for a favor). The dedicator may be referred to in the first, second,

[2] Nisbet and Hubbard, Kiessling-Heinze.

[3] W. Wili, *Horaz* (Basil 1948) 182; H. Dettmer, "The Structural Pattern of Horace's Odes" (Diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1976) 80, note 55; Pöschl (note 1 above) 585–86. See also C. P. Jones, *"Tange Chloen Semel Arrogantem," HSCP* 75 (1971) 81–83, and T. C. W. Stinton, "Horatian Echoes," *Phoenix* 31 (1977) 164–68; in spite of their very different interpretations of 3.26, Jones and Stinton both acknowledge the relation between it and 1.5.

or third person, or in some combination thereof; often the dedicated object is presented as the speaker, and in a few instances the tablet itself is made "to speak."

Odes 1.5 bears all the marks of a dedicatory epigram. The god is named, however ambiguously (*potenti maris deo*), the place where the dedication has been placed is indicated (*sacer paries*), reference is made to dedicated objects (*tabula votiva, vestimenta*), and a story associated with the dedication is related (in the first three stanzas). The tablet, or rather the sacred wall by means of the tablet, technically speaks for the dedicator (*me*),[4] who gives the reason for his dedication in the last stanza: he is grateful to have been rescued from a stormy love affair.[5] As in a number of Hellenistic epigrams, especially those that recount at some length the events leading up to a dedication, the identifying marks of a dedicatory verse appear only near the end of this poem, and their postponement contributes to the epigrammatic twist that the last sentence provides.[6]

Since the story related in a dedicatory epigram should be associated closely with the experience that has prompted the dedication, Horace must be drawing his description of Pyrrha's present victim, and of the course their affair will take, directly from his own experiences with her: the poet has projected his own story upon the *gracilis puer*. As the young man will do in his turn, no doubt, when he has had enough of Pyrrha's duplicity and bad temper, Horace vowed (cf. *votiva*) at the height of the "storm" from which the god rescued him that he would make this offering if he should survive.[7]

[4] Cf. *A.P.* 6.97, 214.

[5] Horace is not retiring altogether from love affairs, however. Sailors who make a dedication in gratitude for surviving a storm do not thereby claim to be changing their line of work (cf. Quinn [note 1 above] 76). Dedications marking retirement usually involve the tools of one's trade, and the inscriptions accompanying them state the retirement explicitly or refer, for instance, to the dedicator's old age (e.g., *A.P.* 6.1, 4, 25, 70).

[6] Cf. *A.P.* 6.203, 217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 237, 245.

[7] Cf. the vow made by a sailor at the height of a storm in *A.P.* 6.245. In *Odes* 1.5, *mutatos deos* (6) suggests not only the change in the gods' attitude toward the youth in his affair with Pyrrha, but also the change from land to sea and consequently from the god who has charge of the former realm to the god who holds sway in the latter. *Mutatos deos* thereby prefigures the ambiguity in the phrase *potenti maris deo* (15–16), which may refer to Venus as well as to Neptune: the masculine form does not exclude a female goddess, and the Greek amatory epigrams that play on the dual aspects of Aphrodite (goddess of love and of the sea) create a context which encourages Horace's readers to think of Venus here (see *A.P.* 5.11, 17, 235; Kiessling-Heinze *ad* 1.5.1). Since this is a fanciful dedicatory verse, Horace need not make his dedication to a clearly specified god but can mix his metaphors of sailors and lovers to the last word of the poem.

The parallel positions of the words *me* and *te,* however, underscore the contrast between Horace and the *gracilis puer,* for their parallelism stresses that the poet now enjoys a status equal to, and independent of, Pyrrha. Moreover, the antithesis between *miseri* and *me* emphasizes the differences between Horace and the whole throng of her hapless admirers.[8] In the very act of making his dedication, the poet proudly advertises his hard-won independence and proves that he has extricated himself from any involvement with Pyrrha. He is therefore justified in distinguishing himself not only from the wretched men who, like the slender youth, have yet to learn her true nature, but also from the foolish lover that he once was.[9] Nevertheless, the mixture of sympathy and gentle condescension which Horace exhibits toward the *gracilis puer* he extends, implicitly, to his former self. This attitude is characteristic of the witty self-irony in which Horace regularly indulges, in the *Odes* and elsewhere: he often detaches himself from the very situations in which he is most involved and includes himself among those whose foibles he fondly records and gently knocks.

Horace's display of allusiveness and subtlety in *Odes* 1.5 invites our further scrutiny of the poem. This scrutiny is especially justified since Horace often reveals a complex scene to the readers gradually and by unobtrusive clues.[10] Many commentators since Porphyrio have recognized that the phrase *tabula votiva* refers to a dedicatory picture, but the implications of this reference deserve to be explored more fully.[11]

[8] See Kiessling-Heinze.

[9] Thus much more irony informs the contrasts between Horace and the *gracilis puer* than is generally realized. On these contrasts see especially Fredricksmeyer (note 1 above), whose observations require emendation on only one major point. Citing *quotiens . . . emirabitus insolens,* he claims that, while the poet has learned his lesson, the youth probably will never learn his (184; cf. Putnam [note 1 above] 252, 254). But these words do not necessarily mean that the youth will never be able to free himself from Pyrrha, only that it will take many storms to persuade him that her lovely seas are not worth the storms which they entail. Presumably, Horace also experienced many storms before he finally called on the gods to free him from Pyrrha altogether. Horace claims to be the survivor not of a single storm but of the whole affair (cf. F. Villeneuve, *Horace, Odes et Epodes,* Tome 1 [Paris 1927] and Jones [note 3 above] 82).

[10] Gordon Williams calls this the poet's technique of gradual revelation: *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 208–10. Cf. E. Fraenkel on *Epode* 16 in *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 42 ff.

[11] Porphyrio *ad v.* 13: *videmus autem hodieque pingere in tabulis quosdam casus quos in mari passi sunt, atque in fanis marinorum deorum ponere;* Lewis and Short on *tabula* in 1.5.13 (*s.v.* H): *"A votive tablet* (on which a shipwreck was painted)." See also Pöschl (note 1 above) 582, Nisbet and Hubbard, Kiessling-Heinze, T. E. Page, and the citations at note 13 below.

Horace need not mention the picture simply in order to meet the requirements of a dedicatory epigram, since his references to the sacred wall, and to the mariner's clothing dedicated to a god, would be sufficient for that purpose.[12] Yet in this finely precise and economical poem Horace not only refers to the picture but even draws attention to it, through his careful phrasing of the last sentence. His use of the ablative of means in a periphrastic construction is more arresting than would be the more straightforward, "The votive tablet on the sacred wall shows that I. . . ." Furthermore, the arrangement of words in the last sentence achieves striking visual effects. The two pairs of interlocking adjectives and nouns on both sides of the verb *indicat* create a symmetry suggestive of a picture or picture gallery, and since no adjective appears in the same line with the noun it modifies, the words seem to be suspended, like the clothes which Horace mentions and like the pictures on a temple wall. Thus the poet invites us to pretend that we are standing before the temple wall on which the *tabula votiva* hangs, and that the poem we are reading is inscribed on the same tablet, perhaps beneath the picture.[13] Since Horace has urged us to use our visual imaginations, we might explore the possibility that we can "see" the picture hanging right before our eyes.

The poem itself may enable us to do so. Since it otherwise bears all the marks of a dedicatory epigram, *Odes* 1.5 may well contain one further element that such poems sometimes included: a description of the dedicated object (see no. 3 above, page 55). Indeed, the vivid pictorial effects of this poem, although many of them are standard devices, are remarkable for their density and power.[14] More remarkable, perhaps, are the close parallels between the pictorial effects in *Odes* 1.5 and the characteristics of paintings contemporary with it.

In wall-paintings, which constitute most of the visual evidence from the last half of the first century, seascapes, idyllic landscapes,

[12] Since rescued sailors often dedicated other objects even when they had already offered up their clothing (*Aen.* 12.768–69), Horace's double offering is not surprising—if indeed he actually refers to two offerings. He does not, however, necessarily say that he has dedicated his clothes to the god, for his phrasing of the last sentence may indicate only that, *like* a sailor who has survived a marine disaster, he has weathered the stormy seas of Pyrrha's love.

[13] Cf. Wili (note 3 above) 249, Fredricksmeyer (note 1 above) 183, and especially Commager (note 1 above) 52.

[14] Mackail (note 1 above) 5; Quinn (note 1 above) 64–65, 67; Commager (note 1 above) 59, 69; Nisbet and Hubbard; cf. M. O. Lee, *Word, Sound and Image in the Odes of Horace* (Ann Arbor 1969) 11–14, and H. Darnley Naylor, *Horace, Odes and Epodes: A Study in Poetic Word Order* (Cambridge 1922) 14–15.

sacral-idyllic scenes, gardens, and panoramic views are enormously popular, and the figures often placed in these settings tend to remain subordinate to their surroundings, or only of equal importance.[15] The painters achieve striking impressionistic effects, through special techniques of brushwork and through experiments in spatiality and perspective, in the play of light and shadow, and in the creative use of color. These effects often create a distinct atmosphere, of storminess or of pastoral calm, for instance.[16]

Odes 1.5 achieves remarkable impressionistic and atmospheric effects through literary devices that include the pictorial arrangement of words and the use of terms which suggest colors, contrasts in light and shadow, and the texture of surfaces. The complex elaboration of intermingled metaphors gives the impression that the landscape and the people in it somehow move in and out of one another, and in general the people in the poem derive their characters largely from their natural surroundings.[17] The painters create a vivid impression of a scene by depicting a few carefully chosen details; Horace follows the same procedure in his poem, and, significantly, he chooses details that

[15] On Roman and Hellenistic painting see M. Borda, *La Pittura Romana*, Le Grandi Civilta' Pittoriche 5 (Milan 1958); R. Brilliant, *Roman Art from the Republic to Constantine* (London 1974); C. M. Dawson, *Romano-Campanian Mythological Landscape Painting* (= *YCS* 9, 1944); C. M. Havelock, *Hellenistic Art* (Greenwich, Conn.); Amadeo Maiuri, *Roman Painting*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Geneva 1953); E. Pfuhl, *Masterpieces of Greek Drawing and Painting*, trans. J. D. Beazley (London 1926); G. Picard, *Roman Painting*, Pallas Library of Art, vol. iv (Greenwich, Conn. 1968); J. J. Pollitt, *The Art of Rome c. 753 B.C.–337 A.D.: Sources and Documents*, Sources and Documents in the History of Art Series, ed. H. W. Janson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966); M. Robertson, *A History of Greek Art*, 2 vol. (Cambridge 1975); D. Strong, *Roman Art*, prepared for press by J. M. C. Toynbee (Middlesex 1980); T. B. L. Webster, *Hellenistic Poetry and Art* (New York 1964).

[16] Although Horace's *tabula* presumably would have been an easel-painting, wall-paintings provide legitimate parallels for his picture. Easel-paintings enjoyed a higher status and were frequently copied by the muralists, who painted frames around their pictures, painted picture-hangers on the wall, and used other devices to present wall-paintings in the guise of easel-paintings (Brilliant [note 15 above] 149, 202; Maiuri [note 15 above] 105; Picard [note 15 above] 47). In any case, the distinction between the two kinds of paintings is not always easy to make, since wall-paintings include not only frescoes but wooden panels, painted on an easel and then inserted into the walls (Brilliant [note 15 above] 149; Maiuri [note 15 above] 14). For valuable remarks about tablet-painting on walls, see Borda (note 15 above) 177–79. Horace finally makes the distinction between the two kinds of painting irrelevant since he invites comparison of his *tabula* with a wall-painting (see note 21 below).

[17] On word order, metaphors, and imagery in the poem, see especially Commager, Fredricksmeyer, Quinn, Pöschl (note 1 above), Nisbet and Hubbard, Kiessling-Heinze, and Lee and Naylor (note 14 above).

recall favorite motifs in paintings. Nymphs and goddesses often dally in grottoes,[18] for instance, and floral decorations both adorn the borders of pictures and fill idyllic landscapes.[19] Ships grace many seascapes, calm and stormy, while temples or shrines find their way into all sorts of paintings. Even the subject of Horace's poem is a favorite among the painters, who delight in depicting amorous adventures.[20]

Odes 1.5 may share further characteristics of paintings contemporary with it. Many of the wall-paintings from the later phase of the Second Style (which ended at about 20–15 B.C.) create the illusion that the wall on which they are painted is broken down or broken through, and the viewer is led to imagine that he is actually looking into another room, into a courtyard, or upon a scene outdoors, often an impressive vista. Horace's poem similarly invites us to gaze at our leisure on scenes of which we are not a part but which we view from some safe yet unrestricted vantage point. One of the chief means by which painters create the illusion of breaking down the surface of the wall is to paint columns and other architectural details which suggest spatial depth and simultaneously create the architectural setting from and within which the spectator views the scene depicted. In the last stanza of his

[18] A votive relief from Mr. Pentelikon (ca. 300 B.C.) depicts a peaceful and idyllic scene with three nymphs, Hermes, Pan, and the dedicator in the entrance to a cave (see Havelock [note 15 above] 197 and illustration 163); on similar Greek reliefs and the importance of the landscape element in them, see Robertson (note 15 above) 375. Webster, (note 15 above) 162–68, discusses the Alexandrian elaboration of this old tradition, which persisted in Rome. A wall-painting in the Casa di Sallustio, Domus A. Cossi Libani (Pompeii), for instance, shows Artemis bathing in a pool set in a rocky grotto, as Acteon looks on (see Dawson [note 15 above] 96–97, pl. 35).

[19] Floral decorations provide borders for both Roman paintings and reliefs, while flowers abound in garden scenes and other settings (for instance, in wall-paintings from the Villa of Livia at Prima Porta, the House of Livia on the Palatine, and the House of Fannius Sinistor at Boscoreale). The combination of bowers with caves or grottoes was very popular in Hellenistic and Roman art: see Webster, (note 15 above) 163–64, who, by way of example, describes a late fourth century Corinthian mirror that shows a nymph washing her hair in a cave, in the entrance of which wreaths and fillets hang, while plants grow from the floor; cf. a picture in the cubiculum of the villa at Boscoreale in which the bower and grotto are combined (illust. in Borda [note 15 above] 33).

[20] See especially Maiuri (note 15 above, 27–31, 77, 79, 81, and esp. 108 ff.) on the relation between the amorous themes of the painters and the witty epigrams of the Alexandrian poets. A number of wall-paintings from the late Republic and early empire depict a man and a woman embracing and suggest the pose that Pyrrha and the *gracilis puer* might strike; see, for example, Apollo and Daphne (from the House of the Dioscuri, Pompeii, fig. 129 in Pfuhl), Neptune and a nymph (from Stabiae, pl. LX in Picard), and a number of pictures reproduced by Borda (note 15 above) 62, 130, 236, 251; cf. an ecphrastic poem of a painting in which Ares and Aphrodite embrace (*A.P.* 9.591).

poem, Horace "paints" the architectural setting in which we are to look at the picture on his votive tablet.[21]

The pictorial effects of *Odes* 1.5 suggest that, since Horace plays with a number of well-established *topoi* in this poem,[22] he may also be having his fun with the literary commonplace of ecphrasis.[23] Ecphrastic dedicatory epigrams of the *Palatine Anthology* often introduce an explicit reference to the offerings which they presumably accompany only *after* describing them, while other ecphrastic epigrams may not contain any such reference, and the reader is expected to infer the existence of the object. In either case, the process of imaginative inference and reconstruction provides much of the pleasure derived from reading these poems. Horace would therefore be doing nothing unusual in *Odes* 1.5 if he should introduce only in the last stanza, and then somewhat coyly, an explicit reference to a dedicatory picture that he has been describing. Moreover, in some dedicatory poems in the *Anthology*, the description of the dedicated object serves simultaneously as the means of recounting the events associated with the offering,[24] and two identifying marks of dedicatory epigrams are thereby combined (see nos. 3 and 4 above, page 55). Thus, the story told by Horace in his

[21] On illusionism generally, see especially Dawson (note 15 above) 58–67 and Borda (note 15 above) 19–54. The effects in *Odes* 1.5 suggest the ambivalence of certain Third Style paintings which "evince the visual implications of a conception of the wall as being there and not there simultaneously" (Brilliant [note 15 above] 152): Horace both invites us into a scene and then reminds us of the wall on which the picture hangs (cf. the early first century A.D. wall-painting from the Casa del Frutteto, Pompeii, reproduced by Brilliant, 153). The architectural trompe l'oeil effects in Horace's poem invite comparison of his tablet to a wall-painting (see note 16 above).

[22] For instance the storm of love, the comparison of a woman to the sea, the dual aspects of Venus as goddess of love and of the sea, the man who returns to a lover whom he knows he should leave. These conceits, some found as early as Semonides, are found in profusion in *A.P.* Book 5 (amatory epigrams). See also Lyne's observations (note 1 above) 221.

[23] On the tremendous importance and vitality of ecphrasis, see J. W. Mackail, *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology* (London 1890) 47–50. Two collections by Gow and Page provide excellent commentary on a variety of ecphrastic epigrams: *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams*, 2 vol. (Cambridge 1965), and *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip*, 2 vol. (Cambridge 1968). On the interaction between literature and the visual arts in Hellenistic Greece, see especially Webster (note 15 above); in Augustan Rome, E. W. Leach, *Vergil's Eclogues: Landscapes of Experience* (Ithaca 1974) 70–112, 263–76; S. Silberberg-Pierce, "Politics and Private Imagery: The Sacral-Idyllic Landscapes in Augustan Art," *Art History* 3.3 (Sept. 1980) 241–51. This interaction persisted through Lucian, Apuleius, and notably Philostratus: see particularly the *Imagines* of Philostratus the Elder.

[24] E.g., *A.P.* 6.203, 217, 218, 220, 221, 228, 237, 245.

poem may also contain a description of his votive picture. Or to put it another way, Horace may tell this story in part by describing his votive picture.[25]

Several modern commentators have followed Porphyrio in envisioning a shipwreck or similar marine disaster on the votive tablet.[26] This picture is a plausible candidate because of actual practices among ancient sailors and because the second stanza presents a vivid description of a young man aboard a ship that is being tossed about on stormy seas. Furthermore, the poem as a whole would then conform in important respects to the conventions of ecphrastic epigrams. In many of these, the epigrammist provides subtle commentary on a scene as he describes it by drawing attention to specific details and by interjecting emotional exclamations.[27] He may also discuss events or scenes which, even though they are not actually represented, are relevant to the story which the object depicts or commemorates, and the viewers/readers thereby receive a larger context in which to interpret the scene before them.[28] If the second stanza of *Odes* 1.5 describes Horace's votive tablet, then the poet provides commentary on this picture by drawing attention to the young man's surprise and dismay and by describing the storm in terms that stress the contrast between the young man's present and future experiences of Pyrrha.[29] Horace also arouses our sympathy and amusement through his dramatic exclamation beginning *heu quotiens*. In the first and third stanzas he relates the background to the events actually

[25] Such a procedure would not have been without precedent in Latin poetry. Williams, (note 10 above) 190 ff., argues that in *Carm.* 4, instead of telling his own story, Catullus allows the dedicated ship to tell its story, and Catullus' only by implication. Williams argues further that *Carm.* 4 should be imagined as a description of a painting, even though the poem contains only the gentlest hints that it is ecphrastic.

[26] Lewis and Short, Nisbet and Hubbard, T. E. Page, Kiessling-Heinze. For Porphyrio, see note 11 above.

[27] E.g., Antipater of Thessalonika describes a painting (or perhaps a statue-group) in which Niobe is the subject: "Why, woman, have you raised your shameless head to Olympus, letting your godlike hair fall from your godless head? Seeing Leto's great wrath, o mother of many, bewail now your bitter and wrong-headed strife!" (*A.P.* 16.133.1–4). Frequently the epigrammists address the spectator, even calling out "Look!" as they draw attention to specific details (see especially *A.P.* Book 16).

[28] In *A.P.* 16.133, for instance (see note 27 above), Antipater refers to events preceding the scene actually depicted when he mentions Leto's wrath and Niobe's wrongheaded strife, and he concludes the epigram by telling Niobe that she will become a lifeless rock, worn out by care. Cf. *A.P.* 6.221 by Leonidas of Tarentum and Catullus, *Carm.* 4 (see note 25 above).

[29] For instance, "the seas rough with black winds," as opposed to the bright colors and calm weather suggested by *rosa, Pyrrha, flavam, aurea, nites, vacuam, aurae.*

depicted, and in the fourth he provides further relevant information. The poet thereby gives a fuller context in which to interpret the picture: the storm which we "see" before us is a metaphor (an allegory, really) for the hazards of love and specifically for the hazards of a love-affair with Pyrrha.

If the second stanza of *Odes* 1.5 is ecphrastic, the picture it describes nonetheless remains a dedication erected by Horace. Since this picture should depict the very storm which its dedicator has survived, the poet himself must be the man whom we actually see aboard the storm-tossed ship. In the poem, however, Horace envisions another man riding such a ship, and he thereby establishes a link between himself and the *gracilis puer*. The future tense (*flebit, emirabitur*) assures us that the slender man of the poem will soon experience the events that we see depicted in the picture; simultaneously, we realize that the man in the picture—that is, Horace—has experienced not only this storm but also the events related in the first stanza and further discussed in the third. By the time we reach the last sentence, we understand fully the history behind the poet's dedication. Locating the description of the picture in the second stanza leads to the same conclusion reached by reading the poem simply as a dedicatory verse: in the inscription, Horace imaginatively projects all of his own experiences with Pyrrha onto another man.

Although Horace's votive tablet may contain the scene described in the second stanza, several conventions of ecphrastic epigrams suggest an alternative interpretation. Poems in the *Anthology* generally use the present tense, rather than the future, for describing the scene actually depicted. Moreover, the epigrammist frequently addresses statements or poses questions to a figure in the work he is describing as a dramatically effective means of guiding the spectators and enriching their appreciation.[30] Thus Horace may well be describing the scene depicted on his tablet in lines 1–5 (*quis . . . munditiis*) and in 9–13 (*qui . . . nites*): on a bright and balmy day, in the middle of a glen or grotto that is overarched and filled by roses, an alluring woman is in a passionate embrace with a slender young man. Horace addresses Pyrrha, that is, the woman in the picture, and he interrogates her not because he is ignorant of her lover's identity, but because he wants to guide the spectators through the picture in a lively fashion. In lines 5–8 (*heu*

[30] In *A.P.* 16.133, for instance (see notes 27 and 28 above), Antipater uses the present tense for the scene actually depicted and the future for describing Niobe's metamorphosis into a rock. Antipater addresses and interrogates Niobe in this epigram; cf. *A.P.* 9.338; 16.131, 134, 137, 141, 144, 157, 171, 195–97, 201, 231, 251, 318.

. . *insolens*), and to some extent perhaps in 12–13 (*miseri . . . nites*), the poet interjects observations outside of the picture but highly relevant to it. With consternation he informs the viewers that a storm will transform the peaceful scene actually depicted and that other lovers (*miseri*) lurk in the wings, in a corner of the picture or just outside the frame. The poet thereby warns that Pyrrha's shining beauty, now enjoyed by the *gracilis puer*, also attracts other men who will prompt her to betray the youth. The information about events outside the picture, together with the subtle commentary implicit in the poet's exclamations, in the details he focuses upon, and in the imagery he uses, provides the spectators with an ominous context in which to interpret the happy scene before them.

This scenario dispenses altogether with the device of projection. Since the picture should record events which its dedicator has lived through and which have motivated his dedication, the poet must be identified with the *gracilis puer*, of the picture and of the poem. He answers his own questions (*quis puer? cui?*) with an epigrammatic irony, wholly appropriate to the last stanza of this poem, in the word *me*.[31] Nevertheless, although Horace was once none other than the *gracilis puer*, he is a new man now. *Odes* 1.5 marks the end of his affair with Pyrrha, and, wiser now, the poet can pointedly distinguish himself from the wretched men for whom Pyrrha still holds allure. Like Odysseus entertaining the Phaeacians in the last stage of his journey home, Horace proves that he has put the past behind him because he is able to recount that past. He has even advanced to the point where he can recall with affection the happier days of his relationship with Pyrrha and find some amusement in the naiveté of which he was once capable.

Although both of the possibilities outlined thus far conform well to the conventions of ecphrastic poetry, neither is fully satisfying. If the second stanza is ecphrastic, Horace employs tenses in a manner uncharacteristic of ecphrastic epigrams, while the first and third stanzas would describe a scene unusual for dedications made in gratitude for surviving an unpleasant event.[32] There may, however, be another can-

[31] In terms of the overall structure of the poem, the final sentence (*me . . . deo*) corresponds to the interrogative sentences in 1–5, for together they reiterate the contrast between "before" and "after" which appears in the stanzas they embrace. In fact, the first four and a half and the last three and a half lines could form a two-stanza poem.

[32] Horace may, of course, intentionally and playfully be varying convention by commemorating his disastrous affair with a scene from its happier days. Even this scene is ominous because of the larger context in which he puts it, his use of such words as

didate for Horace's votive picture. It might contain a continuous narrative and include both scenes suggested by the first three stanzas. The Romans displayed from an early date a marked interest in depicting continuous narratives, and they often provided a continuous landscape or seascape to unify a composition, particularly one presenting distinct episodes in a story.[33] From the late Republic and early Empire come a number of large-scale continuous friezes, while many small paintings also employ the continuous style.[34] Paintings often combine landscape and seascape. Pictures recording the stories of Daedalus and Icarus, Polyphemus and Galatea, and Perseus and Andromeda, for instance, set distinct episodes in each realm.[35] Narrative clarity is frequently achieved by a device that also enhances the unity of the composition: the repetition of a figure or figures from one scene to the next.

The complexity in the composition of many of these pictures indicates that Roman painters would have had little difficulty in depicting both episodes in the story that Horace's poem tells, although the variety in their composition does not provide us with a single model for his picture. We might imagine the lower-left portion to present Pyrrha and the man embracing in a rose-filled glen or grotto; near the middle of the picture the land of this scene might meet the sea, and in the distance (perhaps in the upper right) we could see a storm-tossed ship carrying the repeated figure of the *gracilis puer*. A very different picture is also possible. The grotto scene might dominate the center and the foreground of the picture, while in the distance, on the sea as it spreads out toward the top of the painting, we might see the ship with its passenger in much distress. It is even possible that the storm scene might dominate, although both the greater detail in which the earlier episode is described and the poet's use of the present tense in

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sperat and *fallacis*, and his use of sea imagery to describe it (e.g., *urget*, cf. *Odes*, 2.10.2; *intemptata*, cf. *Odes* 3.4.31, 3.2.22, Verg. *Ecl.* 4.32; *nites*). He may also intend some humor in the image of himself as *gracilis*.

[33] On continuous narratives in Roman landscape paintings, see Dawson (note 15 above) *passim*, especially 180–99; Brilliant (note 15 above) 189–92, 228; Picard (note 15 above) 8–23.

[34] Among the former are the Odyssey frieze and friezes at the Villa of the Mysteries at Pompeii, the Villa Farnesina in Rome, and the Villa of Fannius Sinistor at Boscoreale. Dawson reproduces a number of smaller paintings in the continuous style. Most of these are Third Style paintings and later than 30–23 B.C., but the House of Menander (ca. 30–20 B.C.), for instance, already contains panel-paintings depicting two episodes in the same picture (see Maiuri [note 15 above] 74–76).

[35] See Dawson's plates and his discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 (note 15 above).

the first and third stanzas seem to give the peaceful scene on land greater prominence.

If the entire first three stanzas describe Horace's votive tablet, then he asks questions of Pyrrha, a figure in one part of his painting, in order to guide the viewer, and in general he interjects exclamations, uses elaborate metaphors, and employs other forms of implicit and explicit commentary to enable us properly to interpret the picture. The poet answers his own questions about the identity of the *gracilis puer* with the word *me*. The complexity of a picture in the continuous style would have been unusual for a tablet painting dedicated by a sailor, but then Horace is no ordinary mariner, and the architectural trompe l'oeil effects of the last stanza should not lead us to expect that this is a humble tablet painting.

Since Horace almost certainly does not refer to a real votive picture, we may not be forced to choose between the possibilities that I have outlined but can simply enjoy contemplating them.[36] In any case, determining which of these scenarios might best conform to the conventions of ecphrastic epigrams may be less important than considering the larger effects of the ecphrastic devices in this dedicatory verse. By discussing his affair with Pyrrha through indirection and in a subtly elaborated context suggestive of votive paintings, their attendant inscriptions, and even wall paintings, Horace exaggerates the importance of the whole affair to the point of parody and thereby keeps himself at a safe distance from his own passions. Such ironic self-detachment is thoroughly characteristic of this poet.[37]

[36] There may be still another possibility. The picture might show either a man who is hanging up his drenched clothing on a temple wall or a temple wall already so adorned. (For such votive pictures and dedicatory epigrams meant to accompany them, see Havelock [note 15 above] pl. 163, 171; Robertson [note 15 above] 373–78; and *A.P.* 6.46, 151, 171, 208, 336). This picture would indicate that Horace has been rescued from the very condition to which the *gracilis puer* of the poem is about to be reduced, and Horace would be projecting his own story onto the slender young man. This scenario is not very attractive, however, because it deprives the picture of much interest and does not account for the presence of the characteristic devices of ecphrasis found in the first three stanzas. The ecphrastic devices in the fourth stanza are better attributed simply to their creating architectural trompe l'oeil effects.

[37] Cf. Commager's insightful comments (note 1 above, 155–56): "In poems as personal as the amatory Odes claim to be, we expect a direct relationship with the author, but Horace invites us to nothing more intimate than a triangular area of experience. . . . By hopelessly exaggerating an event's significance he makes it into a joke he shares with us. Only thus could he forestall possible mockery for giving to his feelings a disproportionate importance, for he knew that to laugh at oneself is the only guarantee of being laughed with as well as at."

By tantalizing us with the possibility that he describes the votive painting which this dedicatory verse should accompany, Horace also calls special attention to the poem's visual effects and suggests a context for interpreting them. The very success with which the entire poem actually recreates the impressionistic, atmospheric, and trompe l'oeil effects characteristic of paintings contemporary with it invites us to imagine that the poem itself is the picture, and that the page from which we read is the sacred wall on which the picture hangs. Viewing the poem not only as a dedicatory verse that describes a picture, but also as the very picture which it describes, would conform to Commager's observation: "Several of the Odes commemorating some person or object have a proleptic quality. . . . Certain poems, that is to say, which appear only to describe objectively some message, or to make some promise, turn out to be themselves the substance of that message, or the redemption of that promise."[38] Both the self-referential character of *Odes* 1.5 and the implied identity between the poem and a physical work of art prefigure on a small scale the larger design of which this ode is a part. In the last poem of the collection Horace will address his readers in the first person and with a confident directness, claiming that *Odes* 3.30 is an epigram attached to a *monumentum aere perennius*—the monument which is *Odes* 1–3.[39]

Kenneth Quinn has observed that "the words [*simplex munditiis*] could provide a serviceable judgment of the poetry [Horace] writes."[40] It is perhaps equally true that Horace's poetry shares another trait with Pyrrha, for it may be *fallax*, more than what it at first appears to be. While the standard approach to *Odes* 1.5 retains its force, the perspectives from which I have explored it suggest a darker and more cunning side to the poem's character. Like the lady herself, *Odes* 1.5 may be several

[38] Commager (note 1 above) 324. He considers *Odes* 1.5 specifically to be a poem of this type (see 324, n. 22) and suggests that the poem is a picture and that the page on which it is printed is the "sacred wall" (52).

[39] As one of the first nine poems that form a dazzling introduction to *Odes* 1–3, and as a poem that constitutes the picture it describes, *Odes* 1.5 prepares us for the poet's use of pictorial effects in other poems and for his careful arrangement of the poems in relation to one another: like pictures hung in a gallery, each of the odes has been assigned its proper place in relation to others. In calling the wall on which *Odes* 1.5 and the other poems hang *sacer*, Horace may anticipate his role as *Musarum sacerdos* (*Odes* 3.1.3) and as *vates* (see J. K. Newman, *Augustus and the New Poetry*, Coll. Latomus 88 [1967] and *The Concept of Vates in Augustan Poetry*, Coll. Latomus 89 [1967], and Commager [note 1 above] 13–20).

[40] Quinn (note 1 above) 69; cf. K. J. Reckford, *Horace* (New York 1969) 13, 97.

CONSTANTINE'S PROHIBITION OF PAGAN SACRIFICE

When he died on May 30, 339, Eusebius of Caesarea had not yet put the finishing touches to his *Life of Constantine:* another hand gave it to the world as Eusebius left it, with many obvious doublets, inelegancies, and other signs which reveal that its author had not completed his final revision.[1] The *Life of Constantine,* as it survives, represents a conflation of two literary genres, two conceptions, two drafts. The earlier was a conventional panegyric of the dead emperor; the other, which resembles Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History* in presentation and technique, is an account of Constantine as a Christian emperor, with an almost exclusive emphasis on his actions and policies in the religious sphere and with relevant documents quoted entire.

The central section of Book Two, between the defeat of Licinius (narrated in II.1–19) and the origins of the Arian controversy (described allusively and tendentiously in II.61–62), begins with a relic of the earlier draft. Eusebius summarizes legislation in favor of the Christians which Constantine enacted immediately after he defeated Licinius in 324 (II.20–22). There immediately supervenes, however, a long and homogeneous stretch of the *Life* which quotes the full text of the law just summarized, and summarizes other documents which Eusebius does not quote. It may be analyzed schematically as follows:

II.24–42 Letter of Constantine to the provincials of Palestine. Constantine expounds his view of his imperial mission to convert the Roman Empire to Christianity (24–29), orders the restitution of status and property to Christians who lost them under Licinius' anti-Christian legislation, or to relatives or the church in the case of martyrs (30–36), and ordains that all present owners of confiscated Christian property, including the imperial *fiscus,* shall surrender it with all speed (37–42).

II.43–46 43 Constantine's will was obeyed.

44 Constantine appointed mainly Christians to be provincial governors and forbade pagan governors the long-

[1] G. Pasquali, *Hermes* 46 (1910) 369 ff.; F. Winkelmann, *Eusebius Werke* 1.1 (Berlin *GCS,* 1975) liii ff.

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established custom of preceding official business with a sacrifice.

45 Next Constantine issued two laws: one forbade "the disgusting idolatry performed of old in cities and countryside," specifically the erection of cult-statues, consultation of oracles, and sacrifice (ὡς . . . μήτε μὴν θύειν καθόλου μηδένα), while the other ordered the building of new churches and enlarging of existing ones to receive converts to Christianity.

46 Letter of Constantine to Eusebius instructing him to enlarge existing churches or build new ones and to apply to imperial officials for funds.

II.47–60 Introduction to (47) and text of (48–60) a letter of Constantine to the eastern provincials.

The significance, even the meaning, of the last letter depends on its date and context. Eusebius expressly sets it later than the prohibition of sacrifice (47.1): hence its guarantee to the eastern provincials that they may retain possession of their "shrines of falsehood" should be less important than its total silence about their right or ability to perform ritual acts of sacrifice in pagan temples. On the assumption that Eusebius' report is reliable and accurate, it may be argued that in 324 Constantine established Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, and that he carried through a systematic and coherent reformation, at least in the eastern provinces which he conquered in 324 as a professed Christian in a Christian crusade against the last of the persecutors.[2]

* * *

Such was one of the main theses of a recent study of Constantine and Eusebius, whose interpretation of Constantine proceeded from the prohibition of sacrifice which Eusebius attests. A long and careful review by Dr. H. A. Drake contests both the overall interpretation of Constantine there advanced and the very existence of a prohibition of sacrifice, which is twice characterized as a "posited law."[3] A protest must be entered. In the normal meaning of words, a "posited law" is a law whose existence is posited, postulated, or assumed as a hypothesis

[2] *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 210 ff., 245 ff.

[3] *AJP* 103 (1982) 462–66.

to explain either other evidence or a historical situation which otherwise seems inexplicable. A "posited law" is by no means an apt description of a law whose existence Eusebius asserts in categorical and explicit terms. However, something more serious is at issue than Dr. Drake's use of words: did Constantine issue a prohibition of pagan sacrifice or not?

Eusebius, fortunately, does not stand alone. The Theodosian Code preserves a brief extract from an imperial constitution addressed in 341 to Crepereius Madalianus, the *vicarius* of Italy, which prescribes quick and appropriate punishment for anyone who "contra legem divi principis parentis nostri et hanc nostrae mansuetudinis iussionem ausus fuerit sacrificia celebrare" (*CTh* XVI.10.2). That might seem confirmation enough: not only Eusebius writing between 337 and 339 in Palestine, but also the emperor Constans in 341 affirm that Constantine forbade pagan sacrifice. In an earlier publication, Dr. Drake addressed himself to the law of 341: he seized on the fact that Constantine's law is not extant, construed it as "a curious lack of documentation," and argued that "it is permitted to wonder whether it is not another example of the method of tardy attribution that Constantine's sons engaged in rather freely."[4] In his review, Dr. Drake brings into play Libanius' claim, made in 386 or thereabouts, that Constantine "made absolutely no alteration in the traditional forms of worship" (*Orat.* XXX.6, trans. A. F. Norman), and he puts Libanius on the same level as Eusebius, since "neither statement is documented." He contends, moreover, that Eusebius cannot be believed: "his tendency to see everything through a pro-Christian filter is too well known for a statement this broad and general to be taken at face value."[5]

Such thoroughgoing skepticism about Eusebius is hard to refute. It should perhaps be left to defeat itself. However, two considerations deprive the skeptical arguments of almost all their force. First, the loss of Constantine's law prohibiting sacrifice is not in itself suspicious. There is a perfect parallel in Constantine's legislation on another subject. The lawyer and ecclesiastical historian Sozomenus had read three laws issued by Constantine on the manumission of slaves *in ecclesia* (*HE* I.9.6). But the Theodosian Code and the Justinianic Code preserve only two of Constantine's laws on the subject (*CJ* I.13.1; *CTh* IV.7.1 = *CJ* I.13.2), and it is the innovatory law first establishing *manumissio in*

[4] H. A. Drake, *In Praise of Constantine: A Historical Study and New Translation of Eusebius' Tricennial Orations* (Berkeley 1976) 150, n. 17.

[5] *AJP* 103 (1982) 465.

ecclesia as a valid legal form which has perished, even though it is clearly presupposed in the two extant laws.[6]

Second, Eusebius' failure to quote the law prohibiting sacrifice can readily be explained. Like the law prohibiting provincial governors, *vicarii* of dioceses, and praetorian prefects from sacrificing before they commenced official business (II.44), the prohibition of the erection of cult-statues, the consultation of oracles, and sacrifice on any occasion was probably enacted by letters addressed to imperial officials. Eusebius, therefore, had probably never seen a copy of the original law. He knew the law through the regulations which the praetorian prefect residing at Antioch or the governor of Palestine issued on receipt of Constantine's instructions in order to put them into effect. Eusebius could normally quote only those imperial documents whose text he possessed: his failure to quote a letter of Constantine to praetorian prefects or provincial governors is neither surprising nor suspicious, and it lay beyond the scope of the *Life of Constantine* to quote proclamations which prefects or governors issued in compliance with the emperor's orders.

It is hardly legitimate, moreover, to prefer Libanius to Eusebius, or even to regard his testimony as being of equal weight. Not only was Libanius writing nearly five decades after the death of Constantine and in an apologia addressed "to the emperor Theodosius on behalf of the temples," but he does manifestly exaggerate. Libanius does not claim merely that Constantine did not prohibit pagan sacrifice; he claims that he "made absolutely no alteration in the traditional forms of worship" apart from confiscating temple treasures. Even Dr. Drake concedes that Constantine forcibly suppressed some pagan cults, as Eusebius attests (*Panegyric to Constantine* 8.4 ff.).[7]

* * *

The point at issue is no trivial one. It concerns more than the validity of a modern interpretation of Constantine. It concerns the accuracy and probity of Eusebius of Caesarea, the most voluminous and most important surviving witness to the "Constantinian revolution."

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[6] *Constantine and Eusebius* (1981) 50 f. *CTh* IV.7.1 is unambiguously and unproblematically dated April 18, 321, while the correct date of *CJ* I.13.1 appears to be December 8, 316; cf. *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine* (Cambridge, Mass. 1982) 73.

[7] H. A. Drake, *In Praise of Constantine* (1976) 65 ff.

INTERPRETATIONS

HOMERIC AXPEION

In his paper on Penelope's laugh at *Od.* 18.158–68 (*AJP* 104:2, 172–78), D. Levine argues, I think convincingly, that the queen's laughter stems not from helplessness, confusion, or embarrassment, but rather from her triumphant and pleasurable recognition of her own cleverness in setting a *dolos* for the suitors. In passing, Levine touches on the controversy surrounding ἀχρεῖον in line 163 and lists the broad array of meanings, ancient and modern, proposed for the term describing Penelope's laugh: "pale, idle, inane, useless, helpless, needless, pointless, forced, silly, aimless, improper, artificial, ill-timed, fruitless, feigned, superficial, queer, and foolish."[1] The problem is considerably compounded by the fact that ἀχρεῖον occurs only once again in Homer in a very different context to describe Thersites' glance after he has been roundly thrashed by Odysseus:

ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἔζετο τάρβησέν τε,
ἀλγήσας δ' ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ.

(*Il.* 2.268–69)

The range of meanings offered for ἀχρεῖον here is quite as diverse and extensive as those put forward for the *Odyssey* passage: untimely, contorted, weak and humiliated, at a loss, helpless, silly and embarrassed, useless, stupid, ashamed, with a grimace, a forced meaningless look, deceptive.[2] As Levine remarks: "The soldier and the queen are worlds

[1] D. B. Levine, "Penelope's Laugh: *Odyssey* 18.163," *AJP* 104 (1983) 172–78.

[2] The Scholia (Erbse) offer: τὸ ἀσθενὲς καὶ βάρους μὴ μετέχον; ὀργιζομένου καὶ μὴ δυναμένου ἀμύνασθαι τὸ βλέμμα; ἀκαίρως ὑποβλέψας; τὸ πρόσωπον τοῖς δάκρυσιν ἀμορφώσας. Erbse also cites Apollonius Soph. 49, 20: ἀγεννές, εἰς οὐδεμίαν χρείαν ἐμβλέψας, ἢ σκυθρωπάσας καὶ οἷον διαστρέψας τὴν ὄψιν. Cf. Eustathius 217.36, and *Etymologicum Mag.* 182.41: ἀσθενῶς καὶ ταπεινῶς. A sampling of modern interpretations: J. U. Faesi, *Homers Iliade* (Berlin 1858): "ἀ. χ. bezeichnet die alberne und verlegene Miene dessen, der vor Scham nicht weiss, wo er sein Gesicht hinwenden soll, um keinen Blicken Anderer zu begegnen." A. Pierron, *L'Iliade d'Homère* (Paris 1883): "d'un air hébêté . . . qui n'est bon à rien, par conséquent, *stupide.*" K. F. Ameis and C. Hentze, *Homers Ilias* (Leipzig 1884): "einen unnützen Blick werfend, ohne bestimmtes Ziel und Gegendstand, eine Folge seiner Verlegenheit, daher: mit verlegenen Blick." Cf. *Anhang* (Leipzig 1877) 119–20. D. B. Monro, *Homer Iliad* (Oxford 1884): "'with a grimace,' a forced meaningless look." W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (London 1900): "*with helpless look* . . . the word seems to imply a dazed 'silly' expression, as though Thersites could not recover

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apart. They are both surprised, but their circumstances are otherwise so different that scholars who cite the parallel are forced to explain ἀχρεῖον differently for each scene."[3]

Hitherto, no one has been able to come up with a completely satisfactory definition which suits both passages.[4] Moreover, those meanings that appear the most plausible seem furthest removed from a semantic connection with χρείη.[5] Hence, a good many scholars have simply given up the game.[6] Yet I believe a common denominator can be discovered to account for both instances of the term and one that accords with Homeric usage. I propose that the meaning of ἀχρεῖον derives from the formulaic expression οὐδέ τί σε (or με) χρή, which often enough in Homer does not mean "you need not" but must be translated as "it does not befit you."[7] A few examples may suffice for demonstration. In the first book of the *Odyssey*, "Mentes" concludes his speech of advice to Telemachus as follows:

οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
νηπιάας ὀχέειν, ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι τηλίκος ἐσσί.

(*Od.* 1.296–97)

Here we should translate "it does not suit you" or "it is inappropriate for you to continue to behave like a child." Similarly, Phoenix pleads with the unrelenting Achilles in the Embassy:

ἀλλ', Ἀχιλεῦ, δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί. . . .

(*Il.* 9.496–97)

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from the sudden shock and grasp the position." Further suggestions can be gleaned from H. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum* (Leipzig 1885), and R. van Bennekom in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* (Göttingen 1978) *s.v.* ἀχρεῖος.

[3] Levine (note 1 above) 173 and note.

[4] Cf. W. Büchner, "Die Penelopeszenen in der Odyssee," *Hermes* 75 (1940) 141: "Daraus eine für die beiden Homerstellen passende Bedeutung abzuleiten, ist trotz vieler Bemühungen nicht gelungen. Die umlaufenden Erklärungen . . . passen auch immer nur für eine der beiden Stellen, so dass für die andere eine neue gesucht werden muss."

[5] As van Bennekom (note 2 above) correctly points out: "der Kontext legt die Bed [eutung] *ratlos, hilflos, verlegen* nahe, die semant [ische] Verbindung zu χρείη ist dann aber nicht ganz klar."

[6] For instance, E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1916), concludes concerning ἀχρεῖον: "adv. d'origine et de sens peu clairs." Büchner (note 4 above) 143, resigns himself to considering ἀχρεῖον among the "dunklen Wörtern des Epos," which neither ancients nor moderns have been able to explicate. Similarly, R. Merkelbach, *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee* (*Zetemata* 2) (München 1951) 12, n. 1, remarks on the Penelope scene: "Sie lacht ἀχρεῖον, aber wir wissen bekanntlich nicht, was das heisst."

[7] Cf. LSJ *s.v.* χρή, no. 2.

It is inappropriate and unsuitable for Achilles to keep a heart without pity, for even the gods can be turned. Or again, a disguised Apollo rebukes Hector for holding back from battle:

> Ἕκτορ, τίπτε μάχης ἀποπαύεαι; οὐδέ τί σε χρή.
> αἴθ' ὅσον ἥσσων εἰμί, τόσον σέο φέρτερος εἴην·
>
> (*Il.* 16.721–22)

At the other end of the social scale, the beggar Odysseus responds to the threats of Iros:

> δαιμόνι', οὔτε τί σε ῥέζω κακὸν οὔτ' ἀγορεύω,
> οὔτε τινὰ φθονέω δόμεναι καὶ πόλλ' ἀνελόντα.
> οὐδὸς δ' ἀμφοτέρους ὅδε χείσεται, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
> ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν· δοκέεις δέ μοι εἶναι ἀλήτης
> ὥς περ ἐγών, ὅλβον δὲ θεοὶ μέλλουσιν ὀπάζειν.
>
> (*Od.* 18.15–19)

Here, the collocation of οὐδέ τί σε χρή with the address δαιμόνι' brings out the fact that Iros' behavior is inappropriate to his character and circumstances. Thus, οὐδέ τί σε χρή frequently has the sense of "it is not suitable to your character or situation."[8] ἀχρεῖον can then be taken as "inappropriate to one's character" and hence "uncharacteristic." This sense is compatible with both Homeric occurrences.

Penelope's sudden laughter in Book 18 is not only unusual or peculiar; it is totally uncharacteristic of the grieving queen whom the *Odyssey* repeatedly describes as wasting her days and nights in weeping and lamentation:

> ὀΐζυραὶ δέ οἱ αἰεὶ
> φθίνουσιν νύκτες τε καὶ ἤματα δάκρυ χεούσῃ.
>
> (*Od.* 11.182–83 = 13.337–38 = 16.38–39)

Or as she herself describes her mournful existence to the beggar:

> αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ πένθος ἀμέτρητον πόρε δαίμων·
> ἤματα μὲν γὰρ τέρπομ' ὀδυρομένη, γοόωσα,
> ἕς τ' ἐμὰ ἔργ' ὁρόωσα καὶ ἀμφιπόλων ἐνὶ οἴκῳ·
> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ νὺξ ἔλθῃ, ἕλῃσί τε κοῖτος ἅπαντας,
> κεῖμαι ἐνὶ λέκτρῳ, πυκιναὶ δέ μοι ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ
> ὀξεῖαι μελεδῶναι ὀδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν.
>
> (*Od.* 19.512–17)[9]

[8] Cf. *Il.* 7.109; 9.613; 19.67; *Od.* 19.118; 19.500.

[9] For Penelope's usual lamentation, see, for example, *Od.* 1.363; 13.379; 16.450; 19.603; 20.84; 21.357.

To be sure, Thersites' role in the *Iliad* is restricted to only one scene. But in addition to describing his repulsive appearance, Homer vividly portrays Thersites' customary behavior, which consists in picking quarrels and heaping abuse on his betters:[10]

> Θερσίτης δ' ἔτι μοῦνος ἀμε-ροεπὴς ἐκολώα,
> ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶ ἦσιν ἄκοσμά ⁻ε πολλά τε ἤδη,
> μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἔριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν,
> ἀλλ' ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοΐον Ἀργείοισιν
> ἔμμεναι· αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε· . . .
> ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ' ἦν ἠδ' Ὀδυσῆϊ·
> τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε· τότ' αὖτ' Ἀγαμέμνονι δίῳ
> ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ' ὀνείδεα· τῷ δ' ἄρ' Ἀχαιοὶ
> ἐκπάγλως κοτέοντο νεμέσσηθέν τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ.
> αὐτὰρ ὁ μακρὰ βοῶν Ἀγαμεμνονα νείκεε μύθῳ.
>
> (*Il.* 2.212–16, 220–24)

It is quite as uncharacteristic of Penelope to laugh as it is for the mocking and abusive Thersites to be reduced to silent pain and tears under the blows of Odysseus. His glance may no doubt be helpless, foolish, and sheepish, but it is, above all, out of keeping with his usual brazen character.

Unquestionably, the chaste Penelope has little in common with the impudent and mocking Thersites. Yet, for a moment, each departs from his normal or characteristic behavior, and that departure is signaled by ἀχρεῖον.

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[10] For the vocabulary describing Thersites as anti-epic, see G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979) 259–64.

ΛΗΙΣΤΕΙΑ AND ΛΗΙΖΟΜΑΙ IN THUCYDIDES AND IN *IG* I³ 41, 67, AND 75

During the wars of the fifth century B.C., Greek states frequently resorted to tactics characteristic of pirates. In fact, the Greeks used the same vocabulary to describe all piratical behavior, regardless of motivation. Thus, the terms λῃστεία and its variations and λῄζομαι can refer to plundering for private or personal gain as well as to actions taken for political or military benefit.[1]

Just as piracy could take many forms, so too could its politically motivated counterpart. In Thucydides, there are references to privateers operating on the open seas and along the coastlines of hostile states[2] and to military troops engaged in land-based raids.[3] A number of passages refer to the actions of politically disaffected members of the local population, who take part in raids within their own homeland in hopes of disrupting and dislodging those presently in power. Perhaps their tactics can best be characterized as a form of guerilla warfare.[4]

[1] In what remains the standard survey on piracy, H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (London 1924) 61, noted the difficulty in distinguishing between piracy and other forms of maritime violence. Also see P. Brulé, *La piraterie crétoise hellénistique* (Paris 1978) 106–09, who discusses features that can generally be used to distinguish war from piracy.

[2] For example, the Athenians established a base on Atlante to guard against privateers (λῃστάς) from Lokris (2.32) and also took action against Peloponnesian privateers (λῃστικόν) off the coasts of Karia and Lycia, who were operating against ships returning from Phaselis and Phoenicia (2.69.1). The fact that the Athenians at Pylos received arms from a Messenian 30-oared λῃστρικῆς and a κέλητος suggests that Athens also made use of professional pirates, those who practiced piracy for a living (4.9.1). In addition, there are references to privateers operating out of Megara (λῃστῶν, 3.51.2, and λῃσταί, 4.67.3). We are also told that the Lakedaimonians took great care of Kythera because λῃσταί always posed a threat to that area (4.53.3); however, since Thucydides does not provide a time frame, the reference could be to privateers during the early years of the Peloponnesian War or simply to pirates.

[3] Athens, for example, established garrisons to raid enemy territory at Pylos (λῃστείαις, 6.105.2, and ἐλῃστεύοντο, 7.18.3) and at Methana (ἐλῄστευον, 4.45.2), while the Spartans made raids throughout Attica from their position at Dekeleia (λῃστείας, 7.27.4).

[4] That the Greeks recognized a distinction between traditional warfare and raiding is suggested by a passage in Thucydides (5.115.2) in which the Spartans in the summer of 416 decided that they would not make war (ἐπολέμουν) but did permit anyone who so wished to make raids (λῄζεσθαι) against the Athenians. A distinction between traditional and guerilla warfare is also suggested in 4.41.3 and 4.66.1, both discussed below.

That similar references to guerilla warfare may also be intended in our epigraphical sources is suggested by a comparison of these passages in Thucydides with *IG* I³ 41, 67, and 75; such an interpretation provides an appropriate date and context for all three inscriptions.

Thucydides, for example, in describing the events that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, notes that in Epidamnos the demos expelled the oligarchs around 436–435 after years of political unrest. The exiles then joined forces with the hostile Illyrians in the surrounding countryside and proceeded to make raids against those in the city, both by land and by sea (1.24.5: ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν).

After the Peloponnesian War began, a similar situation occurred as a result of the revolution in Kerkyra in the summer of 427. Here, after losing to the demos, about 500 oligarchs managed to escape to fortified sites on the mainland opposite Kerkyra. From this position the exiles conducted raids against the people on the island and eventually caused a famine (3.85.2: ὕστερον δὲ οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων . . . τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ, ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ). Later, joined by a force of mercenaries, they returned to the island and fortified Mt. Istone; this enabled the oligarchs to control the countryside and continue their raids against those in the city (3.85.3). According to Thucydides, the demos continued to be harassed (4.2.3: οἱ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει φυγάδων), until they defeated the exiles in the summer of 425 (4.48.5).

In the summer of 424, similar events took place in Megara and were planned, unsuccessfully, for Boiotia. Megarian oligarchs, after being expelled in a revolution by the democratic party, established themselves at nearby Pegai and proceeded to raid Megarian territory. Thucydides notes that the Megarians were not only being harassed by the Athenians in war but also by their own exiles at Pegai, οἳ στασιασάντων ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους χαλεποὶ ἦσαν ληστεύοντες (4.66.1). At the same time, democratic Boiotian exiles were plotting with the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippokrates to seize on the same day the towns of Siphai, Chaironeia, and Delion. While they realized that these actions might not lead to an immediate revolution throughout Boiotia, the expectation was that by holding these sites, each one a base for raiding parties and a sanctuary for antigovernment forces, Boiotia would eventually fall (4.76.5: ἐχομένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ λησ-

τευομένης τῆς γῆς καὶ οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς, οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα).

Guerilla tactics were not restricted to politically active citizens; similar raids were conducted by helots and slaves. In the summer of 425 after the Athenians had seized Pylos, they were joined by Messenians from Naupaktos, who were in effect returning to their fatherland. Their knowledge of the terrain and local dialect permitted them to make raids on the Messenian countryside and encourage helots to desert (4.41.2: οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνιοι ὡς ἐς πατρίδα ταύτην . . . πέμψαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐλήζοντό τε τὴν Λακωνικὴν). As Thucydides notes, the Lakedaimonians had never experienced this style of warfare before (4.41.3: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου) and were afraid it would lead to a full-scale helot revolt. Although this did not occur, the Athenian garrison continued to receive helots and other deserters who then returned to harass the Lakedaimonians and plunder the country. Following the abortive Peace of Nikias, although Athens refused to return Pylos to the Spartans, she did agree to withdraw the Messenians, along with the helots and other deserters who were then settled at Kranii in Kephallenia (5.35.7). However, by the winter of 419–418, encouraged by Alkibiades, the Athenians reestablished the helots from Kranii on Pylos to resume their raids on Spartan territory (5.56.3: ἐς δὲ Πύλον ἐκόμισαν τοὺς ἐκ Κρανίων Εἵλωτας λῄξεσθαι).

Prompted perhaps by their success at Pylos, the Athenians in the summer of 413 fortified an isthmus on the Peloponnesian coastline opposite Kythera. Like Pylos, the site was intended to receive helots who wished to desert and at the same time provide a base for raids into the Lakonian countryside (7.26.2: ἵνα δὴ οἵ τε Εἵλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι καὶ ἅμα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται).

Following the revolt of Chios, the Athenians again used similar tactics, taking advantage of the large slave population there. After Athens fortified Delphinion, a coastal site not far from the city of Chios, Chian slaves deserted in large numbers (8.38.1). Because of their knowledge of the country, they too engaged in raids and, according to Thucydides, were able to do great damage. Under such pressure, the Chians sought Spartan help, μὴ περιιδεῖν τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ ξυμμαχίδων πόλεων ἔκ τε θαλάσσης εἰργομένην καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουμένην (8.40.1–2).

This frequent use of λῃστεία and λῄζομαι in Thucydides to describe raids characteristic of guerilla warfare suggests that similar references may be intended in *IG* I³ 41, 67, and 75.[5] Of these inscriptions, the one most historically secure, *IG* I³ 75 (I² 87), recording a treaty between Athens and Halieis, supports such a view. Meritt and Davidson have argued convincingly that the decree dates to 424–423, following the Athenian fortification of Methana in 425–424 and her subsequent raids on Epidauros, Troizen, and Halieis (4.45.2) but before the spring of 423 by which time Athens had secured a treaty with Troizen (4.118.4). Meritt and Davidson suggest that the Troizen and Halieis treaties came at the same time and were designed to bring an end to the Athenian raids.[6]

The conditions to which Halieis agreed included providing a naval base for the Athenian fleet, while promising not to admit guerillas nor engage in guerilla warfare themselves nor fight with the enemy against the Athenians (. . . λ[ειστὰς μὲ *h*υποδέχεσθαι μεδ' α]ὐτὸς [λε-ίζε[σ] | θαι μεδὲ χσ[υστρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τὸν πο]λεμίον ἐπ' [Ἀθε] | ναίος . . .). This change from the Spartan to the Athenian camp as a result of Athenian pressure suggests that a political change took place at Halieis. Pro-Spartan elements may have been exiled or gone underground, but that they remained a threat to the Athenian position in the southern Argolid is clear from the treaty.

The same phrase has been restored in *IG* I³ 67 (I² 53) by Schweigert (. . λ]ειστὰς μὲ *h*[υποδέχε] | [σθαι μεδὲ αὐ]τὸς λείζε[σθαι . . .) in his revision of Bauer's text. However, Schweigert continued to accept Bauer's tentative restoration of the name Philip (based on the letters φι in line 4) and his association of the inscription with the Athenian alliance with Philip and Derdas of Macedon, which is dated by Thucydides

[5] E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg 1929) 11, in his collection of references to piracy in the classical period, mistakenly includes *IG* I³ 41 and 67 (his numbers 22 and 23), although any interpretation of these two inscriptions requires that both concern warfare, not piracy, as shown below.

[6] B. D. Meritt and G. R. Davidson, "The Treaty between Athens and Halai," *AJP* 56 (1935) 65–71; also see Meritt, "Attic Inscriptions of the Fifth Century," *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 98–105. W. E. Thompson, "The Athenian Treaties with Haliai and Dareios the Bastard," *Klio* 53 (1971) 119–24, has attempted to dislodge the Halieis treaty from its date in 424–423 by claiming that ὁ πολέμος in lines 17–18 does not refer to the Peloponnesian War but only to a hypothetical war, but his argument is not persuasive; see for example the comments of D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 76–77, notes 177, 180.

(1.57.3) to the years preceding the Peloponnesian War.[7] For Schweigert and others, the treaty records a promise by Athens neither to permit nor support privateering against Philip and his allies.[8] Such an interpretation, suggesting that Athens had cause to engage in privateering and Philip reason to suspect such behavior, implies a preexisting state of hostilities for which there is no evidence.

Papantoniou has attempted to rule out identification of the inscription with the Athenian alliance with Philip and Derdas by showing that the negatives in the treaty (με in line 7 and μεδὲ in line 10 and restored in line 11) indicate that the inscription contains terms for a truce. Still, Papantoniou continues to favor the restoration of the name Philip but follows the restored text of Papastavrou, in which Philip promises to refrain from hostile action against Athens ("to abstain from acts of robbery"). Then to accommodate both the inscription and the passage in Thucydides, Papantoniou suggests the following series of diplomatic exchanges in the 430s: (1) an alliance was made between Athens and Perdikkas, which permitted the Athenian colonization of Amphipolis; (2) a truce (*IG* I³ 67) was then required between Athens and Philip, who was displeased with Athens' recognition of Perdikkas and "showed himself hostile to the Athenians at Amphipolis"; (3) this truce caused the dissolution of the alliance between Athens and Perdikkas; and (4) the alliance of the Athenians with Philip and Derdas recorded by Thucydides resulted.[9]

Meritt argues against the restoration of the name Philip on grammatical grounds[10] and thus dissociates the decree from the Macedonian royal family. He suggests instead that the inscription records an Athenian covenant with Mytilene after her unsuccessful revolt against

[7] E. Schweigert, "Epigraphical Notes," *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 170–71, and W. Bauer, "Epigraphisches aus dem Athener Nationalmuseum," *Klio* 15 (1918) 193–95.

[8] See for example A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford 1959) 202–03.

[9] G. Papantoniou, "Athenians and Macedonians (*IG* I² 53 and Thuc. 1.57.2–3)," *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge, 1967* (Oxford 1971) 43–45, and I. Papastavrou, "The Foreign Policy of Perdikkas II during the Archidamian War," *Hellenika* 15 (1957) 258, n. 3.

[10] B. D. Meritt, "An Athenian Treaty with an Unknown State," *AJP* 68 (1947) 313–15, has emphasized that the proper phraseology for Philip's territory in line 4 should be τ]ὲγ γῆν τὲν Φι[λίππο, but the article before Philip's name is absent. Both Bauer and Papantoniou admit this problem and suggest that it may be due to an oversight by the engraver.

Athens in 428–427: following Athens' pledge to return land to Mytilene in lines 3 and 4, the remainder of the decree records obligations of the Mytileneans to the Athenians—promises to remain faithful and not to aid the enemy.[11] Meritt's reconstruction fulfills Papantoniou's requirement that the decree record an agreement following a period of hostilities and also permit a more logical translation of the phrase λειστὰς μὲ *h*υποδέχεσθαι μεδὲ αὐτὸς λείζεσθαι. As in the Halieis inscription, this records the condition neither to admit guerillas nor engage in guerilla warfare, a condition particularly suitable to the situation on Lesbos.

After the revolt had failed, the Athenians pulled down Mytilene's fortifications, took control of her navy, and divided Lesbos into cleruchies. However, since the revolt had been led by the oligarchs, Athens decided to spare the demos and put to death only those held to be chiefly responsible for the revolt (3.50.1). Still, some anti-Athenian elements escaped to the mainland and continued to pose a threat to the island. We know that in the summer of 424 these exiles seized Antandros opposite Lesbos and from this base planned to make raids against the island (4.52.2–3), but they were again defeated by the Athenian fleet (4.75.1).

It is within this period, between 427 and 424, that *IG* I³ 67 was probably inscribed. It can be associated with another Athenian decree regulating Mytilenean affairs after the revolt, *IG* I³ 66 (I² 60), which also suggests that land is to be restored to the Mytileneans.[12] Both decrees indicate that a change in policy toward Lesbos took place not

[11] B. D. Meritt, "Athenian Covenant with Mytilene," *AJP* 75 (1954) 358–68; Meritt (note 10 above, 315, n. 8) had tentatively suggested restoring Mytilene in his earlier note. H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II (Munich, Berlin 1962) no. 167, follows Meritt's text but without the restoration of Mytilene, labeling the inscription "Bündnis zwischen Athen und einer unbekannten Stadt—um 430–420?" However, Bengtson believes that the λειστάς phrase concerns pirates and the forbidding of piracy, and thus unnecessarily claims that Athens must be dealing with a maritime state in this decree. B. Virgilio, "Il trattato ateniese *IG* I² 53 (a proposito di una nuova interpretazione)," *StClassOrient* 25 (1976) 177–82, reaches a similar conclusion in a new restoration but dates the inscription between 445 and 430. A clause in the Congress Decree (Pl. *Per.* 17.1) suggests to him a Periklean role against piracy, although the Congress Decree neither mentions nor concerns piracy; see B. R. MacDonald, "The Authenticity of the Congress Decree," *Historia* 31 (1982) 121. L. Braccesi, "Ancora su *IG* I² 53 (un trattato fra gli Ateniesi e il re Artas?)," *ArchCl* 25–26 (1973–74) 68–73, however, accepts Virgilio's restoration and dating but, in place of the unknown maritime state, restores the name of the Messapian dynast Artas.

[12] Meritt (note 11 above) dates *IG* I³ 66 to 427–426, whereas Gomme, "*IG* I² 60 and Thucydides III 50.2," *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson* II (St. Louis 1953) 334–39, suggests a date in 424–423 to allow more of an interval between the crushing of the revolt and the subsequent change of policy suggested by the decree.

long after the original conditions were imposed immediately after the revolt. It is possible that this change in policy occurred because the Athenians depended on the Mytilenean demos to assist them in repelling attacks by the exiles on the mainland—aid that the demos vowed to continue in *IG* I³ 67.[13]

The final inscription is part of the series of Athenian decrees regulating the affairs of the Athenian settlement at Hestiaia that was established after the unsuccessful Euboian revolt in 446. Although the regulations have now been grouped as *IG* I³ 41, attempts have been made to separate one stone (*IG* I² 42) from the group. The inscription on this stone is fragmentary, but a statement that all were liable to pay the εἰσφορά except those engaged in the capture of λειστῶν can be reasonably restored. That this inscription, like *IG* I³ 75 and 67, also concerns a period of hostilities is indicated by the mention of εἰσφορά. Graham has argued that this special property tax levied against Athenian citizens represented a war tax in the fifth century.[14] Apparently, Athens was offering in *IG* I² 42 an exemption from war taxes to those involved in a type of military service, namely the capture of λειστῶν.

The reference to εἰσφορά has also suggested to some a date for the decree. Mattingly, following Cary, claims that according to Thucydides (3.19.1) the first εἰσφορά occurred in 428 and that the decree must have been passed after that date.[15] However, Meiggs has suggested that Thucydides refers here to the first εἰσφορά of many during the war and that this form of taxation was known to the Athenians before 428.[16] Meiggs also believes that the use of the tailed rho on the stone suggests an earlier date, probably before 438.[17]

[13] A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II–III (Oxford 1962) 330, suggests that such assistance by the demos may have caused this change in policy; however, he refuses to accept Meritt's suggestion that *IG* I³ 67 concerns Mytilene and continues to favor the restoration of Philip of Macedon (331, n. 1).

[14] A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (Manchester 1964) 171–72.

[15] H. B. Mattingly, "Athenian Finances in the Peloponnesian War," *BCH* 92 (1968) 476–77, and M. Cary, "Athens and Hestiaea; Notes on Two Inscriptions," *JHS* 45 (1925) 243–50.

[16] R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1973) 519–20. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1969) 161, also refer to the Hestiaia decree in their discussion of the Kallias decrees (no. 58), which they date to 434–433. The Kallias decrees (line B 19) also refer to the εἰσφορά, a reference that Gomme (note 13 above) 278, believes "is to something familiar." Mattingly (note 15 above) 450–85, of course, would have the Kallias decrees date to 422–421.

[17] Meiggs (note 16 above) 519–20, and "The Dating of Fifth-Century Attic Inscriptions," *JHS* 86 (1966) 86–98; also see M. B. Walbank, "Criteria for the Dating of Fifth-

The term λειστῶν could refer to privateers who, as Mattingly points out, were active off the Lokrian and Euboian coasts during the Archidamian War.[13] Meiggs counters by noting that "the risk of piracy in 431 is no argument against a similar risk in the late forties."[19] However, rather than referring to privateers or pirates, λειστῶν may again refer specifically to guerilla activity. Such an interpretation would favor a date in the 440s, at which time such activity must have been prevalent in Euboia, especially around Hestiaia. Whereas a political settlement was reached with other Euboian cities that had revolted, the Athenians drove the people of Hestiaia from their homeland and settled the land themselves.[20] According to Theopompos, the Hestiaians were banished to Macedonia, but it is probable that some pockets of resistance remained in the Euboian countryside in the years immediately following the revolt and continued to pose a threat to the new Athenian settlement. The inscription suggests that at Hestiaia, just as at Mytilene and Halieis, the Athenians were taking special precautions to guard against these exiles and their tactics.[21]

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Century Attic Inscriptions," in *Phoros. Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley, N Y. 1974) 161–69.

[18] In addition to the Athenian fortification of Atlante (2.32), Mattingly (note 15 above) suggests that the Athenians seized Pteleon, also given up in 421 like Atlante (5.18.7), to serve as another base against privateering in Euboian waters—if in fact the Pteleon referred to is the one on the coast of Achaia Phthiotis (see the comments of Gomme [note 13 above] 674). Mattingly mentions as well Nikias' attacks on the Lokrian coast in 426 (3.91.6) and the contemporary Spartan foundation at Herakleia in Trachis, a settlement that the Athenians initially feared but which, according to Thucydides (3.93.2), never posed a problem.

[19] Meiggs (note 16 above) 520. A similar view is expressed by M. F. McGregor, "Athens and Hestiaia," *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography presented to Eugene Vanderpool* (*Hesperia* suppl. xix, Princeton 1982) 111, n. 13: "The mention of λειστῶν (obverse 24) perhaps implies that piracy had been a problem off northern Euboia."

[20] Thuc. 1.114.3, 7.57; Theopompos (in Strabo 10.1.3); Diodorus 12.7, 12.22.2; and Plutarch, *Per.* 23.4, who notes that Perikles also drove out the Hippobatai from Chalkis.

[21] A phrase similar to that found in *IG* I³ 75 and 67 is also found in an earlier, non-Attic inscription, the so-called public imprecations at Teos (ἢ λῃΐζοιτο ἢ λῃστὰς ὑπο̣δέχοιτο in lines B 20–22). The stone is now lost, but based on drawings made in the

TARPEIA'S TOMB: A NOTE ON PROPERTIUS 4.4*

Propertius 4.4 closes with the standard etiology for *mons Tarpeius: a duce Tarpeia mons est cognomen adeptus* (93).[1] In the opening couplet of the poem, however, Propertius implies an etymology of Tarpeia's name that complements the usual story and anticipates the ensuing portrayal of Tarpeia. Read together with the closing etiology, this etymology well justifies Propertius' claim to the title *Romanus Callimachus.*

The opening lines state Propertius' intention to tell of the Tarpeian grove and Tarpeia's tomb (1–2):

> Tarpeium nemus et Tarpeiae turpe sepulchrum
> fabor . . .

The conscious archaizing of these words provides an indication of Propertius' intent. Noteworthy first of all is the emphatic combination of alliteration and paronomasia in *Tarpeium, Tarpeiae,* and *turpe.* Although seen occasionally and to striking effect in Virgil, neither device is favored by Virgil's contemporaries, and both are clearly reminiscent of Ennian *Dichtersprache.*[2] Here, these devices serve to suggest an etymological connection between *Tarpeia* and *turpis.* To emphasize this connection, Propertius concludes the first line in a way

18th and 19th centuries, the inscription is dated to the first half of the fifth century, usually to its second quarter. It is usually associated with the change from Persian control to membership in the Delian League that occurred at Teos in the 470s (see Meiggs and Lewis [note 16 above] no. 30). The phrase in lines B 20–22 could be used to support such a date, again referring to guerilla warfare following political change. However, in the Teos inscription, the phrase is immediately preceded by a similar reference to κιξάλλης (ἢ κιξαλλεύοι ἢ κιξάλλας ὑποδέχοιτο in lines B 18–20), which according to Photius means highwayman and to Hesychios, thief. κιξάλλης and λῃστής are also coupled by Demokritos, fr. 260, as noted by M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century* B.C. (Oxford 1946) no. 23. This suggests that the mention of λῃστάς in this decree may simply be a reference to pirates and not to their politically motivated counterpart.

* I wish to thank the editor and anonymous reader of *AJP* for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this note.

[1] Varro *LL* 5.41 makes the connection explicit; Livy 1.11 tells the tale, but the etiology must be inferred; cf. Dion. Hal. 2.40.3; Plut. *Rom.* 18.1; Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.348.

[2] See E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro: Aeneis Buch VI*[3] (Stuttgart 1970) 192–93, 416.

that suggests yet another word-play: by using the epithet *turpe* to modify *sepulchrum,* Propertius recalls the popular etymology for *sepulchrum* as composed of *sē* (i.e., *sine*) and *pulchrum.*[3] The effect of this complex play on words, in drawing special attention to *turpe,* is to suggest an unusual and ironic etymology for the name of the Vestal Tarpeia: her name is appropriate to the treacherous behavior detailed in the portrait which follows.[4] The appearance of the unusual *fabor* at the beginning of the second line may well be intended to reinforce Propertius' novel prediction of Tarpeia's fate: found in epic and tragic verse from Ennius onward but seen little elsewhere, *fari* was understood in antiquity to have the same root as *fatum.*[5]

In itself, the etiology of the last couplet seems little more than a perfunctory tag serving to integrate this elegy into the fourth book, since the major focus of the poem is the Alexandrian portrait of Tarpeia as treacherous lover.[6] By providing an etymology for Tarpeia's name, however, Propertius also suggests an etiology for her treachery; and he implies that the hill that takes its *cognomen* from *Tarpeia* is not only the scene of her death, but also a reminder of her shameful misdeed (*turpe*). By thus associating the name with the theme of the narrative, Propertius gives peculiar point to his expressed intention to write of *cognomina prisca locorum* (4.1.69) in the fourth book.

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[3] Cf. *CIL* I².1211 (=VI.15346) line 2, *sepulcrum hau pulcrum pulcrai feminae.* In fact Tarpeia's tomb had been destroyed, according to Plut. *Rom.* 18.1, during the period of the Tarquinii, so that Propertius' allusion to a *sepulchrum* can probably not be taken literally.

[4] Elsewhere in this elegy, Propertius refers to Tarpeia as *mala puella* (17) and *improba ministra* (44). On the moral value of *turpis,* see P. Monteil, *Beau et laid en latin: Etude de vocabulaire* (Paris 1964) 293–97, 306. Cf. K. Wellesley, "Propertius' Tarpeia Poem (IV 4)," *Acta Classica Debrecen* 5 (1969) 96: "That the poet has selected a version of the Tarpeia legend that makes her a detestable traitress is abundantly clear from *turpe sepulcrum.* . . ."

[5] See, e.g., Varro *LL* 6.52; V. *Aen.* 1.261–62; Serv. *ad Aen.* 2.54. Cf. also H. Tränkle, *Die Sprachkunst des Properz und die Tradition der lateinischen Dichtersprache,* Hermes Einzelschr. 15 (1960) 44.

[6] Precedents are numerous: in addition to Skylla and Ariadne, mentioned by Tarpeia herself (4.4.39–42), cf., e.g., Leukophrye (Parth. 5), Peisidike (Parth. 21), Polykrite (Parth.

OVID *METAMORPHOSES* I.1–4 AND FULGENTIUS' *MITOLOGIAE*

The final word of Ovid *Met.* I.2, *illas,* must, with Lejay, be emended to *illa,* yielding the following text:

> In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas
> corpora; di, coeptis (nam vos mutastis et illa)
> adspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi
> ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen.

The crucial words may be paraphrased thus: "for you have changed my undertakings as well as your own forms." As Kenney points out in his discussion of the necessity of the emendation, with these words Ovid aligns himself with Callimachus (fr. 1.21–28 Pf) and Vergil (*Ecl.* 6.3–5), whose works Apollo had redirected: "If the literal sense of 'coeptis' is pressed, the words imply that he had actually embarked upon a different kind of poem, but the gods had deflected his purpose."[1] The elegant emendation saves Ovid both from bad syntax and from triviality in a passage in which he should be on his best behavior; I should like here to suggest that the emendation and Kenney's interpretation of its significance allow us to understand the prologue of Fulgentius' *Mitologiae.*

Much of the humor of the prologue (p. 3–15.19 Helm) turns on the author's ironic and self-parodic presentation of the narrator and his bold claim to be able to reinterpret myth along allegorical lines.[2] In two places the narrator reverses the Ovidian manifesto of *Met.* I.1–4 in the name of a new theory of interpretation which finds myth contempt-

9), Nanis (Parth. 22), and Komaitho (Apollod. 2.4.7). See in general A. H. Krappe, "Die Sage von der Tarpeja," *RhM* 78 (1929) 249–67, and P. Pinotti, "Sulle fonti e le intenzioni di Properzio IV 4," *GIF* 26 (1974) 18–28.

Tarpeia's erotic tragedy is very much the centerpiece of the poem: see M. Rothstein, *Die Elegien des Sextus Propertius* Vol. II (Berlin 1924) 243; H. E. Butler and E. A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford 1933) 343; and W. A. Camps, *Propertius: Elegies Book IV* (Cambridge 1965) 86. Cf. also H. C. Rutledge, "Propertius' *Tarpeia:* The Poem Itself," *CJ* 60 (1964) 68–73.

[1] E. J. Kenney, "Ovidius Prooemians," *PCPhS* 22 (1976) 49.

[2] Analysis of the literary nature and the humor of the *Mitologiae* has been overlooked by critics, and I intend to correct this deficiency on a larger scale in a book on Menippean satire. I should point out that self-parody, taking the form of an author telling a comic tale about himself which reflects badly on his powers of judgment, is a typical device in Menippean satire both in classical (cf. *Apocolocyntosis*) and late classical times (cf. *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*).

ible. Ultimately, however, he will be unable to fulfill his promises because of the intervention of Calliope. The prologue records the intellectual embarrassment of the narrator as he plans his work on mythology.

First, in a poem in trochaic tetrameters (7.5–8.5), he calls on the Muses for inspiration, but belittles their powers. He asks for *quicquid exantlata gazis / vestra promunt horrea* (7.23–24), "whatever your storehouses, empty of treasure, have to offer." He then refers to them not as the patrons of the *Aeneid* and the *Iliad,* but of the *Eclogues* and the *Batrachomyomachia.*[3] The poem ends:

> ad meum vetusta carmen
> saecla nuper confluant.

This inverts *Met.* I.4: all ages meet in one poem for summation, and the song is hardly perpetual.

Second, after Calliope appears and tries to entice the narrator into accepting the Greek myths on the grounds that he is her longtime "initiate in the Anacreontic myteries" (10.11–12), he rejects her when she promises the aid of Satyra[4] and says that he will not retail these myths as if they were true. He adds in the course of this argument:

> Mutatas igitur vanitates manifestare cupimus,
> non manifesta mutando fuscamus. . . .
>
> (11.12–13)

Here he inverts the import of *Met.* I.1–2. Ovid is the paradigm of how *not* to write about myth; the *Heroides* had been mentioned earlier as typifying another way in which the narrator would not write about myth (3.20 ff.).[5]

So the narrator establishes himself as an anti-Ovid. Calliope is understandably nervous about her own position under these circumstances; another part of the humor of the prologue lies in the implications of this invocation of a creature of myth to prove the inanity of

[3] E. R. Curtius and W. R. Trask, trans. *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (New York 1953) 419, mention this passage as an example of the mixture of comic and serious elements in a literary work; but we should note that Vergil's *Eclogues* are here mentioned as the most trivial of Vergil's works.

[4] We must read at 10.14 *Satyra* for *satyra,* given the role which Satyra will play later on. For the function of Satyra in this work, see my "Satyra in the Prologue of Fulgentius' *Mythologies,*" *Latomus,* in press.

[5] We need not take this reference as implying that Fulgentius had actually read the *Heroides.*

myth.[6] The narrator tries to convince her that her time is past. For example, after quoting various poets to prove his devotion to her arts, he pointedly adds a line of Terence to illustrate still further his poetical studies:

> Olim isti fuit generi quondam questus aput saeclum prius
> (10.4–5 = Ter. *Eun.* 246)
>
> Once upon a time and long ago, in an earlier age, there was profit in that sort of thing.

Calliope retaliates by making herself indispensable to the narrator's plans. Over his objections, she will send not only Urania and Philosophia to help him in his researches, but Satyra as well (12.3 ff.). She leaves and returns with these three assistants later that night, only to find him babbling horrible verses on the descent of night *in his sleep*. The narrator admits to their awfulness and says that they reveal his mental deficiency. He resumes in prose:

> . . . et, ut in verba paucissima conferam, nox erat. Cuius noctis nomen iamdudum oblitus ut insanus vates *versibus delirabam*. . . .
> (13.17–19)

From this point on to the end of the prologue, the narrator, shamefaced, says nothing. Calliope and her crew take over. The lascivious Satyra seems to be the most insightful of the company (14.1–6); together, they will explain mythology. The fiction presented now by the author is that the goddesses will dictate the three subsequent books of the *Mitologiae* to the narrator and will thus raise his fame to the stars; this is eventually dropped, however, and the author resumes in his own voice in the introductions to Books II and III, where all literary ornament is absent and the prologue forgotten.

The narrator had treated the Muses with contempt and had hoped to present the mystic kernel of their myths as revealed by a source of knowledge which he knows and they do not (12.1–2). This source is undoubtedly Christianity. But he discovers that only the creatures of myth can explain myth, and none of the allegorizations which follow have anything to do with Christianity.[7] This last point is crucial, for

[6] If we press the fiction of the introduction, Calliope will allegorize herself away at p. 25 ff., *Fabula de novem Musis.*

[7] Though Christian writings may be referred to to justify the etymology of a word or to supply a detail, they never supply the substance of the allegorizations, which are purely moral.

the *author* must be expressing his own contempt for the trivialities of myth by not making them reveal any great knowledge, whereas in Fulgentius' *Virgiliana Continentia* the text of the beloved Vergil is made to yield Christian secrets. The *Mitologiae* therefore does not follow the plan which the narrator had in mind; the Muses which he laughingly invoked have taken control and altered his plans.

We see that Ovid ultimately reasserts himself. Creatures of myth cannot be completely dismissed, and the narrator cannot maintain his stance as an anti-Ovid. The narrator cannot present his Christian knowledge to summarize and end the age of myth, which has a life of its own. The entire prologue, I submit, is a humorous and self-parodic account of a Christian exegete who finds that his subject matter, mythology as represented by the *Metamorphoses,* refuses to surrender itself to his analysis and refashions the goal and form of his work. The prologue of the *Mitologiae* is an elaborate play on Ovid *Met.* I.1–4 as emended by Lejay and interpreted by Kenney. I would also suggest (though with trepidation, given the author's notorious lack of *auctoritas*) that Fulgentius' use of Ovid constitutes some measure of support for the emendation at *Met.* I.2.

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REVIEWS

P. G. W. GLARE, Editor. Oxford Latin Dictionary. Oxford, 1982. Pp. xxiii + 2126. $145.00.

Samuel Johnson, a noted lexicographer, once said, "Dictionaries are like watches: the worst is better than none, and the best cannot be expected to go quite true." He was thinking of dictionaries of living languages, which are antiquated when they are published, but in a sense it is also true for ancient languages. Greek and Latin are not completely "static" languages, for new texts (papyri, inscriptions) become known and have to be considered, and the familiar texts have to be revised in the light of new manuscript evidence or better editorial judgment.

The *Oxford Latin Dictionary* is a splendid achievement. Its plan was conceived in 1931, full-time work began in 1933, and the first fascicle of 256 pages appeared in 1968. The promise of bringing out seven more fascicles every two years was kept, and now the whole work is available in a massive volume of more than 2,000 pages at a reasonable price. It has been called "a Latin-lover's 30-year affair."


The preface spells out the main principles. The editors wanted: (1) to be independent from Lewis and Short as well as the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae;* (2) to treat classical Latin from its beginnings to the end of the second century A.D.; (3) to base every entry on an entirely fresh reading of the Latin sources; and (4) to follow the style of the *Oxford English Dictionary.*

I should like to say something about these principles: (1) very sensible, since Lewis and Short never was a very good dictionary, although it still has to be consulted today, and the *TLL* has not progressed beyond O; (2) the earliest Latin attested can hardly be called "classical," and the time limit (end of the second century A.D.), though realistic, seems a little rigid; a more generous sampling of later Latin (Augustine's *Ciuitas Dei* is represented) would have been useful; (3) fine, but implies more than is feasible.

It is now possible to compare a large portion of the *OLD* with the *TLL,* and I have done some checking: the latest fascicle of the *TLL* (vol. IX, fasc. 7, "*ordo*" to "*os*") was also sent as a review copy to *AJP.* Since the *TLL* gathers all Latin (or Graecolatin) words from the sixth century B.C. to the end of the seventh century A.D., there are, of course, some differences. The editors of the *OLD* had to use some older Teubner texts, such as Jordan's 1860 edition of M. Porcius Cato, or Frick's of Pomponius Mela (1880). That could hardly be avoided, though one would have liked to have seen Mynors' text of Virgil used instead of Hirtzel's. The decision to exclude many Latin words attested only after 200 A.D. also makes sense; if this time limit had not been observed, the whole work would have been delayed. What we need now is a dictionary (not just a glossary) concentrating on the growth of the vocabulary of Latin between, say, 200 and 600 A.D.

Ideally, a Latin dictionary should give as full a picture of the language as

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possible within the time limits it has to impose on itself. In practice, however, it will mainly register "literary Latin," in order to help those who want to read the literary texts. Words not attested for the period tend to be neglected, even though it is fairly certain that they were used. *Martellum,* "hammer," must be an old word, but its existence can only be postulated from the evidence of the Romance languages. *Mamma* is attested as a nursery word, but not *nonna, ninna,* or *nanna,* although they were probably just as old. For "lie" only *mentitio* seems to be attested (*Rhetor. ad Her.* 3.3), while spoken Latin probably also had **mentioni(c)a.* For "miller" *molitor* is attested, **molinarius* is not.

All the common German words connected with making and drinking wine are derived from Latin, as the following list clearly shows: *acetum* / "Essig"; *bicarium* / "Becher"; *calcarium* / "Kelter"; *calix* / "Kelch"; *cella* / "Keller"; *copa* / "Kufe"; *lora* / "Lauer"; *mustum* / "Most"; *palus* / "Pfahl"; *piluccare* / "pflücken"; *traiectorium* / "Trichter"; *uinitor* / "Winzer"; *uinum* / "Wein." The *OLD* does not list *bicarium, calcarium* (only as "lime"), *copa* (only as "woman who provides entertainment in taverns"), *traiectorium.* But all these words must have entered the German language at about the same time, and since wine was produced along the Rhine before 200 A.D., they were part of the Latin vocabulary before that time. *Piluccare,* more expressive than the "literary" *pilare,* represents colloquial Latin.

The evidence suggests that the two most productive centuries in the history of the Latin language were the pre-classical and the post-classical periods, the latter one beginning with Apuleius. The classical era seems to have been selective and restrictive rather than productive. It is often said that Ovid "coined" a word, when it is only found in Ovid or first appears in Ovid. This may be true, of course, but it is also possible and, perhaps, more probable that he found the word in an older author and liked it. The archaic authors became fashionable again in the time of Apuleius and later on, perhaps because they helped to enrich the language, and since language has the tendency to grow, classical Latin was less useful. For "river" Caesar always uses *flumen,* never *fluuius* or *amnis.* An abstract noun like *tristitas* (Pacuvius, Turpilius) was abandoned for *tristitia, tristities,* but even comparable nouns in *-ies* seem to be avoided before Apuleius (see below p. 100).

The time limit which the *OLD* observes excludes necessarily a number of authors and texts, notably Christian Latin, but not consistently. Augustine's *Ciuitas Dei* is considered, while the *Passio Sanctorum Sicilianorum* is not, even though it yields such new meanings as "secret court" for *secretarium,* and "tax" not "customs-post" for *teloneum.* A case might have been made for the Hermetic treatise entitled *Asclepius,* for even if this Latin translation of a Greek text is not by Apuleius, it cannot be much later.

Macrobius (late fourth century) is included, and so are Servius and Donatus, but other grammarians and scholiasts who often preserve archaic Latin are not. Only some of the jurists represented in the *Digest* of Justinian have been excerpted. One misses Ausonius and Claudian (see E. J. Kenney, *CR* 20 [1970] 92), because their poetry is neo-classical in style and most of their vocabulary is more likely than not derived from "approved" authors of the Augustan Age, even if we no longer have them.

On the other hand, a good deal of epigraphic material not used by the

older lexica is made available by the *OLD;* more might have been culled from the *Edictum Diocletiani* (301 A.D.), which yields many words for arts, crafts, professions, etc. which must have been current for at least a century.

The *OLD* lists about 40,000 words and is based on a collection of over one million quotations, taken directly from the original texts. It follows generally the principles of the *Oxford English Dictionary*.[1] The semantic structure of the articles is practical and empirical and does not reflect any genetic theories. The semantic groups are arranged according to criteria like "common (colloquial and literary)," "archaic," "dialectal," "vulgar," "scientific," etc. The quotations are usually listed in chronological order, but the oldest attested passage is not always mentioned, especially when it is "uncommon." The distinctions between the meanings often seem over-subtle: 44 for *ago*, 29 for *capio*, 30 for *facio*, 39 for *fero*, 27 for *habeo*, 44 for *in*, 24 for *teneo*, 24 for *uerto*, 24 for *uideo* (the magic number seems to be 24), 28 for *uis, uires*, 44 for *ut*, etc.[2]

Great care has been taken in establishing the correct spelling, even though *derigo* and *dirigo* are not clearly distinguished (see below, p. 000). Quantities are marked, except the "hidden" ones (cf. R. T. Bruère, *CP* 54 [1969] 139; J. L. Heller, *CW* 62 [1969] 282 ff.). Etymologies are furnished, sometimes tentatively. The definitions are in contemporary English. Proper names are properly explained. Many Greek words occurring in Latin texts are included, but there are gaps, especially as far as rhetorical terminology is concerned.[3] There is a novelty: suffixes as nonwords interrupt constantly the sequence of real words; thus we have:

anus[1] "ring or circle; ring or link; anus or fundament"
anus[2] "old woman, etc."
anus[3] "form of *annus*"
-anus "enlargement of *-nus*, etc."

To me, this is a kind of didactic experiment, and a rather whimsical one at that, but possibly useful. Prefixes like *dia-* are also listed as separate entities (in this case with a reference to *DIA*[3]).

The "Publisher's Note" does not tell us much about the history of this impressive undertaking[4] and the technical procedures involved, but strangely enough, some information has come through the Iron Curtain. Marian Plezia, a distinguished Polish lexicographer, was allowed to visit the *OLD* office in the New Bodleian Library more than once, and in his review of the first

[1] On those principles, laid down by James Murray, see the charming book by his granddaughter, Katherine Murray, *Caught in the Web of Words* (1977) 189 ff.

[2] On semantic principles cf. W. Ehlers, *Antike und Abendland* 14 (1968) 172 ff.

[3] Bonnell's *Lexicon* and vol. II of J. Cousin, *Études sur Quintilien* (1936), should have been consulted.

[4] There is a "List of Editorial Staff" on a single page, before "Aids to the Reader," listing 19 names, in the order in which they joined the venture, from A. Souter to D. Raven; some worked for three years or less, others, like Peter Glare, the last editor, for more than 30 years. I remember a pamphlet published by J. M. Wyllie (co-editor with Cyril Bailey, 1939–49, sole editor, 1949–54) which revealed certain tensions and frustrations, but no mention of all this is made in the finished volume. There were many other helpers, including, also in the tradition of the *OED*, 50 outside volunteers.

fascicle (*Eos* 59 [1971] 177 ff.) he revealed some of what he saw there. Since *Eos* is not widely available in this country, I may be allowed to quote from Plezia's review, which is informative in other ways, too. The Polish scholar points out that in *The Periodical* of the Oxford University Press (vol. 33, nr. 265 [1959] 70) one can find a photograph of one of the editorial rooms, with a picture of the team at work: "The photo shows clearly the large wooden shelves on which there are endless cards (tied with string) which constitute the material of the dictionary. . . . We trust we do not betray any 'editorial secrets' if we reveal that the text of the *OLD* is set directly from these cards (which are white in colour). . . . Before they are sent to the printing room, the white cards are interleaved with similar pink ones which contain anything that is editorial, . . . e.g. the English translation, etymological notes, etc. By cutting out the intermediate stage of a typescript . . . an important source of errors is . . . eliminated. Such a procedure, however, is thinkable and possible only when there is a very close and harmonious collaboration between the printing and the editorial rooms. . . ." Apparently the system worked very well.

In his recent *History of Foreign-Language Dictionaries* (1982), R. L. Collison has already a paragraph (pp. 154 ff.) on the *OLD* and offers a "period coverage" of contemporary Latin dictionaries:

Beginnings to about 200 A.D.: *OLD*
180 to 600 A.D.: *Glossary of Later Latin*
476 to 1022 A.D.: *Latinitatis Italicae Medii Aevi Lexicon*
500 to 1699 A.D.: *Medieval Latin from British Sources*
550 to 1150 A.D.: *Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus.*

One considers with awe the fact that British and Irish sources alone have enriched the Latin vocabulary by about forty thousand words. What a testimony to the vitality of the language! With the help of computers, some day all these dictionaries will be integrated.

In an undertaking of the size of the *OLD* one expects all kinds of errors, such as ghost words[5] or wrong definitions,[6] but I have not been able to find very many; where the editors are not sure they place a question mark at the beginning of the entry. I have counted about 200 of these cases, many (as one might expect) ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, and a surprising number of those from the Elder Pliny. The typography is elegant; the arrangement in three columns apparently goes back via the *OED* to Littré.

It seemed worthwhile to go through the list of authors and works (pp. ix–xx), because here the editors had to make decisions on the authenticity or the date of certain texts. They decided, for instance, that neither Cicero, *In Sallustium* nor Sallustius, *In Ciceronem* are authentic (the latter to be dated before Quintilian). The *Declamationes Maiores* ascribed to Quintilian are tentatively placed in the late second century A.D. *Ciris, Culex, Dirae,* and *Priapea* are assigned to the Augustan Age. Ovid, according to the editors, wrote the *Halieutica,* but not the Sappho-Letter (*Her.* 15) nor the *Nux;* a contemporary of his wrote the *Carmen de Bello Aegyptiaco.* The *Octavia* is not by Seneca.

[5] Cf. Luck, *AJP* 102 (1981) 180.

[6] The *LSJS* now suggests for ἔνοδμος "stinking, pungent," rather than "sweet-smelling, fresh."

It may be useful to discuss a number of entries in order to contribute to a future supplement volume. Some of the fascicles were reviewed, as they appeared, by such scholars as E. J. Kenney, J. W. Poultney, and H. Wieland, and I shall refer to their comments here and there. Two general remarks: the Supplement Volume to *Liddell-Scott-Jones*, edited by E. A. Barber (1968), yields a surprising number of Latin words in Greek transliteration, mostly from papyri and inscriptions, many of them well within the time limits of the *OLD*. This mine of information and the *Beiträge aus der Thesaurus-Arbeit* (published over the years in *Museum Helveticum* and elsewhere, and now collected in one volume, 1979) should have been consulted systematically by the editors.

abatos cf. H. Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 748.

abiturium or *abitorium* "latrine" is listed by *LSJS*.

accognomen seems a possible formation for Apuleius (*Flor.* 6,7), but the *OLD* prefers Helm's conjecture *ideoque adgnomen* for ms. *idque adcognomen*.

acrostichis deserves a listing; cf. *LSJS* s.v.; Pease on Cic., *Div.* 2.111.

adiutorium: cf. Kenney, *CR*, n.s. 20 (1970) 91.

aeluros: Housman would have been gratified to see Juv. 15.7 quoted; cf. Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 746; Kenney, *CR* n.s. 20 (1970) 91.

Aeneas: the oldest testimony (*Année Epigraphique* 7th ser. 10, 1960, 138) is missing; cf. Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 747.

aenipes: Heinsius' conjecture at Ovid, *Her.* 6.32 and 12.93 might be considered.

aeromantis: Varro *ap. Serv. auct. ad Aen.* 3.359 should be included; cf. *aeromanteion* in the Paris Magical Papyrus.

ager: this entry is analyzed by Kenney, *CR* n.s. 20 (1970) 92.

aena: "a card or comb used in treating cloth, fibres, etc." But cf. Ernout on Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 27.92, and see also 8.192 which should not be listed under *a(h)enum*, "cauldron." Cf. Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 748.

alisequus: plausibly restored by Achilles Statius in Catullus 66.54; cf. Housman, *CCP* 1157.

allectorium: "reading-room" (*LSJS*, from a second century A.D. inscription, not certain); the *OLD* has *allector*, "official of a collegium, perhaps concerned with the collection of revenues," and *allectura*, "office of collector of revenues," of which *allectorium* may be a synonym.

alte 6a: add Virg. *Aen.* 9.579 *sagitta . . . infixa est alte lateri* (Housman: *lateri manus* codd.) to 10.85 and 11.804.

anceps: Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 749 f., uses this entry as a paradigm to illustrate some shortcomings of the *OLD*.

anguis 4b: In Ovid, *Met.* 8.182 one should read *Anguemque tuentis* (Burman from a Leidensis, Boissonade from Planudes' Greek) for *Anguemque tenentis*. The constellation is the Bootes, not the Ophiuchos. More could be said about the text of the *Metamorphoses*, but one can hardly blame the editors of the *OLD* for using Ehwald's old Teubner text of 1915; Anderson's new one is not much better; see *AJP* 103 (1983) 47 ff.

antanaclasis: this is one of many stylistic terms that the *OLD* does not list, but cf. Quint., *Inst. Or.* 9.3.68; Wieland, *Gnomon* 41 (1969) 748.

babaecalus: probably not slang word for "rich man," but rather for a parasite who flatters his host by shouting βαβαὶ καλῶς.

Baetica: the information given ("Andalusia and part of Granada") is treated scornfully by a Spanish reviewer (S. Mariner, *Emerita* 37 [1969] 199).

balâtro: Lucr. 3.955 (ex coni. amici Turnebi, Heins.) should be mentioned; the passage is not quoted under *barathrum* either. Two reviewers, Kenney (*CR* n.s. 20 [1970] 94) and F. Oomes (*Mnemosyne* 23 [1970] 434) have pointed this out.

ballistarius should be read for *ballistrarius,* I think, for the word is preserved in Greek transliteration on Syrian inscriptions (*LSJS* s.v. ἀρχιβαλιστάριος, βαλλιστάριος).

brachylogia: perhaps excluded because everyone who uses the *OLD* will know where to look it up (Quint. *Inst. Or.* 8.3.82).

caesor (as in *auricaesor*): not attested before 301 A.D., but could be older.

calathus: "cradle for washing gold" (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 34.157) seems doubtful; cf. R. T. Bruère, *CP* 54 (1969) 149.

canabarius is listed along with *canabensis,* and the definition given suggests a time-expired Roman soldier who worked as a trader close to a Roman camp or fortress. *Can(n)abarius* is attested in Greek transliteration, and the *LSJS* offers "worker in hemp" or "seller in a booth." Perhaps some agreement might be reached; **canaba,* "Weinstube" (Meyer-Lübke) may point in the right direction and could be the origin of German "Kneipe."

cauator: from *CIL* 6.9239, "of uncertain meaning" probably refers to a gem-cutter; cf. *LSJS* s.v. καβάτωσ.

ceruicarium: "pillow" *LSJS.*

ceruix: "The plural is often used with the same meaning as the singular, especially in earlier authors." One might add that the word was a dual or a "plurale tantum"; cf. E. Löfstedt, *Syntactica* I² (1942) 31; W. Ehlers, *MH* 9 (1959) 55; H. Wieland, *Gnomon* 49 (1977) 138.

cibariator: "army official issuing food and wine to the troops" should have been added.

cicur: "mild, gentle" (to be connected with *incicur*), but also = *sapiens,* according to *Pauli Festus,* p. 108 M. (Pacuv. 387 R.²): **cicurare* "to tame" survives in Romance languages.

cito: another rhetorical term not recognized by the *OLD* (nor the *TLL*) was explained by Heraeus, in his Teubner edition of Martial (1924, p. xxviii) to illustrate 2.27.3.

Cloelius: the editors should have read D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *CQ* 54 (1960) 41 ff.

Cnosius: this should be recognized as the correct spelling, and the entries on p. 768 placed here.

commentarium: "system of shorthand" (*LSJS*) could be fitted in somewhere, possibly after Seneca, *Contr.* 3, pr. 6.

concha: Martial 5.37.3 refers to oysters, not pearls; cf. Kenney, *G&R* 11 (1964) 79.

concilium and *consilium:* there seems to be a problem here, but the material collected by the editors suggests *concilium* for Virg. *Aen.* 6.433 (Mynors prints *consilium*); cf. 5.735 where there seems to be no variant reading. In the *consilium* entry, under (1b) Lucilius 4 M. and Virg. *Aen.* 9.227 should be connected, for Virgil is quoting Lucilius.

conor: on the etymology, see J. W. Poultney, *CW* 64 (1971) 242.

conuenientia: a reference to συμπάθεια might be helpful; cf. Pease on Cic., *Nat. Deor.* 3.18; ὁμολογία is quoted from *Fin.* 3.21.

cortina: under (1b) Virg., *Aen.* 6.347 should be quoted. The meaning "curtain" must be old; it is attested in a sixth century papyrus and survives in Romance languages.

coxalia: "loin-cloths," i.e., probably some kind of underwear, is quoted by *LSJS* from the *Edict. Diocl.* but must be older.

damno 6: Virg., *Ecl.* 5.80 read probably *uoti* (R, Heins.) for *uotis.*

The distinction between the prefixes *de-* and *di-* would require a monograph in itself. Ever since the Renaissance, textual critics have attempted to establish the proper forms in any given passage, and their efforts should not be ignored. I can only make a few suggestions:

deminutio was restored by Muretus in Sen., *Dial.* 2.5.4 for *di-*. On *deduco* see Kenney, *CR* n.s. 21 (1971) 93; he compares the *TLL* with the *OLD.* (In Ovid, *Met.* 6.405 *diduxit* seems to be a Renaissance conjecture.) *Derigo* is considered older than *dirigo* by the *OLD,* because no certain forms of *di-* are found on inscriptions before the fourth century A.D., but the ms. tradition is divided in Virg., *Aen.* 5.162, and the same problem appears 6.57; cf. also 7.497, 523; Reynolds in the Oxford text of Sen., *Dial.* 4.27.2. In Ovid, *Met.* 3.695 one ought to read *demittite* (Heins.) for *di-* (cf. Bömer, ad loc.). It almost seems as if some tacit agreement between scholars has been reached or is about to be reached, but it is not spelled out anywhere.

Some other formations with *de-* are not interpreted correctly. *Degrandino,* e.g., does not mean "to go on hailing," but "to hail itself out" (cf. Kenney, *CR* n.s. 21 [1971] 95, who compares *decerto* and *detono* and refers to Frazer's note on Ovid, *Fasti* 4.755). One could add *debacchor* which does not mean "to rave, rage" (*OLD*) but "to stop raving" (correctly explained by R. H. Martin, in his note on Ter., *Ad.* 184). *Depaco* "to calm down completely" is a dubious reading in Tac., *Dial.* 38.2, but it has been forcefully defended by F. M. Fröhlke, *MH* 36 (1979) 116ff. Various other functions of *de-* were discussed by H. Nettleship, *Contributions to Latin Lexicography,* 1889. On *describo* see Brink's note on Horace, *Ars* p. 86; on *decipio* Kenney, l.c.95.

dractum = δράκτον has been restored by Housman in Martial 11.8.1 and ought to be listed.

ebriamen, "intoxicating drink" in Apul. *Apol.* 59 is doubtful; read probably *ebria,* "drunkard" with the MSS. (cf. W.-H. Friedrich, in *Beiträge aus der Thesaurus-Arbeit,* p. 1).

ec- is described as a dubious form of *ex-* and the reader is referred to *ecf-* under *eff-,* but Housman (*CCP* 179) and others have made a good case for the spellings *ecfundo, ecfutuo, ecfugio, ecfero* (supported by Sen., *Dial.* 1.3.2 where the apodosis offers *haec ferre,* which was emended to *efferre* in a later tradition, to *ecferre* by Bongars), *ecfluo,* etc. Here, as in the case of *di-* versus *de-* one regrets to see the results of solid scholarly work ignored.

eludificor seems to be a nonword; cf. J. B. Hofmann, *Beiträge,* pp. 2f.

enantiotes (Quint., *Inst. Or.* 9.2.106), another missing term from the vocabulary of logic or rhetoric.

eneruis a: to Sen., *Thy.* 176 add *Herc. Oet.* 1721, as proposed by B. Rehm, *Beiträge,* p. 87.

examen 2a: add Virg., *Aen.* 7.703 (recc., Housm.); cf. 2.727.

excusator: attested by Quint., *Decl.* 329 (p. 294.5 R.) ex coni. Aerodii.

explodo 2: the reading in Sen., *Dial.* 6.19.6 is suspect (see Reynolds' note).

fallax with gen.; cf. Virg., *Ecl.* 4.24 *fallax herba ueneni,* i.e., "quae fallit (= dissimulat) uenenum" (Housman, *CCP* 521).

fas: on the etymology see Poultney, *CW* 67 (1973) 496.

flatus 3b: add Apul., *De Mundo* 23; the MSS. have *faecibus* vel sim., but Floridus (1688) emended the passage.

florus: add Virg., *Aen.* 12.605 ("antiqua lectio" Servius; our codd. have *flauus*).

fornicatio: as Kenney, *CR* n.s. 24 (1974) 90, remarks, the most familiar use of the word is not recorded, for "the only Tertullian known to the *OLD* is the contributor to the Digest." *Fornacator,* incidentally (misspelled as *fornicator* in the MSS. of the Digest), is "one who stokes a furnace."

The *OLD* lists *fullonica* and *fullonicum,* but not *fullatorium,* although it is attested in a second century A.D. papyrus.

gramen: see Kemper, *Mnem.* 30 (1977) 330.

gula 2a: add Sen., *Dial.* 9.9.2 *gulam* (ed. Neapol.: *gloriam* codd.) *temperare.*

hactenus 1: the meaning "to this point in space," elicited from Tac., *Germ.* 35, seems doubtful; cf. Haffter, *Beiträge,* pp. 87 ff.

helios: in Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 24.51 read *helion acten* with Haffter, *Beiträge,* p. 55.

hem: this article, like those on *em* and *ehem* disregards my monograph *Ueber einige Interjektionen der lateinischen Umgangssprache* (1964); it is a pity that the *OLD* perpetuates antiquated theories.

historia 4: add Martial, *Spect.* 21.8 *haec tantum res est facta* παρ' ἱστορίαν (Housman, *CCP* 537 after Buecheler for ms. *ita pictoria*), "in this detail alone did the performance diverge from the story."

honor 3e: *honoris causa* or *h. gratia* apparently means "as a favor"; cf. F. Mehmel, *Beiträge,* pp. 20 ff.

On *hospes, hospita* see M. Leumann, *Kleine Schriften,* p. 149, n. 3.

humanitas 3: add to *Rhet. ad Her.* 3.50 Seneca, *Dial.* 9.10.6 (ex coni. Lipsii).

impendo can apparently also mean "to be expensive" in Sen. *Dial.* 5.5.4, if Muretus' *ira impendit* (for ms. *incendit*) is right.

incutio: to Enn., *Ann.* 512 add Virg., *Aen.* 11.728 *incutit* (Heinsius: *inicit* vel *incitat* codd.).

inflexus[2]: only two "dubiae lectiones" quoted; see Housman, *CCP* 864 ff.

What is the difference between *insiticius* and *insitiuus?* In Seneca, *Dial.* 12.7.9 either word has been suggested for ms. *instituta.*

iurator: "sworn witness" at Sen., *Apocol.* 1.2? But see R. Heinze, *Hermes* 61 (1926) 50 ff.

latebrosus: Virg., *Aen.* 8.713 misunderstood; not the sources of the Nile are meant, but the arms of the Delta; cf. Wieland, *Gnomon* 49 (1977) 140.

leuceorum: seems to be a ghost word, based on a wrong reading of Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 26.52; it should be *leucethron;* see J. André, *Revue de Philologie* 48 (1974) 135.

libido 2a: opposed to *ius* in Cic., *Pro Caec.* 76, as restored by Madvig; cf. P. J. Jensen's excellent monograph on Madvig (1981) 186.

On *loco, locatio, locator, locatim* see Kemper, *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 325 ff.

logos (*-us*): add Mart. 3.20.5 *logos* (Thiele, Housman) for ms. *locos* (*iocos* is a Renaissance conjecture).

lugubris: on the question whether the second syllable is long (cf. *colubra, latebra, tenebrae,* etc.) see Poultney, *CW* 71 (1977) 210.

Marcellianus: the synizesis in Mart. 2.29.5 is hardly admissible, hence *-anus* (Salmasius; cf. Heraeus, p. xxviii of his Teubner edition); cf. *Lucullanus* and *-ius,* both recognized by the *OLD.*

mas[1] 2: "virility"; cf. Sen., *Nat. Qu.* 1.16.71; Housman, *CCP* 1178. *uir* can have the same meaning, duly recorded under *uir* 1 e. Apul., *Apol.* 33 suggests a connection between *marinum* and *uirile.*

mico 1a: Virg., *Aen.* 5.505 should be listed; Slater's brilliant emendation (*micuit* for *timuit*) was unknown to Hirtzel, but is printed by Mynors.

miserinus: "wretched, unfortunate (esp. applied to those who died young)" is followed immediately by Apul., *Met.* 8.21 *miserinum senem.* It has, of course, a purely emotional connotation, regardless of age or size; cf. Italian *poverello* (from **pauperellus*), etc.

numerosus (Ovid, *Tristia* 4.10.49) probably refers to the many lyric meters and stanzas that Horace displayed in his work; cf. my note on the passage; Poultney, *CW* 71 (1977) 210.

The doubtful *nuptio* should probably be combined with *nupturio,* "to desire to marry"; cf. Heraeus on Martial 3 93.18 (p. xxxiii).

nocuus is attested in the *Halieutica* attributed to Ovid (v. 130 should be read with Housman in the following form: *spina nocuus non Gobius una* [the MS has *ulla*]). Richmond, ad loc., defends the word, but is very doubtful about Scribonius Largus where *nociuus* is better attested.

obliuium: since the singular is rare and late, Tac., *Hist.* 4.9.2 should be listed under obliuio (see Heubner, ad loc., Wieland, *Gnomon* 50 [1978] 54).

organum: here the *TLL* and the *OLD* disagree: according to the *TLL* (cf. also B. Löschhorn, *Museum Helveticum* 28 [1971] 193 ff.; 30 [1973] 211 ff.) Quintilian uses it "de partibus corporis"; according to the *OLD* this particular meaning is not found in Quintilian. I think the *OLD* is right and Löschhorn (who also wrote the *TLL* article) is wrong; see, e.g., J. Cousin in his Budé edition of Quintilian, I (1975) 73, but there seems to be a controversy.

I have also compared the articles on *oro* in *TLL* and *OLD;* in the latter it is quite brief and lists the two basic meanings, "to speak" and "to pray," in the wrong order. In early Latin *oro* simply meant "to say something,"[7] even though the oldest testimonies occur in legal contexts; cf. *Lex XII Tabb: rem ubi pacunt, orato,* "when they come to an agreement, you ought to speak (in court)." In a

[7] My colleague, James Poultney, who has kindly read this review and made several valuable suggestions points out that A. Ernout regards derivation of *oro* from *os* as a popular etymology. If *oro* is to be connected with Oscan *urust* "orauerit," then *oro* must contain an original *r,* since Oscan does not rhotacize *s.* Neither Ernout nor Walde favors the idea that *urust* might be a loan from Latin.

special section "in cultu Christianorum (nec non Hebraeorum)," the *TLL* points out that the verb was revived in religious contexts in the sense of "deum precari, colere, laudare," in analogy to προσεύχεσθαι. The *TLL* also makes an attempt to distinguish between *oro, rogo, peto, precor, supplico,* and it presents the material in a more logical order, it seems to me, than the *OLD;* some interesting stylistic uses are also noted.

pertendo 2b: add Sen., *Dial.* 7.7.4 where Gertz emended the *peruenit* of the MSS.

Phocis[1] b: "error. for *Phocaea*"; there seems to be a controversy here, for Reynolds, on Sen., *Dial.* 12.7.8 (*Phocide relicta Graii qui nunc Massiliam incolunt*), notes "*Phocaea* Seneca scribere debuit."

polybutes: Varro, *R.* 2.1.6 *qui* (sc. poetae) *alios uocant . . . polymelos, alios polybutas.* Perhaps this last word should be read as a name in Virg., *Aen.* 6.484 for *Polyboeten* (*-boten* P[1]: *-phoeten* nescio quis).

Puniceus[2]: The article quotes Ovid, *Ibis* 280, but Housman had said, in his 1894 edition (in Postgate's *Corpus*) "*Puniceo* non Ouidianum." In 1928, he withdrew this to a certain point, because of *Met.* 5.536 where all MSS. have *puniceum . . . pomum;* but here one might consider *poenicium* (*poeniceum* Burman, Merkel), according to the *OLD* an alternative form.

raptor: Virg., *Aen.* 8.211 could be cited along with Prop. 4.9.9 (Mynors put Wakefield's conjecture into his text).

simus 1: add Phaedr. 4.9.6 where the MSS. have *simul,* but Housman's change ("the he-goat") is excellent.

spiro 6a: add to Sen., *Epist.* 95.10 and *Dial.* 3.20.3 also *Dial.* 9.1.14. Why is this separated from 1b "to breath divine inspiration"?

There must be a difference in meaning between *spumifer* and *spumiger,* though it may be hard to define. *Spumifer* is documented from Statius where the contexts suggest rivers, etc., while *spumiger* is said of pigs and wolves by Lucretius and Manilius; in Ovid, *Met.* 11.140 one should probably read *spumifero . . . fonti* with Burman.

succipio should be recognized along with *suscipio;* cf. the editors on Virg., *Aen.* 1.175, 6.249.

Tribacelus, "the Thrice-Effeminate" seems to be the title of a comedy by Naevius (*tribaselo* codd., em. Ribbeck).

tristitia versus *tristities:* on the forms in *-es* cf. Heraeus, Teubner ed. of Martial, p. xxxii on 3.93.17; p. xliii on 7.47.6. He recognizes before Apuleius *segnities, luxuries,* etc. and the conjectural *imperfundities,* also accepted by the *OLD.*

uector 2b: "a rider in a vehicle"; add Virg., *Georg.* 3.114 (*uictor* codd., em. Bentley).

uerso 4a: "to drive or direct this way or that," quotes Virg., *Ecl.* 10.68 *uersemus ouis,* but read *seruemus ouis* with Chr. Florens and add the passage to *seruo* 1; cf. *Ecl.* 5.12.

urbanus: distinction "c" has disappeared somehow from the list of quotations under "1," and it ought to be said that the *urbani* in Martial 3.58.29 and Pliny, *Epist.* 9.20.2 are slaves.

Here is a μέγα βιβλίον, but certainly not a μέγα κακόν!

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I Poemi epici rapsodici non omerici e la tradizione orale. Atti del convegno di Venezia, 28–30 settembre 1977, a cura di C. Brillante, M. Cantilena, and C. O. Pavese. Padova, Editrice Antenore, 1981. Pp. xiv + 268.

As long as the Homeric Question has not been resolved, there is no reason to expect an easy resolution to questions concerning the composition of archaic non-Homeric hexameter poetry—above all, Hesiod and the *Homeric Hymns*. Some of the issues are naturally the same (the relation of the poems to an oral improvisatory tradition, the role of writing in their composition, etc.), but the problems arise in a more acute form since these works are frequently dated to a period when the oral tradition is in decline and the alphabet has already been introduced into Greece. Adding to the difficulties are questions of the relationship of these poems to the Homeric tradition, whether derivative and imitative or independent and creative.

The present volume of papers presented at a conference organized by C. O. Pavese forms an excellent introduction to the *Stand der Forschung,* but a reader who hopes to discover a consensus will be disappointed. The well-known contributors offer a range of positions, frequently elaborating or summarizing their earlier studies. Two general essays by Hainsworth and Pavese open and close the proceedings. Pavese restates his views concerning the continuity of a living oral tradition from the Mycenean period to the sixth century B.C. and the existence of a continental poetic tradition, represented by Hesiod and the *Hymns,* parallel to the Ionic epic tradition. The main attraction of Pavese's approach lies in its freeing us from viewing these poems as "sub-epic" and allowing us to evaluate them as independent, albeit traditional, creations. Hainsworth presents a cautious revision of the "hard line" Parry-Lord equation of formulaic poetry = orally improvised poetry ≠ written poetry; formulaic density may not be a sufficient criterion for orality, orally composed verse may be carefully premeditated, and an overlap may exist between writing and oral composition.

Getting down to cases, M. L. West elaborates the views sketched in the introduction to his *Works and Days* that the poem was successively expanded in oral performance but that its final form was only achieved when the poem was written down by the author. West contends that the clearest evidence for a written version lies in the "author's interpolations" which disrupt the coherence of the work, above all, in the section on sailing with its autobiographical "digressions." The question immediately arises as to why the presence of writing should betray itself by incoherence. But a more fundamental question must be posed: are the apparent incoherencies in Hesiod's poem genuine, or are they due to our insufficient reflection concerning the structure and purpose of the poem?

Three papers focus on the relationship between the *Hymns* and the Homeric poems. In examining the *Hymn to Hermes,* H. Herter discovers a dependence on Homeric formulas which manifests itself in certain minor inconsequences. Tracing the expressions concerning Maia's cave to Homeric parallels does not, however, resolve their contradictory character. Only a sustained analysis of the narrative can accomplish that. G. S. Kirk draws on his distinction between "natural composition in a formular tradition" and "deliberate self-conscious composition in a formular style" which may or may not employ writing and applies it to the *Hymn to Apollo.* Analyzing the *Hymn*

section by section, Kirk finds both modes of composition throughout the Delian and Pythian parts; but his judgments, while expressed positivistically, are frequently subjective and display a tendency to identify "sub-epic" usages with exaggeration and lapses in taste. C. Segal also catalogues divergences from Homeric usage in the *Hymn to Demeter,* particularly in the use of double epithets and repetition as a structuring narrative device. But he discovers not decadence but innovation in the self-conscious artistry of the *Hymn,* some of which he acknowledges may be due to the relative brevity of the composition. While some of Segal's observations may be questioned, his approach constitutes a more productive and open evaluation of the *Hymns.*

Rounding off the collection is a paper by W. Burkert on the orality and origin of the *Thebais,* B. Gentili's thesis concerning the genesis of the hexameter from lyric cola, and L. E. Rossi's intriguing examination of the corpus of Delphic responses as (rather poorly) improvised verse. Some excellent excerpts from the general discussion following each paper are included. It must have been a lively conference.

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MAXIMUS VETTA, Editor. Theognis. Elegiarum liber secundus. Roma, Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1980. Pp. lxx + 165. L.18.000. (*Lyricorum Graecorum quae exstant,* 5)

Codex A (= *Parisinus suppl. gr.* 388 of the 10th century) is our only source for the 158 elegiac verses predominantly pederastic which constitute the second book of Theognis (vv. 1231–1389). How much of the second book (and the first for that matter) is poetry by Theognis of (Nisaean) Megara has been controversial for more than 150 years (beginning with F. G. Welcker, *Theognidis Reliquiae,* . . . 1826). Vetta in the very first paragraph of his *Premessa* confesses that in his book Theognis does not necessarily mean genuine Theognis. In the course of his following *Introduzione* he takes the stand that the second book (like the first) is anchored in the sixth to fifth century B.C. and presents amatory poetry, in good measure orally composed, seasoned with the social-political views of the aristocratic party/club, and sung to the accompaniment of a flutist παρὰ πότου. Prior to Vetta's commentary, for the second book we had to rely mainly on the commentaries of T. Hudson-Williams (1910), A. Garzya (1958), and J. Carrière (1948, 1962², 1975³), all of limited scope. So, Vetta's extensive, all-encompassing commentary arrives as a *desideratum.* It gives, on the average, almost a page per Greek verse, while the 46 pages of the densely written *Introduzione* provide additional generous help. The commentary is preceded by a critical edition of the Greek text matched by an Italian translation on facing pages. There is a good bibliography and two indices, *verborum* (the Greek words of the second book) and *rerum notabilium.* The printing is of high quality. Vetta shows admirable familiarity with the scholarship on his subject. His major contribution is not textual but interpretative; he has sifted the bulk of epic, lyric, and elegiac poetry and collected a wealth of *similia* which throws

light on meanings of words, τόποι, formulae, and various conventions. However, the author's performance is not quite free of sporadic weaknesses in judgment on different levels. For example:

In vv. 1233–34 the poet tells us that Love caused the undoing of Aias the son of Oileus. Vetta rightly relates this to Aias' rape of Cassandra. Nevertheless, Vetta treats as one matter Aias' dragging of Cassandra from the altar of Athena and his sexual assault of her. The first activity should not necessarily imply the second. In Euripides' *Troades,* for example, Aias drags Cassandra from the altar but there is no evidence that he rapes her—he dragged her as slave to the Greek camp, where the other enslaved Troades were also taken for subsequent distribution among the victors. Is not the dragging of Cassandra from the altar alone an act of major irreverence, sufficient to excite the full anger of Athena? Vetta should have distinguished between warrior and lover and cited the earliest datable source(s) where Aias clearly appears as raping Cassandra, for only such source(s) are relevant to this verse and to the dating of vv. 1231–34.

Vetta believes that vv. 1255–56 form a reply to vv. 1253–54 (vv. 1253–54 being Solon's fr.17 Gent.-Pr. = 23W) and that the two units offer an example of what he calls "botta e risposta" ("remark and reply"). This I find difficult to accept. Notice first that there is nothing in vv. 1255–56 to make this distich a reply. If vv. 1253–54 were not immediately preceding, none would have suggested that anything is missing before v. 1255. The *botta e risposta* then can be argued only on the basis of a juxtaposition of the thought of the two pieces. According to Vetta a person offers Solon's distich which forms a μακαρισμός pertaining to only one form of εὐδαιμονία (i.e., without excluding other forms of εὐδαιμονία), while he who answers offers an *exclusive* μακαρισμός. This is farfetched. To begin with, the Solonian μακαρισμός *is* exclusive in that it is the one Solon chose, i.e., he chose to say "blessed is he who has X," rather than, say, "blessed is he who has Y," etc., and therefore we implicitly understand him as saying "blessed is he who has X (rather than Y or Z)." Moreover, vv. 1255–56 do not simply recast the content of vv. 1253–54 in exclusive terms ("he who has *no* X can *never* be blessed"), but they alter the content of the latter verses significantly, so that we cannot be the least sure that the intention of the author of vv. 1255–56 was to produce a *risposta* to vv. 1253–54. I find it more probable that vv. 1255–56 are nothing more than a μεταποίησις of vv. 1253–54. The μεταποίησις (vv. 1255–56) having been produced and recorded in the Theognidean text, at some later point someone else entered the Solonian distich as well (known to him in this form). Or else he who produced the μεταποίησις recorded also the Solonian distich (where rightly or wrongly [probably rightly] he took Solon's παῖδες to mean *children* rather than *boys*) to show off (by direct contrast) his dexterity in μεταποίησις, by here transforming nonerotic poetry (= Solon's) into erotic poetry, and even his superiority as a poet over Solon by correcting the very poetry of Solon (by inserting θηρευταί τε κύνες, a Homeric usage, in Solon's poem *pro* καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταί [ἀγρευτής does not occur in Homer], cf. also E. Harrison, *Studies in Theognis* [Cambridge 1902] 110–12). Vetta's further remark (pp. 61–62) that vv. 1253–54 could be felt as a priamel is also unconvincing. A priamel may exist only within a format such as "Solon says x (= priamel) and/but I say y"—there is neither "Solon" nor "and/but I" in the text, and to speak of *Priamel abbreviata* (as Vetta does) amounts to speaking of a priamel that is not a priamel.

In v. 1278 Vetta reads κατὰ γῆς with cod. A, "down upon the earth," rather than κατὰ γῆν with Weigel, "across the earth," "all over the world." In vv. 1277–78 Eros leaves Cyprus to come to humans offering them fertility. I find it likely that someone changed γῆν to γῆς observing that in v. 1275 Eros is described in terms of a star (ἐπιτέλλεται) and supposing that (after such ἐπιτολή) Eros, in v. 1978, must descend from heaven upon the earth (rather than travel *across* the earth). However, while the sequence προλιπὼν Κύπρον . . . εἶσιν ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους . . . φέρων clearly suggests a traveling across, ἐπιτέλλεται is likely to have been intended by the poet as "*comes to full* [= *active*] *existence*" (something analogous to the act of "sprouting"/"growing" suggested by ἄνθεσιν . . . ἀεξομένη [sc. γῆ], v. 1276), rather than as "*ascends to heaven*" so as then to descend *down upon the earth*. After all, why should Love ascend from earth to heaven and then descend upon the earth again if his only intention is to do business with humans. Vetta ought to have at least daggered γῆς (I would have printed Weigel's γῆν).

Following M. West, Vetta believes that the elegy of vv. 1283–94 resulted from a *collage* of two "passages" of different authorship. In the first "passage" the ἐραστής was identified with Atalanta, and in the second the παῖς. The suggestion of an identification of Atalanta with the ἐραστής in the first "passage" seems to me highly improbable. Atalanta is not the "lover" but the epitome of one who *avoids* love. By definition then her persona in an ἐραστής-παῖς context can apply only to the unyielding παῖς, not to the ἐραστής—the ἐραστής conquers the παῖς as Milanion conquered Atalanta (just as the case is in the second "passage"). According to West (*Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*, . . . 1974, 165–67), the point where the two "passages" were glued into one is the diaeresis of v. 1288, with Ἰασίου κούρην belonging to the first "passage" and παρθένον Ἰασίην being either a "stopgap" on the part of him who made the collage or part of the second "passage." But how certain can we be that all this is not wishful thinking?

If the collage is performed on v. 1288, could not the whole verse, including Ἰασίου κούρην, have been written by him who made the collage? Even if we could establish that he who made the collage wrote only half of v. 1288, why should we suppose that he wrote παρθένον Ἰασίην and not Ἰασίου κούρην; that is, why should we suppose that Ἰασίου κούρην belonged to the first passage and inspired the "stopgap" παρθένον Ἰασίην, rather than that παρθένον Ἰασίην belonged to the second "passage" and inspired the "stopgap" Ἰασίου κούρην? Now, if we deny the validity of the claim that Ἰασίου κούρην is part of the first "passage," the view of Atalanta as lover collapses. Atalanta need have no connection with τρώσω, v. 1237, for here τρώσω may well mean only "conquer," "make mine" in terms of the usual erotic metaphor of τιτρώσκω (see LSJ s.v. τιτρώσκω 3). Nor is παρελεύσεαι, v. 1285, of help to one who would like to see τρώσω in terms of Atalanta striking at the suitor. In the myth (Hyg. *fab.* 185; Apollod. 3.9.2), Atalanta runs with weapon in hand behind the unarmed suitor, catches up with him and kills him. Yet παρέρχομαι means "to pass by," "to outstrip," and in terms of the Atalanta race it hardly makes any sense said of the chased suitor—the suitor can never *pass* Atalanta *by*, for he always runs *before* her (for παρέρχομαι in actual races, see, e.g., *Il.* 23.345; *Od.* 8.230). And of course, we need not understand the "fleeing" lad (φεύγοντα,

v. 1287) as fleeing from a quasi-Atalanta lover rather than simply from a pursuing lover (in Greek the lover frequently is referred to as διώκων; to go no further than the second book of Theognis, see v. 1299 [cf. also φεύγειν, v. 1302] and v. 1355). Far from being convinced of the "reversed" role of Atalanta from the first to the second "passage," I am not even convinced that the collage theory is necessary. I think we can see one unity through vv. 1283–94: a lover who has been pursuing a lad's favors for some time but without results tells him to stop "fleeing," for he is a well intending lover, and moreover, even Atalanta, who could "flee" faster than anyone, had finally to quit and marry. I translate the text with additions in square brackets to facilitate the meaning. *Lad: I still have the intention* [unfulfilled so far because of your attitude] *to be fully agreeable to you. Having comprehended this with thoughts as much joyous as noble, stop treating me unjustly* [= stop rejecting the advances of a well-intending lover]. *For, rest assured, you will not outstrip me with wiles and tricks. True* [= confirmatory γάρ], *you have won and* [thus] *you will certainly* [taking ἔχεις as present of anticipation] *be at an advantage from now on; but* [in spite of this] *I shall "wound" you* [= I shall force you to accept my love] *as you flee me, even as they tell that the daughter of Iasius, maiden Iasie, once fled* [her suitor(s)] *refusing wedlock. . . .*" Beginning in v. 1287 with φεύγοντα, the lad and the lover of v. 1283 ff. start *fading out* and the Atalanta story (= [lad/]Atalanta and [lover/]Milanion) begins *fading in.* I find it attractive to suppose that the words δόλῳ - φεύγοντα, vv. 1285–87, have nothing to do with a "passage" where the lover is identified with Atalanta, but that they are only "signs" which in a foreshadowing technique direct us toward the Atalanta myth of vv. 1288–94. The elimination of the "striking" of the suitor(s) by Atalanta from vv. 1288–94, and the insistence there on presenting her as "fleeing" (φεύγειν, v. 1290; φεύγουσ(α), v. 1293 [cf. also vv. 1292–93 where Atalanta withdraws to unapproachable places in order to avoid marriage]): these two peculiarities may well suggest that these verses were written by the poet who wrote vv. 1283–87. The poet having presented, in vv. 1283–87, the lover as "striking" (τρώσω, v. 1287) and the lad as "fleeing" (φεύγοντα, v. 1287), for reasons of *logical consistency* sticks with a "fleeing" Atalanta (= lad) rather than an Atalanta who "strikes" against her suitor(s) ("striking" being reserved for the lover). Even if we suppose that under ζωσαμένη . . . ἔργ' ἀτέλεστα, v. 1290, we should understand an Atalanta striking against the suitor(s), this "striking" is too vaguely expressed to have been thus written without compelling reasons.

If the words of the lover in vv. 1283–87 are incoherent, we may suppose that this is done *artis gratia:* at the beginning the poet presents the lover speaking under emotional strain, but then, when the Atalanta story comes (which prefigures the lover's triumph), the poet allows him to speak more coherently. West proclaims v. 1288 a bad verse. I find it possible that his judgment is prejudiced by his preoccupation with establishing a collage in v. 1288 (a verse produced by collage is rarely good). I see no strong reason why v. 1288 must not be proclaimed a good verse. Notice first the artful reversal in ^{1}Ἰασίου κούρ^{2}ην παρ^{2}θένον ^{1}Ἰασίην which makes an emphatic introduction to the Atalanta myth by position (i.e., Ἰασίου at the beginning and Ἰασίην at the end of the verse) and by echo play (Ἰασι- and Ἰασι-)—as Hudson-Williams has

aptly remarked *in loco:* "The repetition of cognate words . . . is so characteristic of Greek poetry" (cf. also ἀτέλεστα τέλει, v. 1290). Moreover, the sequence κούρην παρθένον is not tautological, for a "daughter" (κούρη) need not be "unmarried," and besides παρθένος, a pivotal word in the Atalanta story is neat here in terms of artistic economy.

In v. 1311 δίωμαι (subjunctive of δίομαι = *to put to flight* . . . , see LSJ s.v. δίω) is genuine according to Vetta. He takes the subjunctive as deliberative, the preceding γάρ as explicative and translates καὶ γάρ σε δίωμαι as ". . . —*e voglio stanarti*—. . . ." I have difficulty in recognizing the subjunctive as deliberative (for it does not involve a question), and the γάρ as explicative (for it explains nothing), and even in appreciating *voglio stanarti* as meaningful. Moreover, the preceding οὐκ ἔλαθες κλέψας in connection with the following γάρ (taking καί as "in fact") recommends an indicative in place of the subjunctive: "you did not escape [my] detection of your theft . . . because I [+ indicative]" (e.g., "*because I have come to know you well* [and therefore can recognize your actions]," or "because I saw you [= your attempt at stealing]"). Like Vetta I have doubts about the viability of Hermann's διῶ⟨μ⟩μαι, and I am not particularly attracted by Ahrens' διώκω either, but unlike him I cannot see how we can keep δίωμαι without a dagger. Perhaps τούτοις, v. 1312, is *dativus commodi* to be taken with κλέψας. The participle may refer to an actual stealing (of money, or the like) on the part of the lad for his newly acquired "friends." This, by extension, will project the "friends" as common thieves and, of course, will celebrate the lover, whom the lad οὐκ ἔλαθε κλέψας, as unbeaten by their criminal schemes.

M. West has interpreted vv. 1335–36 (conjecturing εὕδων in place of εὕδειν, v. 1336) as "The lover's palaestra is at home" (West, *Studies* . . . , 167). Vetta (who keeps εὕδειν and citing X. *Cyr.* 1.6.32 interprets it as consecutive infinitive depending on γυμνάζεται, v. 1335) agrees. What stands against this interpretation is first the words οἴκαδε ἐλθών. If the poet wanted the palaestra at home why did he not present the lover at home (οἴκοι) but instead *led him home* (οἴκαδε ἐλθ.) *out of nowhere?* The preceding γυμνάζεται suggests that the lover goes home from the athletic grounds. He takes his exercise there and then passes the rest of the day at home "resting" by the side of his lad. The μακαρισμός glorifies the aristocratic lover. This meaning is obtainable by accepting Bekker's attractive emendation οἴκαδε ⟨δ'⟩ ἐλθὼν εὕδει{ν} which also remedies the hiatus. The ⟨δ'⟩ may well have been dropped by haplography and then εὕδει changed to εὕδειν under the influence of γυμνάζεται. The adjective πανημέριος is an exaggeration (for before his relaxing the lover has spent time in the gym), and it points to *all* [the remaining part of the] *day till the arrival of the night,* when presumably the lad goes to his own home (the relation between lover and beloved is in terms of ἡμέρα, not νύξ, and perhaps this is meant to indicate that the two have nothing to hide from society). It seems to me that the West/Vetta interpretation, amounting to a μακαρισμός which ridicules the lover (as one taking his exercise not at the gym but at home "sleeping" with his lad [whether "sleeping" means only sleeping or more than that (= having sex)]), shows a disrespectful attitude toward the lover which is unique in Theognis. This uniqueness too suggests that their interpretation is likely to be spurious.

The above examples suggest that the book could profit not negligibly from δεύτεραι φροντίδες, but this suggestion is not meant to dispute the fact that the book, as it stands, is a major contribution to Theognidean studies.

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[The above review was sent to *AJP* in August 1982.—ED.]

J. A. S. EVANS. Herodotus. Boston, Twayne Publishers, 1982. Pp. 198.

J. A. S. Evans' *Herodotus* is a solid addition to the Twayne series. It follows the pattern of the series: a chapter on Herodotus' life, eight chapters arranged to reflect the narrative sequence of the *History*, and a chapter on the *Nachleben*. Evans has usefully added a chapter on Herodotus' sources and one on characterization in the *History*. The whole is concisely written and elegantly annotated; it can be assigned to an upper division undergraduate student as a balanced and thoughtful assessment of Herodotus as a working historian and as a judicious guide to the most recent scholarship on the *History* as a historical source.

Some points of particular strength: Evans has a talent for clear and rapid narration, and the book clarifies those passages in Herodotus that students find confusing. The narrative structure of Book Two receives careful treatment, and Evans makes particularly good sense of the campaign narratives in Books Seven through Nine. He discusses the difficulties of Herodotus' account of Thermopylae; he emphasizes that the account of Plataea is tendentious but internally consistent; he makes sense of the advancement of the Persian fleet, the positions of the Greek and Persian fleets up to and during the battle of Salamis, and the necessity on both sides for continuous coordination between fleet and army. (Because these narratives are so good, it is a pity that maps could not have been included.)

Supplementing the narrative of the *History* is Evans' scholarship. Where Herodotus' account has produced historical controversy, Evans focuses his own discussion on the nature of the problem rather than on one particular solution to it. See, for instance, his discussion of Herodotus' life (Chapter One) and the brief but balanced exposition of the Alcmaeonids (97–98) and of the Themistocles decree (121–23). He refers throughout to other ancient authors whose works bear on Herodotean problems: Lucian, Bacchylides, Agathias, the *Hippias Major*, Diodorus Siculus, Pausanias, as well as the obvious fifth and fourth century heirs and the explicit ancient assessments. He refers repeatedly to inscriptional evidence, both Greek and barbarian, to topographical studies, and to the current scholarship of the archaeology and history of Egypt, Scythia, and the near east. Unobtrusively but definitively, Evans rebuts those who follow Fehling or Hartog in arguing that the literary organization and thematic density and coherence of the *History* prove that Herodotus was not interested in the accurate reporting and assessment of *ta genomena*. Finally, Evans is a student

of Immerwahr, and though he subordinates purely literary concerns to historical issues, he organizes his own discussion nicely around the major narrative units in the *History*. He draws attention to the repetition of leitmotifs (his own favorite pattern he calls the *Erewhon* touch, after Samuel Butler), and he points out passages where Herodotus himself interprets events through significant repetition (see, for instance, pp. 31, 92, 106, 139).

The limitations of the book are closely related to these strengths. Most seriously, Evans tends to dismiss as literary flourishes or folktale motifs those elements in the *History* that conflict with his picture of Herodotus as a serious historian writing a historical narrative. Thus he states that Herodotus makes no sharp distinction between myth and history (21), that the story of Solon and Croesus was "too good for a mere date to spoil it" (23), that Herodotus includes (or invents?) the constitutional debate in 3.80 "to tease his Greek audience" (58), and that we "need not believe" what Herodotus says about Themistocles (117). On all these points Evans may well be right. But the good student is likely to ask why then Evans calls Herodotus a historian, if he veers back and forth between folktale and "real" history without apparently discriminating between them. One would have liked a more systematic consideration of these issues added to the interesting discussion of oral history in Chapter Ten.

Evans' own admirable brevity also sometimes misrepresents Herodotus; in particular, he underplays the presence of Herodotean irony. In 2.55 Herodotus is not beguiled by a clever Egyptian priest, as Evans implies (43–44); Herodotus himself emphasizes that the myth about black pigeons comes from Dodona, in order to contrast the sober rationalism of his Egyptian informants with the excesses of comparable Greek versions of the distant past. Evans also appears evasive or tantalizing at a number of points where one would like explicit historiographic argument. One misses a serious discussion of Herodotus' relation to his contemporaries in the first sophistic, and to the politics of his day. We receive the suggestion on p. 12 that contemporary politics "may not be without significance" for the writing of the *History;* we learn at the (provocatively Herodotean) end of the book that ". . . analogy was a mode of thought in the ancient world." Such hints at Evans' own historiographic judgment might have been elaborated, to the student's great profit. But as the eight-item bibliography appended to the end implies, there is a paucity of good work on Herodotus in English. One hopes to have more, in a more directly argumentative form, from the author of this useful book.

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CHARLES SEGAL. Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 506. $30.00. (Martin Classical Lectures, 26)

This study makes an original and very important contribution to Sophoclean criticism. Although readers familiar with Segal's numerous articles will recognize some of the material, most of it is new and that which is not takes on

fresh significance in the fullness of its new context. According to the book's jacket and to the author's preface, Segal employs a structuralist analysis, but his approach is actually somewhat eclectic. He begins, for example, with an epigram by Jacques Derrida, a critic of structuralism and the leading exponent of deconstruction. The first three chapters, which provide the theoretical background for the subsequent analyses of the individual plays, further suggest that while Segal's enterprise has structuralist foundations, it will also take advantage of other contemporary critical approaches.

Segal draws upon a wide range of Greek myth, ritual, and literature but chiefly upon the Sophoclean texts to establish for each play the structural polarities comprising a series of homologous codes that includes the family, the social order, ritual, space, time, sexuality, and language. The recurrent polarities that Segal discerns (e.g., man and beast, tame and wild, *nomos* and *physis*) can all be subsumed under the broader heading of savagery and civilization. Despite the obvious affinities between his approach to tragedy and Lévi-Strauss' analyses of myth, Segal makes an important distinction between them. In the latter, according to Segal, the contradiction between opposing polarities is overcome by a process of mediation. "In tragedy, however, the stabilizing mediation that society seeks and expresses through its myths . . . is disrupted. Instead of reaching a resolution, polarities break apart into violent conflict or a dangerous preponderance of one side over the other. Tragedy stresses less the unifying, synthesizing capacity of a mediator than the problematical and paradoxical status of the figure who stands at the point where opposites converge" (21). Thus, for example, Segal observes that Deianeira's fear of sexuality stands in opposition to Heracles' untrammeled sexuality, and the institution of marriage fails to mediate as it should between these poles. In the spatial homology, the inner world of the *oikos* in which Deianeira moves and the outer world in which Heracles performs his exploits should be mediated both through possessions brought by Heracles to the house to enrich it and through the domestically produced gifts with which Deianeira welcomes Heracles. This mediation is subverted, however, by their exchange of Iole and the poisoned robe, each "object" by its very nature serving to undermine its mediating function. Within the sacrificial code, the smoke from an offering should mediate between man and god, while the victim should represent both man's superiority over the beast whom he kills and man's inferiority to the gods. But this process of mediation fails in the sacrifice at Cenaeum, where the smoke moves downward and Heracles himself has the status of a beastly victim. A variety of such inversions and unmediated oppositions converges in each major character so that Heracles, for instance, is both a beast and a slayer of beasts, a savage and a defender of civilization, a sacrificer, a victim sacrificed to the gods, and ultimately himself a god.

To describe in a small space Segal's readings of each play would risk misrepresenting them, for they are not reductive decodifications but rich and varied discussions. Even those readers uncomfortable with his approach will find much that is illuminating. Segal explores the linguistic and imagistic texture of each play in great detail and with extraordinary insight. His analysis of the role of language and ritual, particularly sacrifice, and his investigation of the familial and social dimensions to each play should broaden the critical



discussion of Sophocles. The notes and bibliography alone constitute a vast resource (despite a few omissions that are surprising, given Segal's remarkable thoroughness; for instance, his extensive analysis of *logos* in *Phil.* should take into account R. Hamilton, *AJP* 96 [1975] 131–37).

His larger interpretations of individual plays, however, may not always persuade even those who are enthusiastic about his approach. Segal does not in every instance make compelling either his particular choice of polarities or the emphasis he places on one homologous code over another, and his evaluations of characters are sometimes puzzling. In his discussion of *Ajax*, for instance, Segal gives less emphasis to the familial code than it may deserve, especially for the "first half" of the play, while his critical approach does not provide adequate grounds for his admiring Ajax but disdaining the Atreids since, as Segal himself observes (146–48), many of the same inversions apply to all three men. Segal's analysis sometimes lacks force because it can be hard to follow. He tends to arrange his argument paratactically, accumulating fascinating but sometimes diverting details and dividing each chapter into numerous untitled sections, whose relation to one another and to loosely parallel sections in other chapters the reader must labor to establish.

Segal's theory regarding the failure of mediations in tragedy becomes the basis for speculations about the Sophoclean hero and the nature of tragedy. While these speculations are couched in a new vocabulary, they nonetheless recall more familiar interpretations. Segal celebrates the merging or collapse of unmediated oppositions by finding in this violent moment of conflation a certain glory, since he envisions it as a potentially restorative and even creative moment. "Only by overstepping the limits of civilization and suffering the consequences can the hero fulfill his role in the cosmic order. His task is the paradoxical one of enacting the necessity of that order by negating it. He 'attracts magnetically all the contagious miasmas in order to convert them into stability and fecundity'" (45–46). Some readers, however, may suspect that Sophocles celebrates the conflation of unmediated oppositions less than he reveals its dangers, and that he offers visions in which *philia*, the *polis*, *charis*, language in its creative potential, and above all the gods provide successful mediating terms that can transform oppositions into a wholly new set of relations. Segal's larger interpretations are most persuasive for those plays about which he actually argues in much this way, especially for *Phil.*, *O.C.*, and *El.* (where the nearly total absence of such mediations produces the play's unusual effects).

Segal extends his speculations about the creative power of tragedy's failed mediations to the spectators' experience of the plays within the mediating context of performance. "The paradoxical relation of the hero to the cosmic and social orders parallels the paradoxical relation of the tragic performance to the ritual structures of the society. . . . The tragic action . . . is part of a rite that affirms order and stability. . . . In watching the negation of its order the community undergoes the deepest experience of its cosmological consciousness. In the logic of paradoxes that we have been exploring, the tragic confrontation with the negation of civilization is a profoundly civilizing experience" (48). Beyond this theory, which resonates both with Nietzsche's views on the nature of tragedy (see especially Segal's discussion of Dionysus, 48–52) and with the

deconstructive notion of *aporia,* Segal says little about these plays as drama. Neither does his synchronic approach enable him to explore the pragmatic, ethical problems with which the tragic poets concerned themselves in their attempts to provide civilizing experiences. Without reducing characters to stick figures, Segal does not relate their positions in his structuralist analyses to the dramatic arc of human motivations and desires, and his occasional hints at psychoanalytic explanation (e.g., of Deianeira's motivation, 88) do not bridge this gap.

Segal himself recognizes these limitations to his study, if indeed they are only limitations. It is possible, however, that his interpretations cannot be complemented by readings that attend to these texts *as plays:* an important criticism of structuralist approaches is that they oversimplify narratives by giving inadequate attention to their diachronic—that is, to their dramatic—movement. These limitations and problems surely will be explored in future Sophoclean studies over which this book, the most resourceful and challenging analysis of Sophocles' tragedies to appear in some time, should exercise considerable influence.

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H. S. VERSNEL, Editor. Faith, Hope and Worship. Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 2). Leiden, Brill, 1981. Pp. ix + 284. Pl. 64.

This is the second volume in the new Brill series, *Studies in Greek and Roman Religion.* The editor of the series, H. S. Versnel, who made his name with his *Triumphus* (Leiden 1970), a *liber certus in re incerta,* is also the editor of the present volume and one of its chief contributors. Faith, hope, and worship sounds sentimental enough, and the code words "aspects" and "mentality" arouse the worst suspicions in the skeptic who dreads a torrent of semi-profound banalities in the fashion of the Parisian gurus. The book is at times diffuse, but the alarm is premature.

F. T. van Straten discusses "Gifts for the gods" (pp. 65–151), the practice and theology of votive offerings in Greece. He provides a useful classification of the ex-vota: gifts in the fulfillment of a vow, gifts as a token of the *arete* of the devotee and as a monument to the *arete* of the deity; gifts representing the offerer (often engaged in prayer or performing a sacrifice) or the deity. Initiations, contests, and above all sickness figure most prominently as occasions calling for votive offerings. Here the most interesting category, of which van Straten provides a full catalogue, is the anatomical ex-vota, so often misunderstood by earlier excavators disappointed not to have found beauty where functional ugliness was the goal. The book by W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings* (Cambridge 1902) has not yet been replaced, but van Straten's catalogue is a step in the right direction. When we contemplate the bare walls of Greek temples we have to imagine them cluttered with gifts. And gifts are of importance also for the study of religious continuity, for as the author points out, and as

any traveler to these parts of the world can attest, much of the ancient votive lore has survived to our days in the customs of both the Catholic and Orthodox churches.

But to the gods, ancient and modern, words have been even more pleasing than gifts. H. S. Versnel treats of "Religious Mentality in Ancient Prayer" (pp. 1–64) and concludes that "it is hard to perceive a sharp distinction between Greek and Roman attitudes to prayer or between ancient and modern ones, either from a thematic or an emotional point of view" (p. 10). The ancient prayer was composed of two major elements, *invocatio* and *preces*. The invocation posed some problems: whom to invoke? This depended on the nature of the problem and on personal persuasion; Versnel traces the intermingling of the polytheistic and henotheistic elements in the invocations, the intermingling mirrored today in the cult of specialized or local saints and virgins. As to the *preces*, selfishness, the *Gebetsegoismus*, was their most striking feature, as it still is: compare Livy 5.18.12: "precibus ab dis petitum ut exitium ab urbis tectis . . . arcerent Veiosque eum averterent terrorem" with *Missale Romanum, Introitus*, 9th Sunday after Pentecost: "averte mala inimicis." The *precatio* was either silent (often associated with magic) or loud or sung. Of the last form, the hymn, J. M. Bremer provides a typology and a useful survey of extant texts (pp. 193–215).

If the deity acceded to the *preces*, it was entitled to a remuneration. But in Greek and later antiquity the counterpart to *preces* was not *grates* but rather *laudes*. The gods were expected to live up to their end of the bargain; if they did not listen, men felt deceived and would occasionally vent their anger on the gods themselves. Because Neptune was helping Sex. Pompey, Augustus removed his statue from the *pompa deorum* (Suet. *Aug.* 16). But even worse things could happen: statues were flogged, broken, beheaded, and for this attitude Versnel again adduces illuminating parallels from the Christian Mediterranean. He calls this an example of faith, for through their rage men were proclaiming the very existence of gods or saints. No doubt; but it is also an inarticulate realization of a simple truth: men need gods, and gods need men.

We can approach a deity in an active or passive way, and it is to the latter that H. W. Pleket turns his attention. In a very competent epigraphical study on the "believer" as servant of the deity in the Greek world (pp. 152–92), he discusses the concepts expressing the superiority of the deity and the subservience of the worshiper. According to Pleket the self-humiliation of the worshiper before the imperious deity reflects the despotic structure of oriental societies. It is a feature alien to Greek religion. This conclusion echoes the ideas of F. Bömer, but, unlike Bömer, Pleket is inclined to find traces of this attitude in fourth century Greece, which he explains as deriving from "emergency situations," especially with respect to the healer-god Asklepios. Still I see no reason why oriental influences should be excluded from fourth century Greece. For the δουλεία τοῦ θεοῦ of a legally free person an interesting and unexpected parallel can be found in later commentators of Vergil who describe (incorrectly) the position of the wife *in manu mariti* as the *conditio liberae servitutis* (Serv. *auct. ad Aen.* 4. 03).

That common people believed in gods and that statesmen both believed and found it useful need not surprise us; but why did the philosophers believe

in gods? Some apparently did so because of fear (of men, not gods), but P. A. Meijer is certainly right in trying to find a philosophical (and not only a social) explanation of the insignificance of atheism in antiquity (pp. 216–63). The deity was not perceived as a *deus creator*. Hence the philosopher was not forced to choose between a supreme being and matter. Gods and men co-existed within the material world. Philosophically there is nothing wrong with the idea of beings more powerful than men; on the other hand when the *deus creator* is made superfluous he simply disappears.

The religions of antiquity are to be approached on their own terms, and for an attempt to do so we owe thanks to the authors of this book.

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
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THE ARCHAIC AESTHETIC

Glory be to God for dappled things . . .

Denys Page insists that Sappho's reputation must still depend on ποικιλόθρον' ἀθανάτ' Ἀφρόδιτα and φαίνεταί μοι κῆνος ἴσος θέοισιν, for "it is questionable whether there is anything among the new fragments which reaches or even approaches the level of the old. We discern in both old and new the same narrow limitations of interest, the same simplicity of thought, the same delicacy in expression, the same talent for self-detachment and self-criticism. But whereas the two great poems are aglow in the reflection of intensely ardent emotions, the longer of the new fragments appear comparatively dispassionate and colorless. The language is not less elegant; the spirit is much less impassioned."[1] One might ask, first, whether expression of passion is the sole criterion by which to judge poetry and, then, whether passion is necessarily romantic or erotic feeling. Is Page not looking, in part at least, for quite the wrong qualities in Sappho? Might he not rather have thought that the delicacy of expression, which she shares with other of the early lyricists, establishes her in all her work as the most elegant practitioner of the archaic aesthetic? For these poets were not so much interested in the expression of passion as they were intent upon describing the phenomena of their world as they saw, heard, touched, and smelled it. They were fascinated by the variegated nature of the objects of their senses: the sound, color, and movement of birds, insects, fishes, and animals; the subtle variations of pitch in music; the color, texture, and fall of clothing and other dyed stuffs; the touch, color, and scent of flowers; and, above all, the play of light on surfaces of all kinds. Their passion, one might in fact say, was for τὰ ποικίλα.[2]

[1]D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 110.

[2]The texts cited in the following pages are D. L. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962); E. Lobel and D. L. Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford 1955); D. L. Page, *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis* (Oxford 1974); H. Maehler after B. Snell,

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Animals

In Alcman's Partheneion (1.47-49), the chorus leader is like a well-built steed, a bringer of prizes with pounding hooves (ἀεθλοφόρον καναχάποδα), a creature of dreams with wings. She, or another, is a Venetian courser beside an Ibenaean steed.[3] The girls are compared to horses, perhaps because a part of the ritual in which they now sing and dance was a foot race or even an actual horse race.[4] Speed and beauty of movement is then the point here. The Homeric adjective καναχάποδα was chosen for onomatopoeic effect. It attempts to imitate the sound of galloping steeds.

Stesichorus (178) in a fragment from the Funeral Games for Pelias names five horses: Φλόγεον, Ἅρπαγον, Ποδάργας, Ξάνθον, and Κύλλαρον. All the names refer to the color or speed of the creatures. Ποδάργας and Φλόγεον may refer to both. *Etymologicum Magnum*, which cites the passage, says that Κύλλαρος comes from κέλλειν and means "swift" (ταχύς). The etymology is improbable, but the meaning may be right.[5] Again, Stesichorus (235) called Poseidon "prince of the

Bacchylides Carmina cum Fragmentis (Leipzig 1970). I have in general confined my study to the melic poets, but I have when his use of an adjective seemed particularly enlightening, cited Bacchylides as well. Pindar, whom I almost never mention, is obviously worthy of a separate study. (See B. H. Fowler, "The Centaur's Smile: Pindar and the Archaic Aesthetic," in W. G. Moon, ed., *Ancient Greek Art and Iconography* (Madison 1983) 159-70.) My citations are selective; word indices in the above editions will supplement points I make.

[3]D. L. Page, *Partheneion* (Oxford 1951) 51.

[4]T. G. Rosenmeyer, "Alcman's Partheneion I Reconsidered," *GRBS* 7 (1966) 321-59, n. 1, provides an excellent bibliography to that date on this poem. He himself suggests that the ritual described may have included an actual horse race. For important contributions since Rosenmeyer to the identification of the girls, see C. O. Pavese, "Alcmano, il Partenio del Louvre," *QUCC* 4 (1967) 113-33; P. Janni, "Nuovi studi alcmanei," *QUCC* 4 (1967) 188-93; Q. Cataudella, "Sugli scoli A, B al Partenio di Alcmane," in *Intorno ai lirici greci* (Rome 1972) 21-41; F. J. Cuartero, "El partenio del Louvre (Fr. 1 Page)," *BIEH* 6, no. 2 (1972) 23-76 A. Griffiths, "Alcman's *Partheneion*: the morning after the night before," *QUCC* 14 (1972) 7-30; J. W. Halporn, "Agido, Hagesichora, and the Chorus (Alcman 1.37 ff. PMG)," in *Antidosis*, Festschrift fur Walter Kraus zum 70 Geburtstag (Vienna 1972) 124-38; F. R. Adrados, "Alcman, el Partenio del Louvre: Estructura e interpretación," *Emerita* 41 (1973) 323-44.

[5]The word is more likely to be related to κυλλός, which both Boisacq and Pokorny give as "crooked," "bent," or "lame." Aristotle (*HA* 530a.12) tells us that κύλλαρος is the Hermit-crab, and Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* II (Cambridge and London 1963) 31, translates the word in Stesichorus as "Bow-legs," a strange name for a horse which was Hera's gift. Other adjectives describing color or movement of horses occur at Stesichorus 250, Ibycus 285, Simonides 515, and Alcæus 34 and 42.

hollow-hooved [κοιλωνύχων] horses " The adjective, like καναχάποδα in Alcman (1.48), though not truly onomatopoeic, refers to and even suggests the sound of galloping steeds. The near alliteration in κ and χ and the spaced ω's and ν's produce this effect.

Ibycus (287), like Alcman, uses the horse metaphorically. He is himself, trembling at Aphrodite's approach, like an old yoke-bearing, prize-winning horse, who goes, all unwilling, with the swift car to the fray. Anacreon tells of Aphrodite tethering her horses in fields of hyacinths (346.7-9), and the eroticism suggested by this factual or symbolic action and setting is still more explicit in the sustained metaphor of his Thracian filly (417).[6] The coltishness, and therefore the flirtatious manner of the girl, is particularly evoked by the line: κοῦφά τε σκιρτῶσα παίζεις (5). The word παίζω frequently has erotic connotations. Aristotle uses it specifically of the amorous play of mares (*HA* 572a.30), and Alcman (58) uses it of Eros walking upon blossoms of galingale.[7]

In a fragment without context, Anacreon calls colts ῥαδινῆς (456). The comment of the scholiast here is significant. He is commenting on Apollonius Rhodius' line τῆς δ' Ἥρη ῥαδινῆς ἐπεμάσσατο χειρός (3.106) and says that ῥαδινῆς means "soft" or "tender" (τρυφερῆς) but that Anacreon uses it for "swift" (τάχους). Ibycus is reported by the same scholiast to have used the adjective of columns supporting heaven (336); surely the meaning there is "slender." Hera's hand is in some way delicate—soft perhaps—and the colts are in some respect also delicate—slender and swift. Anacreon and other lyric poets use the adjective in ways that comprise these several meanings. Alcman (91) uses it to refer to parts of a necklace which look like the petals of a flower having the color derived from the murex or "purple-fish." The word must refer then to the quality of petals, which may be both "slight" and "soft." Stesichorus (243) uses the word to refer to javelins: the idea may be "slender" and "swift" as in the case of the colts of Anacreon (456). Anacreon himself (407) uses it to refer to thighs (both soft and slender?) in a context which can only be erotic: "Pledge, my friends, your tender thighs." The sense of "delicacy," probably as both "softness" and "slenderness," appears in Sappho's description of Aphrodite herself as βραδίναν (102). Sappho (115) uses the same adjective to describe the sapling to which she compares the bridegroom. The context is erotic, and the sapling is both tender and slender and, like Aphrodite, like the

[6]C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, 2nd rev. ed. (Oxford 1961) 288, 272.

[7]Cf. P. E. Easterling, "Alcman 58 and Simonides 37," *PCPhS* 200 (1974) 37-43, who sees Eros as a mischievous boy "at play."

young man's thighs, like the petals of a flower, "supple." The "suppleness" may apply too to Anacreon's colts and be but another element in their "swiftness."

The figure of the horse is implicit in Anacreon's charming poem (360) to his boy love, whom he describes as the charioteer of his soul. Here the alliteration is π in the first line, the circumflex accents on ὦ and παῖ, the rhyme of κλύεις with ἡνιοχεύεις, as well as the polyptoton all add to the wit and the erotically suggestive tone of the poem.[8]

In another mood entirely, Sappho in a fragment (104), possibly of a wedding song, tells of evening bringing back to their mothers the kid and the lamb. The comparison implicit is that of the bride whom evening will not bring back to her mother—or to Sappho.[9] The creatures are chosen for tender effect. Elsewhere (40) Sappho speaks of a white goat. The color of creatures seems to matter.

Another creature chosen for tenderness' sake and appearing in what one suspects is a romantic context is the fawn. Anacreon (408) says, "gently as a new-budding, suckling fawn, abandoned by its horned mother in a wood, trembles." The adverb ἁγανῶς sets the tone.[10] Sappho (96.15) uses the adjective of Atthis. The suckling creature is νεοθηλέα. This may refer specifically to its horns, or it may refer just to its infancy in general, but the adjective in either case suggests that which is thriving, swelling, blossoming—in short, newly alive. Finally, the verb ἐπτοήθη means literally "flutter," "cower." The trembling motion of the fawn is the characteristic that completes the simile, whatever it was. Sappho (58.16) apparently uses the fawn too in a simile: ἴσα νεβρίοισιν. Elegance of gait may here have been the point: the line above reads γόνα δ' [ο]ὐ φέρουσι. Elsewhere (16.17) she refers to Anactoria's lovely walk (ἔρατόν τε βᾶμα).

Birds

In Alcman's Partheneion (1) the rival chorus appears to be called the Peleiades, that is, the Doves.[11] Twice in the same poem Alcman uses

[8]J. Labarbe, "Anacréon, contemplateur de Cléobule?" *RBPh* 38 (1960) 45-58, sees the polyptoton as marking ascending passion.

[9]Cf. M. Treu, "Die Structur von Sappho Fr. 48,3 und 120D," *RhM* 107 (1964) 289-94.

[10]J. Labarbe, "*Aganôs*. Anacreon fr. 28, I Gentili," *LEC* 37 (1969) 229-35, eliminates ἁγανῶς from this fragment.

[11]This is the view of D. Page (note 3 above) 57. Cf. Bowra (note 6 above). For other views see particularly A. P. Burnett, "The Race with the Peleiades," *CP* 59 (1964)

birds in similes. The singer says that she has "shrieked" (λέλακα) like an owl from the beams (1.86), and another "sings" (φθέγγεται) upon the streams of Xanthus like a swan (1.100). In both passages the verbs may be onomatopoeic. Λάσκω is used of the shrieking of birds (*Il.* 22.141; Hes. *Op.* 207) and the barking of dogs (of Scylla: *Od.* 12.85) and may be an attempt to reproduce these sounds. Φθέγγεται almost certainly tries to sound like human utterance, for which it is often used (*Il.* 11.603; Hdt. 2.57; Pi. *O.* 6.14), and also like the plucking of a lyre, for which it is also sometimes used (Thgn. 761; cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1019b.15).

In Alcman's Halcyon Song (26) the totally dactylic rhythm recreates in its regularity both the motion of the waves and the winging of the birds which it describes. It also gives the same wistful tone that Yeats creates in his anapestic line, "I would that we were, my beloved, white birds on the foam of the sea."[12] The repetition of βάλε δὴ βάλε—the very words of wishing—combines with the meter to enhance this effect. The birds are defined not only by flight but by their sounds (μελιγάρυες ἰαρόφωνοι) and perhaps by their color (ἁλιπόρφυρος).[13]

Alcman (39) declares that he has learned music and song from chattering partridges (γεγλωσσαμέναν κακκαβίδων). He enunciates here a notion that was common in antiquity: men learned music from the birds.[14] The name for partridges is foreign but almost certainly ono-

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30-33; Rosenmeyer, Griffiths, Cataudella, Halporn (note 4 above); also, M. L. West, "Melica," *CQ* 20 (1970) 205-15.

[12]"The White Birds," from *The Rose* (1893), in *The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats* (New York 1959) 41.

[13]On the reading ἰαρός, see M. Benavente, "Similia II," *E Clás* 9 (1965) 235-39, and G. Giangrande, "Interpretationen Griechischen Meliker," *RhM* 114 (1971) 97-131, who defend εἴαρος, and O. Musso, "Hiaros ornis (Alcm. fr. 26 Page, v. 4)," *SIFC* 45 (1973) 134-35, who defends Hecker's emendation. Cf. J. K. Bos, "Een fragment van Alkman," *Hermeneus* 39 (1967-68) 107-9.

[14]B. Gentili, "I frr. 39 e 40 P. di Alcmane e la poetica della mimesi nella cultura greca arcaica," in *Studi filologici e storici in onore di Vittorio de Falco* (Naples 1971) 59-67, has some provocative things to say about the role of mimesis in the archaic oral tradition. He takes the fragment to mean that Alcman found both melody and words by verbalizing the sounds of partridges. C. Gallavotto, "Le pernici di Alcmane," *QUCC* 14 (1972) 31-36, on the other hand, accepts Page's reading γεγλωσσαμέναν as a genitive plural but reads ὁμά for Athenaeus' ὄνομα and takes the fragment to mean that then Alcman discovered music as well by composing in unison with chattering partridges. F. G. Sirna, "Alcmane heuretês tôn erôticôn melôn," *Aegyptus* 53 (1973) 28-70, reads γεγλωσσαμένον (with μέλος) and takes the expression to mean "in maniera vistosa alle note consuetudini delle tribabi."

matopoeic: it imitates the bird's call.[15] The participle γεγλωσσαμέναν is suggestive too of their "clucking."

In his Night Song (89), Alcman ends by describing the sleep of the long-winged birds. The dactyls of φῦλα τανυπτερύγων again suggest the winging of those birds, which sleep so peacefully in the succession of long, slow syllables at the beginning of the line: εὕδουσι δ' οἰωνῶν.

In Stesichorus (209.1.9) a "cawing crow" (λακέρυζα κορώνα) appears, perhaps as an omen.[16] The two words together appear to be onomatopoeic, just as our translation "cawing crows" seems to imitate the raucous call of the bird itself. Stesichorus uses another onomatopoeic line to describe the babbling of the swallow in spring: ὅτε ἦρος ὥραι κελαδῆι χελιδών (211). The verb κελαδέω (κελάδω) is probably itself mimetic. It is used elsewhere of the flow of water (*Il.* 18.576), of the cry of a newborn baby (Aesch. *Ch.* 609), of the cock (Theoc. 18.57), and of bells (Eur. *Rh.* 384). The name of the swallow may attempt to imitate its song. The near alliteration of κ and χ and the repetition of λ's and δ's in the two words do, in any case, yield a sound suggestive of a bird's warbling song.[17]

Ibycus describes several kinds of birds sitting among the topmost leaves:

τοῦ μὲν πετάλοισιν ἐπ' ἀκροτάτοις
ἰζάνοισι ποικίλαι αἰολόδειροι
πανέλοπες λαθιπορφυρίδες ⟨τε⟩ καὶ
ἀλκυόνες τανυσίπτεροι. (317a)

The λαθιπορφυρίδες are unidentified but apparently the same as the πορφυρίς mentioned in the following fragment (b) and presumably a

[15]G. R. Cardona, "Un nom grec de la 'perdix': kakkabê," *Orbis* 16 (1967) 161-64, argues that κακκαβίς is not onomatopoeic but a loan word from the Near East. I myself fail to see why the word could not have been formed onomatopoeically in the Near East. D'Arcy Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (Oxford 1936) 129, identifies the κακκαβίς as *P. saxatilis* "whose call-note is *kakabi* or *kakabet* varied by *cok, cok, cokrre.*" Roger Tory Peterson, *A Field Guide to the Birds of Britain and Europe* (London 1954; reprinted 1974) 105, gives the call of the chukar, a bird very similar to the rock-partridge, as a "chucking or cackling voice, like barnyard fowl"; its name too is apparently onomatopoeic. The rock-partridge, he says, has a staccatto song "tchertsi-ritt-chi." Both the rock-partridge and the chukar are found in Greece today.

[16]Bowra (note 6 above) 78 denies the literal existence of this crow.

[17]The swallow was known in antiquity for its babbling or twittering song. See Thompson (note 15 above) 315, "Epithets and Phrases," and 320, "Their Barbarous Twitter." Peterson (note 15 above) 210 describes the song of the swallow (*hirundo rustica*) as "a pleasant, weak mixture of rapid twittering and warbling notes."

bird of a blue-purple color: πορφυρίων is the purple gallinule, which Aristotle (fr. 272; ap. *Ath.* 388c, D) describes as κυανέος and which we should probably agree is of a purplish hue.[18] Less puzzling is the description of the ducks as ποικίλαι and αἰολόδειροι. These are words which apply certainly to many species of ducks. They are often "pied" or "parti-colored," and the play of light on the plumage, often of a contrasting color, on their perhaps preening necks is a conspicuous feature of these birds. It is commonly acknowledged that the adjective αἰόλος contains the notions of both movement and light.[19] Like ποικίλος it means "variegated," in one or more senses at a time. Alcaeus (345) describes pied ducks of Ocean, come from the boundaries of Earth, which are both τανυσίπτεροι and ποικιλόδειροι. The former adjective suggests flight, the latter the visual result of that flight. Stesichorus (*SLG* 15) calls the hydra αἰολοδε[ίρ]ου: the adjective here embraces both the movement of the necks and the resulting play of light on them.

Anacreon, like Stesichorus, speaks of a swallow in a line which is alliteratively suggestive of the "sweet-voiced" bird he is actually describing: ἡδυμελὲς χαρίεσσα χελιδοΐ (394a). The distribution of liquids (λ and ρ) and χ's and δ's contribute to the musically chattering effect of the line. He also mentions a cuckoo (437). Κόκκυξ, like the English name for the same bird, is mimetic. Anacreon (443) may refer to a bird "swinging" or "quivering" in the dark-leaved laurel and the green olive tree.[20] The verb ταναλίζει suggests something else, in addition to sound, color, and flight, about birds which fascinates. The color or quality of the setting is also significant. Both trees have leaves which we should call green; those of the bay are darker and shiny; those of the olive are remarkable for their silver-gray color. Certainly we should not ordinarily call laurel black-leaved (μελαμφύλλωι), and if we did so, we should be doing what Anacreon surely is doing: describing the play of light on a moving surface rather than what we call color as such.

Anacreon (452: κόρωνα βαίνων) may describe a bird "walking with arched neck." One thinks of Aratus' description of birds before a storm (*Phaen.* 950). In any case, whether or not the fragment refers to a bird, it is the gait of the creature which appears to be at issue. In Ana-

[18]On the meaning of κυανέος see below, "Color." On Aristotle's use here, see especially note 46.

[19]E.g., E. Irwin, *Colour Terms in Greek Poetry* (Toronto 1974) 214-15.

[20]W. B. Stanford, "Marginalia," *Hermathena* 97 (1963) 107-9, suggests, however, that the subject of ταναλίζει is a mountain, or possibly Samos.

creon 453 we come upon another "babbling swallow," again in an alliterative and onomatopoeic expression: κωτίλη χελιδών.

Simonides (508) may be speaking of a half-mythical halcyon, but he does describe the bird as ποικίλος. He refers presumably to its variegated coloring. Aristotle describes the European kingfisher, that is the halcyon, as follows:

> ...τὸ δὲ χρῶμα καὶ κυανοῦν ἔχει καὶ χλωρὸν καὶ ὑποπόρφυρον· μεμιγμένως δὲ τοιοῦτον τὸ σῶμα πᾶν καὶ αἱ πτέρυγες καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν τράχηλον, οὐ χωρὶς ἕκαστον τῶν χρωμάτων· τὸ δὲ ῥύγχος ὑπόχλωρον μέν, μακρὸν δὲ καὶ λεπτόν. (*HA* 616a.14)

This corresponds almost exactly to the description by the modern ornithologist Roger Tory Peterson of *alcedo atthis*, the kingfisher:

> Brilliant iridescent blue and emerald green upper-parts, white throat and neck-patch, chestnut cheeks and under-parts, long dagger-shaped bill.

Peterson's picture shows a bird which is nothing if not ποικίλος.[21]

Simonides refers to the "dark blue" (κυανέα) swallow (597) and to the "lovely-voiced" (ἱμερόφων') cock (583). Color and sound are again the pertinent attributes. The Greeks, as many have observed,[22] had—and have—a taste for a shrill, piercing range of sounds and apparently did not consider the crowing of a cock an unpleasant sound. They may indeed have thought of it as a triumphant cry, a clarion call, hence a "desirable" sound.

In a puzzling passage Simonides (586) refers to nightingales which are in the spring "much warbling" (πολυκώτιλοι), another onomatopoeic word, and "green-necked" (χλωραύχενες). The latter seems to be, as Irwin so ably demonstrated,[23] and as Stanford had suggested before her,[24] an example of true synesthesia. The throat of the nightingale is not literally "green," though it is "pale." The adjective may, however, be transferred from the concept of spring in εἰαριναί; it may refer to the "fresh" song that issues from the nightingale's throat; it may again simply describe the play of light among the leaves of spring upon the bird's throat; or it may be a fusion of all these ideas. It is perhaps comparable

[21] Peterson (note 15 above) 195, 181.

[22] E.g., W. B. Stanford, "The Lily Voice of the Cicadas (*Iliad* 3.152)," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 3-7.

[23] Irwin (note 19 above) 73.

[24] W. B. Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* (Oxford 1936) 55.

to the adjective ξουθός, which Stanford has shown to mean both "tawny" and "whirring," the element common to the two words being density or frequency.[25] Here too color and sound seem to be fused. Irwin's translation of χλωραύχενες as "throbbing" is excellent.

In another song (567) Simonides speaks of the countless birds that fluttered (πωτῶντ') overhead and the fish that leapt straight out of the dark blue (κυανέου) sea at Orpheus' lovely songs. Here fish, rather than birds, are set, as it were, in color, but the two kinds of creatures have much in common. There is the quickness of their now smooth, now fluttering motion. There is too the sheen of plumage and of scales.

Alcman (93) mentions the "wily" (ποικίλον) worm that eats the vine-buds. Here the adjective probably describes the writhing motion of the worm rather or at least more than its appearance. It may, however, suggest the cleverness of that motion, or even of the worm's protective coloring.[26]

Simonides (521) compares the inconstancy of man's fortune to the "change" (μετάστασις) of the long-winged fly. He seems here to refer to the quick flight of the fly and so, one imagines, to the changing color, due to the changing light upon the translucent wing of what may be our dragonfly.

The sparrows which in Sappho (1.10-12) bear Aphrodite's chariot through heaven athwart the black (μελαίνας) earth are lovely and swift and they "whir" (δίννεντες) their wings πύκνα, "with high frequency." They too are set against a colored if traditional background, and they too are remarkable for the quality of their flight.

Color

In Alcman's Partheneion (1.64-65), the girls declare that no "abundance" of "purple" can protect them. They speak obviously of clothing. The dye from the murex or other shellfish was especially prized. The color it produced varied widely in shade from a plum-blue to a red-brown.[27] The best Tyrian purple, Pliny (*NH* 9.135) tells us, was

[25]Stanford (note 24 above) 54-55.

[26]Cf. Alcaeus (69.7) who calls the fox ποικιλόφρων.

[27]C. Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall, and Trevor S. Williams, *A History of Technology* II (Oxford 1956) 367.

the color of congealed blood, and Goheen makes a convincing case for a red-brown color for the "purple-dyed" carpet of the *Agamemnon*.[28] Somewhat puzzling then is Anacreon's description of Aphrodite as "purple" (357) and Simonides' use of the same adjective to describe a "mouth" (585). Irwin is almost certainly right in saying that "in early poetry πορφύρεος is not definitely chromatic, but describes the appearance which purple-dyed material and certain other objects have in common. This may be sheen or iridescence, the apparent mixture of light and dark on a changing surface."[29] This could equally well be said, as she in general contends, about all so-called color words in early Greek poetry. So, here, πορφύρεος might best be translated "blushing" for Aphrodite, as Irwin suggests, and "shining" or "gleaming" for lips. The point is, however, that no one word is really an adequate translation for the adjective. One must take into account all its connotations or suggestions. One need not, for instance, exclude the probable root meaning of "to be disturbed," as of the sea.[30] For Aphrodite the word suggests the flow of blood to the face, a flush, perhaps of passion. It need not preclude either the notion that Aphrodite was born of the sea. Elsewhere, when halcyons, which are chiefly blue, and gallinules, which are what we should call more truly purple, are both described by a word with the root, we need not be dismayed. A sea which is disturbed will display a great range of hues. And when the halcyon is described as sea-purple, it may not refer any more to its color than it does to the fact that it is a seabird and that one of its habits is a "nervous, bobbing action, plunging [into the sea presumably] after small fish or insects."[31] D'Arcy Thompson, discussing ἁλιπορφυρίς as another name for the halcyon, remarks, "I am not very sure that ἁλιπόρφυρος means sea-blue, nor that it is anything so simple as a mere color-epithet: cf. ἁλιάετος."[32] The eagle to which he refers is described by Aristotle: ἁρπάζοντες δὲ καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι φέρειν πολλάκις καταφέρονται εἰς βυθόν (*HA* 9.619a.4). Surely Thompson is on the right track here.

The adjective φοινίκεος, though it is usually translated as "crim-

[28]R. Goheen, "Aspects of Dramatic Symbolism. Three Studies in the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 76 (1955) 113-47.

[29]Irwin (note 19 above) 18. The Greeks seem instinctively to have been aware of the true explanation of color; their terms are therefore not less but more accurate than ours. Cf. Irwin, especially Chapter I.

[30]Pokorny and Boisacq s.v. πορφύρω.

[31]Peterson (note 15 above) 195.

[32]Thompson (note 15 above) 46.

son," as opposed to "purple" for πορφύρεος, ought, one would at first suppose, to describe the same range of colors as πορφύρεος, for it means simply Phoenician and refers presumably to Tyrian purple-dying. Simonides (550), however, uses φοινίκεον to describe a sail which was dyed with the "blossom" of the evergreen oak. This we know, as the ancients did not, is the κόκκος (often confused with the Arab kermes), the insect which, dried, yields a dye of a red or red-purple color.[33] This color, φοινίκεος, was probably as uncertain a shade as πορφύρεος, and the range of hues the κόκκος produced probably overlapped with those of purple-dyed materials. Bacchylides uses the adjective in compounds to describe cattle or bulls as "red-backed" (5.102) or "red-haired" (11.105). Here the color must be a reddish-brown, one end of the spectrum presented by πορφύρεος.[34]

Another dyed stuff appears perhaps in Alcman (46), who describes the Muses as κροκόπεπλοι. The adjective is Homeric and refers there to the Dawn (*Il.* 8.1, 19.1). Medieval and presumably therefore ancient peoples used the stigmata of the crocus to obtain a dye which varied from a yellow to a deep orange color.[35] Again, we should probably not insist upon a single adjective such as "yellow" to translate this word. It is likely that it referred, in Homer at least, to all the visual qualities of the dawn, the dying of the sky with lights that ranged from what we can only describe by color words: yellow, orange, rose.

The last words of the papyrus of Alcman's Partheneion (1.101) mention a girl with lovely "yellow" (ξανθᾶι) hair. Here too any single color word is misleading, though "blond" or "fair" would be a reasonably good translation. The adjective when applied to hair probably refers to any hair which is not dark brown or black. Since Sappho (98.a.6) speaks of a girl whose hair is ξανθοτέρα than a torch, and since horses are also described as ξανθοί (Stesichorus 178 and Alcaeus 42.14), we can suppose that the word described hair that ranged from yellow to brown with perhaps a reddish cast, the color, that is, of "bay" horses. Again, what was important here was a play of light upon surfaces rather than a single and specific hue. Simonides describes honey as ξανθόν (593), and we describe hair as honey-colored; again, we mean the qualities of light and dark in such hair as much as we mean any specific hue.

[33]C. Singer et al. (note 27 above) 366

[34]A. Kober *The Use of Color Terms in the Greek Poets* (New York 1932) 93, basing her conclusion upon Xenophanes' rainbow (32.1-3), says that πορφύρεος takes care of the blue-indigo-violet colors and φοινίκεος of the orange-red end of the spectrum.

[35]C. Singer et al. (note 27 above) 366

Stesichorus had described honey as χλωρόν (179a). Irwin has argued so convincingly for the basic notion of liquidity in χλωρός,[36] that one need add here only that, as in the case of the green-necked nightingale above, she need not choose between a color term and one denoting some other quality of a substance. The word can apply to a color of honey (colors of honey vary considerably) as well as to its moisture. So sand can be wet and pale.[37] So the nightingale can have a liquid song and a pale throat. The ancients were describing texture, not color as we think of it, and they were often describing more than one texture at a time.

Similarly, when Sappho describes herself as χλωροτέρα than grass (31.14), we need not know that the word is connected with bile to realize that she refers to her pallor *and* perhaps to the fresh or moist quality of her complexion.[38] One must here, as elsewhere, think of qualities other than hue. So, when Bacchylides (5.172) describes Deianeira as "green-necked," he may be using Simonides' adjective in a somewhat perfunctory manner.[39] He may, on the other hand, be suggesting the freshness of her skin *and*, as Irwin suggests, the quality of the living voice.[40]

Irwin is probably right in declaring that in Homer κυάνεος meant simply "dark" rather than "dark blue," though the niello work to which she refers might be thought of as having "blue" highlights.[41] If, as she argues, κυανέοισιν in Ibycus (287) modifies ὄμμασι rather than βλεφάροις, then the adjective probably refers to dark (brown) eyes as opposed to blue, green, or gray eyes.[42] So Anacreon (357.2) when he calls the nymphs κυανώπιδες undoubtedly means simply "dark-eyed," and when he describes the men of Ialysos as κυανάσπιδας (349), he may refer to something like the niello work to which Irwin alludes.[43] When, how-

[36]Irwin (note 19 above) 31-78.

[37]Cf. Irwin (note 19 above) 56-60 on honey, 75-76 on sand.

[38]Cf. Irwin (note 19 above) 62 ff.

[39]J. Stern, "The Imagery of Bacchylides' Ode 5," *GRBS* 8 (1967) 35-43, defends Bacchylides' use of this epithet: "Deianira too like a beautiful plant blooms for a moment before the disaster...." Cf. G. M. Kirkwood, "The Narrative Art of Bacchylides," in *The Classical Tradition. Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (Ithaca 1966) 101, who sees Bacchylides as using traditional epithets chiefly for sound, color, and atmosphere.

[40]Irwin (note 19 above) 73-74.

[41]Irwin (note 19 above) 79-96.

[42]Irwin (note 19 above) 100.

[43]Irwin (note 19 above) 82-84. But see G. Giangrande (note 13 above), who defends κυανάσπιδας and thinks that Anacreon refers to a poet who satirizes the Ialysians for using bean-shaped (i.e. figure-eight) shields.

ever, Simonides refers to the "dark mist" (κυανέωι δνόφωι: 543.12) of night, it seems perverse not to admit of a blue cast to the night. The same poet uses the adjective to describe both the sea (567) and the swallow (597). Roger Tory Peterson describes the swallow as follows: "has *dark metallic blue upper-parts*, chestnut-red forehead and throat, *dark-blue lower throat*, remainder of upper-parts creamy white [italics are Peterson's]."[44] His colored illustration shows a bird with a blue to blue-gray back.[45] In flight, however, the swallow does appear quite dark, even black, and so fits well too the description in the Rhodian Swallow Song (848.4–5) of a bird "white on the belly and black on the back." Κυάνεος seems here then to cover the same range of hues as appear on the sea and perhaps also on the metal or niello work on the shields of the men of Ialysos. Again, then, it is clear that these poets were not describing a single color, blue, but a play of light that occurs at night, on the sea, on the plumage of a swallow, perhaps on metal, and in the dark (brown) eyes of some people. Again, Irwin defeats her own purposes in trying to divide "dark" from "blue" as a translation of κυάνεος.[46] She need not choose.

Simonides (555) calls the seven daughters of Atlas "violet-haired," and Alcaeus (384) describes Sappho as "violet-haired." Pindar uses ἰόπλοκον to describe Evadne (*O.* 6.30), and Bacchylides uses ἰόπλοκοι (17.37) to refer to the Nereids. Since his other compounds of the same sort (πυρσόχαιτος 18.51; κυανοπλόκαμος 5.33, 9.53) seem to refer primarily to the color of hair, this one probably does too. It is ordinarily translated as "dark-haired," and that is in a sense a correct translation. Actually, it must, like κυανοπλόκαμος, mean hair that has blue or lavender highlights. Lawrence Durrell, who has a painter's eye, refers in *Monsieur* to Sylvia's "black hair with its violet blackness shining like carbon paper."[47] One ought not, however, to exclude the possibility of the hair being as soft as or smelling of violets *as well as* having violet-colored highlights.[48] So, when Bacchylides (19.5) calls the Graces "violet-eyed,"

[44]Peterson (note 15 above) 210.

[45]Peterson (note 15 above) 196.

[46]Irwin (note 19 above) 103 ff. One need not be disturbed either that Pindar uses κυάνεος to describe foliage and that Aristotle uses it to describe the purple gallinule. Both may mean simply "dark." It is in my opinion, however, more likely that they were thinking of a play of light such as occurs upon the head, for instance, of the mallard duck, which may appear a brilliant blue, green, or purple, depending entirely upon the angle at which the light strikes it.

[47]L. Durrell, *Monsieur* (NY: Viking Press 1975) 15.

[48]On the possibility of the word referring to texture see Kober (note 34 above) 101.

he may be referring simply to the "dark" color of their eyes.[49] He may also, however, be referring, as perhaps in the case of his "lily-eyed" (17.95), to the soft or tender quality of those eyes.[50]

'Ιόκολπον in Sappho (21.13, 103.6) is more likely to refer to clothing than, as Waern suggests, to flesh the color of white violets.[51] The κόλπος was the fold of the garment, the Ionic chiton, which fell over the sash, and ἰόκολπος, like ἰόζωνος, probably stands by metonymy for clothing. Since there was a word ἰοβάπτης, we know that materials were "violet-dyed."[52] What the dye substance was, whether it was different from that of shellfish or from a combination of woad and κόκκος, we do not know. Edmonds, a sensitive translator, may be taking the adjective to refer to scent ("violet-sweet"), and that is a possibility one ought not to exclude.[53] We have no immediate context in 21, but in 103 Sappho is speaking of nymphs, Graces, and Muses, all of whom might be characterized by lovely scent.[54] We know from Homer of rose oil, and we know that Sappho and her companions used scent.[55] There is the possibility too that the adjective refers, in part at least, to the soft or delicate texture of the garment.

If ἰοβλέφαροι and κυανώπιδες mean "dark-eyed," γλαυκώπιδες, it is thought, means "blue-, green-, or gray-eyed." Again, however, the word seems originally not to have been a color word but to have meant "gleaming-eyed." Thompson reveals his usual insight in saying that he thinks we have the word in a very ancient sense when applied to the moon.[56] When Ibycus then calls Cassandra γλαυκώπιδα (303), he may

[49]Isak Dinesen, *Out of Africa* (NY: Vintage Books, 1972) refers to the purple eyes of an antelope (75) and to the violet eyes of oxen (263). Most of us have probably observed that the dark brown eyes of dogs appear violet in certain lights and that the dark blue eyes of newborn babies turn purple before they become brown.

[50]Cf. Irwin (note 19 above) 212-13, who thinks that the primary concept here is delicacy.

[51]I. Waern, "Flora Sapphica," *Eranos* 70 (1972) 1-11.

[52]LSJ s.vv. ἰόκολπος, ἰόζωνος, ἰοβάπτης.

[53]Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca* I (Cambridge, Mass. 1957) 213.

[54]Cf. *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 277 where the goddess is revealed by her lovely scent.

[55]Homer, *Il.* 23.186; Sappho 94.18-20. Cf. too Archilochus 26 (30), ed. Diehl, where the girl anoints her hair and her breast with myrrh. Cf. A. Burnett, "Desire and Memory (Sappho Frag. 94)," *CP* 74 (1979) 16-27.

[56]Thompson (note 15 above) 80. Thompson thinks that the meaning "owl-eyed" is a piece of folk-etymology. Kober (note 34 above) 44 also finds this meaning unlikely. Boisacq s.v. gives "aux yeux brilliants ou pers." Pokorny does not venture an etymology.

be referring to the light or fiercely gleaming quality of her mad or prophetic gaze as much as to the color of her eyes.

The adjective γλαυκός is used of the sea (*Il.* 16.34), of olive wreaths (Bacch. 8.29, 11.29), of the olive itself (Soph. *OC* 701; Eur. *IT* 1101; Soph. *Tr.* 802), and of grapes (Soph. *Tr.* 703). The nearest definition of true color comes in Plato (*Ti.* 68c), who says that κυανοῦς mixed with λευκῶι yields γλαυκός. This is generally taken to mean that dark blue mixed with white produces light blue. This is, for the poets at least, too confining a definition. What the sea in some of its moods, the olive, its leaf, the grape, the moon, and the eyes of some people have in common is a gleam that is light rather than dark, and if we insist upon γλαυκός as a color term, we must think of it as comprising tints and shades of at least yellow, green, blue, and gray.

Gold, Silver, and Bronze

Alcman describes Hagesichora s hair as "blossoming like gold unalloyed," her face as "silvery" (1.51-54). Ἐπανθεῖ has here its root meaning of rising, cresting, surfacing. Χρυσὸς . . . ἀκήρατος refers to the brightness and presumably to the color of the hair—some shade of blond. What Alcman means by the total expression is hair, perhaps wavy, which is remarkable for its golden highlights; and, of course, what is so attractive about true blond hair are the many shades of yellow, orange, gold, brown, and even green that are actually in it. Hagesichora's "silvery" face is perhaps explained by the fact that the ritual described in the poem takes place at or just before dawn: her complexion glows like silver in the moonlight, the starlight, or the first gray light of dawn.[57] So, both expressions, "golden hair" and "silvery face," are in part color terms; in part, and more importantly perhaps, they, like other so-called color terms in early Greek poetry, describe the play of light on surfaces.

Words for gold and silver occur elsewhere in these early poets to suggest, among other things, color. In another Maiden Song (3.68), Alcman compares Astymeloisa to a golden shoot. He means apparently that she is like a yellow sprig or a plant with a golden blossom. He may be saying simply that she is young and delicate—for she is also like a soft feather—or he may mean that she, like the flower, is "blond." He may

[57]Page (note 3 above) 75; Bowra (note 6 above) 63.

also mean that she is as precious as gold. Similarly, when Sappho (132) says that her daughter Kleïs has the appearance or beauty of golden blossoms, she may be referring to color—for elsewhere (143) she calls pulse golden—and mean that her daughter is blond. She may also mean that she is delicate, beautiful and precious. Color words in the lyric poets seldom, if ever, refer simply to color in our sense of the word.

When Stesichorus refers to the sun as a golden cup (185) and Simonides calls the moon golden (581), they are obviously describing their blaze or glow as well as their divinity.[58] Similarly, when Sappho calls Dawn golden-sandalled (103 13; 123), she is probably thinking of dawn, not just as divine, but as glowing like gold. When Anacreon asks a pretty-haired girl in a golden dress to listen to him (418), he may mean a yellow, saffron-dipped dress. He may, however, mean, as Kober suggests, a dress with golden threads woven into it, or a dress which was actually dyed to resemble gold [59] We need not assume that the girl, because she wears gold, is in some way divine.[60]

When Stesichorus calls the springs of the river Tartessus "silver-rooted" (184), he may mean that they were located in or near silver-bearing soil. Ἀργυροῥίζους may, however, connote, even if it does not denote, the color and perhaps the sound of the water. Bacchylides calls the Alpheus "silver-eddied" (8.26). Since it was not a source of silver, he presumably refers to its sight or sound. Bacchylides, also, however, calls the Pactolus "gold-eddied" (3.44). Here he may be thinking factually. We must, in both cases, however, consider the possibility that Bacchylides is using epithets simply to create atmosphere rather than for any more specific purpose.[61]

Ibycus mentions the children of Molione, both of them born from a "silvery" egg (285). There is no need here to emend the text.[62] It is

[58]In Greek poetry the great majority of golden objects belong to gods, and only gods are specifically described as being golden-haired. Gold does, therefore, become almost a symbol of divinity. Cf. Kober (note 34 above) 61 ff.

[59]Kober (note 34 above) 61. On gold-dyeing see E. Gullberg and P. Åström, *The Thread of Ariadne. A Study of Ancient Greek Dress. Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology* XXI (Goteborg 1970) 14.

[60]As does B. Gentili, "Note anacreontiche," *QUCC* 16 (1973) 134–37, who suggests that the poet refers to Aphrodite.

[61]Cf. G. M. Kirkwood (note 39 above) 101.

[62]As does M. L. West (note 11 above), who emends to ἀργυφέοι on the grounds that eggs are white. But cf. G. Giangrande, "Anacreon and the Lesbian Girl," *QUCC* 16 (1973) 129–33, who points out that ἀργύρεον can mean "white." I suggest that to the Greeks white and silver were not separate concepts.

appropriate that these mysterious Siamese twins come from an unusual, a glittering, egg.

The play of light upon worked surfaces makes jewelry particularly attractive. The girls of Alcman's Maiden Song (1.66-67) refer to a snake "spangled all in gold" (ποικῖλος δράκων παγχρύσιος). This is a bracelet, the surface of which is made to resemble the scales of a snake and is therefore ποικίλος: it reflects light to make a "variegated" pattern. Sappho's Hecuba brings to her wedding not only crimson or purple robes but many golden bracelets, countless silver cups, and trinkets of variegated design (ποικίλ' ἀθύρματα: 44.9). Groden translates this last as "a rainbow of trinkets."[63] This is not only delightful but accurate. The expression refers to objects so worked that the play of light upon their surfaces reflects a variety of colors in much the same way that sunbeams passing through the prism of raindrops make a rainbow.

The flash of light occurs too in the mention of objects of bronze. Simonides (543.10-12) describes a brass-nailed chest which gleams (νυκτιλαμπεῖ) in the blue-black mist of night. Alcaeus (357) is thrilled by the blaze of brazen armor. The great house, he says, gleams with bronze (μαρμαίρει . . . χάλκωι), and shining brazen (χάλκιαι . . . λάμπραι) greaves hide the pegs. The whole roof is adorned with gleaming (λάμπροισιν), presumably bronze, helmets. To add to the glittering picture he is trying to present, he mentions Chalcidian, that is, steel swords, and "nodding," "white" horsehair plumes, "adornments" for the heads of men. Both νεύοισιν and λεῦκοι suggest the fascination of the play of light upon a moving surface, and ἀγάλματα, which may be actually related to ἀγλάος "gleaming," "bright,"[64] therefore "beautiful," adds to the "glory" of the scene. Λεῦκοι is not strictly a color word. It was used in Homer of a metallic surface (*Il.* 23.268), human flesh (*Il.* 11.573; *Od.* 23.240), and of water (*Il.* 23.282; *Od.* 5.70). Sappho speaks of something that is "whiter" than an egg (167). One notion in the adjective is then translucence. Others are clarity and brightness.

Bacchylides (21.2) mentions shields which are χαλκοδαιδάλοισιν. Simonides uses δαιδαλέαι to describe the brass-riveted chest in which Perseus and Danaë float on the sea (543.2). The adjective is used in Homer always of objects of metal or wood (e.g., *Il.* 4.135, 8.196, 19.380; *Od.* 1.131). Hesiod (*Th.* 575) and Euripides (*Hec.* 470) use it of embroidery. Later authors use it of fish (Alex. 17) and deer (Nonn. D.

[63]S. Q. Groden, *The Poems of Sappho* (Indianapolis, New York 1966) 22.
[64]Pokorny, s.v. ἀγλαός.

5.391). It seems then to have been akin in meaning to ποικίλος and to refer to a surface which is intricately worked or naturally dappled. Again, the attraction of these objects, of Bacchylides' shields of wrought bronze, of Simonides' carven chest, is the pattern of light and dark that plays upon them.

Clothing

The girls of Alcman's Partheneion (1.62-63) speak of a Lydian cap as well as of garments of purple and a snake (bracelet) spangled all in gold. The interest in clothing is another aspect of the archaic aesthetic. It is closely related to the delight in jewelry and in color—of birds, animals, flowers, foliage, and particularly of dye stuffs. Elsewhere Alcman mentions a girl wearing a λᾶδος, which LSJ defines as a common or a summer dress. Edmonds translates it as a "muslin gown." If the gown was made of linen, or, as seems less likely, of cotton, it may reveal Ionian influence in dress, for the Doric peplos was ordinarily made of wool.[65] Elsewhere Alcman reveals an interest in the texture of materials. In two one-word fragments (177) we have ἰανοκρήδεμνος and ἰανόκροκα. The former is explained as a headdress like violets but the latter as λεπτά, made apparently of light threads (Hesych. s. vv.). Why, we may ask, should the former not mean a "light headdress" or the latter "with violet threads"? May the explanation not be that both the headdress and the threads are "soft as" violets or "the color of" violets (or both)?

The Homeric epithet τανυπέπλου occurs without immediate context in Stesichorus (222), and Alcaeus (130.33) describes a Lesbian beauty contest in which women, in Homeric fashion, go trailing their robes (ἑλκεσίπεπλοι). The Ionian peplos was remarkable not only for its linen texture but for the elegance of drapery made possible by the lightness of the fabric. The archaic vase painters and the sculptors of the archaic *korai* show endless delight in the stylized zigzag patterns made by the folds or the pleats of the Ionic peplos and in the more trans-

[65] Edmonds (note 53 above) 79. But Gullberg and Åström (note 59 above) 17 declare that cotton was not used in Greece until the time of Alexander. On the Ionian peplos and the Doric woolen peplos, see H. Payne and G. Mackworth-Young, *Archaic Marble Sculptures from the Acropolis* (New York 1950) 17-18, as well as Gullberg and Åström.

parent quality of the material.[66] Surely Sappho is speaking of drapery when she tells of the country girl who does not know how to draw her dress over her ankles (57) and of both the elegance of the drapery and its relative transparency when she says that the κατάγωγις of a certain girl excites the beholder (22.14). LSJ defines κατάγωγις as a woman's dress, but the formation of the word itself suggests the "hang" of the garment.

The changing surfaces of light-textured garments was one thing that fascinated the lyric poets. Another was the variegated patterns, whether of weaving or embroidery, upon these same surfaces. Ibycus (316) speaks of "loosing embroidered robes." Ποικίλα here may be either embroidered or woven patterns. We know from vase paintings that elaborate patterns were highly fashionable in the archaic period, and extant fifth century materials are in fact embroidered.[67] Anacreon (358) mentions a girl with embroidered sandal (ποικιλοσαμβάλωι). Sappho in a poem to her daughter (98.11) mentions an embroidered (ποικίλον) headband. Elsewhere (39) she speaks of a ποικίλος μάσλης, a lovely Lydian work, that covered the feet. This, LSJ speculates, was a shoe. In all these instances, the work may have been woven or of some other variegated work rather than embroidered, but it is clearly the pied effect that fascinates.

Music

The lyric poets naturally refer often to "music": to the playing of the lyre, occasionally the flute; to song and dance, which was of course considered but another aspect of music. We know, it is true, very little about Greek music, but we can learn from the adjectives these early poets use something about the qualities that they considered desirable in their music, and we can consider how well these adjectives fit what little we do know or surmise about that music.

Alcman (26) calls the girls in his Halcyon Song "honey-voiced" (μελιγάρυες). Sappho (71) in a fragment uses μέλ[ος] τι γλύκερον, μελλιχόφων, and λίγυραι. The word [ἀ]δύλογοι appears in another fragment (73). Elsewhere (153) she mentions a "sweet-voiced" (ἀδύφωνον) maiden. She uses the simile "sweeter-tuned" (ἀδυμελεστέρα) than the

[66] Gullberg and Åström (note 59 above) 11 maintain that the so-called folds in the draperies of the archaic statues are in fact pleats.

[67] M. G. Houston, *Ancient Greek, Roman and Byzantine Costume and Decoration* (London 1947) 76-77.

lyre (156). Bacchylides (2.12) mentions the sweet sounding of flutes (γλυκεῖαν αὐλῶν καναχάν). The word καναχάν is clearly onomatopoeic. The verb is used of the clang of bronze (*Od.* 19.469), the splashing of water (Cratin. 186), the crowing of a cock (*Id.* 259); the noun is used of the trampling of mules (*Od.* 6.82), the gnashing of teeth (*Il.* 19.365; Hes. *Sc.* 164), the sound of the lyre (*h. Ap.* 185), and elsewhere too of the sounding of flutes (Pind. *P.* 10.39; Soph. *Tr.* 642). The other adjective (γλυκεῖαν) suggests strongly that the high, perhaps quavering, certainly piercing sound of the flutes was pleasing to the ancient ear. The notion of sweetness, which so often accompanies these descriptions of archaic music, may well contain, in synesthesia, the concept of high frequency, piquancy, that causes the piercing quality of the music.[68] Elsewhere (f. 4.75) Bacchylides mentions the "clash" (κτύπος), that is, the "flare," of trumpets. He speaks also of hymns "flaring" (φλέγονται: f. 4.80). This too is synesthesia. Sounds that are described as clanging, sweet, or piercing were, then, admired; these concepts, I maintain, have elements in common. What makes this clear is the other adjective and, in some cases, the accompanying verbs which occur so frequently in connection with music in the archaic poets: λιγύς and κλάζω or κελάδω.

The adjective λιγύς is used in Homer of wind (*Il.* 14.17; *Od.* 3.176) and also of the lyre (*Il.* 9.186; *Od.* 8.67). The word is conceivably mimetic, attempting to reproduce the high-pitched, shrill, or piercing and yet sweet sound that the wind and the lyre have in common. The adjective is also used of Thersites (*Il.* 2.246) and Nestor (*Il.* 1.248, 4.293). Here I think the word refers to the high-pitched voice of an old man and of a quarrelsome and "common" man. We know from elsewhere in the *Iliad* (3.151-52) that old men sounded like cicadas which have "lily voices." The word λειριόεσσαν refers to voices which are, like those of cicadas, piercing, shrill, of high frequency, and continuous.

[68]Cf. Stanford (note 24 above) 47-62: "On Synaesthesia or Intersensual Metaphor." He dismisses γλυκύς as having lost its precise sense sphere. I should like, however, to point out the similarities of sound in λιγύς and γλυκύς and the possibility of mimesis in each. I hear the high, closed υ's, the liquid λ's, and the shrill σ's in each. But cf. W. B. Stanford, *The Sound of Greek* (California 1967) 109-10, who hears another, kinetic mimesis in γλυκύς and who further comments on *Il.* 1.248-49: "There we can hear all the familiar taste sounds with subtle variations built round what is semantically the key word λιγύς, whose consonants and vowels anticipate in timbre-quality, as well as meaning, the physical effect of γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων."

They are λιγυραί and λευκαί or λαμπραί and πυκναί.[69] Alcaeus (347) makes clear the same combination of concepts in his drinking song:

a) ἄχει δ' ἐκ πετάλων ἄδεα τέττιξ . . .
b) πτερύγων δ' ὕπα
κακχέει λιγύραν ἀοίδαν . . .

The song of the cicada is "sweet"; it is also "shrill." Some have supplied too πύκνον, "of high frequency."

Other uses of λιγύς abound. Alcman addresses Μῶσα λίγηα (14) and Μῶσα Διὸς θύγατερ λίγ' (28). More tellingly he says that the Muse "rang out, the shrill Siren": ἃ Μῶσα κέκλαγ' ἃ λίγηα Σηρήν (30). The verb "clanged" is onomatopoeic and gives the nasal quality of the shrillness the ancient (and modern) Greeks found desirable in their music. The verb is used commonly of the cry of birds, in particular of starlings and daws (*Il.* 17.756), of the crane (Hes. *Op.* 449), and of the eagle (*Il.* 12.207; Soph. *Ant.* 112). It is also used of the barking of dogs (*Od.* 14.30), of the wind (*Od.* 12.408), of the rattle of arrows in a quiver (*Il.* 1.46), and of the creaking of wheels (Aesch. *Th.* 205). In a one-word fragment (141) from Alcman we also have λιγύκορτον, referring to the lyre, and in another (140) κερκολύρα is said to reproduce the sound of the lyre (κρέκε κρέκε [Zonaras 1190: see Edmonds I, p. 116]). Taking the two together then we can derive some notion of the twanging, high-pitched, even plucked sound of the lyre, which was obviously admired. When the adjective λίγηα modifies Muse, it may refer to the sound of the lyre (or the flute?) or the human voice.

Stesichorus (209) used the word κεκλάγγῳ apparently of a messenger, perhaps an eagle,[70] or perhaps of the cawing crow mentioned in line 9 (λακέρυζα κορώνα). He also addressed Calliope as λίγεια (240) and the Muse as λίγει' (278). Ibycus (333) used the word κλαγγί: we have no context. Corinna (655.5) used the adjective λιγουροκω[τί]λυ[ς "shrill babbling" of her own voice, and she called Myrtis, a fellow poet whom she chides, λιγουράν (664a). The adjective is clearly traditional and in the latter instance carries no slur.

Sappho (30) used the adjective λιγύφωι[νος. She referred to a λιγύραν χελύνναν (58.12) and a λιγύραν [ἀοί]δαν (103). The most elaborate description of music occurs in her song about the wedding of Hector and Andromache (44.24 ff.), where we hear of αὔλος ἀδυ[μ]έλης

[69]Stanford (note 22 above). Cf. Irwin (note 19 above) 208-10.
[70]Bowra (note 6 above) 78.

and the ψ[ό]φο[ς κ]ροτάλ[ων, and the women who cried out (ἐλέλυσ-δο]ν) and the men who raised the lovely shrill shout (ἐπ]ήρατον ἴαχον ὄρθιον). Again, clashing and high-pitched sounds are prized.

Alcaeus (115.10) uses the word [κ]ελάδεις in a song which appears to celebrate spring. This is a word which has been used to refer to or to imitate the song of the swallow. Bacchylides (14.21) uses the verb to mean "sing of" or "celebrate," referring presumably to human voices. He also uses the adjective λιγύς alone and in telling compounds. He speaks of the "shrill-twanging" string of the bow (λιγυκλαγγῆ: 5.73). He calls himself a "shrill-voiced" (λιγύφθογγον: 10.10) island bee, choruses λιγυκλαγγεῖς (14.14), a voice λιγυράν (f.20 B 2), and a lyre λιγυςχέα (f.20 C 1).

The folk-music of modern Greece, which may be very old indeed, is by Western standards high-pitched and shrill and strikes the Western ear as being somewhat nasal; that is, it could be described by the ancient verb κλάζω as well as the ancient adjective λιγύς. Sachs declares that ancient Greek music was more like Japanese music of today than anything else available to us, that it was primarily melodic, and that it maintained very slight and subtle differences of pitch.[71] Is this last perhaps what Pindar meant by a ποικίλον ὕμνον (*O.* 6.87) or by ποικίλον κιθαρίζων (*N.* 4.19)?[72]

Flowers

The names of flowers are used in the lyric poets, in adjectival forms and in compounds, as color words. "Violet-haired" and "lily-eyed," though they probably refer to texture as well as to color, are examples. Flowers, particularly the rose, appear for their own sake as well in these texts, often in romantic or erotic contexts, but often to suggest texture as well as to state fact, to create atmosphere.

In his *Helen*, Stesichorus (187) tells of wreaths of roses being tossed together with Cydonian quinces, boughs of myrtle, and twisted crowns of violets at the chariot of the king. The occasion is presumably the wedding of Helen and Menelaus. Ibycus (288) tells of Euryalus, the Muses' darling, whom Cypris reared among blossoms of rose. This appears to be from a love poem to a boy. It is, however, in Sappho that we most often find roses in romantic or erotic settings. In the very fragmentary

[71]C. Sachs, *The Rise of Music in the Ancient World* (New York 1943) 198–271.
[72]Cf. Plato, *Legg.* 812d: τὴν ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας.

Invocation to Aphrodite (2) the goddess' grove is shadowed with roses. Her shrine here is in a charming grove of apple trees. The statements are both factual,[73] but roses and apples are both tokens of love, a part of courtship and so an important part of the archaic aesthetic. In the tender farewell (94) to one of her girls, Sappho reminds her of how when they were together she used to put on wreaths of roses and violets and on her delicate neck plaited garlands of buds. These flowers are a part of their private aesthetic, and the adjective ἀπάλαι, although it modifies δέραι, enhances by association or transference the sense of the delicate texture of the blossoms as well.

Again, in the poem (96) about the girl gone to Lydia who longs for gentle (ἀγάνας) Atthis we find, in a charming simile, roses growing with delicate (κἄπαλ') antherisk and the budding (ἀνθεμώδης) honey lotus in the lovely (κάλα) dew and by the light of the rosy-fingered (βροδοδάκτυλος) moon. Now the adjectives that apply to the flowers and even the moon enhance the sense of the lovely, tender, budding, and rosy flesh of the young girls. The Homeric epithet is not a perfunctory piece of versification. It is rather a particularly sensitive and effective transference, and again by synesthesia it suggests all the qualities of the moon and its light, which is sometimes, as it rises and sets, actually orange or more pink than yellow or white, but which in any case is always tender, as are roses to the touch, or delicate, as are roses in scent.[74]

In a fragment of a love poem (286), Ibycus describes a garden in language which is erotically suggestive. In spring Cydonian quinces, in themselves love tokens, are watered by river streams, there where the maidens keep their garden unshorn. Bowra is probably wrong in assuming that Ibycus is writing with deliberate symbolism; nevertheless, springtime and a garden which is ἀκήρατος and which belongs to παρθένων are highly suggestive.[75] The vine blossoms which swell (αὐξό-

[73]By factual I mean that the garden is not symbolic in the modern or French sense of the word, though it may well be imaginary. I see, however, no compelling reason to consider this poem a description of either a dream or a trance. But for recent discussions of the subject, see T. McEvilley, "Sappho, Fragment Two," *Phoenix* 26 (1972) 323-33; P. Wiesmann, "Was heisst kôma? Zu Interpretationen von Sapphos' Gedicht auf der Scherbe," *MH* 29 (1972) 1-11.

[74]For other recent interpretations of the passage, see T. McEvilley, "Sapphic Imagery and Fragment 96," *Hermes* 101 (1973) 257-78; L. Weld and W. Nethercut, "Sappho's rose-fingered moon. A Note," *Arion* 5 (1966) 28-31; I. Waern (note 51 above) 1-11; G. M. Kirkwood, *Early Greek Monody* (Ithaca, London 1974) 253-54.

[75]Bowra (note 6 above) 260; see J. Trump, "Kydonische Apfel," *Hermes* 88 (1960) 14-22, on gardens and fruits as love symbols.

μεναι) and ripen (θαλέθοισιν) beneath the shadowing shoots (ἔρνεσιν) also have sexual overtones. Gardens and the plucking of blossoms occur in other passages of Greek literature which describe girls who are about to lose their virginity,[76] and the archetypal significance of the unplucked blossom is in any case obvious. Sappho too uses the imagery of growing things to suggest youth, virginity, and desire. Her poem (105a), probably to a bride, which compares her to the sweet apple ripening beyond the reach of the pickers, is a charming statement of this universal experience. The hyacinth trampled underfoot (105c) is another, and the bridegrooms likened to the tender sapling (115) still another. Elsewhere Sappho (98), writing to her daughter, seems to tell her that for a girl with hair more yellow than torches, wreaths of flowering buds are more becoming than purple headbands. Again, the association of blossoms with a young girl is suggestive, though not necessarily symbolic, of love.

In a passage analogous to that of Ibycus 286, Anacreon, in a poem to a boy love (346), tells of Aphrodite tethering her horses in a field of hyacinths, where the boy seems to have gone to escape his mother's supervision. Again, the setting is not, in the modern sense, symbolic, but the flowers are as erotically suggestive as are those of Ibycus' "unshorn garden." Bacchylides (19.39) is equally suggestive in saying that Io, driven by the gadfly, came to the flowering (ἀνθεμώδεα) Nile, where she bore Zeus' child Epaphus. Here the connotations are, most immediately, of fecundity but reminiscent surely of Io's ravished virginity.

Texture

Words for "delicate," "dainty," "soft," and "gentle" abound in the lyric poets.[77] Again, it is instructive to examine the contexts. Stesichorus (212) says that it is necessary to find a Phrygian tune to sing "delicately" (ἁβρῶς) when spring comes on. Actually, ἁβρῶς might be taken here

[76] *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. 6 ff.; Moschus, *Europa*, 32 ff.

[77] M. Treu, *Von Homer zur Lyrik. Wandlungen des Griechischen Weltbildes im Spiegel der Sprache* (Munich 1955); *Zetemata*, Heft 12, provides a study of "haptische Empfindungswörter" (ἁβρός, ἁπαλός, μαλθακός, τέρην) in Homer and the archaic poets and tries to show that the tactile sense of these words has increased in the latter. Cf. A. E. Harvey, "Homeric Epithets in Greek Lyric Poetry," *CQ* 7 (1957) 206-23, who counts many of these texture, color, and lustre words as *Lieblingswörter* and maintains, quite rightly, that they are not to be seen as dead or trite. There is, I add, some reason that these and not others are *Lieblingswörter*.

with the genitive absolute as well as with ὑμνεῖν, and the ambiguity of word order enhances both notions, that of singing and that of the arriving spring. Anacreon uses the adjective ἁβρόν to describe a girl's neck, shadowed by her hair (347.1). Here he describes specifically the delicate flesh of the neck, but the concept of shadowing, a part of that play of light and dark so dear to the archaic lyricists, is also enhanced by the use of ἁβρόν. Anacreon, like Stesichorus, also uses the adverbial form of this word for music: he plucks his lovely lyre delicately (ἁβρῶς: 373), serenading his dear girl, who may also be described as ἁβρῇι, though Page daggers the final two words of Hephaestus' quotation. Here again the word describes music, and, even if we accept Page's daggers, suggests the flesh of a young girl. A gloss on a one-word fragment of Anacreon (ἁβρός: 461) is enlightening: ὁ κούφως βαίνων, κατὰ στέρησιν τοῦ βάρους (Orion lex. 3.11). This notion of a lightness of touch occurs in Sappho who speaks of pouring wine "daintily" (2.14), and perhaps again, together with the appearance of delicate flesh, in her description of the dark-eyed Andromache as ἄβραν (44.7). In a particularly enchanting and revealing fragment, Sappho (58.25–26) declares that she loves delicacy (ἁβροσύναν) and then seems to equate this with the shining light of the sun. Here then together in near synesthesia are two of the most important concepts in the lyric poets: delicacy and light.

Ἁπαλός, "soft," is another word denoting texture which occurs frequently in the lyric texts. It is used in Homer most frequently of the human body (e.g., of the neck, *Il.* 3.371; the cheeks, *Il.* 18.123; the feet, *Il.* 19.92). So Alcman in the fragmentary Maiden Song uses it of feet (3.10), of a hand (3.80), but also of a feather (3.68). Anacreon (370) calls a sister ἁπαλήν, and he uses the word too of hair (414). In the former the context is female; in the latter erotic, for he blames a boy for cutting off a "blameless blossom of soft hair." Hair—and the cutting of it—has sexual significance. Sappho (81b) bids a girl Dirce weave with "tender" (ἁπάλαισι) hands a wreath of anise spray for her lovely hair (ἐράτοις φόβαισιν). Here again is hair described by an erotic word, flowers, and "tender" hands all in a single fragment, all in a familiar context, all part of the archaic, particularly the feminine, aesthetic. In another fragment (82), a girl Gyrinno is described as ἁπάλας. In 94.16 the adjective modifies δέραι, "neck," and it appears again in uncertain context toward the end of the fragment. In 96.13 it modifies ἄνθρυσκα, "chervil." In 122 Sappho speaks of a too tender girl plucking blossoms (ἄνθε' ἀμέργαισαν παῖδ' ἄγαν ἁπάλαν). In 126 she wishes that someone may sleep on the breast of a tender companion (ἁπάλης ἑτάρας); here too the context is surely erotic. Alcaeus (45.6) uses the same adjec-

tive to modify hands. Here girls are washing (?) their thighs with the water of the river Hebrus. The word ἀπάλαισι here is erotically suggestive as well as descriptive and traditional.

Another word for "tender" in the lyric poets is τακερός, used literally of food that "melts in the mouth" (e.g., of ribs of beef in Pherecr. 108.13). In Alcman's Maiden Song (3.61), the girl gives glances more melting (τακερώτερα) than sleep or death. This occurs in a context with "limb-loosing desire." Anacreon calls Eros himself τακερός (459).

Τέρην or τέρεινος, another "texture" word, appears too in these texts. Homer uses it of tears (*Il.* 5. ?), of flesh (*Il.* 4.237), of leaves (*Il.* 13.180) and of blossoms (*Od.* 9.449). Cunliffe gives it therefore as "rounded," "showing firm, rounded contours," "swelling with sap." Ibycus (315) uses the word to describe laurel (τέρεινα δάφνα), Anacreon (375) of half-bored flutes (τερένων ἡμιόπων . . . αὐλῶν), and Alcaeus (397) speaks of the "blossoms" of harvest time or fruit (τερένας ἄνθος ὀπώρας). The adjective in the lyric texts then embraces sound, sight, touch, and, in the last instance, perhaps scent as well. The laurel is swelling with sap; the flutes have full swelling tones;[78] the harvest is swelling with ripeness.

The concept of delicacy appears again in the adjective λεπτός. Homer uses it most often of garments and the like (LSJ), but also of "peeled barley" (*Il.* 20.497), of "thin bronze" (*Il.* 20.275), of "powdery rust" (*Il.* 24.506), and of a "mental faculty" (*Il.* 10.226). Simonides uses the word to describe a baby's ear (543.20); Sappho, the fire that runs beneath the flesh (31.9), and a girl's "heart" (φρένα: 96.17). She also appears to have called someone of "delicate voice" (24c6: λ]επτοφών[). Bacchylides (5.28) calls the plumage of the eagle λεπτότρικα. Here again is the delicacy or fineness of flesh, of a voice, of the diaphragm, of fire, and of feathers; here again the adjective applies to the senses of sight, sound, and touch and, by extension, to what we think of as emotion but which the ancients almost certainly thought of as purely physical phenomena.[79]

Light

The archaic lyricists appreciated delicacy. They also took delight in all that sparkled and gleamed, that shimmered and glowed. Words

[78]Irwin (note 19 above) 54.

[79]Cf. R. B. Onians, *Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1954) 23–40.

that convey these effects occur with striking frequency in their texts and in all the familiar contexts. Λιπαρός, which basically means "anointed with oil" and so "sleek" or "shining" and so both "rich" and "radiant" is one of them. In Alcman (80) we hear of Circe literally anointing (ἐπαλείψασα) the ears of Odysseus' companions, and Simonides (511a7) may be speaking half literally when he describes Pytho as λιπαρά; he may really be referring to the oily appearance of scales. Bacchylides probably means "rich" or "prosperous" when he calls Pelops' island λιπαρᾶς (1.13). Garlands (1.157) which are so described may be shining, but this may also be a somewhat more literal reference to olive wreaths. When, however, he describes the daughter of Time and Night as λιπαρά (7.1), he can only mean "radiant." So, Heracles, when he asks Meleager if there is any unwed daughter in Oeneus' house whom he can make his "splendid" bride (5.169), refers in part at least to her radiant appearance, and when he calls Asopus' daughters λιπαροζώνων (9.49), he probably means that they wore "splendid" garments: clothes that were "rich," therefore probably "with a sheen." Here, of course, one cannot discount the fact that he may have had in mind the gleaming appearance of rivers. When Bacchylides calls a victory λιπαράν (11.38), he means "glorious," but there may be here too a suggestion of the sheen of olive leaves and so even of the olive oil itself. In 16.29 he calls Heracles' home λιπαρόν: the meaning is probably both "shining" and "rich"; "splendid" is perhaps the best English word for it.

Λαμπρός is a word which, like λευκός (and πολιός), applies to several sensuous experiences. It can mean "bright" or "shining," as of the sun (*Il.* 1.605), the moon (Hes. *Th.* 19, 371), a star (*Il.* 4.77), metal (*Il.* 13.132); "bright and white," as of cloth (*Od.* 19.234); "keen," as of a wind (Hdt. 2.96); "clear" or "limpid," as of water (Aesch. *Eum.* 695); and so "illustrious," as of a person (Hdt. 6.125). So, Anacreon (451) addresses the sun, in what Bowra thinks may be a Maiden Song, as καλλιλαμπέτη, and in another fragment (385), perhaps from a "washing" song, a girl says that she comes up from the river, bearing all things λαμπρά.[80] The very texture of the open vowels and the liquid λ's in these fragments enhances the sense of radiant young girls, coming perhaps at the shining dawn, with objects that are either themselves bright or that gleam in the rays of the early morning sun. So also Sappho (16.18) speaks of the radiant sparkle (ϰἀμάρυχμα λάμπρον) of Anactoria's countenance, and she uses the verb λάμπηι to refer to the moon at

[80]Bowra (note 6 above) 304–5.

its fullest (34). Alcaeus (34.10) speaks of the Dioscuri as shining (λάμπροι) stars. In his vivid description of a house glittering (μαρμάιρει) with brazen armor, he speaks of the roof gleaming (λάμπραισιν) with helmets and of shining (λάμπραι) greaves (357). In 383 he again uses the adjective of weapons. Bacchylides uses the adjective of fire (3.54) and the verb of gold (3.17). He declares that the whole thing shines (λάμπει) with truth (8.21), but in a more striking passage he describes a gleam as of fire that shone (λάμπε) from the splendid gleaming (ἀγλαῶν) limbs of Nereus' daughters (17.104).

Ἀγλαός is a word which has much the same ambiance as λάμπρος. It seems originally to have meant "gleaming." Homer used it of water (*Il.* 2.307) and of limbs (*Il.* 19.385), but it did come eventually to be used of "illustrious" men (Pind. *O.* 14.7). In the lyric poets the former, more literal senses seem to predominate.[81] Simonides (507) calls a grove of Zeus well-treed and "shining" (ἀγλαόν). He is probably thinking of the appearance of the grove as well as its glory in belonging to Zeus. In Bacchylides (5.154) Meleager, describing his own death, says that he wept for the "glorious" (ἀγλαάν) youth that he left behind him. He is speaking somewhat abstractly, but the memory of the radiant beauty of his youth is surely here too. In 17.2 he calls the youths whom Theseus takes to Crete ἀγλαοὺς and the Nereids ἀγλαόθρονοι (17.124). The concepts of radiance and glory are present in both instances.

Conclusion

It is, despite the sad state of our texts, possible to define the texture of the archaic lyricists. One might, in fact, characterize these poets by an interest in texture itself. We have seen that they delight in the shapes, the movement, the color of animals; the play of light upon the plumage of birds and the scales of fish; the texture, the fall, and the movement of draperies; the shine of gold, silver, and bronze; the sweet piercing tones of music; the scent, color, and touch of flowers. We see too that they, like all good poets, make use of onomatopoeic effects, of synesthesia, of alliteration, assonance, and meter—and of course they used music, too—to impart to their audience their delight in the objects

[81] M. Treu, "Licht und Leuchtenden in der archaischen griechischen Poesie," *Stud. Gen.* 18 (1956) 83-97, argues that from Homer to Pindar words for "light" become increasingly abstract.

of their senses. Of all the textures which they tried to convey in their verse, none is so vividly achieved as that of changing light: of flickering, shimmering, glittering, and sparkling.

Simonides (533a) uses the onomatopoeic verb ἐβόμβησεν to refer to the "booming" sound of the sea. The word is used in Homer of falling bodies (*Il.* 13.530, 16.118) but later of thunder (Nonn. D. 1.301) and of the buzzing of bees (Theoc. 3.13), mosquitoes (Ar. *Pl.* 538), and even of birds (*AP* 5.291). Elsewhere (600) Simonides describes another, visual texture of the sea. He speaks of a wind "stippling" στίζουσα the sea. Here too one can imagine a connection between sound and sense.[82] And here too is that shimmering, variegated surface that so intrigued the archaic lyricists, and it is caused here—as we shall see that it is elsewhere—by the wind. In another passage (595), for instance, Simonides says that there arose not even the breath of winds that causes leaves to quiver (ἐννοσίφυλλος) and keeps the honey-sweet (μελιαδέα) wind from reaching the ears of men. Here are two familiar concepts in a single fragment.

The play of light finds expression too in the description of shadows. Stesichorus (185.5) tells of Heracles stepping into a grove shadowed over with laurel (δάφναισι κατάσκιον), and Ibycus (286.5) speaks of grapes ripening beneath the leaves' shadowing spray (σκιεροῖσιν ὑφ' ἔρνεσιν). Bacchylides describes a wood as δάσκιον (11.93), and he suggests shade too when he calls a hill τανίφυλλον (11.55).[83]

The shimmering quality of light attracted the ancients; so did its sparkle. Sappho (16.18) speaks of the "sparkle" of Anactoria's face. Bacchylides (3.17–18) gives a vivid picture of the celebrations for Hiero's victory. The gold shines sparklingly when the high and richly wrought tripods stand before the temple: λάμπει δ' ὑπὸ μαρμαρναῖς ὁ χρυσός, ὑψιδαιδάλτων τριπόδων.

Bacchylides uses the adjective δαιδάλεος in a number of other places. In 5.140 he uses it, in a manner reminiscent of Simonides, of the chest (δαιδαλέας ἐκ λάρνακος) from which Althaea took the fateful firebrand. Bacchylides also calls a ship "well-wrought" (εὐδαίδαλον: 17.88), and in a fragment (4.64) he calls altars "wrought" (δαιδαλέων).

[82] Στίζουσα cannot, of course, be truly onomatopoeic, for it means literally "tattooing": s.v. LSJ. Cf. Pokorny s.v. στίζω and Boisacq, s.v. στίβος.

[83] M. Treu (note 77 above) also discusses the concept of shadowing in Homer and the early lyricists and maintains that it develops markedly in the latter.

We have already seen that he describes shields as made of "wrought" bronze (21.2), and elsewhere he describes the man-slaying bronze as "flashing" (αἴθων: 13.50). The fact that he elsewhere describes a hide as αἴθωνος (5.124) shows how closely the notions of light and hue were connected in the ancient mind. Edmonds translates the word in the latter instance as "tawny," which may be as near in English as we can come.[84] Bacchylides also describes ships as αἰολοπρύμνοις (1.114), and elsewhere (15.57) he says that Hybris flourishes with "shifty" (αἰόλοις) gains. The idea here seems to be similar to that of ποικίλος: variegated, twisting, quick-moving, hence "tricky," "wily." The ships' prows on the other hand are probably brightly painted in a variety of colors or with a variety of pictures. Bacchylides also describes a bow as ποικίλον (10.43); he presumably means "painted." In 11.33, however, he calls certain acts ποικίλαις. Here he seems to mean "guileful" or "tricky," for he is speaking of a lad who was done out of his victory not by τέχναις ποικίλαις but by some god. Sappho, on the other hand, when she calls Aphrodite ποικιλόθρον' (1.1), almost certainly means that her throne is either painted or carved to show a variegated surface, or, as some have so attractively but less persuasively suggested, that she wears a gown embroidered or woven with a variety of flowers or charms.[85] It is to be remarked, however, that only a line later Sappho calls the goddess δολόπλοκε. The idea of "cleverness" or "trickiness" was not as negative to the Greeks as it is to us; the first word may well have suggested the second here, if it is not in fact an error for ποικιλοφρών.[86]

The idea of a fluttering wind, one that sets leaves in motion and stipples the sea, seems to occur metaphorically as well as descriptively in the early lyricists. Sappho (22.12-14) tells of how desire flutters about (ἀμφιπόταται) the lovely one and how the sight of the girl's drapery sets

[84]Edmonds (note 53 above) III, 153. Cf. LSJ s.v.

[85]L. B. Lawler, "On Certain Homeric Epithets," *Phil. Quart.* 27 (1948) 80-84; G. M. Bolling, "Poikilos and Throna," *AJP* 79 (1958) 275-82; M. C. J. Putnam, "Throna and Sappho 1.," *CJ* 56 (1960-61) 79-88; L. B. Lawler, "Pepokilmena zoîa," *CJ* 56 (1960-61) 349-51; J. Svenbro, "Sappho and Diomedes: Some Notes on Sappho I LP and the Epic," *Museum Philologum Londiniense* I (1975) 37-49; R. Merkelbach, "Aglaothronos," *ZPE* 11 (1973) 160. For the traditional interpretation, that ποικιλόθρονος is formed from θρόνος, not θρόνα, see E. Risch, "Thronos, Throna und die Komposita vom Typus crysothronos," *Stud. Clas.* 14 (1972) 17-25.

[86]Cf. W. F. Wyatt, Jr., "Sappho and Aphrodite," *CP* 69 (1974) 213-14; R. Neuberger-Donath, "Sappho Fr. 1.L. Poikilthron' oder Poikiliphron," *WS* 82 (1969) 15-17; G. A. Privitera, "La rete di Afrodite, Richerche sulla prima ode di Saffo," *QUCC* 4 (1972) 7-58.

the beholder aflutter (ἐπτόαισ'). In another poem (31) she tells how her beloved's laughter makes her heart flutter (ἐπτόαισεν) in her breast and how a trembling (τρόμος) takes here. She also speaks of another, an uneducated woman, who will flit about (ἐκπεποταμένα) among the obscure dead (55). She remarks to Atthis that she goes fluttering (πόται) after Andromeda now (131). And Alcaeus (283.3) seems to speak of something or someone, probably Paris, fluttering (ἐ]πτ[όαισ-) Helen's heart in her breast.

In what is perhaps her most sensually appealing passage, embodying many of the favorite concepts of the archaic lyricists, Sappho describes the grove of Aphrodite (2). It is in a charming grove of apple trees. Its altars smoke with frankincense. Cool water sings through the apple boughs. All the place is shadowed (ἐσκίαστ') with roses. From shimmering leaves (αἰθυσσομένων φύλλων) sleep (drifts down). A horse-rearing meadow blooms with flowers. Breezes blow gently (ἀήται πνέοισιν μέλλιχα). Do you, she bids Cypris, take the garlands, pour into golden cups, do it gently (ἀβρῶς), nectar mixed with our celebration; pour it like wine. There could not be a better statement of the archaic aesthetic, unless it is the delightful and anonymous fragment:

κυανέας πο]λυόμματον
ποί]κιλμα νυκτ[ός. (*SLG* 458)

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THE SPLITTING OF CHORAL LYRIC IN AESCHYLUS' *ORESTEIA**

The propriety of distributing the individual sentences of a choral lyric structure between subgroups of the chorus or even among individual choral members remains in question.[1] As far as I can determine, there has been no adequate examination of dramatic texts in this century which seeks to establish the existence of such a practice or assesses its potential for dramatic effect. As a result, editions and translations of Aeschylean plays,[2] especially the *Oresteia*, display a full spectrum of editorial practice ranging from the permissiveness which allows a chorus to split its lyric stanzas among individual speakers to austere limitations prohibiting the division of a chorus into sections which are smaller than half-choruses.[3] Critics who favor individual voices have offered one or

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[1] The division of a strophic song between half-choruses in Soph. *Ajax* 866 ff. seems clear, but problems remain in regard to such division in the plays of Aeschylus and Euripides; see the passages cited by D. Page, "The Chorus of Alcman's *Partheneion*," *CQ* 31 (1937) 94–101. In this study I shall focus on Aeschylean practice because there are strong indications that the three tragedians reveal highly individualistic styles in composing their choral songs. These basic differences are most clearly presented on the chart in W. Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin 1933) 124–27, and in the chapter by J. Rode, "Das Chorlied," in W. Jens, *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie* (Munich 1971) 85–115. For further discussion, see Kranz, *passim*; many relevant sections in the other essays collected by Jens; and also M. Griffith, *The Authenticity of the Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge 1977) esp. ch. 3.

[2] Because the authorship of the *PV* is so disputed, I will exclude it from this paper. The evidence on split choruses is at best limited to a few passages, and information from a possibly unauthentic play could be distorting.

[3] Müller and Hermann divided lyric strophes among different groupings of individual speakers but at least did agree in their comments on specific passages that such divisions are allowable; e.g., on *Ag.* 475 ff.: G. Hermann, *Elementa Doctrinae Metricae* (Lipsiae 1816) 726, and his commentary (2nd ed. 1859) on 454 versus K. O. Müller in the *Gött. gel. Anz.* (1834) 1979–82; and on *Eum.* 140 ff. and 244 ff.: Hermann, *Opusc.* VI. 2, 37–40, 50–54, versus Müller, *Aeschylos Eumenides* (Göttingen 1833) 84–87. To their names must be added: F. Bamberger, *De carminibus Aeschyleis a partibus chori cantatis* (Marburg 1832); R. Arnoldt, *Der Chor im Agamemnon des Aeschylos szenisch erläutert* (Halle 1881); C. Muff, *De Choro Persarum Fabulae Aeschyleae* (Halis Saxonum 1878);

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more of the following arguments: (1) single stanzas or consecutive stanzas should not contain repeated or diametrically opposed sentiments which would be inappropriate in the mouths of the same singers; (2) similarly, repeated meters within one stanza or section of an ode might be given to one group of singers, especially when the meter contrasts with neighboring sections; (3) the separation of the whole chorus into smaller units or even into individual voices can often be easily accommodated to the number of sentences comprising stanzas and whole odes; and (4) the presence of an epode could be a sign that the strophes were divided among choral speakers while the epode was sung by the coryphaeus or by the united chorus. Yet the practice of early editors ranges widely, as can be seen in the long lists of Wecklein's *Appendix* in regard to the following passages which have been candidates for such splits: *Seven* 78 ff., 860 ff., and 1045 ff.; *Supp.* 1029 ff.; *Ag.* 481 ff.; *Ch.* 464 ff.; *Eum.* 140 ff. and 244 ff.[4] Yet in this century strong prohibitions against individual singers of lyric are evident in the texts and comments of Wilamowitz, Page, and especially Fraenkel, who attacks such splitting of choral form as an expression of "a wretched modern delight in deceptive liveliness."[5]

Critics like Fraenkel are unwilling to permit such division in the absence of positive evidence showing that such an assignment of lines actually occurred in an original production. This is a highly conservative position, but one which will always attract adherents. Yet it is difficult to imagine what a chorus could say to indicate explicitly that it was splitting its lines among individual speakers.[6] "I" and "we" are used in-

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and W. Christ, "Theilung des Chors im attischen Drama," *Abh. Bay. Akad. der Wiss., phil.-phil. Kl.* 14 (1878) 157-226. N. Wecklein, "Über die Technik und den Vortrag der Chorgesänge des Äschylus," *Jhrb. f. Cl. Phil.* Suppbd. 13 (1884) 213-38, begins to move toward an insistence that the united chorus sings all strophic lyric songs, but he finds some exceptions.

[4] N. Wecklein in the 2nd part of his edition of 1885.

[5] Fraenkel in his commentary on the *Ag.* ii, pp. 245-46. Denniston and Page, in their 1957 edition on 475-87, following Fraenkel, caution against dividing the lines among more than half-choruses, but Page, in his 1972 editio maior, removes even the markings which suggest such division; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechische Verskunst* (Berlin 1921) 190.

[6] The obvious example is *Ag.* 1348 ff. with consecutive ἐγὼ μέν, ἐμοὶ δέ, κἀγώ, but these are spoken iambics and thus contain a more direct diction and accompany a more naturalistic stage action than lyric passages. The division of the chorus at *Supp.* 1052-61 is more typical of Aeschylean lyric; the necessity of different speakers is clear from the responsive conversational phrasing as well as the contrast in attitudes. But here

terchangeably without specifying a shift in speaker,[7] and choruses in unison can ask a series of questions or shout out exclamations. Asyndeton in itself is not a reliable guide to division among speakers.[8] Consequently Fraenkel is correct in stating: "In no extant Greek tragedy is there an instance of a stanza or an epode of a stasimon divided among three or more sections of the chorus . . .,"[9] provided that we will accept as evidence only indisputably clear occurrences in the remaining texts. But such conservatism, while undeniably safe, may misrepresent what actually happened on stage.[10]

To be sure, Aeschylean strophic stanzas are commonly divided between the chorus and individual actors: for example, *Pers.* 1002 ff., *Ag.* 1114 ff., and *Ch.* 456 ff. There may also be a strophic passage where actors split lines at *Seven* 966 ff., if these lines are authentic. But while none of these passages offers evidence on the possibility of dividing a

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the disagreement is so great that many critics have left the regular chorus intact and substituted a second chorus of handmaidens; thus, there is no evidence in the words of the ode that the chorus must divide itself into sections. Given that there is no such handy group to take the part of half-choruses at the end of the *Seven*, editors are forced to accept a split in the singers at 1066 and 1072. In each example the content requires an opposed group of singers, yet there is no indisputable signal given by the chorus that they are splitting, and editors seek to avoid this expedient in the *Supp.* by recruiting the handmaidens. If these are the clearest examples and involve only half-choruses in any case, what hope is there of finding evidence which would satisfy the demanding criteria of Fraenkel?

[7] The detailed study by M. Kaimio, *The Chorus of Greek Drama Within the Light of the Person and Number Used* (Helsinki 1970), shows that there are certain moments at which the Aeschylean chorus will refer to itself by a first person plural (e.g., within prayers, on occasions where the collective nature of the group is emphasized). Usually the Aeschylean chorus will use a first person singular but can vary this by shifting to a plural (cf. especially *Eum.* 349, 352, 354, 359, 374, 381, 391, and 393—all in an ode where no one has found a reason to split choral parts among separate speakers). Thus, the number of speakers has no effect on the chorus' choice between singular and plural in referring to itself.

[8] On Aeschylus' liking for asyndeton in general, see Wilamowitz (note 5 above) 190: "asyndeti amantissimus" and Kranz (note 1 above) 149 f., where he identifies asyndeton as a *schema Aischyleion*.

[9] Fraenkel ii, p. 246.

[10] As has been pointed out by H. Lloyd-Jones, "The *Supplices* of Aeschylus: The New Date and Old Problems," *L'Ant. Cl.* 33 (1964) 356–74, human ingenuity can often put itself into blinders that impede a full perception of the richness that actually lies before our eyes. His attitude toward experimenting with new hypotheses deserves restatement: "Our material is so scanty that we shall run the risk of making some mistakes; but we know enough about it for the attempt to be worth making, and by making it we may become alive to features of tragic technique that would otherwise escape us" (373).

strophic lyric among several choral members, still there is no doubt that strophic stanzas in Aeschylean drama can be split among various speakers; the strophic form is thus not of necessity confined to one and only one voice. Cohesion must come from another source, such as the traditional unity of the chorus when it is singing within a strophic form. Yet because the chorus of the *Agamemnon* does break apart so dramatically in a unique moment at 1348 ff., it is worth reexamining three lyric passages in the *Oresteia* where indications in the manuscripts, in the words of the texts, and even in the peculiarities of staging combine to suggest that the chorus splits a lyric unit even within a strophic structure among individual voices or small groups of singers. And when these divisions of the chorus into smaller units are coordinated with the development of dramatic themes in the *Oresteia*, the case is further strengthened.

I. The Epode at *Ag.* 475 ff.

Tremendous confusion reigns in the assignment of these lines. Many editors print paragraph marks which divide the stanza into three speeches but give no indication of how many speakers join to sing each section of the stanza (e.g., Weil, Thomson, Mazon, and Murray)—or else they omit these markings, thus indicating that the stanza is to be sung in unison by the whole chorus (Hartung, Wilamowitz, Fraenkel, and Page [1972]). Some comment specifically: the lines are divided as three speeches delivered by half choruses by Wecklein and Page (1957); among three individual speakers by Müller[11] and Smyth; among four individual speakers by Hermann, Enger, and Arnoldt;[12] and among twelve individual speakers in an unbelievable structure and altered text by Keck. But neither the phrasing nor dramatic setting of this epode has been examined carefully to find evidence for the appropriate allocation of lines.

475–78 versus 479–82. Choruses in Aeschylean lyric[13] do ask sequential questions, but usually the repeated questions are parallel in content and do not change their topic as radically as in this passage. Generally the interrogative word is repeated (*Pers.* 94 f., 956 f., 966 ff.; *Seven* 93 f., 156, 738 f., 850 f., 1057; *Ag.* 85 ff., 785 ff., 1150 ff., 1487

[11] *Kl. Schr.* i. 280 f.

[12] Hermann, *Opusc.* vii, 45–57; Arnoldt (note 3 above) 41–47.

[13] Here defined as lines not in iambic trimeter, that is, nonspoken lines. Thus, the passages here cited include strophic lyric, nonstrophic lyrics, and anapaestic sections.

f., 1541 ff.;[14] *Cho.* 316 ff., 338, 871, 1075 f.),[15] or the questions are so parallel in content as to be the same questions (*Pers.* 144 ff. = how does Xerxes fare?; *Seven* 93 ff. = shall I seek the gods' aid?, 104 ff. = will you betray us?, 156 f. = what is our fate?, 1057 ff. = what shall I do?; *Supp.* 777 ff. = what will happen to us?; *Ag.* 1490 f. [= 1514 f.] = what shall I say?, 1506 f. = how can you be guiltless?; *Cho.* 338 f. = what god is there in the situation?, 855 ff. = what shall I say?).[16]

There are three passages of sequential questions in Aeschylean choral lyric which do not show such parallelism: *Seven* 99–105, *Ag.* 477 ff., and *Cho.* 1074 ff. The passages in the *Seven* and the *Ag.* are similar to a series of questions asked by a single character in conversation where the topic shifts easily from point to point and the speaker seeks answers from various perspectives (e.g., *Ag.* 272 + 274 + 276, 545 + 547 + 549, 1207 + 1209 + 1211) or to dialogue where two speakers ask questions of one another about the same topic (*Ag.* 268 f. and *Cho.* 122 ff.); and, in addition, the passage in the *Seven* has always been a candidate for division of speakers.[17] Probably *Cho.* 1074 is best interpreted as a parenthetical corrective to 1073 and is not part of a series of questions. Thus the phrasing of *Ag.* 474–82 finds its closest parallel in the cited scenes where there are firm indications of individual speakers.

479–82 versus 483–87. There may also be grounds for assigning 483 ff. to a different section of the chorus. There is no connecting word between 482 and 483, as noted above, but Wilamowitz and Kranz have pointed out how characteristic of Aeschylus such asyndeton is.[18] The

[14] This is a four-part sequential question, each part asking, "Who will arrange the funeral rites for Agamemnon?" Three of the questions begin with τίς.

[15] *Pers.* 634 ff. belongs in this category in spirit if not in form. The two parallel questions = "Does he hear me?"; but they are separated by one interjected statement.

[16] *Ag.* 211 ff. is not an exception. The chorus in its lyric reports the words of a character, who probably did not express his darker musings in lyric. He asks sequential questions, but they are not parallel in content.

[17] Probably maximum disagreement among editors concerns the parodos of the *Seven.* Wecklein's *Appendix* reveals the varieties of line assignment up to his time, and there is no unanimity even among more recent editors. A division of 78–107 among individual speakers is favored by Hermann, Paley, Passow (*Opusc.* 95), Verrall, Murray, Dawson, and F. Bücheler, "De Septem Aeschylea," *RhM* 32 (1877) 312 f. C. Robert, "Die Parodos des Aischyleischen Septem," *Hermes* 57 (1922) 161–70, assigns these lines to half-choruses. The full chorus sings these lines according to U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aeschylos Interpretationen* (Berlin 1914) 69 ff. (cf. *Hermes* 14 [1879] 174 f.), and J. Mesk, "Die Parodos der *Sieben gegen Theben*," *Philol.* 89 (1934) 454–59.

[18] See note 8 above.

convincing sign of another speaker is the sequence of question and answer:

Question: τίς ὧδε παιδνὸς ἢ φρενῶν κεκομμένος,
φλογὸς παραγγέλμασιν
νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν, ἔπειτ'
ἀλλαγᾶι λόγου καμεῖν;[19]

Answer: γυναικὸς αἰχμᾶι πρέπει
πρὸ τοῦ φανέντος χάριν ξυναινέσαι·

This kind of direct question followed immediately by an answer is unprecedented for the chorus of the *Oresteia* unless two separate roles are involved.[20] Usually the chorus asking a question in unison does not answer its question but rather adds an intensifying idea which is intended to make the question more pointed and even more difficult to answer. A clear example is found at *Ag.* 1565 f.:

Question: τίς ἂν γονὰν ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων;

Intensification: κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄται.

Line 1566 is not an answer but serves to make a difficult question even more perplexing. Similar structures are found throughout the *Oresteia*; one of the clearest examples is *Ag.* 85 ff.:[21]

τί χρέος; τί νέον; τί δ' ἐπαισθομένη,
τίνος ἀγγελίας
πειθοῖ περίπεμπτα θυοσκεῖς;
πάντων δὲ θεῶν τῶν ἀστυνόμων,
ὑπάτων, χθονίων, τῶν τε θυραίων
τῶν τ' ἀγοραίων
βωμοὶ δώροισι φλέγονται·[22]

[19] All Greek passages are taken from Page's Oxford Text (1972).

[20] In fact, I can find only one exception in Aeschylean drama, *Supp.* 586 ff. Here there is no question of splitting the chorus, and yet there is a clear question-answer form within a lyric stanza. I can only say that evidence from the *Oresteia* is consistent and admit this exception.

[21] Other examples in the *Oresteia* are *Ag.* 681 ff., 783 ff., 975 ff., 1019 ff., 1120 ff., 1132 ff., 1162 f., 1407 ff., 1454 ff., 1489 ff., 1505 ff.; *Cho.* 48 ff., 388 ff., 594 ff., 855 ff.; and *Eum.* 788 f., 842 ff.

[22] There are other questions asked by the chorus, but they fall at the end of strophic stanzas or at the end of a play, allowing no space for continuation within the same lyric unit; thus, these passages provide no parallel to *Ag.* 479 ff. At *Ch.* 871 ff. and 1052 f., the chorus still does not answer its own question but turns to another idea. At

Parallels to the question and answer sequence at *Ag.* 479 ff. are found in passages where the old men of the *Ag.* ask a question and receive an answer from a second speaker (e.g., *Ag.* 272 ff., 630 ff., and 1207 ff.).[23] And, of course, the closest parallel occurs where there are individual members of the chorus asking questions and giving responses to one another at *Ag.* 1363 ff. and 1367 ff. In fact, this passage provides the only two occasions on which the chorus indisputably shows the question and answer structure among its own members and the speakers are clearly individuals—although they are speaking and not singing in a lyric framework. Thus, parallels to similar expressions combine to suggest that 479-82 are sung by different voices from 483 ff. and possibly by individuals.[24] The text offers no indication that 485-87 should be assigned to a separate segment of the chorus.

In dramatic terms it should be noted that the proposed splitting of this lyric stanza among individual speakers would be only the first of several occasions in this trilogy where the chorus shows a tendency to break from traditional choral form under the strain of coping with the events happening around it. I have argued elsewhere that the old men reveal their confusion in the third stasimon, try unsuccessfully to avoid singing in the scene with Cassandra, and finally are unable to complete what should be the fourth stasimon when their song is interrupted by the death cries of Agamemnon.[25] At this point (*Ag.* 1348 ff.), they split apart into twelve individual speakers—in no way resembling a tragic chorus. This shattering of choral unity is typical of Aeschylean dramatic writing. The metaphors and images of the play are brought onto the stage and not left solely in the realm of verbal ornamentation. It has often been noted that Orestes brings the "net" of Justice on stage at the end of *Cho.*, and the animal imagery of the first two plays is evident in the snaky hair of the Furies and their pack-like movements in the *Eum.*[26] Similarly the music-making which has been a verbal image or

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Ch 719 ff., although it may appear that the chorus answers its own question by singing a prayer to the dead, the πότε in line 720 requires an answer which refers to a future time after the house has been liberated; see the note by Tucker on line 716 ff.

[23] To this list should be added the supportive evidence of *Supp.* 1060 f., where the direct response is a strong indication of two speakers.

[24] The same is probably true of the question-answer sequence at *Seven* 95-98; see note 17 above.

[25] "The Confused Chorus (*Agamemnon* 975-1034)," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 336-46.

[26] The best of the recent studies showing how Aeschylean imagery enters into the action of the plays are: R. F. Goheen, "Aspects of Dramatic Symbolism. Three Studies in

motif since the watchman's prologue is developed on stage as the audience watches tragedy's basic formal component, the tragic chorus, break apart when they hear Agamemnon's death cries. From this point on the chorus sings several unsymmetrical strophes with sporadic musical additions.

This motif of the collapse of the chorus' ability to join in singing formal hymns occurs first in the epode at 475 ff. In the preceding stanzas, the old men hoped to sing words of thanks and blessing to the gods, but as they begin to consider the pain which has come to the Greeks and the punishment which may fall upon them for Agamemnon's overzealous sacking of Troy, they also think of the threat to the state by angry citizens and must even consider that they too will have to suffer "the stroke of Zeus." In the course of the ode, their thinking has moved step by step to a conclusion which is justified but unpalatable. And the dilemma of accepting the unpleasant results of their own reasoning drives them to doubt the original cause of this chain of thinking, the torch announcing the fall of Troy.[27] The outward sign of their dismay is the splitting of the normally unified chorus in the epode where three groups or possibly individuals sing of their skepticism just before the messenger arrives to tell them that any such skepticism is unwarranted.

Thus there is support in the development of musical form for the tripartite division of choral lines in the epode at 475 ff.[28] Given the con-

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the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 76 (1955) 113-37; R. Lattimore's introduction to his translation (Chicago 1953); and A. Lebeck, *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

[27] The issue here is a fundamental one involving the degree of consistency in the characterization of the chorus. Fraenkel ii. 245 ff. and R. D. Dawe, "Inconsistency of Plot and Character in Aeschylus," *PCPhS* 9 (1963) 21-62, esp. 43 ff., see the necessity for an abrupt shift in the chorus' attitude in the epode at *Ag.* 475 ff. regardless of an inconsistency in their characterization. This inconsistency was felt so deeply by Verrall that he created two groups of chorus members (see his edition of 1889, Appendix J). But others have argued for a consistent development in the chorus' thinking: Wecklein in his 1883 edition on 481-685, where he comments that the chorus simply no longer wants to believe; Wilamowitz (note 5 above) 185 f.; Kranz (note 1 above) 159 f.; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* (1343-71)," *CQ* 4 (1954) 23-30; B. Alexanderson, "Forebodings in the *Agamemnon*," *Eranos* 67 (1969) 1-23; Lebeck, *The Oresteia* (note 28 above) 37-46; K. J. Dover, "Some Neglected Aspects of Agamemnon's Dilemma," *JHS* 93 (1973) 67 f.; and Scott, "Lines for Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 489-502)," *TAPA* 108 (1978) 259-69.

[28] One could speculate that half-choruses sing with group A singing the first and last section; the result would still be an unusual asymmetry. Customarily Aeschylus seems to seek symmetry in his use of half-choruses to stress a contrast or opposition; e.g., *Seven* 369 ff., 1066 ff., and *Supp.* 1052 ff.

versational tone in this epode (which is similar to the very practical words at 1348 ff.) and the unusual phrasing of sequential questions and question-answer structures, both of which are closer to parallel conversational passages than to lyrics sung in unison, I believe that Fraenkel is too strict in dismissing the possibility of such division.

II. *Eum.* 140 ff.

Some editors give this song to a unified chorus,[29] but the majority agree that at least the first strophic pair should be split among individual singers, and several do not reunite the chorus throughout this ode. Those who would split at least part of the song among separate voices are Wellauer, Bamberger, Müller, Paley, Hermann, Hartung, Sidgwick, Blass, Weil, Mazon, Murray, de Falco, and Young. Rossbach, Kirchoff, Westphal, and Wecklein give the song to half-choruses. Murray marks various parts showing a series of speakers in the first and second stanzas and separate speakers for each of the following four stanzas to a total of twelve. But even though the spirit of splitting the chorus among individual speakers in the first strophic pair may be correct, there are problems in accepting his precise assignment of lines.

First let me offer the evidence which supports the probability of individual speakers during this song. This idea is an old one going back to the scholiast in M who marks ἐξ ὧν μία at line 140 and carefully states that the action is to be seen as one Fury waking another so that the whole chorus does not sing at the same time. This is surely true of the spoken lines of the choregos at 140-42. At 144 the M scholia imply that each segment is said individually.[30] But more compelling is the unprece-

[29] Schütz, Paley, Wilamowitz, and Page.

[30] The most concerted defense of the unity of speakers is offered by Kaimio (note 7 above) 117-20, who discounts the remarks of the scholiast by stating that they refer to style rather than manner of delivery; and this is a possible interpretation. In any case it is wise in such a matter to dismiss the details of information of the scholiast as potentially derived evidence, if not speculation. Kaimio makes his major point by citing precedent for the alternation of number in 143-45. But he does not comment on the shift back to "I" in 147 and the unprecedented rate of these shifts within one stanza, nor do his parallels to passages where "I" is the normal form to connote the oppression felt by a victim contain examples where there is a significant change of subject within a stanza. He is willing to admit that this stanza at *Eum.* 143 creates the illusion of members of the chorus

dented alternation of singular and plural forms identifying the chorus almost at random as "I" or "we" in lines 143–48. As noted above, choruses can easily refer to themselves in either singular or plural, but never is there such frequent switching among forms within one stanza. The closest parallels in surviving Aeschylean drama are *Pers.* 992 vs. 1000; *Seven* 95 vs. 99 and 102 vs. 103, 151 vs. 156; *Supp.* 777 vs. 780; *Eum.* 349 vs. 352, and 354 vs. 359. While these are all lyric passages in which the subject shifts within one stanza, occurrences are at least three lines apart and there is only one such shift per stanza, except at *Seven* 99 ff., which is itself a strong candidate for division among individual speakers. *Eum.* 143–48 offer four shifts of subject in one stanza. Further, the words are repetitive and the thought does not develop; each of the first three lines simply states that the speaker has suffered, repeating the same word-root παθ- four times.[31] It is unprecedented for a single or unified choral voice to make such unstructured repetitions;[32] but a series of speakers corroborating one another can do this. Clearest parallel passages are in laments where one speaker picks up another's words in echoing and repeating the lament: *Pers.* 1003–77 and *Seven* 961–1004. Finally, there are staging problems associated with the entrance of this chorus. The Furies are said by the priestess to be asleep (46 f.); thus

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speaking to each other, but this seems to be more than illusion when parallel passages fail to offer support for a unified chorus.

But scholiasts can be useful when they note something odd in a text. Prof. H. G. Edinger has suggested to me that the scholia from M and E on lines 140, 144, and 145, although somewhat cryptic, are groping after an explanation in terms of staging for some formal phenomenon which would perplex the ordinary reader. Thus, early in the study of the text someone felt the need to explain a peculiarity in these stanzas.

[31] Kaimio (note 7 above) 119, n. 3, states that 143 is not a complete statement because there is no object for ἐπάθομεν. He identifies 144 as a parenthetical interruption "inserted by the same speaker to heighten the effect of 145 f."; this same speaker then continues in 145 by repeating ἐπάθομεν and supplying the required object. But he himself cites the counter evidence of πάσχω used absolutely at *Ag.* 250 and *Supp.* 386.

[32] There are places where a chorus immediately repeats a word once for emphasis: *Pers.* 680, 1000; *Seven* 134, 171, 204, 904 f., 911 (text problems here); *Supp.* 370; *Ag.* 1456. In a few passages, more complex repetition is highly structured in order to focus maximum emphasis on a single point by dwelling on one word or phrase: *Pers.* 647 ff.; *Seven* 900 ff.; *Ag.* 1562 f.; and *Cho.* 312 f. *Seven* 878 f. and 888 f. are phrased similarly, with δῆθ' reinforcing the repetition. There are two repetitions which seem consciously designed to create a corresponding musical effect: *Pers.* 550 ff. = 560 ff. and 694 ff. = 700 ff. Yet none of these examples offers such an unstructured, seemingly purposeless triple repetition.

devotees of the *ekkyklema* see this entrance as proof for its existence;[33] but the *Vita* states that the chorus members entered σποράδην ("in a scattered way") and caused children to faint and women to miscarry. Probably this report derives from a production of this scene, but not necessarily from the original production; in any case it is difficult to see how the chorus would have been so frightening on their second entrance since it is the first entrance which has the greatest impact. It seems possible to have two or three of the Furies visible, huddled in the background when the doors of the temple are opened, rouse themselves and then summon others who enter through the door from backstage one by one.[34] As each Fury enters, she would have her own words to sing until the whole chorus is assembled.[35] They would enter rapidly once they were awakened, thus requiring only the short individual statements at the beginning of this song. Together the alternation of singular and plural subjects, the close repetition of similar words and thoughts,[36] and the probabilities concerning the staging suggest that at least the first two stanzas are split among individual speakers.

Yet Murray's symmetrical assignment of lines, which postulates corresponding interjections into continuous speeches, is his own invention, probably based on a desire to have corresponding speech divisions throughout this song. Yet line 151 seems to depend on line 150, since it more naturally interprets the act by which the old gods are being "trampled" (καθιππάσω) than it identifies the trickery (ἐπίκλοπος) of the Olympians,[37] and the δέ in 153 separates that statement from the preceding lines. Non-corresponding division of lines seems necessary here. Further, at 163 the manuscript's reading requires that κρατοῦντες govern θρόνον or else there is an anacoluthon; Wilamowitz offered a more

[33] Cf. A. M. Dale, *Collected Papers* (Oxford 1969) 123, 270, answered by O. Taplin, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus* (Oxford 1977) 369–74.

[34] This type of simple staging is outlined by P. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions* (Oxford 1962) 82 f., and Dale (note 33 above) 270. The few representative Furies would be visible when the doors open revealing Orestes, Apollo, and Hermes in the temple. As each of these characters (as well as Clytemnestra) begins to speak, he could move out of the background to the more central playing area in front of the main door.

[35] Thus, there is no pressing need to find entering lines for 12 or 15 speakers, although a structure of 12 speakers can easily be found (see discussion, p. 161).

[36] To make the list of repeated ideas complete through the first four stanzas, one should add: ἐπίκλοπος and ἐξέκλεψας (149 and 153): κέντρῳ and μαστίκτορος (157 and 160); νέος and νεώτεροι (150 and 162); δικαίως and δίκας (154 and 163).

[37] The trickery and stealth of Apollo referred to again in line 153 is a reference to the disappearance of Orestes, not to Apollo's honoring of his rights.

reasonable structuring of the whole passage by supplying τ' in line 166, a structure which makes θρόνον a joint object with ὀμφαλόν. This makes it possible to divide antistrophe B among individual speakers in a different way from strophe B. Murray's corresponding assignment of lines requires devices which are too complicated in view of available simpler solutions. While such irregular divisions are unusual in tragic lyric, Page has shown that they are not unprecedented.[38]

Still, in spite of problems with Murray's precise divisions, the spirit of assigning individual speakers within the first two stanzas and thereafter seems correct. And once the case for individual speakers is shown for the first strophe, there are two possible schemes for individual assignments throughout the ode which will accommodate twelve speakers: (1) four speakers in the first strophe and antistrophe (143, 144, 145–47, 148, 149, 150–52, 153, 154) and then one speaker for each of the next stanzas; or (2) eight speakers assigned as above in the first strophic pair, then four speakers for the next strophic pair (155–59, 160–61, 161–62, 163–67), and then the chorus as a unit would sing the last two strophes. Each structure allows a rapid entrance of the chorus onto the stage at the beginning so that eight of them are present by the end of the first antistrophe. Both the first strophic pair and strophe-antistrophe B in the second scheme offer unsymmetrical divisions among speakers. Such imbalance is suited to the characterization of the chorus in this scene. As they awaken slowly, there are indications of subverbal sounds in the script which are tantalizingly vague: they mutter two μυγμοί, then two ὠγμοί, and finally, just before breaking into intelligible speech, a μυγμὸς διπλοῦς ὀξύς. One of them then utters the first intelligible line in a state of half-sleep as she darts after Orestes in her dream. After Clytemnestra delivers her scornful, unlovely charge, one member of the chorus raises her head, notices that Orestes is gone, and starts to waken others; she at least speaks a recognizable trimeter. Then one by one the members of the chorus begin to appear on stage.

It is also possible to consider an intermediate position between the united chorus as singer and small groups or individual voices—namely that the first strophic pair is split between the coryphaeus and the full chorus (or the coryphaeus leading the full chorus). Lines 144–50 are adequately complete to be individual statements and are iambic trimeters, but the shift to the first person plural in 145 suggests a different

[38] Page (note 1 above) cites *Supp.* 1052 ff.; Eur. *TW* 159 ff., 197 ff., 587 ff.; and *Rhesus* 526 ff.

speaker, while the participle in 151 needs to be said by the same speaker. Thus, lines would be assigned as follows: 143, lyric by full chorus; 144, trimeter by coryphaeus; 145–46, lyric by full chorus; 147, trimeter by coryphaeus; 148, lyric by full chorus; 149, chorus; 150–52, coryphaeus; 153, coryphaeus or chorus?; 154, chorus? This is a possible grouping of lines, but here our evidence is simply inadequate to discern such precise line assignments. Even in this structuring of the line, there would be unusual division within the ranks of the chorus in this most organized of choral forms.[39]

Whatever assignment is correct, these lines are tragedy's most untraditional and imaginative choral entrance.[40] If Aeschylus wanted to show that the formal structure of this chorus—so shattered in the *Agamemnon*—was still broken and that the very gods of ancient Justice were unable to create a harmoniously ordered musical form, he could have done it in no stronger way than by opening with this ramshackle parodos. The initial words are inarticulate groans; the meter, alternation between excited dochmaic and quite irregular trimeter. The song seems to be split somehow among different voices who at this moment appear incapable of sufficiently organizing themselves to sing a strophe in unison. Their dance probably mimics the groggy movements of a person fighting off a deep sleep. Finally when they have roused themselves and are ready to act like a chorus, they do not enter the beginning of the drama; they leave the stage finding that they must chase the play, so to speak, to catch up with it.

III. *Eum.* 244–75[41]

Because this passage is not a strophe or an epode, it falls outside the strict guidelines stated by Fraenkel, but it will be discussed briefly

[39] This type of assignment is suggested by T. Musenides, *Aischylos und sein Theater* (Berlin 1937) 144.

[40] The contrasting passage is the parodos of the *Ag.*, the most musically ornate, poetically structured, and philosophically profound song in Greek tragedy. By comparison choral music-making and dancing at the beginning of the *Eum.* have sunk to a low level.

[41] Those who hold to a unified chorus are: Schütz, Paley, Sidgwick (1887), Weil, Wilamowitz, and Page (1972). Editors who would divide these lines are: among individual speakers, Wellauer, Hermann, *Opusc.* vi.2.46–55, Müller, Drake, Murray; among subsections of the chorus, Westphal, Wecklein, Sidgwick (1902), Mazon, V. de Falco,

here because it is the third of the lyric passages in the *Oresteia* which are probably sung by separate voices. The iambic lines (244-53) are probably spoken by the coryphaeus who leads the disorganized chorus onto the stage. Since he describes them as a pack of dogs in pursuit of a wounded and bleeding deer (247 f.), the chorus would appropriately spill into the orchestra looking everywhere in their search for Orestes.[42] They have not located him at the close of the iambic passage (252 f.), and do not find him until 257, when one person or section of the chorus finds him and calls to the others (257-60).[43] Even though the speech at 261-63 can be given to a new speaker, there is no reason in the text for such an assignment. But at 264-68 the speaker directly addresses Orestes in the second person in four of the five lines. Lines 261 ff. avoid such forms, as the speaker gives a more impersonal statement of the law, and are thus probably sung by a different section of the chorus. The rest of the speech seems logically joined and developed, especially in 269-75 where the word γάρ (273) explains the preceding ἐπάξια. Whether each sentence of this lyric would be spoken by a separate member of the chorus (as Murray's markings suggest) or whether there are some individual speakers only at the beginning is impossible to determine. I tend to favor the notion of seven individual speakers plus the choregos all the way to 275 since this would reemphasize the continuing impression of disor-

Studi sul Teatro Greco (Naples, 2nd ed., 1958) 25-30, and Thomson. But many editors seem willing to be less strict in their demands here. Page (note 1 above) 94 admits a division of speakers, although he does not specifically rule out a division between half-choruses; he allows such splitting here and in several other passages because these lyrics are not in strophic structures. Even Fraenkel (ii, p. 246, n. 1) by default would allow such division because these lines do not occur in a stasimon. The closest formal parallel is *Seven* 78 ff. (see note 17 above).

[42] Rode (note 1 above) 89-95 discusses these lines among other astrophic sections, all of which involve mimetic action.

[43] Kaimio (note 7 above) 135 f. follows Rose (ii, 247 on lines 254-58) in asserting that ὅρα at 254 does not command the others to seek a missing person but rather to be on their toes so that he will not escape for a second time. Both assume that Orestes is plainly visible to the chorus as they enter and that they neither need to search for him nor announce that they have found him. But they ignore που in 252 and λάθῃ in 256. If Orestes is unfound at 252 and the speaker fears that he has escaped at 256, but the chorus has found him well enough to describe his posture at 257 f., then there is some type of search and a need for a moment when someone finds him and tells the others. ὅρα provides the final moment of searching (which could have begun as early as 246), and 257 would announce the discovery. It is all very quick—but then, as Kaimio and Rose note, Orestes is not very well hidden. Rose still splits these lines among individual speakers (see on line 267), but Kaimio insists on a unified chorus.

der in music and staging at the beginning of this play, but no firm proof is available. At the very least, it seems probable from the words which describe and accompany the frantic searching of one section of the chorus that 254–56 must be sung by a different person(s) than 257–60.[44]

The song itself does not represent the deliberations of a unified chorus moving from topic to topic in an orderly fashion; these seem more the remarks of individual Furies who slowly come to perceive the situation in a series of responses to one another. They are no more organized in this scene than the chorus which falls into individual perceptions after the death of Agamemnon. Content thus compliments the lack of a strophic structure for this song; the chorus sings random lines which contain no particular pattern in thought or meter[45] and thus are free to move as individuals in the orchestra since their movements would not have to be repeated to an antistrophic stanza immediately thereafter. They search out their victim and then close on him as separate entities rather than as members of a formally organized chorus who must always seem to be conscious of the group nature of their dance. The two sequential disorganized choral entrances in the *Eumenides* join with the other short scenes at the beginning of this play to project an image of thorough and vicious chaos, a reflection of the true state of the universe before the trial and the foundation of the court of the Areopagus.[46] If the dramatic chorus is a vestige of the basic ritual out of which tragedy developed, then this chorus is a denial of the order, the structure, and the group dancing of the early form. The rebirth of musical order in the reconstitution of the chorus at the end of the *Eumenides* will accompany the establishment of permanent cosmic order, the blessing for which the early rituals were performed.

In summary, Fraenkel's proscription against individual voices in choral lyric is too rigid. There seem to be indications in these three pas-

[44] Wilamowitz (note 17 above) 221 states the difficulty in being more certain on the assignment of these lines: "Nur einmal, wo der Gesuchte entdeckt wird, könnte eine neue Stimme einsetzen, dann da ist natürlich Pause; aber Pause ist da auch, wenn derselbe Redner oder Sänger fortfährt."

[45] As a sign of this loose structure—most of these sentences could be arranged in a different order with little loss of meaning and minimal changes in grammar. Only 261 (τὸ δ' οὐ πάρεστιν) and 273 (γάρ) seem to develop from the immediately preceding sentences.

[46] Taplin (note 33 above) 378 ff. points out that these two entries of the chorus can be seen as mirror scenes. He feels that such entries would stress the relentlessness of the Furies' pursuit; I would add to this the continuing vision of a chorus in disarray.

sages of the *Oresteia* that lyric stanzas could be split among individual speakers for special effect. Obvious direct evidence is unavailable and, to be sure, such splits are not common occurrences in those tragedies which survive, but inferences carefully drawn from the texts should allow us to consider possible use of such a striking visual and unmusical device by the ancient playwrights; critics should consider the possibility of individual speakers in other Aeschylean passages such as *Seven* 78 ff.[47] and *Supp.* 1052 ff.[48] In the *Oresteia*, the split chorus following the death of Agamemnon does not stand alone but is a significant component of the musical design of the whole trilogy.

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[47] See note 17 above.

[48] See the latest study by M. McCall, "The Secondary Choruses in Aeschylus' *Supplices*," *CSCA* 9 (1976) 117–31. He argues effectively that only the Danaids, splitting into half-choruses, sing the strophic stanzas at 1052 ff. He describes the attitudes of each group, but it is possible to ponder alternate staging with individual speakers or, at least, smaller units than half-choruses since the logic of each role (however one assigns the lines) is not compelling (see note 6 above). In fact, if each of two roles were tightly and logically composed, there would not be the continuing dispute over line assignment (see McCall, p. 126 f. and his n. 40).

THE STRUCTURE OF HORACE, *ODES* 1.3: A PROPEMPTICON FOR VERGIL

Odes 1.3 has posed difficult problems of tone, meaning, and structure: whether the poem is more humorous than serious,[1] whether it is more admiration for man's tragic courage than condemnation of his sinful audacity,[2] whether it is actually two poems or merely one oddly structured ode.[3] In addition, the critical response to the piece as a whole may be characterized as severely negative. Gordon Williams speaks of a "lack of coherence,"[4] while Nisbet and Hubbard find that Horace here shows "none of his usual tact and charm."[5]

The purpose of this paper is a limited one: while I cannot hope to resolve the issues raised above, I will attempt to suggest an overall structure which could serve as a sound basis for subsequent reconsiderations of tone, meaning, and artistic merit. My thesis is that *Odes* 1.3 is a carefully conceived and structured whole in which all parts have closer interconnections than have been realized. For this purpose it does not matter whether the poem belongs solely to the genre of the propempticon or indeed also borrows from the tradition of the diatribe. Rather than an investigation of literary antecedents, our focus is the poem as it unfolds itself.[6]

[1]See E. Adelaide Hahn, "Horace's Odes to Vergil," *TAPA* 76 (1945) xxxii–xxxiii. Hahn argues that ' . . . as the extravagant tone suggests: Horace is teasing Vergil, who inveighed against seafaring in *Ecl.* 4, for crossing the sea himself. . . ."

[2]See J. P. Elder, "Horace, C., I, 3," *AJP* 73 (1952) 140–58.

[3]See K. Procinger, "Zu Horazens Ode I 3," *WS* 29 (1907) 165–72.

[4]Gordon Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 159. Williams comments:

> But the major part of the poem is taken up with a series of common-places centred round the hoary theme: 'How foolhardy was the first man to sail on the seal' The passenger on the ship was Virgil, and Horace describes him as 'half of my soul.' The undistinguished, conventional themes have no bearing on this personal note and there is not the slightest sense of a personal relationship in the greater part of the poem: Virgil is once, briefly, mentioned and makes no further mark on the composition.

[5]R. G. M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book* 1 (Oxford 1970) 42. In the same vein, see the earlier commentator, C. H. Moore, *Horace: Odes and Epodes* (New York 1902) 63.

[6]On the Latin propempticon, see Kenneth Quinn, *Latin Explorations* (London 1963) 239–73.

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It should first be said that I reject totally Prodinger's claim that *Odes* 1.3 is in fact two poems, lines 1-8 comprising one ode distinct from lines 9-40, which form a second ode.[7] Although Prodinger's hypothesis has, of course, not enjoyed serious support among scholars, it is worth mentioning at the outset because Prodinger boldly underscores the major issue which has puzzled critics: the apparent disconnection between "the first part of the poem" (lines 1-8) and "the second part of the poem" (lines 9-40). Below is the synopsis offered by Nisbet and Hubbard:[8]

> 1-8. Preserve Virgil on his voyage to Attica, O ship. 9-24. The first sailor was unnaturally fearless. God did not intend us to cross the seas. 25-40. Man's reckless daring leads him to ruin. Prometheus stole fire, Daedalus flew through the air, Hercules broke into Hades; we are like Giants assailing Heaven and provoking divine vengeance.

In defense of the ode's unity and coherence, Hendrickson argued that after the first eight lines of the propempticon proper, Horace follows with reflections which,[9]

> though put in an enunciative form, were in reality an expression of grief, an imprecation upon man's audacious enterprise, which had devised a means of separating friends.

J. P. Elder, following in the steps of Hendrickson, suggested that the poem's progression (Vergil, mankind, Prometheus, Daedalus, and Hercules) is most significant. The ode, he concludes,[10]

> is a study, set forth in a careful formalism of man's greatness in the face of Heaven's decrees—in fine, a study of man's tragic heroism.

Horace, Elder believes, is concerned less with the nature of *impietas* than with "man's *audacia* in his sinfulness."

Let us now turn to the ode. The overall linear allocation is 40 = 8 + 32 (= 16 + 16) or lines 1-40 = 1-8 + 9-40 (= [9-24] + [25-40]).

[7] Prodinger (note 3 above) 171.

[8] Nisbet and Hubbard (note 5 above) 40. N. E. Collinge, *The Structure of Horace's Odes* (London 1961) 83, posits a tricolon composed of 1-8, 9-20, and 21-40. But lines 21-24 clearly focus on man's impiety in crossing the sea and hence complete the thought begun with the launching of the first ship in line 9.

[9] G. L. Hendrickson, "Horace's Propempticon to Virgil," *CJ* 3 (1908) 100-04 at p. 100.

[10] Elder (note 2 above) 144.


While the two basic building blocks[11] are eight lines (1-8) and 32 lines (9-40), the first eight lines are set in a symmetrical relationship to two sections, each of which is 16 lines (9-24 and 25-40) or twice the number 8. While lines 1-8 are a prayer that the ship might carry Vergil safely from Italy to Greece, it is the four basic elements alluded to which form a primary linkage with both 16-line sections. In each of the first three lines divinities are invoked, and in each case the individual is clearly identified but not named:

diva potens Cypri = Venus
fratres Helenae, lucida sidera = Castor and Pollux
ventorum pater = Aeolus

In line 21, toward the end of section 2 (9-24), again a divinity is mentioned but not named: *deus*. And finally, in the last line of the poem, line 40 of section 3 (25-40), a divinity is again mentioned and this time named: *Iovem*. We have then a progression and climax beginning with the unnamed *diva*, *fratres*, and *pater* of section 1, going next to *deus* of section 2, and finally in section 3 to *Iovem*, who is probably the same as *deus* but only now clearly identified. But to return to the four elements:

Cypri = earth
lucida sidera = fire
ventorum = air
navis = water

Each reference to a divinity was so constructed as to cite one of the basic elements in nature. When the *te* of line 1 is eventually identified as the *navis* in line 5 which is to carry Vergil to Greece, Horace furnishes the last of the four basic elements: water. These four elements which occur in section 1, recur in 2 and 3 in the following deliberate pattern:



[11]The basic structure of the poem is bipartite and not tripartite. On this point see John V. Cody, *Horace and Callimachean Aesthetics*, Collection Latomus 147 (Bruxelles

Section 2 (lines 9–24) concerns itself essentially with the element of water, or more precisely with the violation of it by the man, *qui fragilem truci / commisit pelago ratem / primus* (10–12). Some reference, however, is also made to the other three elements already alluded to in section 1:

Africum ... Aquilonibus ... Noti = air
Hyades = fire (and water)
scopulos, Acroceraunia = earth (with an etymological hint of air and fire in the appositive Acroceraunia)

We should note that Horace in the term Hyades neatly combines the elements of fire and water. The cluster of stars in the constellation Taurus suggests both fire and rain as Ovid (*Fasti* 165–66) makes clear:

ora micant Tauri septem radiantia *flammis*,
navita quas Hyadas Graius ab *imbre* vocat.

All heavenly bodies or stars, however, carry a predominant association with fire. For example, Ovid (*Met.* 15.665) speaks of *sidereos ignes*, and Cicero (*Rep.* 6.15) remarks: *ex illis sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis.* In section 3, the remaining three elements or, more precisely, the violation of them, receive prominent treatment in connection with a named individual:

Prometheus — fire
Daedalus — air
Hercules — earth

Prometheus brought fire to mankind, Daedalus flew through the air, and Hercules went down into the earth to Acheron, all contrary to the laws of nature.

These last mentioned incidents suggest a second major linkage in the poem: the crime of theft (*furtum*). Sections 1 and 2 present *furtum* largely in connection with water, while section 3 portrays *furtum* in the context of the three remaining elements: fire, air, and earth. In section 1, Horace employs commercial and legal language (lines 5–8):

navis, quae tibi creditum
debes Vergilium; finibus Atticis
reddas incolumem, precor,
et serves animae dimidium meae.

1976) 73–74. Curiously, A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Q. Horatius Flaccus, Oden und Epoden*[10] (Berlin 1960) 19, summarize the poem as if it had four sections: 1–8, 9–20, 21–36, 37–40.

The metaphor treats the ship as a person to whom a deposit (Vergil) has been entrusted (*creditum*) and who is therefore obliged (*debes*) to return (*reddas*) the item undamaged (*incolumem*). A violation of the obligation of a deposit falls under the laws of theft. In section 2, Horace returns to the deposit motif when by a slight shift he refers to the person who first entrusted (*commisit*) a fragile craft to the rough sea (9–12). Notice the poet has deftly varied the relationships: in section 1, a personified ship was entrusted with a human who was to be returned secure from the sea to land; in section 2, a human has entrusted a ship to the sea. Commercial and legal Latin regularly employ the verbs *credo* and *committo* as synonyms for placing something somewhere for preservation, protection, care, and the like. And we find in pseudo-Acron the following comment on line 11: "*commisit*. Credidit, ut Terent. (*Eun.* V.7.16): *Quem* lupo commisisti."[12] To complete the pattern of theft, we turn again to section 3 with its catalogue of three persons who violated the three basic elements: Prometheus and fire, Daedalus and air, Hercules and the earth. But what have these transgressions to do with *furtum*? As Horace and tradition present them, each involves the crime of theft. Prometheus stole (*subductum*) fire from heaven. Daedalus tried the empty air on wings not given to humans (*pinnis non homini datis*). Daedalus took or stole wings in the sense that with feathers and wax he appropriated wings which nature (*deus*, Horace would say) had given only to birds. Finally, the labor for which Hercules descended beneath the earth required that he steal the dog Cerberus (*Odyssey* 11.618–26). The notion of theft cannot be mistaken, for Horace himself introduces the series with the phrase *per vetitum nefas* (26), concludes with *per noctrum . . . scelus* (39), and most important, in describing the theft of fire, he employs the words *fraude mala* (28), which, while not precisely a legal phrase, recall, as the commentators remind us, Horace's own *malos fures* (*Sat.* 1.1.77) and approximate the legal form *dolus malus*. The *Digest* of Justinian preserves a comprehensive definition of *furtum* by Paulus which interestingly employs the adjective *fraudulosa* (*Dig.* 47.2.1.3):

> Furtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa lucri faciendi gratia vel ipsius rei vel etiam usus ejus possessionisve: quod lege naturali prohibitum est admittere.

[12]F. Hauthal, *Acronis et Porphyrionis Commentarii in Q. Horatium Flaccum* 1 (Berlin 1864) 15.

Notice that Paulus expressly, as Horace does implicitly, concludes that theft is contrary to the natural law. This concept was thoroughly familiar to the Romans, and Cicero had already given stately expression to it in *de Officiis* 3:

> Nature does not suffer us to increase our capacities, resources or wealth by despoiling others.

One should notice that

> illi robur et aes triplex
> circa pectus erat,

has a twofold connection with section 1. First the *aes* of line 9 subtly recalls the *Cypri* of line 1, when we reflect that in Latin the word *aes* is regularly used for the phrase *aes Cyprium*: copper or bronze from Cyprus. Just as the feminine substantive *Cypria* means Venus, so the neuter substantive *Cyprium* means copper. More important, however, is the connection between the *navis* employed in section 1 (line 5) and the first word of section 2 (line 9) *illi* who is described as having oak or a triple layer of bronze around his heart. That first shipbuilder or first sailor is in fact described in terms which suggest a ship itself. While the commentators cite passages from Greek (especially Homer) and Latin sources for a heart made of metal or wood or stone,[13] Horace has chosen to say that the heart is covered with oak and bronze. The man who first launched a ship has a heart surrounded by oak just as a ship has wood on its exterior. In fact triremes had keels made of oak, and Caesar himself records an instance of some ships which were made entirely of oak: *naves totae factae ex robore* (*B.G.* 3.13). Elsewhere in the *Odes*, Horace uses the phrases *aeratas . . . navis* (2.16.21) and *aerata triremi* (3.1.39). Vergil wrote in the *Aeneid* (8.675):

> in medio classis aeratas, Actia bella,
> cernere erat, . . .

As Fordyce[14] remarks on this passage, "technically the word [*aeratus*] refers to the bronze beak of warships . . . but it becomes a conventional epithet of sea-going ships." In the phrase *aes triplex circa pectus*, the *aes . . . circa* = *aeratus*, that is, *aere tectus*. Thus, in section 1, the ship (*navis*)

[13]For example, *Il.* 2.490, 24.205; *Theogony* 764; Tibullus 1.1.64.

[14]C. J. Fordyce, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos, Libri VII–VIII* (Oxford 1977) 276.

was personified, while now in section 2, the sailor is described as if he were an oaken and bronze ship. In this connection we should add that a curious suggestion of pseudo-Acron (on line 9) has been ignored by commentators:

> *Triplex*. Verbum ab usurariis tractum posuit, quorum auaritia [uel] spe lucri uel commercii (*commercio*?) inuentum nauigium sit.

If Horace did borrow the adjective *triplex* from the world of moneylenders to suggest that threefold profits (in Horace *aes* is used in the senses of *nummi cuprei* or *pecunia*[15]) motivated sea trade, the commercial language of section 1 has been continued in section 2 not only in *commisit* (11).

A few structural observations remain to be noted. Each of the three main sections of the ode employs the device of anaphora conspicuously at the beginning of the line: *sic* (lines 1 and 2); *qui* (lines 18 and 19); *audax* (25 and 27).[16] Both section 2 and section 3 employ the same framing technique. Section 2 begins with man, *illi*, and concludes with an unspecified *deus* whose prudent efforts to separate land by water are frustrated by impious ships (*impiae ... rates*), where the epithet is clearly transferred (only men are *impii*). Section 3 begins with mankind, *gens humana*, and concludes with the named diety, *Iovem*, whose efforts to lay down his lightning bolts are frustrated by mortals (*mortalibus*) through their stupidity (*stultitia*) and sin (*scelus*). Section 3 appears to be more symmetrically structured than the previous sections. Horace boldly combines the device of anaphora noted earlier with a triple repetition of the stem *gen* in lines 25–28:

> audax ... gens ... audax ... genus ... gentibus.

Beyond this, the first four lines of section 3 (lines 25–28) echo and contrast with the last four lines of section 3. Consider the following items:

omnia perpeti (25)	—	nil ... ardui (37) neque ... patimus (38,39)
gens humana (26)	—	mortalibus (37)
ruit (26)	—	ardui (37) caelum ipsum petimus (38)

[15]See *TLL* under *aes*, 1.1075.
[16]See Giorgio Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Florence 1964) 273–74.

per vetitum nefas (26)	—	per nostrum scelus (39)
fraude mala (28)	—	stultitia (38)
Iapeti . . . ignem . . . intulit (27–28)	—	Iovem ponere fulmina (40)

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THE ART OF SAFE CRITICISM IN GREECE AND ROME*

What Herodotus in 5.78 called *isegorie*, "equality of speech," and what the Greeks more generally called *parrhesia*, "the right to say everything," is for most of us, as it was for Herodotus, "the first requisite of a state."[1] Repression of "equality of speech" is normally associated with tyrannical regimes, with ideological or religious absolutism. Greek writers of fifth and fourth century Athens, however, were keenly aware that blunt expression of unpopular opinions on religious, moral, or political issues is dangerous in a democracy too. The writer is generally safer to adopt some form of rhetorical "figured" speech.

We often forget that outright, blunt expression of our thoughts is not only more dangerous than "figured" speech, but usually less effective, even with friends, as Plutarch warns us in *Moralia* 66E–74E. Ancient rhetoricians, recognizing this, devoted much time and energy to what they called "figured problems": how to express oneself safely, tactfully, and effectively in almost every imaginable situation.[2] This paper explores some uses of "figured" speech in Greek and Roman writers, both in theory and in practice. It is my contention that there is a long tradition of "figuring" language in the interests of both tact and safety, and that this tradition reaches back beyond the documented beginnings of Greek and Roman rhetoric and forward into the Roman Empire and beyond.

Art and Elusiveness

Ancient poets and critics alike had little use for forthright expression. If art is concealment, what is obvious is not really art. Homer's blunt critic of the powerful, Thersites, is beaten by Odysseus and

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[1] T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (London 1952) 39. Cf. Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 6.

[2] See Hermogenes, *On Invention* 204 ff. (Rabe).

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mocked by the soldiers on whose behalf he is speaking (*Il.* 2.211-77).[3] His efforts have been wasted. True, Thersites' judgment of the warrior kings is not unlike the judgment we ourselves might want to pass on them. It may even be the poet's own judgment on them. But the criticism is not done in the right way by the right person. Quintilian comments (*Inst. Or.* 11.1.37):

> idem dictum saepe in alio liberum, in alio furiosum, in alio superbum est. verba adversus Agamemnonem a Thersite habita ridentur: da illa Diomedi aliive cui pari, magnum animum ferre prae se videbuntur.
>
> Often the same thing said may be a sign of freedom in one person, madness in another, and pride in a third. The speech against Agamemnon, when made by Thersites, provokes laughter. Give those words to Diomedes or someone of his stature, and they will seem to bear witness to a lofty spirit.

The *Iliad*, not Thersites, must make the point. And the devious, expansive hero and narrator of the epic *Odyssey*, the antithesis of blunt candor, is a wickedly appropriate person to assault Thersites.

Outspoken bluntness fails, says Aristotle, because the blunt speaker does not frighten us as much as the oblique speaker. The people we fear, he observes in *Rhetoric* 1382B, are:

> καὶ τῶν ἠδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ *παρρησιαστικοί*, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι, ἄδηλοι γὰρ ἢ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.
>
> Not those among our victims, enemies, or adversaries who say everything *forthrightly*, but those who are gentle, ironic, up to everything. Since you cannot see when they are close, you can never see when they are far away.

Parrhesia, "saying everything" bluntly, does not make the speaker formidable. And "formidable speaking," *deinotes*, is a major style of oratory in antiquity, as Demetrius points out in the fifth section of his *On Style*.

[3] There was a considerable literature on Thersites in antiquity. See E. Fiesel, *RE* Zweite Reihe 5, 2455-72; Eustathius, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem* (Hildesheim 1960) vol. 1, 166-78; *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, ed. G. Dinsdorf, vol. 1, 91-98 (on *Il.* 2.212-77); cf. *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, ed. H. Erbse (Berlin 1969). Libanius 8.243-45 (Förster) argues a case for Thersites. Lucian, however, in *True Story* 2.20, has Thersites bring a case for assault (*hybris*!) against Homer. But Homer retains Odysseus as his attorney and wins the case.

Emphasis Ancient and Modern

Those ancients who praise artless speech and criticize the techniques of *deinotes* are often themselves the most skilled practitioners of *deinotes*. Plato, who defends Socrates against the charge of *deinotes*—of being *deinos legein*, "formidable in argument"—in the *Apology*, is the source for many illustrations of this style in the rhetoricians. The claims his Socrates makes to bluntness convinced few critics in antiquity. Creating the illusion that one is speaking plainly when one is not is part of being "formidable in argument." Indeed, Plutarch (*Moralia* 59D) tells us to look out for "counterfeit bluntness": *Kibdelos ... parrhesia.*

The chief feature of *deinotes* is its compactness.[4] It relies on the listener to supply details omitted altogether by the speaker. Demetrius cites, as an instance, a message from the Spartans to Philip of Macedon: "Dionysius at Corinth." The point of the message, he claims, would have been weakened and reduced to mere narrative had it been set forth in full: "Dionysius has been deposed and is making a beggarly living as a teacher in Corinth" (*On Style* 241). Unless one knows the background, the Spartan message seems like little more than an innocuous piece of information. The force of what is being communicated lies not in what the Spartans say, but in what they do not say—in what they pass over in silence.

"Letting a lot be evident in a little is more cunningly forceful: τὸ δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ ἐμφαινόμενον δεινότερον" (*On Style* 241). We note the verbal form *emphainomenon*, "being evident," "being present for someone to find," often associated with the rhetorical figure *emphasis*. Quintilian defines *emphasis* as follows (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.64):

> est enim etiam inter figuras, cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur.
>
> *Emphasis* is among the forms of figured speech too. It is the process of digging out some lurking meaning from something said.

In the forceful style, *deinotes*, the reader or listener must supply some information, do some work himself. Hence symbolic expressions, τὰ σύμβολα, are features of this style, since we are left to infer (ὑπονοῆσαι) the meaning from a riddling kind of statement (*On Style* 243). Similarly, personification, because it involves not speaking in one's own person—οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου λέγει—creates *deinotes* (*On Style*

[4] *On Style* 240-45.

265-66). Metaphor and simile, both describing something in terms of something else, work toward the same effect (*On Style* 272-73). *Deinotes* itself involves asking questions of one's listeners without revealing one's own position on the issue, driving them to perplexity by what amounts to cross-examination (*On Style* 279).

What Demetrius outlines is the very essence of Socratic *deinotes*.[5] And the heart of his discussion is what is usually called *schema* or *eschematismenos logos* by Greek rhetoricians (*On Style* 287):

> τὸ δὲ καλούμενον ἐσχηματισμένον ἐν λόγῳ οἱ νῦν ῥήτορες γελοίως ποιοῦσιν καὶ μετὰ ἐμφάσεως ἀγεννοῦς ἅμα καὶ οἷον ἀναμνηστικῆς, ἀληθινὸν δὲ σχῆμά ἐστι λόγου μετὰ δυοῖν τούτοιν λεγομένων, εὐπρεπείας καὶ ἀσφαλείας.
>
> That which is called "figured" in speech present day orators use for humorous effect. They combine it with vulgar and suggestive *emphasis*. But genuine figured speech has these two goals in mind: good taste and the speaker's safety.

I have translated *schema* and *eschematismenon* as "figured speech" rather than as "innuendo" as Grube suggests, or "covert allusion" as Roberts suggests, because neither alternative gives any intimation of the meticulous arrangement *schema* implies.[6] *Emphasis*, though we may translate it as something like "double entendre," makes clear what double entendre does not: that the additional meanings are put there for the reader or listener to find. They do not occur accidentally.

To illustrate how figured speech has good taste in mind, Deme-

[5] G. M. A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto 1961) (*Phoenix*, suppl. vol. 4), regards Demetrius' discussion of figured language as a digression from the topic of *deinotes*: "a modern writer would avoid the charge of irrelevance by using a footnote," he observes in footnote 35, p. 30. There is nothing, however, to indicate Demetrius thinks it a digression from his main discussion. Rather he takes it as central to his treatment of *deinotes*, as I think it is. For the association of *deinotes* and *emphasis*, see Dionysius, *On Thucydides* 16, where it is pointed out that in some places Thucydides fails in his perfect economy and craftsmanship: ἢ ῥᾳθύμως ἐπιτετροχασμένα καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἔμφασιν ἔχοντα τῆς δεινότητος ἐκείνης ... "or reeled off easily without the slightest *lurking trace* of his famous *forcefulness*...."

[6] Grube (note 5 above) ad loc; and W. Rhys Roberts' translation of Demetrius in *Aristotle the Poetics, "Longinus" on the Sublime, Demetrius on Style*, tr. W. Hamilton Fyfe and W. Rhys Roberts (London 1932) (Loeb Classical Library), ad loc. Their translations of γελοίως also seem unsatisfactory to me: Grube renders "in a ridiculous manner" and Roberts "to a ridiculous extent." There is little humor in "ridiculous" when used in these ways, and the essence of much double entendre in most languages is humorous. For the meaning and use of *schema*, see discussion below and note 20.

trius cites in 288 a passage from Plato's *Phaedo* (59C) in which he says the philosopher wishes to reproach (λοιδορῆσαι) Aristippus and Cleombrotus for not visiting Socrates in prison before his execution. He does not attack them openly (διαρρήδην), for this would be to commit himself to reproaching them. Instead Plato has Phaedo ask who was with Socrates. Phaedo enumerates those present. When asked whether Aristippus and Cleombrotus were there, Phaedo answers: "No, they were in Aegina." Everything, Demetrius concludes, comes through in (*emphainetai*) the expression, "They were in Aegina."

The point is to achieve reproach without committing oneself to an outright statement of reproach. The effect is powerful (*On Style* 288):

> καὶ πολὺ δεινότερος ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ *ἐμφαίνοντος* τὸ δεινόν, οὐχὶ τοῦ λέγοντος.
>
> The effect is more forceful because it is achieved by letting the fact *speak for itself* rather than having the speaker make the point for himself.

We note the presence of forms suggesting *emphasis*: things lurk for the reader or listener to discover; facts speak for themselves.[7] Aegina is not far from Athens; the passage by boat cost very little—two obols, Plato tells us himself in *Gorgias* 511B.

For modern readers the facts do not speak at all. Editors of the *Phaedo* usually ignore Demetrius' interpretation or dispute it.[8] We are

[7] On *emphasis* see W. Rhys Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Literary Composition* (London 1910) 17-26, and the sources cited there; cf. G. Ballara, "La dottrina delle figure rhetoriche in Apollodoro di Pergamo," *QUCC* 5 (1968) 37-91. *Emphasis* was already in common use as a rhetorical term before the end of the fifth century B.C., to judge by this passage from Euripides' *Philoctetes* found in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1433B (fr. 794 Dindorf):

> λέξω δ' ἐγὼ, κἂν μου διαφθεῖραι δοκῇ,
> λόγους ὑποστὰς αὐτὸς ἠδικηκέναι,
> ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ πράγματ' αὐτ' εἴσῃ κλύων
> ὁ δ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν *ἐμφανέτω* λέγων.
>
> Even though he reckons he has annihilated my arguments by conceding he has acted unjustly, I shall make them. So you will hear and know the facts from me, and his own words will *expose* him as what he is.

[8] R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge 1955) 30-31, ignores Demetrius; J. Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford 1911) 10-11, disagrees. Ancient testimony supports Demetrius' view. Callimachus, *Epigram* 24, says a Cleombrotus (quite possibly the one mentioned in the *Phaedo*) committed suicide after reading the *Phaedo*. Hackforth, loc cit., suggests he may have done so because he was convinced by the arguments for the

simply not attuned to writing which proceeds by indirect suggestion rather than by direct statement. The modern meaning of *emphasis* itself offers the most powerful comment as to why. When we "emphasize" something, we proclaim it to our readers, leaving no doubt that we want its presence known. The ancient writer does the exact opposite. Plato does not "emphasize" (in our sense) the issue about Aristippus and Cleombrotus. The reader must find the points for himself and suppose the judgment he passes is his own, not one suggested by the writer. Unfortunately, since we expect something to be said clearly and obviously, we often presume, as do the editors of the *Phaedo*, that what is not "emphasized" in our way is not "emphasized" in anyone's way—or even being said.

Here is the risk the writer takes when he employs figured speech. It is a risk that would not have been nearly so great in antiquity as it is today, as we will see shortly from what Quintilian says. But since the Romantic era, classicists have tended to find such innuendo morally repugnant and to balk at the suggestion that Plato might have engaged in its use.

Diodotus

Plato is not unique in using figured approaches to criticism. Among Greek prose writers, Thucydides is hardly less remarkable. In the debate over Mitylene, whose citizens democratic Athens had voted to destroy, Thucydides shows a keen awareness of the intimidating pressure popular leaders and the populace itself can exert in a democracy. Diodotus, who argues against the extermination of the Mitylenians—and thus the policies of the people and its leader Cleon—leaves no doubt of the pressures he is resisting in stating his case (3.42–48).[9] Yet the force of Diodotus' speech lies not only in what he says, but in what he specifically declines to say. He will not argue the moral case against the extermination of the Mitylenians, only the case of political expediency. The listener must adduce and ponder on his own the moral issues involved in the mass murder.

immortality of the soul. Shame and humiliation at the "lurking" rebuke made more sense as an explanation to the ancients; cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1, and Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Plato* 3.36.

[9] On this speech, see A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 (Oxford 1956) 313–24.

This does not mean Diodotus and Thucydides feel no moral outrage. Nor does it mean that the positive response to Diodotus' words—the vote to spare the Mitylenians—is the result only of popular acceptance of his argument for political expediency. On the contrary, the most forceful element in Diodotus' speech is what he never actually expresses in so many words but is implicit in his every comment. To tell an audience you will not appeal to its moral sense is to rebuke its shamelessness. But both the historian and his speaker find it more prudent and rhetorically forceful to leave Diodotus' audience itself, and us, to pass moral judgment.

The Ox upon the Tongue

The same phenomenon occurs in Greek tragedy. The watchman in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (37–38), for instance, alerts the audience that all is not well in Argos. But he declines to be specific:

> . . . βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ μέγας
> βέβηκεν· οἶκος δ' αὐτός, εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι,
> σαφέστατ' ἂν λέξειεν. . .
>
> A huge ox has walked and now stands on my tongue.
> If the house could take voice it would speak clearly.

The house, in fact, does speak to at least one person in the play: the captive Trojan prophetess Cassandra. Cassandra recoils in horror at the palace gates, sensing at once the doom awaiting her captor, Agamemnon, and herself. She also detects the history of forbidden sexual relationships, of children murdered and fed to their father that has become the hallmark of the house of Atreus. When Cassandra gives voice to what she feels the house is telling her, the Argive elders who are the play's chorus understand her allusions to the crimes of Atreus and Thyestes. They even perceive a mythic parallel for the murder, mutilation, and cannibalism of the Argive royal house. But they are less able to detect the relationship of past horror to the present moment. They cannot accept what Cassandra finally tells them quite plainly: that she and Agamemnon are going to be killed by Agamemnon's wife.

People will grasp only what, in a sense, they already know. Thus, the watchman has a point when he says, after mentioning the obstructive ox on his tongue, that he must be content to "speak to those who

understand, and remain a mystery to those who do not—μαθοῦσιν αὐδῶ κοὐ μαθοῦσι λήθομαι" (*Agamemnon* 39). He will communicate, but not directly, because he is too discreet or too afraid to say what he knows. Cassandra will not speak directly either, aware no doubt that she will not be believed. At first she says nothing at all; to understand her, we must read her thoughts, just as she appears to be able to "read" the silent house. Next she becomes verbal, but obscurely so. To comprehend her lyrical riddles, we must already know what they are referring to. Finally, she turns to plain speaking. As her warnings become blunter and less oracular, we might expect the Argive elders to understand her better, but they do not.

Cassandra's explicit bluntness cannot overcome their preconceptions about what is and is not possible. Earlier they would not believe Clytemnestra, a woman, could have engineered relays of beacon fires to warn of Troy's fall. Women do not do things like that. So when they are told Clytemnestra will murder Agamemnon, they understand but do not believe what they are hearing. Women do not murder their husbands.

Cassandra's difficulty with her "audience" may mirror difficulties Aeschylus anticipates with his own audience. He is, after all, the vatic being addressing the Athenians as Cassandra addresses the Argives. Will his audience be able to accept the link between myth—that is to say, what it knows—and contemporary reality? The watchman and Cassandra help the audience link myth and current events and show the dangers of assuming, as the Argive chorus does, that "repetitions" of familiar crimes cannot occur because protagonists and circumstances are not identical. One must even be prepared for the "unthinkable"; sometimes woman will be the hunter and man the victim.

Aeschylus moves, like Cassandra, from implicit to explicit connections between myth and contemporary events. It is generally recognized that the *Agamemnon* (and the *Oresteia* as a whole) are a comment on the playwright's Athens as well as a masterly recreation of the sorrows of the house of Atreus. As Cassandra becomes progressively blunter in her statements, so does Aeschylus. In the trilogy's final play, the scene *is* Athens and the court of the Areopagus. The poet shows his Athenian audience an Athenian jury making a glorious appearance in an Athenian trial. The city's own goddess, Athena, casts the deciding vote, acquits the final participant in the nexus of Atreid slaughter, and prevents the outbreak of civil war. The drama comes home to the audience's own city; the house over which the poet is himself a kind of watchman has

found a voice. It is an exercise in Demetrius' *deinotes*, as all Greek tragedy is.

Aeschylus was luckier than most ancient poets. He wrote as Athens was on the verge of democracy not tyranny; writers in less hopeful times could not make the transition from implicit to explicit. They address us as Cassandra addresses the chorus in the early stages of their scene.

Silent Rebellion

Cassandra has even less "right to say everything" than the watchman. She enters in a chariot, accompanying her captor, and is present throughout his dialogue with Clytemnestra. She stands, silent and withdrawn, as Agamemnon symbolically reenacts his deeds of blood by walking on the tapestries Clytemnestra sets before him. The reader almost forgets Cassandra is on stage—but not the audience at a performance, who can see her during the dialogue and observe her as Agamemnon enters the house. Aeschylus knows how to use a character's silence for dramatic effect. During the subsequent choral meditation on fear and sickness lurking in the hearts of men, we may wonder whether the Argive elders are themselves the voice for Apollo's silent priestess on the stage.

Abruptly, Clytemnestra orders Cassandra to enter the house (1035). The audience, like Clytemnestra, asks itself whether Cassandra can understand, or even hear, what is going on around her. Her silence becomes an issue in the play. Her failure to respond either vocally or physically now appears to be a statement in itself, an act of defiance. Clytemnestra reasons that Cassandra must understand the order given, "unless, like a swallow, she speaks a foreign tongue—εἴπερ ἐστὶ μὴ χελιδόνος δίκην/ἀγνῶτα φωνὴν βάρβαρον κεκτημένη—" (1050–51). Allowing, though only ironically, for the possibility that Cassandra cannot speak, Clytemnestra offers her the chance to indicate her understanding with a gesture of the hand (1060–61). When she still receives no reply, Clytemnestra concludes Cassandra is possessed, even deranged, and departs with a threat: she will train her captive to bear the bit, as if she were a wild horse (1064–68). Cassandra, we will recall, is in a chariot as Clytemnestra speaks.

The chorus picks up this figure when Cassandra is left alone with them: urging her to bear the yoke (ζυγόν) now she is compelled to do so (1071). The proud rider, once conquered, becomes the animal ridden.

But Clytemnestra's metaphor runs deeper. Slavery will impose an unwelcome curb on the reticent girl's future ability to speak. Her present silence will be broken, like a horse's, by training her to the bit. In the watchman's terms, this will be the ox upon her tongue.

The threat of brutal silencing lurks in Clytemnestra's earlier simile of the swallow. The swallow is a migrating bird whose arrival heralds spring, a new beginning, good times.[10] It is not, however, a bird of good omen to all people at all times. Swallows nesting in a general's tent, for instance, are a particularly bad sign.[11] Thus Agamemnon's relationship to Cassandra, Clytemnestra might be suggesting, bodes no good for him. Further, according to Artemidorus, *Oneirocriticon* 157.25H, the swallow signals music and marriage. It is even, the Suda suggests, a slang term for the female genitals. So the bird also symbolizes Clytemnestra's fear of a rival.

Other and more terrible warnings for Clytemnestra and Cassandra lurk in swallow lore. The Pythagoreans declared that the bird should never be received into the house—χελιδόνα ἐν οἰκίᾳ μὴ δέχεσθαι; this is advice both Agamemnon and Clytemnestra ignore to their cost.[12] Above all, there is the tale of Philomela, metamorphosed into a swallow after her rape and mutilation by Tereus, king of Thrace, and hideously avenged by her sister Procne.[13] No myth offers a more grisly mirror for the criminal house of Atreus, as the chorus in the *Agamemnon* seems to recognize.

Fundamental to the myth of the Thracian swallow is the shearing off of Philomela's tongue by her assailant. She is left no verbal means of communicating to others what has happened to her. So she weaves her story into a tapestry to let her sister Procne know what has happened. The skill of her hands restores the power to communicate that has been torn from her mouth. Procne exacts a savage vengeance on Tereus: killing, and serving to him as food, their son Itys. Finally, Philomela is transformed into a bird that cannot sing but can utter only a barbaric twittering (Apollodorus 3.14).

Philomela, we should add, was the daughter, in most Greek tradi-

[10] Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 770, Theophrastus, *Enquiry into Plants* 7.151; Pliny *NH* 2.47; Ovid *Fasti* 2.853, Columella *RR* 11.2.

[11] Aelian 10.34; Plut. *Anthony* 994A. On Greek swallow lore in general, see D'Arcy Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (London and Oxford 1936) 314-25.

[12] Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 119.4; cf. Aristotle 1512b9, fr. 192.

[13] See F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso Metamorphosen*, vol. 3 (Buch VI-VII) (Heidelberg 1976) 115-19, and the sources cited there.

tions, of Zeuxippe, whose name means "yoker of horses." So when Clytemnestra compares the prophetic Cassandra standing in her chariot to a barbarian swallow, there is a threat in the analogy. Cassandra is a swallow who cannot speak properly and whose tongue will be trained to the curb. The Athenian audience would surely not miss her allusion, for the story of Philomela is a very Athenian one. Her father was Pandion, king of Athens. The swallow myth links the house and deeds of Atreus to the fate of Athenian princesses in a foreign land. Aeschylus himself makes the point explicitly in 1140–45: the chorus, bewildered at Cassandra's sense of impending doom in the house, compares her to the nightingale lamenting the death of her son Itys (1140–45).

Cassandra does not miss the allusion, this time to Philomela's sister Procne. Procne is metamorphosed into a nightingale. But Cassandra rejects the identification with Procne: "ἐμοὶ δὲ μίμνει σχισμὸς ἀμφήκει δορί: for me there remains the cutting by the tearing weapon's edge" (1149). If she is a daughter of Pandion, she is the mutilated Philomela, who, deprived of her tongue, cannot communicate in words but twitters like a barbarian swallow.

The configuration of characters in the Atreid myth differs from that in the story of Philomela, Procne, and Tereus. Cassandra is the barbarian brought to Greek "civilization," and the enemy who threatens her speech and her life is not a man, but a woman. The conquering Agamemnon, even Apollo himself, may be her Tereus, but she has no Procne as an ally, no art of weaving to help her, no possibility of making her danger understood. The weaver of tapestries here is Clytemnestra.[14]

Aeschylus' watchman and his Cassandra, not to mention the myth of Procne and Philomela, are reminders that fear does not suppress communication. Rather, it limits and redefines communication. The watchman's last word, λήθομαι, tells us that those who do not understand will miss the point; it also tells us that the speaker will give them the slip. Blunt speech gives way to oblique speech in situations where the speaker is (or feels) threatened or unsure of his audience. Many ancient poets, and all ancient rhetorical theorists, lived when overt criticism of the ruling powers was dangerous. They sensed the need for obliqueness. But they also sensed the greater persuasiveness of oblique suggestion.

[14]The swan, not the swallow, is the bird with whom one would normally associate a prophet. Clytemnestra (herself a swan-child) recognizes this (and a rival songbird) when she compares Cassandra's final prophetic lyricism to the song of the dying swan (*Agamemnon* 1444–46); see F. M. Ahl, "Amber, Avallon, and Apollo's Singing Swan," *AJP* 103 (1982) 373–411, especially 383–89.

Demetrius' Two Conditions for Figured Speech

Let us examine the conditions under which Demetrius says "figured speech" is used:

1. It is used when it would violate good taste not to proceed indirectly.

This is the condition we are most familiar with in the English-speaking world, where, for most of the last two centuries, overt sexual statement was considered in poor taste and was suppressed by censorship. The impact on English language novels, theater, and films was immense. George Bernard Shaw complained in the preface to *Man and Superman* of the predicament of drama in his day, "forced to deal almost exclusively with cases of sexual attraction, and yet forbidden to exhibit the incidents of that attraction or even to discuss its nature."[15] Some attempts were made to suppress even sexual innuendo. Hence a memo sent out in Hollywood by RKO studios with a list of words deemed "unacceptable by censors in certain states."[16] The obvious four-letter words are missing; it is assumed the unprintable is also unspeakable. Included in the proscribed list were such words as "nursery" and "virtuous." In short, some minimal skill in figured speech and latent meaning is needed to detect what they found so upsetting about such words. But for all this, Mae West sang, "I love a man who takes his time," and her apocryphal "come up and see me sometime" made mockery of every attempt at censorship. It was impossible to find a way of exposing such "figured speech" without making oneself look dirty-minded. The critic

[15] G. B. Shaw, *Collected Plays with their Prefaces* (London 1971) vol. 1, p. 495. Since, for some time in Victorian England, even the word "theater" was suggestive of decadence and immorality, German Reed called his theater a "Gallery of Illustration" and his plays "Illustrations." At the Gallery, some of W. S. Gilbert's first dramatic works were performed; the famous "portrait gallery" scene at the opening of the second act of *Ruddigore* almost certainly derives from Gilbert's work at the Gallery, where he once produced a short play about pictures coming to life, *Ages Ago*. See *Gilbert before Sullivan: Six Comic Plays by W. S. Gilbert*, ed. J. Stedman (London 1967) 1–11, especially p. 5. Among German Reed's other euphemisms were "parts" (i.e., acts), "assumptions" (i.e., roles), and "gathering" (i.e., audience). Even in his last operas, Gilbert was aware of the dangers of shocking "that worthy gentleman, the Licenser of Plays" (*The Grand Duke*, Act II; see *The First Night Gilbert and Sullivan*, ed. R. Allen [London 1975] 440).

[16] See K. Macgowan, *Behind the Screen* (New York 1965) 358; cf. his discussion of film censorship in general (347–72); cf. G. Phelps, *Film Censorship* (London 1975) *passim*, and especially 7–13. Phelps shows how rife political and moral censorship continues to be in the treatment of film in Britain and the United States.

who explicated her meaning could have had the charge of foulness thrown back upon him. The obscene suggestion was latent, not overt.

Critics were often well aware of the possibilities of figured speech.[17] The result was a sort of dance between writer and censor which yielded some fine works of drama. Now that this kind of censorship has, however temporarily, eased in several countries, critics often mistake for prudery the attempts made by writers and directors of the past to get around the rules of censorship. W. S. Gilbert, Victorian England's master satirist, is, sadly, all too often represented as the epitome of the views he ridiculed. It is important to bear this problem in mind when we come to Demetrius' second condition in which figured speech is employed:

> 2. When it is not safe to speak directly.

As English-speaking literary critics sometimes forget how strong the forces of "moral" censorship were during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so they sometimes forget the everyday realities of writing under the political tyrannies which have been so much a part of twentieth century life. Such situations, Demetrius well knew, called for "figured speech," for emphasis of the ancient kind (*On Style* 289):

> πολλάκις δὲ ἢ πρὸς τύραννον ἢ ἄλλως βίαιόν τινα διαλεγόμενοι καὶ ὀνειδίσαι ὁρμῶντες χρήζομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος λόγου.
>
> Often when what we say is directed toward a tyrant or someone who is violent in some other way, and when we want to censure him, we are compelled to use figured speech.

This dilemma and its literary results in modern times have been more often and widely encountered in central and eastern Europe than in English-speaking countries. The best description I know is that of Czeslaw Milosz in *The Captive Mind*.[18]

Although, as Demetrius points out, figured speech may be just as

[17] The writer accused of outraging taste can reply, as W. S. Gilbert did when someone suggested that the "Ruddy" in the original spelling of *Ruddygore* was a thin disguise for the euphemism of the already euphemistic "bloody"; "Then I suppose you'll take it that if I say 'I admire your ruddy countenance,' I mean 'I like your bloody cheek.'" See L. Baily, *Gilbert and Sullivan, Their Lives and Times* (Harmondsworth 1979) 90.

[18] C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (New York 1953) esp. 24-50, discussing the difficulties in the West of understanding the dilemma of writers under political and ideological pressure; cf. Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Ill. 1952) and his *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, Ill. 1959).

necessary in a democracy as in a tyranny—when popular leaders like Cleon (whom Diodotus opposed) and Cleophon are in power (*On Style* 294)—it is most to be expected of a speaker trained in rhetoric during times of tyrannous rule. A man has three alternatives (*On Style* 294):

> τὸ μὲν οὖν κολακεύειν αἰσχρόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιτιμᾶν ἐπισφαλές, ἄριστον δὲ τὸ μεταξύ, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον.
>
> Flattery is shameful. Direct criticism is risky. The best course is the middle course: figured speech.

Figured speech (*schema, eschematismenos logos*) is, then, criticism from which the speaker or writer himself stands back. He is safe because the critical links in thought must be established by his reader or listener: the text is incomplete until the audience completes the meaning. Quintilian reiterates this point (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.65):

> huic vel confinis vel eadem est, qua nunc utimur plurimum. iam ad id genus, quod et frequentissimum est et exspectari maxime credo, veniendum est, in quo per quandam suspicionem quod non dicimus accipi volumus, non utique contrarium, ut in εἰρωνείᾳ, sed aliud latens et auditori quasi inveniendum.
>
> Bordering on—if not actually identical with—this figure [i.e., *emphasis*] is one which we use a great deal nowadays. For now I must come to that kind of figure which is both extremely frequent in occurrence and particularly eagerly awaited. In it we want something other than what we actually say to be understood by exciting some suspicion to that effect. It is not the opposite of what we say, as in irony, but something which lurks there for the reader to discover.

We should particularly note Quintilian's observations on: (1) the *frequency* of this figured speech; (2) its similarity to *emphasis*; and (3) the eagerness with which it is awaited, whether by a speaker's audience or by Quintilian's own readers is not entirely clear—probably both.

Quintilian's Three

We do not know who first applied the term *schema*, which means something like "speech by indirection," to figured speech. Largely because Aristotle does not do so in his *Rhetoric* and because there is no restrictive use of *schema* as a rhetorical term in Plato either, some have thought the term post-classical, by which, presumably, they mean post-

Aristotelian.[19] Certainly Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor at the Lyceum, used *schema* as a rhetorical term, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus shows in *Isocrates* 3 (=Theophrastus fr. 5 Schmidt). And Theophrastus died in 287 B.C. at over 80 years of age. But the person with whom rhetorical *schema* is most clearly associated is the notorious, acerbic rhetorician and critic of Homer and Plato, Zoilus, a contemporary of Aristotle's, about whom Quintilian observes (*Inst. Or.* 9.1.14):

> verum id ipsum anguste Zoilus terminavit qui id solum putaverit schema, quo aliud simulatur dici quam dicitur, quod sane vulgo quoque sic accipi scio; unde et figuratae controversiae quaedam de quibus post paulo dicam, vocantur.
>
> Zoilus was the one who gave the term [*schema*, figured speech] its narrow definition. For he considered as *schema* only those instances in which what is said is different from what appears to be said. I know this is, in fact, the popular way of taking it. That is why Rhetorical Exercises in Figured Speech, which I will discuss shortly, are called what they are called.[20]

A rhetorician of the fifth or sixth century A.D. preserves Zoilus' definition, which Quintilian appears to have translated: ὁρίζεται δὲ Ζώϊλος οὕτως, σχῆμά ἐστιν ἕτερον μὲν προσποιεῖσθαι, ἕτερον δὲ λέγειν—"*schema* is pretending to say one thing and actually saying something else."[21] Such a tight definition seems unlikely to have come forth unless

[19] *Schema* and *schematizo* are used in a context suggestive of rhetoric: Plato, *Gorgias* 474D, 511A and D; see T. Irwin in *Plato, Gorgias* (Oxford 1979) 231-32: "'dressed up' [*eschematismene*]; or 'putting on airs.' The reference to dress may recall the 'impersonating' or 'dressing up' mentioned in 464C (and cf. 465B). The use of the same term for an elaborate, figurative rhetorical style makes it suitable for the contrast in this passage." We do not, however, see clear-cut use of *schema* as a rhetorical term until Hellenistic times because most surviving rhetorical studies are post-Aristotelian.

[20] Phoebammon, *De Figuris* 1 (in C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 8 [Stuttgart 1835] 487-519 [493]). Phoebammon, we should note, does not agree with Zoilus. On Phoebammon, see W. Stegeman, "Phoibammon," *RE* 20.1, 326-43. On Zoilus, see H. Gärtner, "Zoilos (Homeromastix)", *RE* Suppl. 15, 1531-54. Notorious as a severe critic of Homer, Zoilus achieved further notoriety for writing a history of the universe from the birth of the gods to the death of Philip of Macedon in three books. He was not the sort of person to appreciate unnecessary detail.

[21] On *schema*, Zoilus, and Phoebammon, see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 116, 289-90; H. Schrader, "Σχῆμα und τρόπος in den Homerscholien," *Hermes* 39 (1904) 585; J. Fairweather, *Seneca the Elder* (Cambridge Classical Studies, Cambridge 1981) 170-71; also Vossius, *Inst. Or.* 5.255-66, and the numerous treatises in Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 8.

there was already a convention using *schema* as a rhetorical term. *Schema*, like *emphasis*, has its origins in fifth century rhetorical usage. Zoilus' fame lies in making it a common rhetorical term with a strictly defined meaning which later scholars sought to broaden.

If we accept Grube's date for Demetrius' *On Style* as around 270 B.C., Zoilus' would be the earliest surviving definition of "figured speech." But there is no conclusive evidence; the work might be as late as the first or second century A.D. Still, Demetrius' view of *schema* seems intermediate between Zoilus' and Quintilian's. Demetrius, we recall, tells us figured speech is used under two conditions: (1) when it is not in good taste to speak forthrightly, and (2) when it is not safe to do so. Quintilian offers three situations which produce figured speech (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.66):

> eius triplex usus est: unus si dicere palam parum tutum est, alter si non decet, tertius qui venustatis modo gratia adhibetur et ipsa novitate ac varietate magis quam si relatio sit recta delectat.
>
> It is used under three sets of circumstances: 1. If it is not at all safe to speak forthrightly (*palam*). 2. If it is not in good taste to do so. 3. When it is adopted only for pleasurable effect, and delights the audience by its novelty and variations more than direct expression would.

Demetrius sets first and treats first the matter of good taste. Quintilian sets first and treats first the matter of the speaker's safety. He then adds a third usage Demetrius does not discuss.

Quintilian, of course, is concerned with practical education of Romans in very trying political times (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.67):

> ex his quod est primum frequens in scholis est. nam et pactiones deponentium imperium tyrannorum et post bellum civile senatus consulta finguntur et capitale res est obiicere anteacta, ut, *quod in foro non expedit, illic nec liceat.*
>
> Of these the first is commonly taught in the schools. Subjects like the conditions for tyrants setting down their military and executive power, and decrees made by the senate after a civil war are developed and practiced—and it is a capital offense to accuse people of past actions. *For what is not relevant to the lawcourt is not permitted in the schools.*

Quintilian suggests a rationale for his different arrangement of Demetrius' conditions for using figured speech. The problem is not, first and foremost, one of politeness and decency, but one of survival.

Living and practicing rhetoric as he did in the years following the fall of the Julio-Claudians, the civil wars which brought Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian to the throne in quick succession, then Titus and Domitian, he must have been well acquainted with the need to deal with such topics and with the perils of doing so. In Demetrius, the situation seems less threatening. But this could arise as easily from his Greekness as from a difference in time of writing. Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* and Dio Chrysostom in his *Discourses* both give far less terrifying pictures of Domitian than do their Latin-speaking contemporaries. The young Roman aristocrats who were Quintilian's students had a great deal more to fear from the emperor, not least because, in political terms, he had more to fear from them.

It will, of course be objected, that the tyrants Quintilian mentions are not the Caesars, but *personae* in school exercises: *illos tyrannos*. But such objections rest on two assumptions: first, that it is "unthinkable" that Quintilian could be explaining how to criticize Roman emperors and get away with it; second, that if that is what he meant, he should have come directly to the point and avowed that "you can say what you like against the Caesars . . ." to clear up misunderstanding. Obviously, to make such a statement bluntly would have been political lunacy. Historians and poets who were Quintilian's contemporaries in Flavian Rome bear out with almost unanimous voice the dangers of direct criticism. Naming the Caesars outright would also undercut Quintilian's own point about the need to use *emphasis* and ambiguity. And Quintilian, like most rhetoricians, likes to make the text in which he explains a particular phenomenon an example of its use as well.

Finally, Quintilian makes it clear in the sentence I have italicized that what is taught in the schools should apply to everyday public dealings. If one is to be taught how to deal with "those tyrants" in school, they must have their counterparts in the "real" world. While Quintilian himself complains of the irrelevance of what often goes on in the schools to anything in real life and concedes he is fighting a losing battle, he surely sees his own *Training of the Orator* as part of the battle against irrelevance, not another demonstration of it.

As the realities of tyrannical rule are (fortunately) remoter from us, so too are the techniques of self-expression needed under such circumstances. There is no better illustration of this than G. W. Williams' observation that the most interesting of Quintilian's three conditions for the use of figured speech is the last—when it is, essentially, purely orna-

mental.[22] It is hard to contest Williams' adjective "interesting," since he is, presumably, passing personal judgment on the matter. But we must bear in mind that it is, of all the categories, least important to ancient authors. Zoilus and Demetrius do not mention it at all, and Quintilian puts it in the last position.

Let us consider, briefly, what Quintilian says about this final category of figured speech before examining what ancient writers considered the more important categories. In 9.1.13, Quintilian offers a broad definition of figured speech as "that which is poetically or oratorically altered from the simple and obvious manner of speaking: *quod a simplici atque in promptu posito dicendi modo poetice vel oratorie mutatum.*" In fact, a little earlier, Quintilian suggests that *schema* may be "any deliberate modification of colloquial or simple format in either one's meaning or one's speech: *in sensu vel sermone aliqua a vulgari et simplici specie cum ratione mutatio*" (*Inst. Or.* 9.1.11).

This broader definition is, of course, today's popular, one might even say exclusive, concept of figured speech: something intrinsically simple, expressed in a complex and florid manner. To reduce it to its "proper" simplicity, all you have to do is strip away the adornment. Since this is also a popular way of reading Roman imperial poetry nowadays, and one adopted by Williams himself, it is not surprising he laments that Quintilian gives it such scant attention.

Today's popular notion of figured speech was not, however, the popular notion in antiquity any more than our notion of what *emphasis* means corresponds to Quintilian's or Demetrius' understanding of it. This should be clear enough from Zoilus' and Demetrius' total omission of Quintilian's third category. Quintilian's remark about Zoilus, cited above, makes it explicit: "He considered as *schema* only those instances in which what is said is different from what appears to be said. I know this is, in fact, the popular way of taking it." Quintilian reaffirms the point in 9.2.65: "*quod, ut supra ostendi, iam fere solum schema a nostris vocatur*—this, as I showed above, is virtually the only case in which the term *schema* is applied by us rhetoricians."

[22] G. W. Williams, *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry* (New Haven 1980) 191: "He [Quintilian] gives the briefest attention to the third (which is the most interesting) because he is always thinking in terms of a speaker and an audience, sometimes in a real court, but usually in a declamation-school." Most poets also recited their works to audiences. Quintilian's third category is the only category Williams discusses.

Essential to Zoilus' definition, to Quintilian's first two conditions for figured speech, and to everything Demetrius says on the subject is the idea that in figured speech the speaker wishes us to understand something beyond, or something different from, what the superficial meaning of his words suggests. Most important, if this was the popular notion of figured speech, we may be sure the speaker's audience was as ready to detect and decipher such allusions as the speaker was to provide them.

There is, then, a profound contrast between the educated audiences of Greek and Roman times and modern audiences. The ancients were trained in the same rhetorical thinking that Demetrius, Quintilian, and many others expound. We are steeped in the values of post-Romantic criticism and almost ritually denounce rhetoric and rhetorical literature. As a result, the Classical scholar will usually presume the exact opposite of what would be presumed by Quintilian's educated contemporaries, just as he will on hearing the word "emphasis." For us an ancient writer employing figured speech is saying something simple in an elaborate way, not expressing the complexity of reality by complexity of language.

The result of this difference of perspectives has been, and continues to be, a radical misunderstanding of ancient authors who use figured speech extensively. Chief among the victims are authors of Quintilian's own day when the need for *schema*—in the sense that he, Zoilus, and Demetrius use the term—was high. There is to date no major study of any of Quintilian's many poetic contemporaries which even allows for the possibility that Zoilus' *schema* is at work, much less interprets their work in terms of such figured speech.

Bluntness and Openness

If we now return to Quintilian's first condition under which figured speech is used, we note a distinction between the use of figured speech in dealing directly with a tyrant and figured speech as used in the lawcourt. Of the two Quintilian considers the latter more dangerous than the former. In only two sentences he explains how you speak against a tyrant. But it takes him several pages to discuss how figured speech is employed in court. Given the almost universal preconception among classicists that it is "unthinkable" that speakers or writers would attack an emperor like Domitian without immediate and severe risk, we

should find this difference surprising. And I suspect Quintilian intended to surprise his reader (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.67):


> quamlibet enim *apertum*, quod modo et aliter intelligi possit, in illos tyrannos bene dixeris, quia periculum tantum, non etiam offensa vitatur. Quod si ambiguitate sententiae possit eludi, nemo non illi furto favet.
>
> You can speak well and make open statement against the tyrants we were discussing, provided the statement can be understood in another way. It is only danger you are trying to avoid, not giving offense. If you can slip by through ambiguity of expression, there's no one who won't enjoy your verbal burglary.[23]

The words are carefully chosen. Contrast his statement that figured speech is used when speaking directly is not very safe (*si dicere* palam *parum tutum est* [9.2.55]) with his observation here that you can speak as openly as you wish (*quamlibet enim* apertum) against the tyrants. This suggests a difference between speaking directly (palam *dicere*) and speaking openly (aperte *dicere*)—a difference that has slipped by us in recent years. To say something that is *apertum* is to say it so that its meaning is, like a book, open, but inactive until the reader, the audience, spots it. To say something *palam* is to proclaim it unmistakably, to speak bluntly. What is spoken *palam* by the plain speaker is stated *aperte* in figured speech.

Quintilian also tells us that the criticism does *not* have to elude the tyrant himself. It does not matter if you offend him. You just make sure that you keep him from doing you any harm. Most important of all, we note the presumption that the audience will be sympathetic to the speaker who attacks the tyrant in this way.

Such attacks on tyrants, Quintilian hints, lie outside the realm of genuine daily business. They can be treated cursorily and simply because the situation can be carefully controlled by the writer or speaker. Only two audiences must be taken into account: the tyrant who is being attacked and everyone else. Of these the latter will be well disposed to the writer or speaker. Modern critics of Latin literature also suppose a double audience, but that is where the similarity ends. Quintilian assumes the audience will delight in criticism of the tyrant and that the tyrant might be offended. Modern criticism supposes the tyrant would

[23] For further discussion of this passage and its consequences for the interpretation of Roman poetry, see F. M. Ahl, *Lucan: An Introduction* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 39, Ithaca 1976) 17–61.



be delighted and that everyone else would endure the flattery of their leader with patience.

In summing up the use of figured speech in attacks on tyrants, Quintilian refers to it as *silentium*, silence—a word we often see in descriptions of the climate for writing and speaking in Domitian's reign. Silence is an appropriate term for this communication in which what is meant is not said, but is left for the listener to discover.

The *vera negotia*, the "real business," of the courts have not yet experienced "this need for silence" (*hanc silenti necessitatem* [9.2.68]), even though Quintilian feels the man engaged in such business is in the greatest danger. There is, I suspect, no little *schema* in this statement itself. The real business of the courts contrasts with what would have been the aristocratic view of poetry: something less than real, the occupation of leisure time (*otium*), not the stuff of an active life in business which, to a Roman, is the denial of leisure (*negotium*). Despite the greater danger, then, the man in public life has not been silenced in quite the way the poet has.

The orator may have to censure *personae potentes*, "powerful [living] personages" (9.2.68), to make his case, even though this is not his direct or desired goal. He has a triple audience: the judge, his opponent, and external powerful people who may be offended. No part of this audience is necessarily well disposed to him. Someone in public life, like Tacitus or Pliny, was in constant and complex danger. He might offend inadvertently and unambiguously. Poetic contemporaries, such as Martial and Statius, ran a lesser risk. They could write *aperte* if not *palam*, and they could take their audience's sympathy for granted, tweaking imperial noses as much as they liked so long as what they said could be taken in another way. Their work did not have to have the specific focus of the orator's.

What Quintilian recommends for the orator in such dangerous circumstances is the same technique Demetrius says is the force of Plato's art, the essence of his *deinotes*, in the *Phaedo* (*On Style* 287): letting the facts speak for themselves (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.71–72):

> res ipsae perducant iudicem ad suspicionem, et amoliamur cetera ut hoc solum supersit; in quo multum etiam adfectus iuvant et interrupta silentio dictio et cunctationes. sic enim fiet ut iudex quaerat illud nescio quid ipse quod fortasse non crederet si audiret et ei quod a se inventum existimat credat . . . in summa, *sic maxime iudex credit figuris si nos putat nolle dicere.*

> The facts themselves should lead the judge to suspect. Our job is to remove everything else so that only this conclusion remains. Use of the emotions helps a lot. It's good to break the flow of your speech with silence, to hesitate. Then you may be sure the judge will search out that certain something which he probably would not believe if he heard it actually stated. You may be sure he will believe what he thinks he himself has discovered . . . In sum: *the judge is most likely to believe what is figured in our speech if he thinks we are unwilling to say it.*

The depth of the illusion must be greater in the courts than in a more academic, declamatory situation. Demetrius reinforces Quintilian (*On Style* 291):

> Πολλαχῆ μέντοι καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν, οἷς ἐοικέναι εἴ τις ἐθέλοι καὶ ψόγους εἰκαιοψόγους εἶναι θέλοι τις, παράδειγμα τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχίνου ἐπὶ τοῦ Τηλαυγοῦς, πᾶσα γὰρ σχεδὸν ἡ περὶ τὸν Τηλαυγῆ διήγησις ἀπορίαν παρέχοι, εἴτε θαυμασμὸς εἴτε χλευασμός ἐστι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἀμφίβολον, καίτοι εἰρωνεία οὐκ ὄν, ἔχει τινὰ ὅμως καὶ εἰρωνείας ἔμφασιν.
>
> Often words say opposing things simultaneously. If anyone wants to deal in these and offer censure which does not appear to be censure, the obvious example is what Aeschines has to say about Telauges. For the entire treatment of Telauges leaves one confused as to whether it is praise or mockery. This double-edged approach, though it is not irony, has something of irony lurking in it.

Again we find *emphasis*, this time rendered "something . . . lurking." The master of figured speech implants the meaning and often deliberately leaves the impression that he does not want us to understand what is implied. In figured speech the censure must seem unintentional.

Our error, when we read a Greek or Roman writer, trained in rhetoric, is to assume such criticism really is unintentional, that the writer has lost control of his meaning. We go one step further than Quintilian's judge: we assume the speaker does not intend to say what his words appear to say; the effect must be caused by the writer's oversight rather than his intent. This denies the rhetorician his skill, finds him guilty of violating what Quintilian calls the first virtue of oratory: avoiding a mistake, *primaque virtus est vitio carere* (*Inst. Or.* 8.3.41).

The writer of the *Art of Rhetoric*, attributed wrongly to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, underscores our problem (*Ars Rhetorica* 9.1 [321–233]):

> τολμῶσί τινες λέγειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐσχηματισμένη ἰδέα λόγων, δεῖ γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλέον τὸ καθ' ὑπονόιαν λέγειν.

εἰ γὰρ συνίησιν ὁ ἀκούων, ἐξ ἴσου καθέστηκεν τῷ φανερῶς ἀκούοντι, εἰ μὴ συνίησι, πλέον οὐδὲν τῷ λέγοντι. ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι ἐσχηματισμένους λόγους ὥστε τοὐναντίον οὐδεὶς λόγος ἀσχημάτιστος οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦς λόγος οὐδείς.[24]

Some people dare to say there is no such figured concept of speech: one must either speak simply or not at all. For communicating by suggestive subcurrents achieves nothing extra. Either the listener understands, in which case he is on a par with someone who has heard it spoken clearly, or he does not understand, in which case there is no additional advantage to the speaker. I on the contrary maintain that the person who denies that figured speech exists is very far indeed from being correct in what he says. For there is no such thing as speech that is not figured. There is no such thing as simple speech.

Quintilian and most ancient rhetoricians before the fourth century A.D. would have agreed with the writer in general principle, though they would maintain some sort of distinction, as Quintilian does (*Inst. Or.* 9.1.7–14), between figured and nonfigured speech. Many classicists incline toward the opposite view. We incline to believe Plato's Socrates when he contrasts his simple truthfulness with the clever twists and turns of phrase his accusers employ, instead of perceiving that he is adopting a rhetorical posture calculated to appeal to those who believe that what is simple is true.

The Suspension of Belief

If art is the simultaneous representation and concealment of something, we may be tricked into assuming that the most careful art is, in fact, artless. The more perfectly concealed the seams and joints, the more perfect the illusion of artlessness.

It is this illusion of artlessness, Quintilian suggests, that the orator using figured speech should try hardest to achieve. Figured speech should never be obvious (*ne sint manifestae*), it should not rely on ambiguous words and double entendres (*verbis dubiis et quasi duplicibus*), and it should not depend on syntactical ambiguity (*compositis ambiguis*); above all, such usages should not occur too often (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.69–70). If the effect is overdone, the figured speech lies open to de-

[24] On the authorship of the *Ars Rhetorica*, see *Dionysius Halicarnaseus Quae Exstant*, ed. H. Usener and L. Rademacher (Stuttgart 1965) vol. 6 *Opuscula* 2, p. 252.

tection rather than the meaning lurking beneath it: *densitate ipsa figurae* aperi*untur* (9.2.72). Once the art is detected, the effect is lost. The technique is spoiled once the audience is conscious that it is being manipulated by technique.

Ancient rhetoricians, in short, begin with a very different presumption about the speaker or writer and his audience than that which has been common since the Romantic era. They suppose in an audience the desire to believe; we suppose a tendency to disbelieve. The ancient rhetorician would probably have been amused by our concern for the intellectual skeptic who must be induced to suspend disbelief. Aristotle points out that proverbial wisdom is so successful in speeches because of the audience's lack of sophistication (φορτικότης) (*Rhetoric* 1395B):

> χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν.
>
> They love it when someone happens to proclaim the universal validity of ideas which they themselves hold in individual instances.

We are, perhaps, too sensitive to the possible presence of the intelligentsia in an audience. Aristotle declares that rhetoric does not concern itself with the occasional Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems correct of the group as a whole (*Rhetoric* 1395B).

The Emperor's New Fish

The success of the romantic notion of suspending disbelief would be no mystery to an ancient critic: it flatters us as members of the audience. We like to consider ourselves intelligent and critical rather than gullible. The flattering view we take of ourselves (Plutarch *Moralia* 48F–49A calls it *philautia*) enables the flatterer to move us as he wishes. This is precisely Juvenal's point in the fourth satire when he explains how the emperor Domitian was taken in by a fisherman who claimed the huge fish he had recently landed wanted to be caught so it could honor the emperor's table (*Satires* 4 69–71):

> ipse capi voluit. quid *apertius*? et tamen illi
> surgebant cristae. nihil est quod credere de se
> non possit, cum laudatur dis aequa potestas.
>
> "The fish itself wanted to be caught." What could be *more open* than this? But the emperor's coxcomb rose. There is nothing power equal to the gods cannot believe about itself when praised.

It is not only the ordinary people who wish to be taken. So does this emperor. In fact, the greater the power of the individual, the greater his gullibility, his susceptibility to flattery. People are unlikely to disbelieve someone who tells them what they want to believe, no matter how absurd what they want to believe may be. Hence Juvenal's use of the expression *quid apertius?* What could be more open? The fisherman is not speaking directly (*palam*), but he is speaking *aperte*, as the listener is expected to gather. The illusion that the fish wanted to be caught so it could be eaten becomes the bait by which the fisherman hooks his emperor.

Flatterers maneuver their ruler much as Aristotle's orator would maneuver the people in the assembly—so they can use him for their own purposes. The goal of persuasion is, after all, to secure obedience to one's will. The master persuader wields immense power. The fact that *only* the emperor is persuaded that the fish wants to be caught makes the ploy doubly effective: Domitian looks like an idiot for believing the fisherman, who has now landed two absurdly large fish in one day. The fact that we are not persuaded by the absurd statement does not diminish its persuasiveness. It persuades the person it is designed to persuade. And that fulfills Aristotle's requirement for what is persuasive: τὸ πιθανόν τινὶ πιθανόν (*Rhetoric* 1365B); it is persuasive because it persuades someone.

We do not have to assume that the "flattery" must seem sincere to everyone in the imperial council. Crispinus and other officials present when the fisherman spoke surely knew that fish do not want to be caught.[25] But they would not have dared rebuke the fisherman any more than Hans Andersen's courtiers dared tell their emperor that his "new clothes" were really not there at all. To take the fisherman to task for his mocking flattery which so delighted Domitian would be to endanger one's own life, not his. A peasant is more likely than a courtier to admit the truth to either Andersen's or Juvenal's emperor.

Domitian's weakness was, Juvenal suggests, his belief in his own godhood, his desire to be both god and master of the Roman world. Most Romans, certainly the intelligentsia, were well aware Domitian was not a god. Even Domitian's father, the emperor Vespasian, had jested on his deathbed: "Alas, I think I am becoming a god" (*heu puto deus fio* [Suetonius, *Vespasian* 23]). To talk extravagantly of the emper-

[25] American readers, however, may be familiar with a very successful television commercial which depicts a fish wanting to be caught.

or's divinity is not simply to flatter, but to control by flattery and, simultaneously, to mock before those who know better, his divine pretensions. Flattery is a kind of aggression; he who succumbs to it, Cicero suggests, is succumbing to mockery (*De Amicitia* 99):

> *aperte* enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est . . . quid autem turpius est illudi?
>
> There is no one who does not see *open* adulation, except for the man who is entirely out of touch with reality. So one must take very studious care that this shrewd and hidden flatterer does not snake his way into us. For what is more disgraceful than to be mocked?

Domitian, in Juvenal 4, is the one who does not see what is open to others. He does not detect the *aperte . . . adulantem.* Not only is he shamed by being mocked and fooled, but he is also allowing his power to be assumed by others because of his susceptibility to flattery. Seneca observes cynically of the aggressive flatterer (*Natural Questions* 4a, preface 9):

> quo *apertior* est adulatio, quo improbior, quo magis frontem suam perfricuit, cecidit alienam, hoc citius expugnat.
>
> The more *open* flattery is, the more outrageous, the straighter it keeps its own face while leaving others crestfallen and shocked, the more quickly it takes its victim by storm.

We see here a glimpse of why Seneca wrote the *De Clementia* to Nero as he did and of why Quintilian could make light of the task of criticizing tyrants. The emperor who lays claim to godhood as Domitian did becomes entrapped by his own delusions, his own lies. He cannot take exception to those who give him the divine honors he himself has demanded, even if he knows they are intended as mockery. For the Big Lie demands lip service from its creator as well as his subjects. Hence Quintilian's observation about the effectiveness of figured speech (*Inst. Or.* 9.2.75):

> haeret enim nonnumquam telum illud occultum, et hoc ipso, quod non apparet, eximi non potest; at si idem dicas *palam* et defenditur et probandum est.
>
> Sometimes that hidden weapon hits and sticks and splinterlike cannot be removed because it is not evident to the eye. But if you were to say the same thing directly a defense is available and the issue must be proved.

Quintilian is talking here about figured speech in the courts, rather than in direct attacks on a tyrant. But assuming the emperor is alert to multiple entendres, the superficial flattery is sufficient to protect the speaker from adverse reaction.

In Juvenal's fourth satire, however, the point seems to be that Domitian takes the fisherman's remark at face value even though the poet clearly expects his reader to find it absurd. Juvenal's attitude resembles that of Dio Chrysostom, another survivor of Domitian's reign, who observes (*Discourse* 3.21):

> ὁ δὲ αὖ τὸν ἀνόητον ὡς φρόνιμον ὑμνῶν, οὗτος ἂν τυχὸν ἁπάντων εἴη πιθανώτερος διὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν τοῦ ἀκούοντος.
>
> The person who praises the idiot as if he were a wise man may well be the most persuasive of all because his listener is an idiot.

Dio's third *Discourse*, we should add, is addressed to the emperor Trajan, and praises his wisdom. And Philostratus, in his *Lives of the Sophists* 488, tells us that Trajan is reputed to have said to Dio on several occasions, τί μὲν λέγεις, οὐκ οἶδα, φιλῶ δέ σε ὡς ἐμαυτόν: "I've no idea what you're saying, but I love you as I love myself."

The Limits of Safe Criticism

Of course, there are limits beyond which even the most skillful orator must not step. You do not talk, Demetrius warns, about the Cyclops or even mention the word "eye" in front of Philip II of Macedon, blind in one eye. Similarly, Hermeias, the eunuch ruler of Atarneus "though gentle [πρᾶος] in all other respects, would get angry at the mention of knives, cutting, and excision" (*On Style* 293). Demetrius here tells us what to do and what not to do in the same sentence. We are in trouble with Hermeias if we mention knives and cutting, but safe if we make reference to his gentleness—even though the Greek word for gentle becomes a slighting double entendre when applied to a eunuch. Gentleness is, after all a good quality in a monarch. That insult Hermeias would simply have to endure.

Demetrius finds figured speech absolutely indispensable when communicating with tyrants (*On Style* 293):

> ταῦτα δ' εἴρηκα ἅμφηναι βουλόμενος μάλιστα τὸ ἦθος τὸ δυναστευτικόν, ὡς μάλιστα χρῄζον λόγου ἀσφαλοῦς, ὃς καλεῖται ἐσχηματισμένος.

> I have said this because I want the character of the potentate *to show through* [*emphēnai*] quite clearly, and to make it quite clear that this character demands that we use "safe" discourse: figured speech, as it is called.

Again, *emphasis*. This seems the consensus among writers of the early empire as well as among their successors in the second and third centuries A.D. Indeed, Philostratus, writing well after Domitian's reign, not only reinforces Demetrius' argument, but criticizes those who do not use figured speech. He expresses annoyance with Antiphon (Antiphon the orator, he says, but appears to mean Antiphon the poet) for condemning the tragedies of Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and for declaring in Dionysius' presence that the best bronze came from Athens—for from it they made statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. In consequence of this ill-concealed hint at tyrannicide, Antiphon was put to death. And he was wrong to act as he did, Philostratus says, because tyrants should be encouraged to follow literary careers. Then they will kill less, ἧττον ... ἀποκτενοῦσιν, and may even "cure themselves of their violent disease by the medicine of poetry" (*Lives of the Sophists* 500). Plutarch, we may add, mentions the same story in *Moralia* 68B.

Demetrius also hints at how figured speech may be used to direct tyrants to more noble goals (*On Style* 292). But what appears to be most on the minds of both Demetrius and Philostratus is the pointlessness of direct verbal attacks on the emperors. Philostratus offers the following advice (*Lives of the Sophists* 500):

> ξυμβουλίαν ἐς πάντας ἡγώμεθα τοῦ μὴ ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τὰς τυρρανίδας, μήδε ἐς ὀργὴν ἄγειν ἤθη ὠμά.
>
> Let this be my advice to everyone: not to challenge tyrannical governments, not to incite their raw natures to anger.

There is no mistaking Philostratus' loathing for tyrants and tyranny. Yet he sees no obvious way of getting rid of them and, thus, no purpose in provoking them.

This attitude emerges most clearly in his criticism of Herodes Atticus, the famous millionaire who was also a famous orator. Marcus Aurelius suspected him of treasonable activities with the emperor's son-in-law, Lucius Verus, and brought him to trial at his military base of Sirmium in Pannonia. Herodes, frantic at the recent death of his freedman Alcimedon's daughters, whom he had raised as his own children, was not in full control of himself at the trial, Philostratus says, and be-

gan to attack Aurelius verbally and bluntly (*Lives of the Sophists* 560–61):

> παρελθὼν γὰρ καθίστατο ἐς διαβολὰς τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος οὐδὲ σχηματίσας τὸν λόγον, ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν ἄνδρα γεγυμνασμένον τῆς τοιάσδε ἰδέας μεταχειρίσασθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χολήν, ἀλλ' ἀπηγκωνισμένῃ τῇ γλώττῃ καὶ γυμνῇ διετείνετο...
>
> When he came up he began to attack the emperor. He did not even put his words in figured speech—the appropriate way for a man trained at school in this kind of rhetoric to keep his anger under control. Instead, with contentious and unschooled nakedness of tongue, he stretched himself to the limits....

After such a preamble, we might expect the attacks to be direct and vicious. They are nothing of the kind. All Herodes does is protest the emperor's ingratitude in blaming him for being associated with Lucius when it was, in fact, the emperor himself who told him to look after Lucius. This is enough to make the praetorian prefect suggest he has jeopardized his life. The threat does not move Herodes. He simply comments "an old man fears few things," γέρων ὀλίγα φοβεῖται (*Lives of the Sophists* 561). What saves him is Aurelius' philosophical reaction. The emperor glosses over the "insult" and proceeds with the trial, where, as it turns out, reports of Herodes' honeyed but subversive eloquence subvert Aurelius himself and reduce him to tears.

Philostratus makes a number of points here, quite apart from his witty double entendre with the word *gymnos* meaning both "naked" and "school." The first is that Herodes Atticus can be threatened with immediate execution for a relatively mild expression of bad temper and grief at Marcus Aurelius, reputedly the most saintly emperor. The second is one we often find in Roman imperial writers: that the old and those determined to die have no fear of the tyrant. Statius comments of Aletes' open criticism of Eteocles in *Thebaid* 3.216–17:

> unde ea libertas? iuxta illi finis et aetas
> tota retro...
>
> Where did his freedom come from? His end was near,
> his life was all behind him.

But surely Philostratus' most important point is that, although Herodes finally gets away with his criticism, the effect of it is lost because it is the emperor who looks good (and philosophical) for pardoning his blundering "insult," not Herodes for making it. The situation called for figured speech. Herodes was trained in it. He should have used it.

Philostratus' attitude to open opposition, then, differs greatly from that which post-Romantic Western European or American morality seems to dictate: namely, speak your mind and chance the consequences. To Philostratus this is simple foolishness. It throws away life without any real gain or, worse still, gives the tyrant an immediate chance to prove you wrong simply by sparing you. Hence Caesar's notorious *clementia*. Rhetorical theorists wanted to train students not in how to achieve martyrdom, which requires no special education, but in how to deal successfully with the powerful and even shape and direct their power.

Figured speech provided a convenient answer to the obstacles created by the imperial autocracy, at least insofar as communicating ideas goes. Writers, like Aeschylus' nightwatchman, communicated with those in the know and contented themselves with giving the slip to those who were not. One may get some idea of how much this approach was in vogue from the following example mentioned by Philostratus. He is describing the reaction of a second century A.D. sophist named Polemo, who was accused by his detractors of not having enough skill to pull off figured speech. Polemo responded to his critics by quoting *Iliad* 9.312–13:

> ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀίδαο πύλῃσιν,
> ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.
>
> Hateful to me as the gates of Death is the man who hides one thing in his mind and says something different.

Philostratus comments immediately after the quotation: "Perhaps he [Polemo] was being enigmatic when he said this," ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσως ἔλεγεν αἰνιττόμενος (*Lives of the Sophists* 542). His uncertainty tells us how prepared a rhetorician was to allow for figured speech even when he could not detect it for certain himself, and when the speaker concerned appears to be denying outright that he is using it.

The context of Polemo's quotation shows Philostratus' caution is not misplaced. The speaker is Achilles, rejecting Agamemnon's conciliatory embassy. The remark, most obviously, pertains to Agamemnon's two-facedness. But Agamemnon's ambassador here is Odysseus, a man notorious for duplicity. Superficially, Agamemnon is being slandered, but so too, by innuendo, is Odysseus. We should add that Achilles himself is not being altogether candid and direct in his reply, despite what he says. So Polemo's apparent condemnation of figured speech is, in fact, an *emphatic* (in the ancient sense) refutation of those who say he is

not skillful enough to use it. It is an example, like Cassandra's in the *Agamemnon*, of silence as *emphasis*.

The edge between genuineness and falseness is so slight that Plutarch distinguishes between a friend and a flatterer by saying that the former will observe: "εἰ δύναμαι γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστί—I'll do it if I can and if it's possible"; a flatterer says: "αὔδα ὅ τι φρονεῖς—speak your mind" (*Moralia* 62E). Yet these phrases occur in adjacent lines, but in reverse order, in three Homeric locations. Calypso says them to Hermes (*Od.* 5.89-90); Hephaestus says them to Thetis, who wants him to make armor for Achilles (*Il.* 18.426-27); Aphrodite says them to Hera, who wants to borrow Aphrodite's beauty to deceive Zeus (*Il.* 14.195-96). In each case the flattery precedes the "friendly" remark.

Figured speech, I suggest, was the normal mode of discourse throughout much of Greek and Roman antiquity. Indeed, in the two treatises on figured speech included among the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the most frequently cited exemplar of figured speech is Homer himself. Dionysius hails Homer in *On Literary Composition* 16 as the most "many-voiced" of all the poets: πολυφωνότατος ἁπάντων τῶν ποιητῶν. So powerful was the use of figured speech considered by ancient rhetoricians that it was thought central to the forceful style of oratory, *deinotes*. Hence the charge against Socrates that he was δεινὸς λέγειν suggested to rhetoricians that he was master of all the techniques of *deinotes*. And it surely underlies St. Paul's boast that he is "all things to all men."[26]

During the Roman Empire, the techniques of figured speech and *deinotes* became the most prudent mode of expression. If we were to read Greek and Roman literature of imperial times in terms of the techniques according to which it was composed, we would have a much better understanding—and higher opinion—of it. For our mode of criticism allows only two kinds of speech: "direct criticism" and "flattery." It excludes altogether that intermediate stage of figured speech which Demetrius discusses. This has enabled us to discard huge amounts of Latin and Greek literature as second-rate before even reading it. The logic runs as follows:

1. It is "unthinkable" to criticize the emperor. Roman poets are "right-thinking" and "sincere"; Roman emperors are either "good," like Augustus, or "bad," like Nero and Domitian.

[26] I Corinthians 9:19-22.

2. No right-thinking person would criticize a "good" emperor, and no one who valued his life would criticize a "bad" emperor.

3. Flattery of the emperors is therefore sincere. Those writers who flatter "good" emperors show their "good" taste, those who flatter "bad" emperors their perverse taste.

The only post-Augustan writers this criticism can countenance are those who waited until the bad emperors were dead, then attacked them. Aristotle, quoting Glaucon, condemns such criticism in *Poetics* 1461b:

> ἔνια ἀλόγως προὐπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται, καὶ ὡς εἰρηκότος ὅ τι δοκεῖ ἐπιτιμῶσιν, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει.
>
> [Critics] make certain groundless assumptions; then they vote to condemn what they have assumed to be there; then they base their arguments on the conclusions they have drawn, and condemn the writer as if he has actually said what they are attributing to him whenever it conflicts with their own presuppositions.[27]

In ancient Rome, as surely as in our own times, there have been those who defied the tyrants, both overtly and covertly, in word and deed. Such behavior is not "unthinkable." On the contrary, it has many names. To those who disapprove, for example, it may be foolhardiness; to those who approve, it is courage.

Roman Literature in Roman Terms

Let us take just one instance of the distortion caused by this failure to understand that "flattery" of the emperor is not necessarily either flattering or sincere. In *Silvae* 3.4, Statius tells of the dedication to Asclepius by the imperial favorite Earinus of the clippings from his hair.[27] The young man would have been fully bearded, the poet tells us, had he not been castrated and sent to the emperor Domitian as a eunuch. For Domitian had not yet forbidden the castration of young boys. His clemency, the poet declares, had not yet begun. The relationship of Domi-

[27] For more on this problem see two other articles of mine: "Lucan and Statius," in *Ancient Writers*, ed. J. Luce (New York 1982) 917–41, esp. 925 ff., and "From Horace to Statius: Poetry and Power in the Early Empire," *ANRW* 32.2 (forthcoming).

tian to Earinus is compared to that of Jupiter and Ganymede, the empress Domitia's role to that of Juno.

Reaction among modern critics has been strongly negative. David Vessey says the poem produces an effect "hardly less than emetic upon a modern reader."[28] H. E. Butler goes farther: it is "one of the most disgusting productions in the whole range of literature."[29] Vessey sees quite clearly what the text implies, but argues, "Statius does not want any unfortunate conclusions to be drawn from too close an interpretation"; Butler declares, "the emperor who can accept flattery of such a kind has certainly qualified for assassination."[30] There is no disputing the effect Statius' poem creates in the reader. But since the supposition of almost all critics of Flavian literature is that Statius could not possibly be criticizing Domitian—that would be "unthinkable"—the effect must be explained as having occurred unintentionally, even against the wishes of the poet.[31]

The critics have made the same error as Quintilian's judge, who believes the conclusion to which the orator has led him was not the one the orator wanted to lead him to. The effect, they conclude, is caused by the poet's incompetence and poor taste. This is why modern scholarship is at a loss to explain Statius' immense popularity in the Middle Ages, when readers were well aware of, and still practiced, such forms of rhetoric.

A wholly different perspective will emerge on most Roman poets from the late republic onwards if we abandon the assumption that they could not have been criticizing the powerful. Instead of assuming that the reactions Vessey and Butler experienced to *Silvae* 3.4 occur because Statius' art has failed, let us assume they occur because it has succeeded. Demetrius, Quintilian, and other rhetoricians show clearly in their treatments of figured speech that criticism of tyrants is possible, openly (*aperte*) if not directly (*palam*). We have found what lurks beneath the text for the reader to discover, to paraphrase Quintilian. But like Vessey and Butler, we reject what we find. We are readier to impute incompetence and lack of taste to a great poet than to question the presupposition that criticism of the emperor was unthinkable. In short, we read

[28] See also Martial's poem on Earinus: *Epigrams* 9.11–13, 16–17, 36. For a full treatment of these poems and *Silvae* 3.4, see J. Garthwaite, "Domitian and the court poets Martial and Statius," Diss. Cornell 1978, 63–129; cf. Ahl (note 23 above) 28–33.

[29] D. Vessey, *Statius and the Thebaid* (Cambridge 1973) 35.

[30] H. E. Butler, *Post-Augustan Poetry* (Oxford 1909) 229.

[31] Vessey (note 29 above) 32; Butler, loc cit.

Statius the way Domitian probably tried to read him, if he ever really bothered to look at the *Silvae*.

As we have seen, Quintilian suggests that rhetorical attacks on tyrants were quite safe in his day (Domitian's day), provided that they were couched in figured terms. It was the equestrian or senatorial leaders in public life whose everyday activities might generate friction with the palace who were threatened most,[32] for they were always the potential opposition. A moment of anger, like that of Herodes Atticus' confrontation with Aurelius, or a moment of incaution, as when Aelius Lamia made a few suspicious jokes at the emperor's expense, or when Helvidius Priscus satirized Domitian's divorce in a play about Paris and Oenone (Suetonius, *Domitian* 10) could be ruinous. It is one thing to compare the emperor to Jupiter, as Statius does; it is another to compare him to Paris. Quintilian's cardinal rule is that one of the levels of meaning must appear complimentary.

Writers whose public lives placed them close to the hub of power did need to be careful. As Tacitus, contrasting the days of Trajan with those of Domitian, remarks, we now have the rare time of productivity "when you can feel what you want and are allowed to say what you feel," *ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet* (*Histories* 1.1). But we should beware of taking Tacitus "at his word" just as we should beware of taking Polemo at face value. The verdict of extant literature is very different. Latin poetry flourished under Domitian. The closest thing to epic Trajan's reign has left is his column, and Suetonius, in his *Lives of the Caesars*, never even mentions Trajan's name. The Caesars are twelve and end with Domitian.

First century senatorial writers who fell victim to imperial wrath were often arguably political rather than literary casualites—Lucan and Seneca, for example. But most poets of the Roman empire were political small fry. As Martial notes rather allegorically in *Epigrams* 1.22, the rabbit has more reason to be afraid of dogs than of lions. Poets, like the Thracian critic of Domitian in Suetonius, *Domitian* 10, could be thrown to the dogs.

Like their counterparts in the nineteenth and twentieth century theater, Greek and Roman writers found in figured language a means of coping with imposed restrictions, of expressing themselves with relative security. The punishment for failure, of course, was more terrible

[32] See my discussion of Statius' preface to *Silvae* 4 in "From Horace to Statius" (note 27 above).

for the Roman than the Victorian, but not necessarily worse than for the writer caught in subversion by Hitler or Stalin. The mastery of language confers a certain freedom, despite society's repression. That is why, the author of *On the Sublime* suggests (44.4), no slave could become a rhetorician: δοῦλον δὲ μηδένα γίγνεσθαι ῥήτορα. We might quite appropriately reverse the notion too: no rhetorician becomes a slave. The first translation tells us what the situation was in Roman law, the second what it was in rhetorical practice.

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THE ORIGIN OF ETRUSCAN *TUSNA* ("SWAN")

On a large fourth century Etruscan bronze mirror published by E. Gerhard in 1867[1] and re-edited by A. J. Charsekin,[2] the circular centerpiece depicts Atunis (Adonis) in the embrace of Turan (Venus). Behind Turan's back is a draped, bejeweled, and winged female figure holding an alabastron in one hand and a bodkin in the other, with the name Zirna inscribed next to her. On the left, a huge bird emerges from behind Atunis and cranes its neck above the head of the somewhat runty Atunis so that its beak almost nudges Turan's tiara. Next to the bird stands the name Tusna (see Figure 1).

The bird is a swan. Named swans are not exactly common; even Leda's and Lohengrin's birds were just "the Swan." Thus *tusna* is presumably the Etruscan word for "swan."[3]

Words for "swan" are frequently akin to terms for whiteness; collocations like *niveos cycnos, candidior cycnis* (Vergil), and *albus olor* (Ovid) were poetic commonplace, while conversely a *niger cycnus* to the Romans was the quintessential *rara avis in terris* (Juvenal 6.165). Greek κύκνος itself is cognate with Skt. *śukrá-* "shiny, white." Similarly OHG *albiz* and Russian *lebed'* "swan" are etymologically akin to Lat. *albus* "white." There is accordingly some probability that *tusna* may have to do with whiteness. In that case, it perhaps represents a loan from an Umbrian **dōsnō* < **lousnā*, with *d* < *l* in the manner of Umbrian *fameřias* < **famedias* < **famelias* besides Oscan *famelo*, Lat. *familia*. The reverse development *d* > *l* is well known (Lat. *lingua* "tongue," *lacruma* "tear," *lēvir*, "husband's brother," *oleō* beside *odor*, *solium* beside *sedeō*), and the *d*:*l* fluctuation is endemic in areal context (Umbr.

[1] *Etruskische Spiegel* IV, nr. 322.

[2] "Etruskische Inschriften in den Museen der UdSSR," *Zur Deutung etruskischer Sprachdenkmäler* (Frankfurt 1963) 70–81, with plates I–XII. This item (nr. 9, p. 77, and plates VI–VII), now in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad, seems to have badly deteriorated since Gerhard's days, with several of the names of ancillary figures circling the rim corroded away. For an unimpaired version and a discussion, see also A. J. Pfiffig, *Religio etrusca* (Graz 1975) 275–77.

[3] Calling Tusna along with Zirna merely a "mythological name" (C. de Simone, *Die griechischen Entlehnungen im Etruskischen*, vol. II [Wiesbaden 1970] 100) is hardly illuminating.

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A. J. Pfiffig, *Religio etrusca* (Graz 1975), Abb. 121, p. 276.

tuder: Etr. *tular* "boundaries"; Gk. 'Οδυσσεύς: 'Ολυτεύς, δάφνη: λάφνη, λαβύρινθος: Myc. *da$_2$-pu-ri-to-jo*; Hittite *tabarna-*: *labarna-*). This **lousnā* is formally comparable to the early Latin *Losna* which appears on a Praeneste mirror (*CIL* 1^2.549, 14.4095 *Poloces Losna Amuces*) where it designates the moon goddess and linguistically antedates the later *Lūna*. In origin **lousnā* is an early Italic feminine form of the Indo-European adjective **lowksno-* or **lewksno-* "shiny, white" (Avest. *raoxšna-*) which has yielded astral terms in several languages (Old Prussian *lauxnos* "stars," OIr. *lūan* < **lowksnos* "moon," OCS *luna* < **lowksnā* "moon"). The adjective originally qualified a base-word for "star" or "moon" (as in Skt. *candrá-mas-*, literally "bright moon"), becoming subsequently elliptic. In the same way it may have occurred in an Italic combination **lousnā* (*avis*) (= an Avestan *raoxšnā vīš*) "white bird," which, borrowed from Umbrian, had an ephemeral future in Etruscan *tusna* but gave way in Latin to the Greek-origin *cycnus* (Lucretius, Cicero; itself partly supplanted by the ornithonym *olor* [< **elor*] in Augustan poets and later prose), perhaps for the obvious reason that the form which became *lūna* had in the meantime been preempted by the outcome of the parallel elliptic collocation **lousnā* (**mēnsā*) (vel sim.), parallel to Gk. *σελάσνᾱ (*μήνσᾱ). The root involved, IE **lewk-* (Gk. λευκός "white"), shows other traces of an initial *l* > *d* change in Greco-Italic context (e.g., Hesychius' δευκές· λαμπρόν), perhaps originating dissimilatorily in the name Πολυδεύκης (< *Πολυλεύκης; cf. Etr. *Pul(u)tuke*, *Pultuce*, Old Latin *Podlouquei* [Lavinium], *Poloces* [Praeneste], Latin *Pollux*).

Forms such as *tusna, tusnu, tuśnu, tusnui, tuśnui, tusnus* occur as cognomina in Etruscan inscriptions;[4] whether they have mere homophonic relevance to the topic of this note or represent a person's name meaning "Swan" cannot be determined (but cf. Gk. Κύκνος[5] and Russian *Lebedev*). In any event the cluster *sn* was common and stable in Etruscan (*rasna, snute*), and the language was readily able to accommodate and preserve an early Italic **lousnā* > Umbrian **dōsnō*[6] > Etr.

[4]References in M. Pallottino (ed.), *Thesaurus Linguae Etruscae I. Indice lessicale* (Roma 1978) 348, 351, or H. Rix, *Das etruskische Cognomen* (Wiesbaden 1963) 154.

[5]Incidentally occurring on two Etruscan scarabs as *Kukne* (cf. C. de Simone [note 3 above] in fn. 3, vol. I, p. 86).

[6]Attested Umbrian has no initials in *l-*; those that had not become *d-* appear as *v-* (e.g., *Vufiune* < **Leudhyon-*). There is no example in the Umbrian remnants themselves of word-initial *d-* < **l-*; but the well-documented medial instances and the paral-

tusna or *tusnu* (for phonemic lack of *d* and *o*; incidentally **dōsnō* would have been written *tusna* or *tusnu* in the defective Umbrian alphabet as well).

Tusna would not be the only example of a borrowed animal name in Etruscan: on a fifth century Etruscan carnelian gem (Cabinet des Médailles of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris) the likeness of a suckling lioness is accompanied by the legend *leu*.[7]

Specific borrowings from Umbrian into Etruscan would not be limited to the postulated **dōsnō* either: there is, for example, Umbr. *kletra* "litter" which appears as Etr. *cletram*. Lexical interchange was clearly a two-way street.

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lels from the Mediterranean orbit give it strong plausibility. The paucity of the corpus does not raise high expectations of finding one (and hence mitigates the *e silentio* factor); after all, despite **l-* being a common initial phoneme in Italic, the presumably normal Umbrian *v-* < **l-* is present only in a handful of attestations (*Vufiune*, *Vuvçis*, *vutu*, *vapeře*).

[7]Cf., e.g., C. de Simone (note 3 above) fn. 3, vol. I, p. 89. Nor is this the only swan on Etruscan mirrors: Gerhard's nr. 110 (uninscribed) depicts a young man with an earring, loosely draped in a veil-like sheet and holding up a mirror in his left hand, riding side-saddle backwards on a very disgruntled-looking swan, with his right arm around the swan's twisted neck (see D. Rebuffat-Emmanuel, *Le miroir étrusque d'après la collection du Cabinet des Médailles* [Rome 1973], Plate 56). In the toilet scene of *ES* 213 (British Museum), Turan on the right has a swan peeking out from behind her, besides the dove on her left shoulder (see *Studi etruschi* 48 [1980] 177).

THE DELETION OF *S* IN PLAUTUS*

One of the important phonological characteristics distinguishing Archaic Latin from Classical Latin is the deletion of word final *s* in preconsonantal contexts. In Archaic Latin, both in inscriptions and in literature, the deletion of *s* is a prominent feature. In contrast, very few instances of the deletion of *s* can be documented in Classical Latin.[1]

Considerable disagreement surrounds the process of *s* deletion in Archaic Latin. On one hand, some scholars maintain that *s* was deleted only after the short vowel *o* in preconsonantal contexts;[2] on the other hand, some claim that *s* was deleted after any vowel regardless of quantity or quality, but only if the following word began with a voiced consonant.[3] Such fundamentally different claims about *s* deletion in Archaic

*I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Brian Joseph and to Cathy Jolley for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

[1] Some examples of *s* deletion occur in Lucretius. The one example in Catullus (116.8) is well known. Even Cicero, who calls the deletion process *subrusticum* "hickish" (*Orator* 161), uses *s* deletion a number of times in his translation of Aratus' *Phaenomena*; see W. S. Allen, *Vox Latina* (Cambridge 1965) 37. Diachronically, the difference between Archaic Latin and Classical Latin has been accounted for in a number of ways. It has been claimed—by E. H. Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia 1940); Allen (1965); V. Väänänen, *Le Latin Vulgaire des Inscriptions Pompeiennes* (Helsinki 1937); E. Hamp, "Final -s in Latin," *CP* 54 (1959) 165-73; and others—that *s* was reintroduced into Classical Latin simply by analogy from prevocalic position where final *s* presumably remains. (There are, however, a few cases in inscriptions where *s* appears to be deleted in prevocalic contexts.) L. Havet, "L's Latin Caduc," *Etudes Romances dédiées à Gaston Paris* (Geneve 1891), has suggested that *s* was reintroduced in imitation of poets who used word final *s* because their Greek models did. E. Hamp, "On the Conditioned Loss and Restitution of Latin -s," in R. J. Campbell, M. C. Wang, and M. G. Golding, eds., *Linguistic Studies in Romance Languages* (Washington, D.C. 1974) 1-7, argues that *s* was reintroduced for stylistic reasons. I have argued, "The Deletion of *s* in Latin: Its Consequences for Romance," in Philip Baldi, ed., *Papers from the XII Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages* (Amsterdam 1983) 265-277, that the (s:ø) variant was a stigmatized feature and that (s:s) was reintroduced in order to avoid the use of this stigmatized variant.

[2] E. Hamp (note 1 above, 1959); C. Proskauer, *Das auslautende -s auf lateinischen Inschriften* (Strassburg 1909).

[3] E. Hamp (note 1 above, 1974); Allen (note 1 above); G. B. Perini, "Appunti per la storia e la preistoria di *-s* latino," in *Dignam Die a Giampalo Vallot* (Padova 1972) 247-84.

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Latin suggest that the nature of the process itself needs to be reexamined.

The exact status of the deletion of final *s* in varieties of Archaic Latin (and in related varieties, e.g., Faliscan) can only be established after the corpus of relevant data—the inscriptional and metrical evidence and the testimony of antiquity—have been taken into consideration. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all of these data. More modestly, this paper initiates such an undertaking by analyzing the metrical data for *s* deletion from the Roman playwright Plautus.

The Variable Nature of s *Deletion*

In Plautus the deletion of *s* is a variable phonological process; that is, *s* is deleted in some contexts, in others it is pronounced. For example, *Aulularia* 18 (iambic senarius):

– – ⏑ – ⏑ – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – ⏑ – – – ⏑ –

atque ille vero *minu' min*usque impendio

The metrical requirements of this line are such that the final *s* of *minus* "less" in foot 3 must be absent and the final *s* of *minus* in foot 4 must be present in order to ensure proper scansion. If the final *s* of *minus* (foot 3) were present, then foot 3 would consist of a cretic (– ⏑ –) instead of a dactyl (– ⏑ ⏑), a resolution which is unacceptable in iambic senarii. Similarly, the meter demands the presence of final *s* in *minus* in foot 4. Were final *s* absent in this position an open syllable would result and the foot would consist of an unacceptable sequence (⏑ ⏑).

To represent the fact that word final *s* may or may not be present, the standard variable notation (s) is used. Hudson's extension of the standard notation has also been adopted.[4] Thus, the variant with *s* present is represented (s:s), while the variant with *s* deleted is represented (s:ø).

The fact that *s* deletion is a variable process calls for a quantitative treatment of the data, using contemporary variationist techniques insofar as they apply.[5] This study provides a description of the structure of

[4] R. A. Hudson, *Sociolinguistics* (Cambridge 1980) ch. 5.

[5] W. Wolfram and R. Fasold, *The Study of Social Dialects in American English* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1974) ch. 6; Hudson (note 4 above); for additional treatments of variation in early texts, see H. Hock, "Retroflexion Rules in Sanskrit," *South Asian Languages Analysis*

the variation (s:s)—(s:ø), indicates the proportion of use of the different variants, and describes the effects different environments have on the use of the different variants. Finally, since synchronic variation is often the vehicle of language change, the diachronic implications of this process are briefly considered.

Methodological Considerations

Since metrical texts were the source for the data considered, the identification and collection of (s) were dictated by the nature of the Latin metrical system.[6]

The Latin metrical system is based on the regular alternation of long and short syllables. Long syllables are composed of long vowels, diphthongs, or short vowels in closed syllables, that is, followed by two or more consonants; short syllables are those which contain short vowels in open syllables. For the purpose of this study, the lexicon can be divided into two categories: words which end in the sequence -$\bar{V}s$ (e.g., *vidēs* "you see") as opposed to words which end in the sequence -$\breve{V}s$ (e.g., *doctus* "learned"). Words which end in the sequence -$\bar{V}s$ can be eliminated from consideration because the final syllable will remain long even if *s* is deleted. As a result it is impossible to detect the deletion of *s* metrically in these cases.[7] Fortunately, this limitation does not invalidate the identification and collection of (s) by scansion. Inscriptional evidence suggests that *s* was deleted primarily after short vowels, not

(1976) 49-62 (for Sanskrit); Sven-Tage Teodorsson, "Phonological Variation in Classical Attic and the Development of Koine," *Glotta* 57 (1979) 61-75 (for Classical Greek); T. E. Toon, "Lexical Diffusion in Old English," in D. Farkas, W. Jacobsen, and K. W. Todrys, eds., *Papers from the Parasession on the Lexicon* (Chicago 1978) 357-64 (for Old English); and Wanner and J. D. Cravens, "Early Intervocalic Voicing in Tuscan," in E. C. Traugott, R. Lahrum, and S. Shepard, eds., *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*, vol. 14 (Amsterdam 1980) 339-345 (for Tuscan).

[6] For a lengthy discussion of the methodological problems involved in the analysis of (s) in Plautus, see R. Wallace, *The Variable Deletion of Final -s in Plautus*, thesis (Columbus 1981).

[7] While it is impossible to detect instances of *s* deletion after long vowels by meter, there is some orthographic evidence to suggest that *s* was deleted in this context. However, *s* deletion in this context is restricted to six lexical items (see Wallace [note 6 above] 29-30) and then only if the clitic *ne* follows. Since this study is concerned with the detection of (s) by metrical means, this orthographic variation is not discussed. For the evidence on (s) in the context -V__#*ne*, the reader is referred to Wallace (note 6 above).

after long ones. For those words whose final sequence is -*V̆s*, it is possible to detect (s) providing the following word begins with a consonant because the deletion of *s* results in a short syllable, the retention of *s* in a long syllable.

Not only is metrical identification of (s) restricted to certain lexical items, it is also restricted to certain positions in a given verse type. For each type of verse, the positions where (s) could be detected would be relatively straightforward if the Latin metrical system were inflexible—for example, if every trochaic septenarius consisted invariably of sequences of trochees (-˘). Were this the case, the identification of (s:ø) and (s:s) would be simple indeed. In a trochaic septenarius, for example, a word like *doctus* would necessarily be counted as an instance of (s) with the variant (s:ø) in initial position if the following word began with a consonant. Unfortunately the detection process is more complex, due to the series of resolutions (metrical substitutions) possible for any given verse type. Trochaic septenarii allow the first five feet to be resolved in any of three ways: with an anapest (˘˘-), a dactyl (-˘˘), or a spondee (- -). As a result, it is much more difficult to detect instances of (s). For a word such as *doctus*, (s) can be identified in three positions: if it begins the sixth foot, which is almost invariably trochaic, or if the final syllable of this word is the second syllable of a dactyl or the first syllable of an anapest.

In sum then, (s:ø) is detected only in those words that end in the sequence -*V̆s* and that occur in the context (#)#*C* when the meter demands a short syllable. Similarly, (s:s) is detected only in words that end in the sequence -*V̆s* and occur in the context (#)#*C* when the meter demands a long syllable

Because the identification of (s) is restricted to certain positions metrically, the nature of the variable (s) is slightly different from typical phonological variables.[8] Usually the rate of occurrence for a given variable in a text is discussed in terms of how many times a particular variant occurred as opposed to how many times it *might* have occurred. But it is impossible to discuss the variable (s) in these terms since the meter automatically determines the variant that must appear. As a result it can only be assumed that detection of variants by scansion will yield a representative indication of the actual percentage of *s* deletion. In addi-

[8] W. Labov, *Sociolinguistic Patterns* (Philadelphia 1972) esp. ch. 1; Hudson (note 4 above); J. K. Chambers and P. Trudgill, *Dialectology* (Cambridge 1980) esp. chs. 4-6; Wolfram and Fasold (note 5 above).

tion, most contemporary studies of structured variation attempt to describe the effects different conditioning factors have on the frequency with which a particular variant occurs, that is, which factors favor the occurrence of a particular variant and which factors disfavor the occurrence of a particular variant. Since the occurrence of the variants of (s) in a text is determined by metrical consideration, any discussion of the probability of a variant occurring in a particular environment is out of the question. Nevertheless, this does not prevent discovery of which environmental factors favor or disfavor *s* deletion. It is assumed that those environments which disfavor *s* deletion will show lesser rates of deletion.

Results

From the 20 texts of Plautus, 1,828 instances of the variable (s) were collected.[9] The variant (s:ø) was positively identified in 1,058 cases, while the (s:s) variant was identified in 770 cases. In Plautus, word final *s* was deleted in preconsonantal contexts at a rate of 57.9%.

Five factors, four linguistic and one extralinguistic, were discovered which significantly inhibited or promoted the deletion of *s*:[6]

1. whether or not final *s* was preceded by a morpheme boundary;
2. lexical context, the identity of the word which contains final *s*;
3. frequency;
4. the nature of the following boundary, whether final *s* was followed by a word, enclitic, or sentence boundary; and
5. style, whether formal or casual.

These factors are considered in order.

Preceding Boundary

The question of the influence of a preceding grammatical boundary on the deletion of *s* is complicated considerably by the problem of

[9] The only Plautine text excluded from analysis is the *Vidularia*. It is simply too fragmentary to be useful.

[10] In addition to the factors cited in section 4, the following factors were checked for possible influence on the deletion of *s*: polymorphemic vs. monomorphemic words; voiced vs. voiceless consonants in the following environment; the articulatory features of consonants; and the quality of the preceding vowel. The last three factors had no effect on the deletion process (see Wallace [note 6 above] for discussion). The first factor is essentially a function of lexical identity and frequency, since the words which occur most frequently with (s) are the monomorphemic ones.

determining morphological boundaries in a number of verb and noun classes. Should *o*-stem nouns, for example, have a boundary before or after the *o*? Is *seruos* "slave" to be divided morphologically as /serw + os/ or /serwo + s/? The same question can be asked of *i*-stem nouns, mixed *i*-stems and the like. There is no easy solution to this problem, and one will not be attempted here. Instead, a traditional approach to these questions has been taken, and morphological boundaries have been assigned as they are assigned in such Latin grammars and Allen and Greenough.

By adopting this solution the only examples of (s) with a + (morpheme) boundary preceding final *s* are the second singular active verbal forms, for example, *ducis* "you lead" /dūki + s/, *facis* "you make" /faki + s/, and so on. There are 115 second singular verbal forms with (s), only 34 of which contain the variant (s:ø). The (s:s) variant occurs in 81 cases. Thus, the rate of deletion is 29.6% when a morpheme boundary precedes word final *s*. Since this rate of deletion is considerably lower than the general rate of *s* deletion, it is safe to conclude that the presence of a morpheme boundary inhibits the deletion of *s*.

Lexical Identity

There were 276 lexical items in Plautus which contained at least 1 instance of the variable (s). These items were grouped into categories along two parameters: frequency of occurrence with (s) and frequency of deletion of *s*. Only those items which occurred with 5 or more instances of (s) were sampled in an attempt to ensure representative behavior on the part of each word. Fifty-two words attest five or more occurrences of (s).

When the rate of deletion of these items was compared, it was found that they could be ranked (Table 1) according to rate of deletion. Some lexical items delete *s* at a greater rate than others. It was impossible, however, to account for these differences in rate of deletion in terms of phonological or syntactic differences between words. This suggests that the rate of deletion of *s* may vary from word to word according to what the word is and not according to its phonological or syntactic properties; that is, some words favor the deletion of *s* more than others.

Frequency

Careful consideration of Table 1 not only indicates that deletion of *s* is more sensitive to some lexical items than others, it also indicates

Table 1. Frequency of *s*-deletion in words with more than five instances of (s)

Word	(s:ø)	(s)	% of deletion
deus	9	9	100
genus	7	7	100
suos	5	5	100
quibus	44	45	97.8
nimis	94	97	96.9
prius	112	117	95.7
tribus	12	13	92.3
tuos	48	53	90.6
bonus	9	10	90
meus	71	79	89.9
magis	112	126	88.9
minus	48	54	88.9
sumus	16	18	88.9
satis	84	95	88.4
opus	24	28	85.7
foris	5	6	83.4
moribus	4	5	80
Venus	11	14	78.5
Iovis	6	8	75
scelus	8	11	72.7
erus	37	52	71.1
vetus	4	6	66.7
eris	5	8	62.5
malus	6	10	60
ratus	3	5	60
salvos	3	5	60
nullus	3	6	50
usus	4	8	50
omnibus	9	20	45
probus	3	7	42.8
filius	5	12	41.7
facis	9	22	40.9
agis	4	10	40
animus	2	5	40
estis	3	8	37.5
quoius	3	8	33.3
ipsus	2	6	33.3
potis	2	8	25
servos	2	9	22.2
amoris	1	5	20

Table 1. *Continued.*

Word	(s:ø)	(s)	% of deletion
hostibus	1	5	20
intus	3	18	16.7
mulieris	1	6	16.7
eius	1	7	14.3
iratus	1	7	14.3
huius	2	16	12.5
quis	1	29	3.4
is	1	59	1.2
aedibus	—	11	0
amplius	—	7	0
natus	—	7	0
uxoris	—	6	0

that it is sensitive to those lexical items which occur more frequently with (s). In terms of frequency of occurrence with (s), 9 out of the top 12 words (see Table 2) have a deletion rate of over 70%, and the group as a whole has a deletion rate of 79.8%. For the next 12 lexical items (see Table 2), only 5 words have a deletion rate of 70% and the deletion rate for the group as a whole is 52.5%, a difference of nearly 30%. This clearly indicates that the deletion of *s* is, in part at least, a function of frequency. Note, however, that *s* deletion is not purely a function of frequency. Some lexical items, such as *aedibus* dative/ablative plural "buildings," *huius* genitive singular of *hic* "this," *intus* "within," *is* "this," *quis* "who?," and so on, do occur frequently but have a low rate of deletion. Others, such as *deus* "god," *suos* reflexive pronoun, occur rather infrequently and have a high rate of deletion.

Following Boundary

As was mentioned earlier, it is possible to distinguish three types of boundary following *s*: enclitic, word, and sentence. There is an enormous difference in the frequency of occurrence of (s) before a word boundary as opposed to an enclitic or sentence boundary. While (s) occurs 1,695 times at a word boundary, it occurs just 47 times at an enclitic boundary and 86 times at a sentence boundary. Moreover, there is a significant statistical difference in the rate of deletion before each type of boundary: 60.8% (1,030 (s:ø) vs. 665 (s:s)) before a word boundary,

Table 2. Lexical items arranged according to frequency of (s)

Word	(s:ø)	(s)	% of deletion
magis	112	126	88.9
prius	112	117	95.7
nimis	94	97	96.9
satis	84	95	88.4
meus	71	79	89.9
is	1	59	1.2
minus	48	54	88.9
tuos	48	53	90.6
ĕrus	37	52	71.1
quibus	44	45	97.8
quis	1	29	3.4
facis	9	22	40.9
omnibus	9	20	45
intus	3	18	16.7
sumus	16	18	88.9
huius	2	16	12.5
Venus	11	14	78.5
tribus	12	13	92.3
filius	5	12	41.7
scelus	8	11	72.7
aedibus	0	11	0
agis	4	10	40
bonus	9	10	90
malus	6	10	60

42.6% (20 (s:ø) vs. 27 (s:s)) before an enclitic boundary, and 23.3% (20 (s:ø) vs. 66 (s:s)) before a sentence boundary. This suggests that the deletion of *s* is disfavored when an enclitic or sentence boundary follows and, in case of a following sentence boundary, heavily disfavored.

Style

Typically the texts of Plautus are divided into classes according to meter.[11] The first class consists only of those verses composed in iambic

[11] For a discussion of the phonostylistics of (s) in Plautus, see R. Wallace, "A Note on the Phonostylistics of Latin: (s) in Plautus," *Glotta* 60 (1982) 120-24; W. T. MacCary and M. M. Willcock, *Critical Text of the* Casina *of Plautus* (Cambridge 1976) app. 1.

senarii, the so-called "spoken" verses. The second class is called *cantica*. This class is further subdivided into "recitative" and "sung," depending again on meter. The "recitative" verses are those composed in any long sequence (septenarii and octonarii and the like) of iambs, trochees, or anapests; the "sung" verses are those composed in shorter sequences (e.g., dimeters) of iambs, trochees, or anapests, in bacchiacs or cretics, in Aeolic measures, or combinations of these.

"Spoken" style (hereafter Style I) and "recitative" style (Style II) were grouped together for the purposes of analysis because, again according to typical descriptions, these two types closely resemble each other, the only difference being that "recitative" has musical accompaniment.[12] When the corpus of data was analyzed according to style, a significant difference was found in the rate of deletion between Styles I and II and the "sung" style (Style III) (see Table 3). The deletion rate in Styles I and II was found to be 60.2%, whereas in Style III the deletion rate was 43.9%. From this difference in rate of deletion, it is possible to conclude that deletion of *s* is sensitive to stylistic differences and that Style III, the "sung" style, disfavors the deletion of *s*.

The Variable Rule in Plautus

Since deletion depends, to a large degree, on lexical identity (see p. 218), it is not practical to attempt a formal statement of the process; I will give instead an informal summary of the effects of environmental factors on the process.

There appear to be at least three factors which inhibit the deletion of *s*: a preceding morpheme boundary, a following enclitic or sentence

Table 3. Deletion of *s* according to style

Style	(s:ø)	(s:s)	(s)	% of deletion
Styles I and II	943	623	1,566	60.2
Style III	115	147	262	43.9

[12] Apparently there is little difference in linguistic formality between Style I and Style II. This is what is suggested by comparison of the *s* deletion rates for both styles: Style I, 450 (s), 264 (s:ø), 58.7% rate of deletion; Style II, 1,116 (s), 679 (s:ø), 60.8% rate of deletion.

boundary, and Style III. Two factors appear to favor the deletion of *s*: the nature of the lexical item containing (s) and the frequency of the lexical item containing (s). Thus, the deletion of *s* in Archaic Latin is not categorical or near-categorical, as is often assumed, but variable. The evidence from Plautus suggests that the proportion of use of the different variants was about 3 to 2 in favor of (s:ø).

Evidence for Lexical Diffusion

By far the most compelling conditioning effect on the deletion of *s* is lexical context. As mentioned earlier, when a list of the individual words containing (s) was compiled and the score for each word (see Table 1) calculated, it was found to be impossible to account for the gross differences in the occurrence of (s:ø) in a word by that word's phonological or syntactic properties. For example, all of the following words consist of an adjective stem plus the nominative singular masculine inflectional ending *-us*: *bonus* "swell," *iratus* "angry," *malus* "bad," *natus* "born," *nullus* "none," *probus* "trusty." Nevertheless, the rate of deletion for each lexical item is radically different: *bonus* 90% (9/10), *iratus* 14.3% (1/7), *malus* 60% (6/10), *natus* 0% (0/7), *nullus* 50% (3/6), *probus* 42.8% (3/7). Similarly, all of the following words consist of a noun stem plus the nominative singular ending *-us* and yet the rate of deletion between them varies considerably: *animus* 40% (2/5), *deus* "god" 100% (9/9), *erus* "master" 71.1% (31/52), *filius* "son" 41.7% (5/12), *servos* "slave" 22.2% (2/9). These examples clearly show that the probability of the (s:ø) variant occurring in a word depends on what the word is and not on the word's phonological or syntactic properties.

The pattern of variation illustrated in the words cited above and in those cited in Table 1 is of interest because similar patterns have been found in recent sociolinguistic studies. The pattern of variation for the variable (ʌ) in Belfast is representative.[13]

In a study of the Belfast vernacular, the vowel in words like *pull*, *full*, *put*, and *took* was found to vary between [ʌ] (e.g., *cut*) and [ʉ] (higher than but close to RP [ʊ]). When this variable was analyzed, dif-

[13] R. Maclaren, "The variable (ʌ), a relic form with social correlates," *Belfast Working Papers in Language and Linguistics 1* (1976) 45–68; J. Milroy, "Lexical alternation and diffusion in vernacular speech," *Belfast Working Papers in Language and Linguistics 3* (1978) 101–14.

ferences were found in the probability of a variant occurring from one word to another although there were no phonological or syntactic differences.[14] This particular pattern of variation, lexical differences between contexts, is said to provide support for the notion of lexical diffusion.[15] A given sound change is said to spread gradually through the lexicon, affecting some words before others and affecting some words to a greater degree than others. Since the [ʌ] pronunciation in Belfast is an innovation and since this innovation has affected different lexical items to different extents, the innovation is assumed to be gradually spreading through the lexicon. Similarly, in Archaic Latin the pronunciation (s:ø) is an innovation, and Table 1 shows that different lexical items have been affected to different degrees. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that the variation between (s:ø) and (s:s) in Plautus is indicative of a *sound change in progress*, and that the sound change is *diffusing* through the lexicon.

Existing evidence also indicates that the innovation is not spreading through the lexicon randomly. Since the lexical items affected most are those with a high frequency of occurrence, it is reasonable to conclude that the innovation is more likely to spread to items which occur frequently; since there is a phonological constraint against the deletion of *s* when a morpheme boundary precedes, it is reasonable to propose that the innovation is more likely to spread to lexical items which do not have a morpheme boundary immediately preceding final *s*; and finally, since there is a tendency for *s* deletion to be inhibited when a clitic or sentence boundary follows, it might be suggested that the innovation is more likely to spread to items which occur more frequently before a word boundary. Whether there is any way to verify these claims empirically is doubtful, but they are consistent with the data, and they do suggest that the progression of the sound change through the lexicon is not entirely aimless, a finding which is in keeping with one of the characteristics of lexical diffusion discussed by Kiparsky.[16]

[14] Hudson (note 4 above) 169, table 5.4.

[15] W. S-Y. Wang, "Competing sound changes as a cause of residue," *Language* 45 (1969) 9–25; W. S-Y. Wang and C. Chen, "Implementation of phonological change: The Shuang-feng Chinese case," *Proceedings of the Annual Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society 6* (Chicago 1970) 552–59; M. Chen and H-I. Hsieh, "The time variable in phonological change," *Journal of Linguistics* 7 (1971) 1–13; M. Chen and W. S-Y. Wang, "Sound change: Actuation and implementation," *Language* 51 (1975) 255–81.

[16] P. Kiparsky, "Concluding remarks," in E. C. Traugott, R. Labrum, and S. Shepard, eds., *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*, vol. 14 (Amsterdam 1980) 409–17.

Some insight into the original locus of diffusion may be gained by considering constructions like *prius quam*. Since these two items occur in construction together with considerable frequency, it is reasonable to assume that the deletion of *s* originated in constructions such as these. *prius quam* provides a fairly compelling case. The final *s* of *prius* is deleted 112 times. Over 50% of the cases of deletion occur when *prius* is in construction with *quam*. There are 70 instances of *prius quam* in construction and in 64 instances (92.6%) the *s* of *prius* is deleted. One reasonable way to explain the high percentage of deletion in this phrase is to suppose that the sound change originated in constructions like this one, became more frequent in these constructions, perhaps became nearly categorical in these constructions, and then gradually began to affect the lexical item in question in other contexts.

Concluding Remarks

On the basis of the preceding discussion the following conclusions are offered. Synchronically, the deletion of *s* in Plautus is a variable phonological process. The process is constrained in the following contexts: when a morpheme boundary precedes; when a sentence or enclitic boundary follows; and when the style is "sung," that is, more formal. The deletion process is favored by certain lexical items, particularly those that occur most frequently in preconsonantal contexts. Diachronically, the variable (s) in Plautus illustrates sound change by lexical diffusion along the axes of lexical identity and frequency of occurrence.

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REVIEWS

ANDREW LINTOTT. Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. 289. $25.00.

Despite Thucydides' emphasis on the *stasis* in Corcyra at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and the importance of this phenomenon in all of Greek history, no modern study has previously singled out *stasis* as a theme for detailed analysis. Andrew Lintott, author of *Violence in Republican Rome* (Oxford 1968), has sought to fill that void in this compact and rather difficult book. Lintott's study begins with an all too brief chapter on violence in archaic Greek society. This may, in fact, be the best part of the book and in it Lintott presents some interesting discussions of blood vengeance, community defense (in response to *boē*), and popular justice. In this section Lintott ranges widely, from the Homeric poems, to Aristophanes, to the world of the Hottentott, but his arguments are succinct and to the point, and the reader follows them with ease and anticipation. After this point, however, the book becomes more difficult to read and occasionally quite confusing.

Stasis, in the classical sense, is generally first associated with the economic difficulties of the aristocratic age and the rise of the first tyrants. Lintott, however, questions any essential connection between the tyrants and either the hoplites or the poor, and he stresses the relatively low level of political violence that was necessary to effect change in the early *polis*: "if the majority of the hoplite class were favourable or even neutral in their attitude to a tyrant, this was sufficient.... Few men were needed in immature city-states to make a coup..." (p. 42). In Athens, Lintott accepts the traditional view of Solon as *prostates tou demou*, but he sees *stasis* as essentially an aristocratic activity: "it is personal and based on an aristocratic sense of honour" (p. 52). In this early period Lintott notes considerable variation from city to city—thus, in Ionia the plutocrats feared Persian power and came to an accommodation with the poor, while in Magna Graecia the struggle between rich and poor was particularly violent. In Sparta, by contrast, the celebrated absence of *stasis* is to be explained by the secrecy by which the government was conducted and the ban on money, which made conspiracy difficult.

In the classical period, the character of *stasis* changed considerably. First, most states developed law codes and regular government institutions; second, the enfranchisement of large numbers of citizens led to greater political consciousness among the common people; and third, foreign intervention came to play a dominant role in the stimulation of *stasis*. Indeed, Lintott follows Thucydides in seeing imperialism as the foremost issue of the age and the dominant cause of *stasis* in the fifth century. In Lintott's view Sparta took the lead in this process, followed later by Athens and then Thebes. Athens, of course, was not motivated by egalitarian principles and it "did not treat the common people

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allied to it as partners: rather, it was their 'big brother,' whose dealings were largely with their *dunatoi* . . ." (p. 103).

In post-Periclean Athens Lintott sees a considerable escalation of factional conflict, instigated in part by the growth of semi-political associations (*hetairoi*). Thus, the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 405 and the political confusion of the last years of the war are not ascribed to class antagonism but to political struggle among the aristocracy. As for the motives of the oligarchy, Lintott concludes that it is probably impossible to distinguish between ideological conviction and private ambition since these were probably inseparable in the mind of the participant.

In the fourth century there was apparently an increase in public violence and many scholars see this as the result of growing distance between the rich and the poor in the cities of Greece. Lintott, however, questions both of these conclusions, saying that the increase in violence may be only apparent and that the greater participation of the common people in violence was a result of their politicization: the *demos* saw the results of the oligarchic revolutions of the late fifth century.

Overall, this book is a thorough survey of the events and the issues involved in the study of violence and revolution in the Greek *polis*. It is primarily a narrative history and the reader will find here an account of most of the details which led to the most famous outbreaks of political violence in the Greek world. Unfortunately, the book does not contribute much that is new and it does not go substantially beyond its narrative focus. Only with difficulty can the reader disentangle analytic sections from the mass of narrative detail. That effort is frequently worthwhile: for example the discussion in the first chapter and the most interesting treatment of the absence of "self-help" in the Greek *polis* (as opposed, for example, to Rome, where self-help remained an important part of the legal structure at least to the end of the Republic).

What is perhaps most irritating about this book is the absence of any clear-cut conceptual frame: Lintott does not always define his terms and he does not tell the reader exactly what he proposes to do and how he will go about doing it. For example, throughout the book Lintott naturally contrasts the aristocracy (or oligarchy) with the *demos* and the common people, but he makes no attempt to define those terms and, although his discussion suggests that the composition of the *demos* underwent considerable change, this has little place in the analytic frame. More seriously, recent scholarship has suggested strong reservations about the nature of the aristocracy and the *demos* and the definition of these terms over time, e.g., Ronald P. Legon, *Demos and Stasis: Studies in the Factional Politics of Classical Greece* (diss. Cornell University 1966) and Walter Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece* (Lawrence, Kansas 1980). Lintott may not agree with all of the conclusions of these two scholars, but he should at least consider them, especially since many of the arguments are set forth in a series of articles that are easy to find.

Lintott's view is almost entirely political and it is not surprising that he concludes that *stasis* was political in motivation and that it was primarily a struggle among the aristocracy. In this regard, one might invite comparison with G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London 1981); both books approach their subject from a doctrinaire point of

view, although de Ste. Croix at least takes considerable care to define his terms and to consider the view of the opposing side. Lintott does not give the reader a real opportunity to consider an approach other than his own and through most of the text he does not let on that social and economic considerations may have been thought, by some, to have played a role in the events he describes.

It is true that toward the end of the book Lintott addresses the question of why the classical Greek city did not witness class-oriented violence of the modern kind. In the first place, he says, there can have been no class conflict because there was no free labor market where individuals (men) "could confront one another as employers and employees.... What the poor eventually came to desire was not so much a change in the system but a fresh start in the shape of cancellation of debts or reassignation of land" (p. 257). Secondly, Lintott points to the "greater social coherence of the city-state ... and probably also the persistence of some patron-client relations between the *dunatoi* and the *demos*..." (p. 259). Now, some of these points are certainly well taken and the importance of factors encouraging vertical integration in Greek society should not be underestimated. But Lintott probably goes too far by suggesting that both the city proletariat and the rural peasantry were "reconciled to their betters by membership of a political community, which gave the poor some, even if indirect, constitutional access to the levers of power" (p. 261). This would seem to be so much wishful (or romantic) thinking and not at all confirmed by the *level* of political violence and "class" hatred attested by Thucydides and the other sources.

Perhaps more seriously, Lintott does not argue his case throughout the book. Rather, at a number of points he notes that there is "no evidence" for social or economic motivation in the domestic violence of the Greek state. Certainly, our sources are primarily "political" (in the sense that they look primarily for political motivation), although they too see economic concerns especially in the late archaic period and during the fifth century (e.g. the *demos*' desire for wealth at the time of the Sicilian expedition). In the end, of course, Lintott's conclusions may be correct; certainly he is to be applauded for his refusal to use jargon and his insistence on the peculiarity of the individual historical event. But his case would be stronger had he addressed the issues more clearly and directly and faced the problem that the sources cannot always be trusted to represent faithfully the motives of protagonists involved in factional violence.

In conclusion, this is an important book on an important topic in Greek history. It is only to be regretted that the author did not cast his net more widely and deal more fully with some of the fundamental issues the study of violence must necessarily involve.

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GORDON WILLIAMS. Technique and Ideas in the *Aeneid*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 301. $27.50.

In this expansive, searching addition to his notable critiques of Latin literature, Professor Williams turns to the *Aeneid*, attending chiefly to the epic's

narrative art. He divides his inquiry into two main segments, each with several subdivisions. The first is devoted to figures of thought that aid in the structuring of the story line (W. maintains as an essential principle that only from careful analysis of the means of communication can the ends be judiciously weighed). Part two, entitled "The Point of View," explores ways by which the narrator impresses, frequently by indirection, a personal stamp on his subject matter and orients the reader toward proper evaluation.

In the initial segment W. examines Virgil's concept of fate as a means for anticipating nearer events within the epic plot and for peering toward a further historical distance, all the while standing for, and revealing, the workings of the human psyche. For W. the gods are concepts figural for what motivates mortal action, for man's conscience, for the process of events that ultimately constitutes fate. Divine machinery serves regularly as trope for the poet's voice (i.e., the author's point of view). In essence Virgil's gods mirror Epicurean divinities, a "fiction of the poet, a synecdoche of human attempts to explain an essentially hostile universe..." (213).

Among other categories of figuration, W. analyzes the power of the simile to invigorate its setting, the anticipation of ideas by which one context previews another, the use of ring composition where a later moment fulfills an earlier, and the interpenetration of themes for mutual enhancement. W. interprets—correctly and with a series of helpful exempla—Virgil's reshaping of his poetic past, especially the work of Homer and Apollonius Rhodius, as a primary exegetic guide. For instance, we gain insight into the narrator's notions of moral behavior in the heat of action by comparing Zeus' comment on Hector's folly in provoking Achilles (*Il.* 17.198-208) with the ethic of moderation the *Aeneid* narrator preaches in his own voice at 10.501-5 (87-88). Irony, too, is a significant factor in such revelations, as in the misconceived equation Turnus and his colleague Latins occasionally make of themselves to the Greeks at Troy.

The second segment opens with a discussion of poetic fantasies that interconnect the story line with ideas and values contemporary with the poet and of the many reverberations of future Rome in Aeneas' doings, especially in the four major passages in books 1, 6, 8 and 12 where the poet's own world is looked at *in extenso* through speech and ecphrasis. This imaging of Roman history, predominantly that of the Augustan age, is in turn "subsumed within the greater field of the human condition" (162). In search of "the poet's voice," the felt presence of the narrator, W. looks again at Virgil's use of simile as an instrument of authorial involvement, proclaiming objectivity or urging a particular subjective bias. After further consideration of apostrophe, of variations on the epitaph and on direct intervention as vehicles for authorial comment, W. offers more general observations on "Pessimism and Poetics," "Moral Ambiguities" and on ideas, such as a yearning for peace, that pervade the epic.

I have summarized extensively to give some intimation of the richness of material W. explores. The counter-arguments which his book will elicit, and I predict that they will be numerous, will be but a measure of its forceful standpoints and presentation. I would like to devote the remainder of this review to two of many areas that scholars will probe: W.'s treatment of the end of the epic, as Aeneas kills Turnus, and his interpretation of individual similes.

First, the ending. Already at page 92 we read that, judging by the way each hero is depicted, there is a "moral dilemma on both sides" (true) and that

"it may be easier to feel sympathy for the sudden blinding rage of Aeneas than for Turnus' pleading" (debatable). Aeneas has a "basic instinct for clemency" (225) that makes him hesitate, but the belt of Pallas on Turnus "accidentally" reminds him of his duty to avenge the former's death and therefore of the need to sacrifice his antagonist. In punishing Turnus he shows his anger yet "it is not anger for himself but for someone else" (224).

W. prepares the reader for this perspective carefully throughout the book and polemicizes against those who do not concur with it. He would have been more persuasive had he raised, and discussed, major arguments against it. There is, for example, the question of *clementia*. "Clemency should be shown only where it is deserved" (208, paraphrasing Augustus *RG* 3.2 on the aftermath of foreign, not civil, conflict). Anchises, at the end of his disquisition to his son in book 6, employing the apostrophe *Romane* and commanding leniency for the defeated, war against the arrogant, "addresses himself not to Aeneas but specifically to Romans..." (208). But W. is at pains elsewhere to see a "direct connexion between the course that Aeneas feels destined to follow and the greatness of the age of Augustus" (146). The thrust of his father's speech is to unite Aeneas with his future (*Romanos tuos*) and to visualize both himself and his son as part of a composite race with Aeneas its prime initiator (cf. 6.806–7). Austin (on 6.851) is on the mark: "Anchises now speaks not to Aeneas alone but to each future Roman exhorting each to his duty." Aeneas' final act should depend not on instinct but on confirmed duty, based on *pietas*.

According to W. the "themes of punishment and vengeance are made to coincide" as Aeneas performs his final deed. Turnus' crime (223, n. 15) is not that he killed Pallas but that he forced Latinus to take up *arma impia* (in itself a dubious shifting of responsibility). But if such is the case why need Pallas be mentioned at all? If Pallas and Turnus' *scelus* are unconnected, then Aeneas' excuse for his final deed is perverse (it has been strongly argued that proud Turnus' public humiliation is punishment enough in any case). W. defends Aeneas' supposedly selfless anger ("The only way a good man can go into battle and kill is by having *furor* and *ira* aroused in him" [222]) without documentation from Virgil for the interdependence of goodness, fury and anger. He omits mention that *saevus dolor*, scarcely an altruistic abstraction as we learn from the narrator's portrait of Juno at 1.25, is a formidable ally along with *furiae*, to this energetic duo. In fact *ira* and *furor* are at odds with *pietas* from the epic's start (re. Juno and Aeneas at 1.10–11, *furor* and *pietas* in the paradigmatic initial simile, 150–51, and, most succinct, the definition of *Furor* as *impius*, at 294). Moreover, if vengeance for Pallas and Evander is Aeneas' primary motivation, what has become of the ethics of restraint and of the non-violent, unheroic essence of *pietas* which W. has often called to our attention as guiding principle (e.g., 111 ff., 117)?

His treatment of some of the *Aeneid*'s most famous similes reveals at once the virtues and the limitations of W. as critic. Of many enlightening details, one could mention W.'s tracing of the "movement of ideas" in the context of book 7 derived from 376–84 (63), the powerful use of *atrum* at 12.450 (168), *Poenorum* as an important "authorial detail" at 12.4 (172). Yet, in spite of his spirited discussion, W. by no means proves that the falling leaves in the tree simile at

4.441–46 are equivalent to Aeneas' tears or that the spinner-weaver who serves as metaphor for Vulcan at 8.407–15 is a widow (the uses of *coniunx* in book 8 tell against this view as does the imitation by Valerius Flaccus at *Arg.* 2.137 ff.). I do not sense humor (189) in the ant simile at 4.401–7, nor do I find anything "gentle" (161) about the plucking of the flower in the comparison of Pallas to a *virgineo demessum pollice florem* (11.68). These are Virgil's only uses of *demeto* and *pollex* and present a careful change from his model at Catullus 62.43 (*tenui carptus ungui*). For the first time in Latin *demeto* must be translated "nip" or "pluck," but the reader experiences as well the expected meaning "mow down" (cf. Cat. 64.354), a meaning whose bluntness is enhanced by the replacement of the trimmer's fingernail by her thumb.

Sometimes W. does not allow a simile its full potential. At 11.492–7 Virgil, varying *Iliad* 6.506–11 where the freshly accoutered Paris is subject, likens Turnus to a stallion freed from his stable and heading for his favorite haunts. We easily identify the two heroes, one fighting for Helen, the other (in his mind at least) for Lavinia. That Homer uses the same simile later of Hector (15.263–8) is an "unwelcome" surprise (83). Yet Turnus has aspects of this Trojan about him as well. He is arming and his armor now must contain Pallas' sword-belt (another of Virgil's ways in book 11 of recalling the death scene of Pallas). Virgil's ancient reader would remember what happens to Hector once he is panoplied as Patroclus.

On occasion, when a simile obstructs his general thesis, W. will deflect its implications. As Aeneas storms over the battlefield after the killing of Pallas, the narrator compares him to the giant Aegaeon, raging against Jupiter with one hundred arms and hands. Recent critics consider Virgil here commenting on Aeneas' barbarity. W. contends the opposite. Because "the reader can be trusted to have grasped the poet's conception of Aeneas by now" (180), the simile must be interpreted as exemplifying the viewpoint of the terrified Latins. But, when we remember that Aeneas has just seized eight captives to serve as human sacrifice and slain at least eleven people, of whom one is a priest and two pray abjectly for mercy, Virgil may in fact be telling us something unpalatable but veracious about his hero.

All in all W.'s interpretation of the *Aeneid* is a wide-ranging addition to Virgilian bibliography, often informative, often provoking dissent, always challenging. Unfortunately the book's production exhibits a degree of carelessness unwonted from a distinguished scholar published by an eminent press. Looking at the translations alone: on 62, "among her people" is bracketed though it translates *per medios*; 88, ἄμβροτα is not translated; 98, 9.146–7 are Englished but not quoted in the Latin; 133, *miserabile visu* is present in the Latin but not translated; 160, *fit gemitus* is quoted but not translated; 174, *equo* is omitted from the translation; 270, 2.196–7 are translated but not quoted in the Latin. The utility of the volume is enhanced by a detailed list of passages quoted and by a full, helpful index.

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A. L. F. RIVET, COLIN SMITH. The Place-names of Roman Britain. Princeton, Princeton University Press and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. Pp. xviii + 526. $100.

This joint endeavour by a Romance philologist and a Romano-British expert with a long interest in maps and place-names arose from the discovery that they were working on similar lines. If at first glance there is an impression of two books in one, this stems not from the dual authorship but from the lengthy gazetteer of all known Romano-British place names which forms the second half of the book (pp. 237-514), while the first consists of continuous chapters. In fact the two parts are integrally connected, since exempla from the gazetteer are needed to illustrate arguments made in the earlier section. Technical material is not, however, thereby simply relegated to the back, for many a detailed treatment appears in the earlier chapters, as witness the route by route survey of the British section of the Antonine Itinerary, or the many specific philological or textual points which are raised. In short, this is no book for the faint-hearted: neither is it purely a work of reference, for the discussion bears on issues such as the Latinity of Roman Britain and the nature of the maps available in the Roman world. After an introduction, one chapter apiece is devoted to the various categories of material—the literary authorities, Ptolemy, itineraries, the Ravenna Cosmographer, the Notitia Dignitatum and finally inscriptions. Throughout, a knowledge of Latin is normally taken for granted (though the literary authorities of chapter 2 are translated), but translations (or, for descriptive place-names, Latin equivalents) are given for Greek. A thorough grounding in Roman Britain and its geography, or in the relevant branch of philology, is obviously desirable.

After a brief *Forschungsgeschichte* which, among other things, stresses the preeminence of the 16th-century William Camden in early provincial Roman studies, the introductory chapter deals with the languages of Roman Britain. Although intended primarily in relationship to place-names, this is the most general and non-technical section of the book, effectively presenting the wider conclusions in a manner interesting and comprehensible to non-experts. Occasionally, specific references are lacking (on p. 14 the "best modern opinion" in Gaul must be that of P.-M. Duval in *La vie quotidienne en Gaule pendant la paix romaine* [Paris 1952]) or misleading (p. 15 n. 2, where consultation of Ellis Evans, *Gaulish Personal Names* [Oxford 1967] 116-17 will show that it is Taximagulus, not Tasciovanus, which may mean "slave of Taxis"). The authors (here mostly Smith) argue persuasively for a large measure of very varied bilingualism, for the possibility of a written British Celtic and for a vigorous late Roman literary (as opposed to spoken) Latin which was then re-inforced by the church. The energy which this imputes to what has been termed "sub-Roman" Christianity corresponds with the picture recently drawn by Charles Thomas, *Christianity in Roman Britain to A.D. 500* (London/Berkeley 1981)—as the authors certainly knew. In seeing a Vulgar Latin of Roman Britain, as opposed to a more specifically "British" Latin, they are at odds with the great *doyen* of Roman-British philological studies, Kenneth Jackson: while amply acknowledging their general debt to him, they point to the vastly increased amount of epigraphical evidence now available for a Latin written by people well below

the social summit. The place-names of Britain (apart from the comparative lack of names terminating in *-acum*) have naturally much in common with those of Gaul. Purely Latin names, despite military occupation, are few, the vast majority being either Latin/Celtic compounds or names of purely British origin (Celtic or sometimes pre-Celtic); these then did in a sense become Latin, and thereafter underwent Latin rather than Celtic sound changes. As in Gaul, new Roman foundations (including fort sites) were usually given native names: some, e.g., Novio-magus, are at least appropriate to new settlements, others, e.g., Durnovaria, not obviously so. Among the large body of purely British names, references to geographical features (especially water) and to human habitation predominate. Finally, the introduction offers a useful if inevitably more technical analysis of the sources of error, or of legitimate variants, in place-names, and the problems of distinguishing one from the other, given that scribes both ancient and medieval, normally ignorant of the material, were involved. Reference might have been made here to the problems of reproducing Scottish Gaelic place-names in English orthography, and to the many absurdities that resulted: this would have strengthened the point that a high degree of logical consistency is not really to be expected. This chapter might also have been the place for some conclusions on the nature of ancient maps, a topic broached several times but nowhere summarized, though who is better equipped than Rivet?

The following six chapters (the first three primarily by Rivet, the others by Smith) have a common format. After discussion of the nature of the documents, the type of information they afford, their sources and their problems, whole sections of or excerpts from the ancient texts are reproduced, with further detailed commentary. This sometimes makes for heavy going, though there are numerous tidbits of curious knowledge to delight the attuned reader—a possible reference in Plutarch to western Scotland's feared Corryvrechan whirlpool (more might have been made, by contrast, with the same author's information, in *Caesar* 23.2, that many ancients denied the very existence of Britain), or the fact that some place-names derived from that curious 18th-century invention, the spurious Richard of Cirencester, were only expunged from Ordnance Survey maps after World War II. Problems are squarely faced, the latest improved texts and commentaries taken into account (though we still find a reference on p. 53 to Suidas for the *Suda*) and, as a result, some previous identifications or emendations rejected. Among these are the variant Tanaus (Tyne) for Taus (Tay) in Tacitus *Agricola* 22.1, Pausanias' puzzling "Genunian region" (which a defective textual tradition seems to have moved to Britain from Raetia) and various "ghost" names produced by the over-trusting Collingwood and Richmond from the garbled text of the Ravenna Cosmographer. To explain the curious distortion of Scotland by Ptolemy, Rivet follows Tierney's suggestion that it derived from Eratosthenes, and that no astronomical data were to hand for Britain. The upshot is that Orrea (Horrea) Classis is to be sought north of the Tay and Pinnata Castra near the river Findhorn, while the legionary fortress at Inchtuthill was Victoria (after the 20th legion); this shift north of several places is certainly consistent with recent archaeological discoveries.

In the section on itineraries (mostly the Antonine, since the Peutinger

Table is sadly truncated for Britain), Rivet discusses the sources of error, especially the quite regular shortfall of the mileages given. It might be noted that if the so-called *milliarium Tongrense* actually stood near its find-spot (just outside a medieval city-gate of Tongeren), it might support the idea that distances were measured from the city limits, though not necessarily the rather vague concept of a "town-zone" (pp. 153–54). The pressing into service by Smith of the Notitia Dignitatum is accomplished with a brief and notably sane survey of the problems of its date and purpose, and a warning against expecting too high a degree of logicality (since it was not used for any practical army purposes). Relevant inscriptions, apart from the Rudge cup and Amiens patera with their references to forts on Hadrian's Wall, are few. The argument attributing the generally small number of Romano-British inscriptions to the lack of town walls built in the late third or early fourth century should not however be pressed too far—inscriptions from Metz and Reims are mostly from cemeteries, and Trier had no walls of that period.

The Gazetteer gives full discussion of etymologies as well as identifications, and is a fascinating mine of information (on Gaul as well as Britain), not all of it unpublished but only here made conveniently available. To pick a few random examples: archaeology and philology combine to suggest that the Roman fort Blatobulgium (Birrens) may have been called "flour-sack" after its granaries; the name Brocolitia probably refers to pointed rocks (but are there any?) or (more likely) heather, although 'brock" for badger comes from a British root; the well known element Venta defies explanation (see under Bannaventa, p. 265), and Pliny's famous tale that Italian Beneventum was originally Maleventum is exposed as mere amateur etymologising. In the Appendix on doubtful names, the reviewer has at last discovered the reason for the curious name Bertha applied to a roman fort in Perthshire (it is a 14th-century invention).

In the introduction, Smith engagingly admits that the etymology of place-names is at best learned guesswork, and that some of today's best guesses may be no closer, though usually less entertainingly fantastic, than those of ancient or early modern scholars. But even if scholarship moves on, as it must, this modestly authoritative book is assured of a permanent place. Many potential readers, it is true, will prefer to consult it in libraries rather than buy it for their own shelves, a fact that is presumably reflected in the high price. But for devotees (professional or amateur) of ancient maps or toponymy, it is treasure trove, as to all scholars concerned with the interplay between Latin and Celtic in the northern provinces. Certainly, to anyone who happens to be tired of the 150 page book-with-a-thesis, it promises absorbing (but also interruptable) reading, and may even have the person not well versed in Jonathan Swift (see p. 105) reaching for a dictionary of quotations. This is a book in the very finest, relatively timeless antiquarian tradition, in which very real erudition and wit are happily combined with an earnest endeavour to reach the limits of currently establishable truth.

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HELENE P. FOLEY, Editor. Reflections of Women in Antiquity. New York, London and Paris, Gordon and Breach, 1981. Pp. 420. Cloth, $39.50.

In *A Room of One's Own* (1929) Virginia Woolf described her research for a lecture she was preparing for the Arts Society on women and fiction. She began at the British Museum, she writes, "... for if truth is not to be found on the shelves of the British Museum, where I asked myself, picking up a notebook and pencil, is truth?" On the shelves were many books about women—most of them, she notes, written by angry professors, and most of them dealing with the time of Shakespeare and later. Even today she would be likely to begin her research with Shakespeare: a large gap still exists where the books on women in antiquity should be. The gap is slowly being filled, however, and *Reflections of Women in Antiquity* is an excellent sampling of today's work in this field.

Virginia Woolf also noted the inconsistency between the significance of women as a spur to the imagination (as portrayed in Shakespeare, for example) and the insignificance of women in actual life (as depicted in historical documents). It is a major strength of this volume that its contributors demonstrate their awareness of this inconsistency, and that they are both careful in their use of evidence and tentative in their conclusions. Carefulness, however, does not mean stodginess, and the reader of *Reflections* will be pleasantly surprised at the use of new methodologies and at new ways of looking at familiar texts.

The fifteen papers selected for this volume represent, according to Foley, the two main types of methodology used for the study of women in antiquity today. One approach, adopted by most of the contributors, is the careful study of ancient poetic texts for insights about the place of women in the Greco-Roman world. Included in this group are studies of the polarities in *Iliad* VI (Arthur), Sappho's "romantization of the erotic impulse" (Stigers), Sappho's language and "the double-consciousness of women" (Winkler), Attic drama as a historical source (Foley), Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* as a "dialogue between tragedy and comedy" (Zeitlin), Theocritus' *Idylls* 2 and 15 and the "call to complacency about the status of real women" (Griffiths), Asclepiades' female characters as respectable women rather than prostitutes (Cameron), and Virgil's treatment of Aeneas' relationships with women (Perkell).

The remaining papers adopt the second line of research and represent the critical analysis of various types of evidence for the economic, social and legal position of women in antiquity. Topics examined in these papers are the economic and social position of women in Mycenaean Greece (Billigmeier and Turner), the role of women in "establishing and maintaining social order" in Herodotus (Dewald), the evidence for the literacy of Greek women (Cole), the economic and legal position of women in Roman Egypt (Pomeroy), the role of women in Etruscan Italy (Bonfante), the influence of women in the cultural and political life of Republican Rome (Carp), and the evidence for adultery at Rome (Richlin).

The book's major drawback is the vast expanse of time represented in its contributions. A single book including papers on topics from the Bronze Age to the fourth century A.D. obviously cannot cover any historical period or literary genre in depth. The Hellenist will be disappointed that only three papers deal with the Classical Period, and Latin scholars that only three papers deal primarily with Roman women and Latin sources. Nevertheless, these excellent pa-

pers present the reader—both specialist and non-specialist alike—with an overview of the state of the research in this field, and provide a stimulus for further work. Foley and the other contributors are to be commended for a valuable addition to our limited knowledge of women in antiquity.

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J. DIGGLE, Editor. Euripidis Fabulae ii. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981.
JAMES DIGGLE. Studies on the Text of Euripides: Supplices, Electra, Heracles, Troades, Iphigenia in Tauris, Ion. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981.

A new Oxford text of Euripides has been needed for a long time, Murray's being quirky even for its day. Now James Diggle is at work on a replacement and has given us, as his first installment, a new edition of Murray's second volume together with a volume of discussions of individual passages. (The reason for beginning with the second volume is that five of the six plays in it depend on a single manuscript and the sixth on only three. We need not, therefore, wait for these plays upon the extensive investigation of mss. necessary for the majority of the plays in volumes i and iii.) D's text is based on the conclusions of Turyn and Zuntz: that for the "alphabetic" plays P is a copy of L; that Demetrius Triclinius made two sets of corrections in L, the earlier set based on a ms. or mss., the later on his own conjectures; that these two sets can be distinguished by ink color; that P was copied from L after the first but before the second set and provides us with readings obliterated by Triclinius' subsequent corrections; and, further, that for *Tro.*, in addition to V and P, a third ms. Q is an independent witness for lines 1-610.

The fresh collation of L only rarely produces anything new (e.g., at *El.* 568 where, however, D's preferred reading may be a mere slip by L), and the number of places where Q alone preserves the truth is small (the two most important, *Tro.* 238 and ⸗2, were already noted by Murray). What makes this edition a great advance over its predecessor is D's patient hard work. In the textual discussions in *Studies* and in the earlier articles of his to which he refers the reader, D spares himself no pains to determine exactly how regular or anomalous any given metrical, lexical, grammatical, or stylistic phenomenon is. As a result, future editors of tragedy will turn to his discussions of, for example, correption confused with elision (*Sup.* 60-62), ὡς for ὥστε in Euripides (*Sup.* 201-4), trimeters without caesura (*Sup.* 699), the distribution of σμικρός and μικρός (*HF* 503), repetition of a single word of the preceding speaker in an indignant question (*HF* 556-57), as well as other discussions mentioned below. D has a good grasp of the enormous secondary literature on the text. To this material he brings a considerable fertility in producing his own conjectures and a sober and independent judgment capable of distinguishing—whether in his own work or that of earlier scholars—what is of permanent value. Available space allows me to illustrate these virtues from only three of the six plays. Here are some of the textual changes and discussions worthy of mention.

El. 1 the obelus is deserved: 102 ἔω Kirchhoff: 115–16 'Αγαμέμνονος [κούρα] Seidler καί μ' ἔτικτε Hermann: 135 δὲ pro τῶνδε Hermann: 186–87 a valuable note on prodelision in lyric: 209 φυγὰς πατρίων Seidler: 216–17 a good defense of ἐφεστίους, illuminating the stage action: 238 ὅπως Elmsley, with a discussion of the idioms ἔχειν πῶς τινος and εἶναί πού τινος: 244 τί δ' αὖ σοῦ Seidler: 277 the obelus is deserved: 353 τίνα πορεύοντες Reiske: 360 del. Barrett: 368–72 Reeve's deletion mentioned in app. crit.: 373–79 del. Wilamowitz: 396–400 Reeve's deletion mentioned in app. crit.: 426–27 D's discussion shows the superiority of Schaefer's γνώμη πέσῃ to Stobaeus' γνώμης πέσω: 434 χορεύματα Diggle: 460 πεδίλοις κορυφὰν Herwerden: 484 θανάτου δίκαν Diggle: 568 repunctuated, with φρονεῖς (L^{ac}) for φρονῆις: 582 Vitelli's lacuna after this verse is adopted: 619 τἄμ' οὖν (Weil): 659 μοι Diggle, ἄγε Jortin: 776 καινὸς Kvičala: 864 ὑπάειδε Diggle: 921–24 Hartung's deletion mentioned in app. crit.: 955 πέρας Weil: 1045 Diggle's supposition of a lacuna after this verse is convincing: 1126 δεκάτην σελήνην Musgrave: 1107–8 post 1131 trai. Weil: 1152 σχέτλιε Diggle: 1209 τακόμαν Seidler: 1234 βαίνουσί Hartung: 1263 ψήφου . . . θέσις Tucker: 1330 οἶκτος Diggle.

Tro. 59 οὗ Wecklein: 60 κατηιθαλωμένην Elmsley, with discussion of periphrasis as the equivalent of a transitive verb: 99 δέρην ⟨τ'⟩ Musgrave: 101 ἄνσχου Nauck: 119 ἐπιοῦσ' Musgrave: 150 διερειδομένου Herwerden: 166 ἐξορμίζεσθ' Headlam: 198 τάνδ' ἂν . . . ἐξαιάζοις Wilamowitz: 332 χόρευμ' ἄναγε, πόδα σὸν Diggle: 335 βόασον Diggle: 416 ἠιτησάμην Naber: 417 σοῦ Hermann: 474 ἡ μὲν τύραννος Elmsley: 514 ἄισον σὺν Burges and Seidler: 533 πεύκαν οὐρεί αν Dobree: 546 ἄειρον ἅμα Diggle: 592 δή ποθ' Seidler: 593 Πριάμωι Musgrave: 634–35 del. Dindorf: 638 obelized: 695 ἔχω Burges: 742–43 del. Nauck: 745–48 West's highly attractive deletion mentioned in app. crit.: 809 ἀτιζόμενος Jackson: 862–63 del. Herwerden: 918 del. Paley: 975 οὐ Hartung: 1059 αἰσχίονες Hermann (cf. S. *Phil.* 906 for the rare moral use applied to people): 1069 ἔωι Wilamowitz: 1140 del. Herwerden: 1177 στέγω Diggle: 1252 ἐν Porson: 1257 τούσδ' Lenting.

Ion 1 ὁ χαλκέοισιν οὐρανὸν νώτοις Ἄτλας Page's suppletion of a lacunose quotation in Philodemus: 51 Herwerden's deletion is mentioned in the app. crit.: 98–99 εὔφημοι Camper, φήμας [τ'] Hermann: 190 τᾶιδ' Dobree: 237 ante h. u. lac. indic. Lloyd-Jones: 300 ὑστερεῖ Badham 324–25 post 329 trai. Herwerden: 355–56 post 358 trai. Diggle: 382 ἕνα δ' ἂν εὐτυχῆ Heath: 475 καρποφόροι Diggle: 507 λόγων Badham: 521 φιλεῖν Triclinius: 528 ἐμοί L^{sl}: 537 ἄλλων Dobree: 578–81 del. Diggle: 583 τ' Dindorf: 609 τῆς συμφορᾶς Diggle: 692 πλέκει Diggle, τέχναν Schoemann: 700–1 πόσει τ' . . . φίλωι Diggle: 711 δεινῶν Diggle: 712 νέου Hartung: 737 παλαιῶν . . . αὐτοχθόνων Jackson: 743 περιφερὴς στίβος Diggle: 830–31 del. Dindorf: 844–58 del. Diggle: 899 βάλλω τὰν σὰν εἰς εὐνάν Buchholtz: 905 σὺ δὲ ⟨καὶ⟩ Diggle: 911 φῶς Wilamowitz: 922 κάποις Kirchhoff: 925 οἴκτου Nauck: 932 'κθεῖναι Dobree: 959 πῶς [δ']; Matthiae: 1035 ⟨τι⟩ Wakefield: 1065 λαιμῶν Scaliger: 1108 ante h. u. lac. indic. Badham: 1117 del. Kvičala: 1275–78 del. Diggle: 1300–3 post 1295 trai. Nauck: 1343 ὁ θεὸς [σ'] . . . δόμοις ⟨σ'⟩ Badham, useful discussion of synizesis: 1406 δόλωι Jacobs: 1410 πλοκάς Jacobs: 1434 σκόπελος ἐξηνέγκατο Stephanus et Scaliger: 1562 κομίζηι 'ς post Lenting et Reiske Diggle: 1581 ἓν φῦλον Hermann.

Now let me mention a few disagreements and suggestions. *El.* 59: the transposition of this verse to follow 56 is not an improvement. 59 looks like a second purpose to the action of 56, not a second purposive action. It also interrupts the connection between 56 and 57. The sense is best rendered by ἀφῶμεν (Schafer), though the corruption would be hard to explain. The obelus seems called for. 498: D ought to consider Jackson's objections (*Marg. Scen.*, pp. 89 f.) to ὀσμῇι κατῆρες. 518–44: Mau's excision, seconded by Fraenkel, deserved mention.

The by now standard assignment of speakers in 671–84, first proposed by Kvičala but already there in germ in the *editio princeps* of Victorius, is mere *Spielerei* and should be abandoned in favor of the ms. attributions. The arguments for change (see Denniston) are nugatory: 676 may mean "Grant these men [Orestes, Senex] the right to avenge a father" and can belong to Electra as assigned by L. In 679, "these your dear children" are unproblematic in Orestes' mouth, where L puts them. In 672 we need not accept Fix's οἴκτιρέ γ', which would require a change of speaker. (The only close parallels to this kind of interruption of a prayer after an initial vocative are comic anyway. See Ar. *Pax* 446 and 452 with Platnauer's notes and Denniston, *GP*, p. 137.) Read Dobree's οἴκτιρον. (For the alternation of present and aorist imperatives, cf. *Hip.* 473–74 and Barrett's note.) The arguments against change are weighty: first, while names of speakers have no ms. authority, *changes* of speaker do. In all the places in our passage (673, 674, 676, 677, 684) where the wording either compels or strongly suggests a change of speaker, the tradition indicates such a change. The previous 53 lines have been in stichomythy, with all but one change accurately marked (L omits the paragraphos at 630). How, in view of this general level of accuracy, can we believe that eight paragraphoi have disappeared in the short space of our passage? Second, there is no parallel for the kind of prayer Kvičala imagines, where one speaker gives one vocative, the second speaker a second, the third supplies an imperative, and so on. The parallel supplication in *Cho.* 479–509 shows what normal practice is. There is good reason, then, to retain the ms. attributions, including 684 as given to Electra (the unmodified πατήρ fits her better anyway) and no change of speaker at 685.

This leads to a simple solution to the problems of 684–93, where Broadhead's transposition of 688 to follow 684 and Nauck's deletion of 685–89, both accepted by D, are unnecessary. Read Seidler's κτανεῖν in 685, delete 688–92, and all is well:

Ηλ.	πάντ', οἶδ', ἀκούει τάδε πατήρ· στείχειν δ' ἀκμή.	684
	καί σοι προφωνῶ πρὸς τάδ' Αἴγισθον κτανεῖν,	685
	ὡς εἰ παλαισθεὶς πτῶμα θανάσιμον πεσῇι,	
	τέθνηκα κἀγὼ μηδέ με ζῶσαν λέγε.	687
Ορ.	πάντ' οἶδα. Ηλ. πρὸς τάδ' ἄνδρα γίγνεσθαί σε χρή.	693
	ὑμεῖς δέ μοι, γυναῖκες, κτλ.	694

(In 685, πρὸς τάδ' is prospective, "in view of what I am about to say," and anticipates the ὡς clause of 686–87. In 693, it is retrospective.) In 693 Orestes' πάντ' οἶδα ("you need say no more") shows that he understands Electra's 687 as an oblique threat of suicide, a threat she feels the need to spell out only to the Chorus in 695–98, not to her brother. (The author of 688–89 is not appreciative of this reticence nor impatient of the redundancy his addition introduces.) In

reply, Electra draws the consequences for Orestes: be brave. (D, p. 38, attempts to legislate against this *antilabe* but on the basis of too narrow a formulation. The fact is that isolated *antilabe* occurs, as at *Sup.* 513, *HF* 531, *Ion* 803, and it is doubtful that it was important to E whether the division occurred after the third, or after some other, element.) Then she addresses the women of the Chorus, telling them to give her a signal of the outcome by shouting to her as she sits within, sword at the ready. That 688 is spurious is shown by Jackson, *Marg. Scaen.*, p. 235. That 690–92 are is shown by the following: their author appears to have misunderstood 694–95 as a reference to a shout of gladness or grief from within the house (given by whom?) rather than as a signal; ὀλολύξεται πᾶν δῶμα suggests a whole palace rejoicing and is ridiculously applied to a humble cottage; the tense of θνήισκοντος is false (will they give over mourning when Orestes expires?); and it is absurd to regard the joy at his victory or the mourning for his defeat by "the whole household" as a motive for Orestes' bravery worth mentioning in the next breath after, or instead of, the suicide of his sister. The phrasing ταῦτα σοὶ λέγω / ὑμεῖς δέ is not adequately defended as characteristically Euripidean by Diggle's examples (p. 39), in all of which the contrast is made within a single line.

959–66: The assumption of a lacuna before or after 966 is necessitated only by the traditional but needless rejection of L's speaker indications at 959 and 962–65. The reasons for these changes (see Denniston) are not weighty. There is no need to assume that Orestes cannot speak the words σφαγῆς πάροιθε (961) because his nerve is already failing. On the contrary, it is only the sight of his mother later that unnerves him (968–69: γάρ = yes, for). Nor is 964 a "horrified dwelling on the maternal tie" (Denniston) but rather typical stichomythic padding. Against change: first, Orestes is the natural one to give orders to his slaves. His εἶεν, likewise, is a proper resumption of the business at hand after the harangue of Electra, for which he himself had given permission. Second, only Electra can identify Clytaemnestra in 964 since Orestes has not seen her since he was a baby. The only change desirable is Kirchhoff's transposition of 965 and 966. Orestes assents to the identification of the mother he does not know on the basis of her splendid finery (for this use of καὶ μήν, see Denniston, *GP*, p. 353). Electra then remarks that she has come nicely into the trap. Orestes' hesitation follows directly on the sight of her. 1272: Reiske's ἀστιβὲς would improve sense and rhythm alike. 1292–1307: In a forthcoming note I argue that Victorius' assignment of 1292–93 and 1298–1300 to the Chorus, Orelli's μυσαραῖς in 1294, and Arnoldt's transposition, seconded by Winnington-Ingram, of 1295–97 to follow 1302, all adopted by D, are not only unnecessary but positively ruinous.

Tro. 71: Nauck's κοὐ δείν' seems intolerably flat. 95–97: D's treatment of these lines is unsatisfactory, as I show in a note forthcoming in *CQ*. Blomfield's δὲ for τε gives the required sense: "That mortal is a fool who sacks cities but who, when he has given to desolation the temples and the tombs, shrines of the departed, perishes later himself." The folly of such men does not consist in sacking cities, which does not fall under divine condemnation either in this play or elsewhere, but in the fact that after conspicuous success they meet by their own subsequent mistake (here the slight to Athena) with conspicuous failure. 114: There are three reasons why we require a paroemiac here and why therefore Hermann's νῶτ' ἐν στερροῖσι ταθεῖσα is correct. First, elision at sentence-end

coinciding with the end of an anapaestic metron or verse is quite rare (e.g., *Sup.* 1233). In our passage the elision is introduced by emendation. Second, the pause created by catalexis is desirable before the οἴμοι of 115: cf. *Hip.* 207 and 1369. Third, the passage is symmetrical: 6 full dimeters plus paroemiac, 3 full dimeters plus paroemiac, 3 full dimeters plus paroemiac, and 6 full dimeters plus paroemiac. 308: Bothe's and Seidler's φέρε gives the correct meter here (two dochmii), but the line should be repunctuated: ἄνεχε, πάρεχε φῶς· φέρε σέβω, φλέγω. For φέρε with the first-person subjunctive, see 1282 and LSJ s.v. IX.2. 703: Musurus' οἳ is dubious as I doubt that one will find a parallel in E for an article standing all but bare at the end of one line with the noun and its other modifiers in the next. Read ἵν' ἦι ποτε and P's ἐξ οὗ in 704: "so that he may someday be the source from whom sons begotten might settle Troy again." For the potential optative without ἄν in a relative clause, cf. A. *Ag.* 620. 886: Not even the most anthropocentric sophist would identify the power that governs the world with the mind of *mortals*, and βροτοῖς, a suggestion I remember reading somewhere but cannot now locate, is all but inevitable. 1171–72: D's "fort. corrupti" should read "aut valde corrupti aut interpolati."

Ion 258: Against L Dindorf's ποίου πατρὸς, attractive as restoring to Ion the questions, What is your country? Who is your father? and What is your name? to be answered by Creusa ὕστερον πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς, D cites the frequency of τίς with words for parent and of ποῖος with πάτρα, χθών, and the like. This is impressive, though two passages where ὁποῖος is used with μήτηρ (*Ion* 574 and 803) are evidence on the other side, and D's attempt to explain them away is not convincing. A more important piece of evidence on the other side is that in all the places where E uses φῦναι or πεφυκέναι with an ablatival genitive, with or without a preposition (*Hcld.* 325, 509, *Hip.* 448, *Sup.* 842, *El.* 673 [Barnes], *IT* 4, *Ion* 50, 313, 778, *Pho.* 9, 11, *Or.* 11, 17, 22, *Ba.* 989, fr. 360.8, 520.3, 739.1, 839.9), the genitive is never a place and in all but two of these (*Sup.* 842, fr. 839.9) it is a person. This speaks strongly in favor of Dindorf. Mention should also be made of Murray's πατρός, γῆ δ' in 261. 374–77: Several phrases here have a Euripidean ring, and a motive for interpolation is hard to discover. There are grounds for suspicion, but the square brackets are not fully justified. For a defense, a reinterpretation with minor emendations, see *TAPA* 109 (1979) 113–15. 390: The suggestions of Sander, Seidler, and H. Müller, reported in D's apparatus, all labor under an almost certainly fatal objection: E does not elsewhere contract any form of ἐᾶν by synizesis. Of the suggestions reported by Wecklein, only Badham's ἀλλ' αἰνέσαι μὲν deserves to have any future. 589–90: Several people have realized that αὐτόχθονας ought to be predicative and only κλεινὰς attributive, yet previous attempts to make it so, such as Wakefield's φησὶ πᾶς αὐ., are unconvincing. The obelus may be called for, yet perhaps the truth lies somewhere in the direction of εἶναι μῦθος ἔστ' αὐ., with μῦθος ἔστ' being displaced by its gloss φασι and the meter thoughtlessly repaired. Then in 590 I would read κοὐκ: "Men say that famous Athens is autochthonous and no imported race." 598: Herwerden's ὄντες σοφοί, adopted by D, is wrong. This conjecture makes Ion's second class of Athenians δυνάμενοι which cannot mean "men of ability" but only "[politically] powerful" (see LSJ s.v. I.1), the very thing they decline to be. It also creates grammatical difficulties since the three nominatives modifying the subject

of σπεύδουσιν now stand in no discernible relation. Why should σοφοί have an ὄντες and χρηστοί none? L's reading is correct and it means "All those who, being well-born and having the means to become philosophers, do not rush into politics, etc." Only thus can we explain the connection among being "good," having the ability to be "wise," and an inactive life. At the same time, I believe 595-606 to be spurious: see *TAPA* 109 (1979) 116-24 and now *GRBS* 23 (1982) 31-50, esp. 35-36 and nn. 15, 29, 40, and 53. 1405: Whitman's explanation of this line (*CP* 59 [1964] 257-58), with P's γε and L's λόγωι in 1406 has a good chance of being right.

Misprints at *Ion* 60, 1280, and 1583.

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LA FILOLOGIA GRECA E LATINA NEL SECOLO XX

Congresso Internazionale—Roma, 17-21 settembre 1984

Under the auspices of the Italian Council for Scientific Research (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche), a Congress is to be held in Rome from September 17th to 21st 1984, in the Aula Magna of the Council itself, Piazzale Aldo Moro 7, Roma. The subject will be "Greek and Latin Philology in the Twentieth Century."

The Aim of the Congress is to provide a comprehensive outline as well as an international survey of the studies concerning the history of textual tradition and criticism, the editing of texts, and the interpretation of Greek and Latin literature, during the 20th century. A large number of scholars from various countries have been asked to contribute with papers relating each to their own cultural areas.

Organizing Committee: Prof. Graziano Arrighetti (Università di Pisa, Chairman)—Prof. Donatella Fogazza (Università di Roma, Secretary)—Prof. Leopoldo Gamberale (Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli)—Prof. Franco Montanari (Università di Pisa).

Secretary of the Congress: Prof. Donatella Fogazza—Segreteria del Congresso "La filologia Greca e Latina nel secolo XX"—Istituto di Filologia Classica—Facoltà di Lettere—Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5—00185 ROMA (Italia).

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late mythographers. Even when *ethos* and opportunity are duly regarded, such conjectures have a rather small chance of being right, for our knowledge of the tradition is too defective; Wilamowitz' notion of the *Catalogue*, now tested against the real article, shows how much can be done by a master, and at the same time how much is quite beyond reach. Yet these qualms are not so important. The main objection is that the Erysichthon story, like any Greek myth, is not to be explained in terms of literary artifice, of poetic fancy and learned variation. Even if every link in the chain of literary succession were assured, the significance of the story would still escape us. Consider the following points.

The principals of the story are strange and shifting. The famished offender may be either Erysichthon or Triopas, who is otherwise Erysichthon's father; and Aethon, ostensibly a surname of Erysichthon, must be another independent figure. Moreover, a somewhat similar role outside the Erysichthon story falls to Phorbas, said to be either son or father of Triopas. The destitute Erysichthon is supported by his daughter Mestra, who procures endless bride-gifts; but Erysichthon himself is also represented as a lad who lives with his parents and is reduced at last to begging at the crossroads. There are conflicting local ties. The setting of Erysichthon's or of Triopas' misfortune is invariably Thessaly, save in the earliest version of all, where it is Athens; Erysichthon as a native of Athens evokes the Athenian *genos* Erysichthonidae. Although Triopas and Phorbas are enrolled in Thessalian and also in Argive genealogy, the town and sanctuary Triopium near Cnidus has first claim to Triopas, and Phorbas belongs to Rhodes, more precisely to a festival of Ialysus. Other deities besides Demeter are concerned in the story. Mestra is abducted by Poseidon and like other favourites of his is rewarded with magic powers. Apollo is worshipped at Triopium and is served by the *genos* Erysichthonidae; he also stands behind Phorbas on Rhodes.

It is perfectly futile to say that such details as these—the various persons, places, and deities—are invented or altered by poets and historians to suit their own purposes. The details obviously come from real life, from the most constant and glaring aspect of life in the ancient world, namely public ritual. Most Greek myths are inspired by ritual (and ignorance of ritual vitiates most of modern theorizing about the myths). In the present case we have not one myth, but a pattern of myths, and their source must be a pattern of rites occurring at different places—at Triopium, on Rhodes, and at Athens. Only Triopium can explain the name and nature of Triopas; Phorbas' adventure on Rhodes is expressly labelled in our sources as a ritual *aition*; Erysichthon's Athe-

nian milieu happens to be very fully documented. For Aethon direct evidence fails, but a case can be argued for the type of ritual, and a guess can be made about the setting. Places as far apart as Athens and Triopium have contributed to the Erysichthon story because they share certain rites. W. Burkert, to whom we owe a number of profound studies of myth and ritual, has suggested that our story arises from ritual begging in the service of Demeter.[2] We shall see that ritual begging is indeed a large part of it, but begging in the service of Apollo, not Demeter, much the best-known form. Thus an old and popular story reflects an old and prevalent rite.

Triopas and Triopium

Triopas appears in the story almost as constantly as Erysichthon himself.[3] From the *Catalogue* onwards Erysichthon's father, wherever named, is Triopas ([Hes.] fr. 43a.3, 43b; Call. *H. Cer.* 30-31, etc.; Ov. *Met.* 8.751, cf. 872), except in Hellanicus, who made Myrmidon the father (*FGrHist* 4 F 7, whence Ael. *Var. Hist.* 1.27) and may have placed "Triops" in a collateral line (cf. F 122). In a version familiar to later sources, Triopas takes the place of Erysichthon, and offends Demeter in Dotium, and is punished with infamy or destitution, and therefore goes abroad (Diod. 4.61.1-2 = *FGrHist* 533 [Rhodos, Anhang] F 11; Marc. Sid. *IG* 14.1390 II; Hyg. *Astr.* 2.14). Lycophron appears to conflate Triopas and Erysichthon (*Alex.* 1391-96). The question arises whether Triopas was not once an independent figure somehow equivalent to Erysichthon, so that the two might be either affiliated or identified.

We look first for Triopas' place of origin. Triopas and Erysichthon are nearly always said to be at home in Thessaly, in Dotium, and after one of them offends Demeter, Triopas removes to Triopium or thereabouts. The *Catalogue* situates Erysichthon in Athens, but attaches him to the Aeolid stemma through his father Triopas, whose Thessalian background is thus presupposed. In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (lines 211, 213?) Apollo as a suitor vies with Phorbas son of Triopas—doubt-

[2] *Gnomon* 46 (1974) 322-23; *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1979) 135, 208, ns. 6-8.

[3] For Triopas see M. Mayer, *ML* 5 (1916-1924) 1118-25 *s.v.*; Wilamowitz 2.35-39; Ernst Wüst, *RE* 7A 1 (1939) 168-74 *s.v.*

less in Thessaly, which according to the outlook of this part of the *Hymn* is Apollo's first stamping ground.[4] Triopas' further connections are plainly secondary. He may be born on Rhodes and travel thence to different parts, to Thessaly and Triopium and so on (Diod. 5.56.5, 57.6 = Zeno *FGrHist* 523 F 1; Diod. 5.61.1-3 = *FGrHist* 533 F 11); he may rule on Cos, or may beget the Coan eponym Merops (schol. Theocr. *Id.* 17.68b; Steph. Byz. *s.* Μέροψ); his son Phorbas may come from Thessaly to Rhodes (Dieuchidas *FGrHist* 485 F 7; Polyzelus *FGrHist* 521 F 7); or his son Xanthus, at the head of Pelasgians "from Argos," may settle Lycia and Lesbos (Diod. 5.81.2). These figments illustrate the putative links between the Dodecanese and Thessaly, the lore of Pelasgian and other migrations, and the pretensions of Rhodes. Triopas is enrolled in Argive genealogy, as son of Phorbas and father of Pelasgus, as early as Hellanicus (*FGrHist* 4 F 36b); and though his transparent name agrees with a prominent feature of local worship (more of this below), he and his kin are obviously fetched from Thessaly to Argos to subserve the exegesis of "Pelasgic Argos" (*Il.* 2.681). Much later the Argive Triopas throws out suckers at Pellene, Elis, and Messene.

The original home is either Thessaly or Triopium, but which? Thessaly, says the myth. But as already intimated, Triopas' flight from Dotium is part of a larger pattern. Thessaly, in the schemes of fifth century historians which still haunt us, became the starting point and forcing-bed of folk migrations—of restless Pelasgians, Dorians, and Boeotians, and of many lesser breeds. Long before this, epic poets gave a large domain to the progeny of Thessalian heroines accosted by Poseidon or Apollo. In the myths of Heracles, moreover, Thessaly has a special relationship with Cos and Rhodes, and Cos in particular shares other old names with Thessaly. The hypothesis of actual movements of people, Dorian or pre-Dorian, from Thessaly to the Dodecanese—or even in the reverse direction—is a favourite recourse of historians,[5] and as yet is neither confirmed nor belied by the growing archaeological evidence in both quarters. The substantial Mycenaean remains on Cos and Rhodes might also encourage us to reconsider the old notion that these places took the lead in forming the Heracles cycle and perhaps other myths,[6] and that many persons and events were afterwards transposed

[4] The text and meaning of lines 208-13 are problematic. The name Τρίοπος in line 213 appears to be corrupt; cf. Wilamowitz, *Isyllos von Epidauros* (Berlin 1886) 80, n. 53.

[5] M. Sordi, *La lega tessala* (Rome 1958) 1-31, argues for a migration of Dorian Greeks from the Dodecanese to Thessaly at the end of the Mycenaean period.

[6] Cf. P. Friedlander *Herakles* (Berlin 1907).

to Thessaly to fill a void which we still sense in the Homeric *Catalogue of Ships*.

Such are the general problems, and it is obvious at once that for the present purpose a solution is beyond our reach—but it is also unnecessary. For, given the strong disposition to trace the settlement of Cos and Rhodes to Thessaly, it was inevitable that Triopas and Triopium should come into it. This disposition antedates our earliest notices of Triopas, in the *Catalogue* and in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*; so does Triopium as the federal sanctuary of the Dorian *hexapolis*. Triopas the eponym of Triopium is coeval with the Dorian settlement of these parts, which goes back at least to the Dark Age, perhaps even, in view of the disputed reality of the "Dorian migration," to Mycenaean times. On the Thessalian side, no real-life cult or custom can be found to explain the origin of Triopas; and at Triopium, as we shall see in a moment, the famous worship of Apollo has nothing to do with Triopas' escapade in Thessaly. So it is natural to suppose that Triopas the eponym of Triopium was projected back to Thessaly, conformably with the disposition noted above, and was then provided with a plausible motive for emigrating. On a strict analysis, we do not know (though it seems improbable to the last degree) whether the founders of Triopium came from Thessaly and brought Triopas with them; but we can say with full assurance that the myth of Triopas is no authentic memory of such a thing.

The Triopium sanctuary is thus the key to the mythical Triopas. The sanctuary, with the like-named town and harbour, has been conjecturally located at Kumyer, in a valley opening on the south coast of the Cnidian peninsula, rather closer to New Cnidus (Tekir) at the tip of the peninsula than to Old Cnidus (Burgaz) at the middle of the peninsula.[7] The sanctuary and the agonistic festival Dorieia belonged to Apollo. A learned writer refers also to the worship of Poseidon and the Nymphs (Aristeides, *On the Foundation of Cnidus*, *FGrHist* 444 F 2)—not surprisingly, since Poseidon was to the fore throughout the *hexapolis* (and at Halicarnassus even shared with Apollo the honour of founding the city, according to *SIG*[3] 1020), and the Nymphs were popular on Cos and no doubt elsewhere.[8] The primacy of Apollo is very clear in both literary and epigraphic sources. Yet Triopas' affinity with Apollo has been completely obscured by a modern misconception which we must now dispel.

[7] See G. E. Bean and J. M. Cock, *ABSA* 47 (1952) 202-12, with pl. 37.

[8] Despite Jacoby on Aristeides *FGrHist* 444 F 2-4, there is nothing to be said for the hypothesis of a Hellenistic *Umordnung* of the sanctuary and festival.

In discussions of Erysichthon, Triopium is regularly associated with Demeter, and we are told that Triopas brought her cult from Thessaly.[9] This view rests partly on confusion between Triopium and Cnidus, partly on misreading of the sources. Although the name Triopium may be given to the whole Cnidian peninsula or to the western half with the successive sites of Old and New Cnidus, what Triopas founded was the sanctuary or the town Triopium, both quite distinct from the town of Cnidus.[10] At New Cnidus, Sir Charles Newton excavated the civic sanctuary of Demeter, which lies on sloping ground at the northwest and in its aspect and its furnishings much resembles other Demeter sanctuaries excavated recently on Thasos and at Corinth, Gela and Cyrene.[11] It is substantial but unremarkable (apart from the cult statue, perhaps the work of Leochares), and seems not to be mentioned in ancient literature; "the famous cult of Demeter" which modern writers somehow equate with Triopium is in the same class as Demogorgon. For the rest, three items of evidence have been misunderstood.

1. The sources who speak of Triopas' offending Demeter—Diodorus, Marcellus, Hyginus as cited above—do not say or imply that he afterwards expiated the offence by transplanting her worship to a new site; nor does Callimachus, speaking of Triopas as father of Erysichthon (*H. Cer.* 24–32). When Triopas fled, he left Demeter behind. In Lycophron the composite Triopas-Erysichthon is allusively referred to as the contemner of the goddess ληκτηρία κυρήτα; of these epithets κυρήτα is said by the scholiast ad loc. and by the Etymologicum Magnum, citing Orus, to have been used at Cnidus, and ληκτηρία has been so interpreted by modern commentators. These are mere inferences from Lycophron, and misguided too;[12] for since the insult to Demeter

[9] The misconception is shared by most of the writers cited in note 1 above and by those cited in note 14 below. It would be unkind to single out phrases like "the famous Knidian Demeter sanctuary."

[10] Cf. Bean and Cook (note 7 above) 209. In speaking of a figure of Triopas set up by the Cnidians at Delphi, Pausanias describes him as "founder of Cnidus" (10.11.1); this is at odds with some other traditions of Cnidus' founding (Hdt. 1.174.2; Str. 14.2.6, p. 653; Diod. 5.9.2; schol. Lyc. *Alex.* 1388), but need cause no surprise.

[11] See Newton, *A History of Discoveries at Halicarnassus, Cnidus and Branchidae* (London 1862–1863) 2.376–425; I. C. Love, *AJA* 76 (1972) 399–401, 77 (1973) 418.

[12] Wilamowitz (2.39, n. 2) and Fehling (179, n. 30) are rightly sceptical. Poseidon has the epithet κυρήτειος at Cameirus (*IG* 12.1.705), and he or another deity at Tegea (*IG* 5.2.96); such evidence points to a function shared by Poseidon and Demeter, but does not help to locate the cult of Demeter. ληκτηρία, Lycophron's other epithet for Demeter, was interpreted by Holzinger ad loc. as "dwelling at the end," *scil.* of the Cnidian peninsula, a suggestion quite as lame as the paraphrast's, who says that Demeter stopped Erysichthon and "made him cease," λῆξαι. Now the dative ληκτηρίαι has been

occurred in Thessaly, it was doubtless from this direction, not from Cnidus, that Lycophron took the epithets.

2. The Cnidian Demeter was far from the mind of Herodes Atticus when he gave the fanciful name "Triopium" or "land of Triopas" to Regilla's estate beside the Appian Way (*IG* 14.1389, 1390).[13] The name evokes the Thessalian homeland of Triopas and is thus appropriate not only to the shrine of "the new Demeter," the elder Faustina, but also to the large and fertile tract that included cornfields, vineyards, olive groves, and pastureland; this tract was meant to be as sacrosanct as Demeter's legendary grove, and the sacrilege of Triopas is expressly cited to deter intruders (*IG* 14.1390 II 36-39, cf. II 5-6).

3. Herodotus (7.153) says that the forebear of the tyrant Gelon came from the island of Telos "which lies off Triopium" and joined the Lindians bound for the site of Gela, and that a later member of the family named Telines used the *hiera* of the Earth Goddesses (i.e., Demeter and Kore) to reconcile some disaffected citizens at Gela and to obtain the hereditary priesthood of the Goddesses as a reward. This passage does not allow us to infer that the Geloan worship of Demeter or any of its leading features was derived from Triopium.[14] The family of Gelon had charge of a cult which is typical of Sicily, not of their land of

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restored by editors, with certainty, from the accusative of the mss., which agrees with the "peninsula" of Cnidus. The word was wrongly assimilated to ληκτηρία in line 966, the "furthest" part of Sicily; perhaps in line 1391 the spelling as well as the case is deformed, and we might then conjecture λικμητρίαι "winnowing" (the feminine form of λικμητήρ), a good epithet for Demeter.

[13] It is hard to see how any reader of Marcellus' poem could think of Cnidus rather than Thessaly, and yet the misunderstanding is inveterate; see, e.g., Kaibel on *Epigr.* 1046; Wilamowitz, *SBBerl* 1928.11-12 = *Kl. Schr.* 2.203-4; J. Weiss, *RE* 7A 1 (1939) 176-77 *s.* Triopion 2. Marcellus refers to the estate as δήμωι ἐνὶ Τριόπεω and δῆμον Δηωοῖο φιλόξεινον Τριόπαο (*IG* 14.1390 I 49, II 5); "in the land of Triopas" Faustina like Demeter presides over cornfields, vineyards, and olive groves (I 49-50), and Athena and Nemesis are summoned to "the hospitable land of Demetrian Triopas," which has vines and corn and trees and pasture (II 7-9, 21-22), in order to punish intruders as severely as Triopas was punished.

[14] So Boeckh, combining Hdt. with schol. Pind. By further misinterpreting the *hiera* as statues, G. Zuntz, *Persephone* (Oxford 1971) 136-39, deduces that Gelon's forebear introduced to Sicily the statue type of the Samian Hera, which became the seated goddess widely reproduced in Sicilian terracottas. Burkert, *Gnomon* 46 (1974) 321-23, and *Struct. and Hist.* (note 2 above) 131, 135, affirms the same connection, and aligns Triopas and Erysichthon with "the Demeter-Telines tradition." This is a panorama of illusion. It should also be said that if the episode of bringing back disaffected citizens is actually an *aition*, the ritual background will not be the advent, *katagōgē*, of the goddess, as Burkert has it, but a concerted withdrawal and return of worshippers, as at the Thesmophoria.

origin; the promontory Triopium is mentioned only to locate Telos, and Telos is mentioned only to explain Gelon's ancestry and the name Telines borne by the first priest. A scholiast on Pindar (*Pyth.* 2.27b) improves on Herodotus, and shows us why Pindar mentions Cinyras in a poem for Hiero, by saying that the forebear "brought the *hiera* from Triopium in Cyprus to Sicily"; the forebear and "Triopium in Cyprus" are thus a link between Hiero the hierophant and the Cinyradae who serve "the goddess." Since this rigmarole is inspired solely by Herodotus and Pindar, it gives no further warrant for the inference from Herodotus.

Triopium then is a shrine of Apollo, in which Demeter has no place. Why is the shrine called "Triopium," or why is the tutelary figure called "Triopas"? The question we ask depends on which name is thought to come first. The hero's name occurs also in the forms Τρίοψ and Τρίοπος, and the place-name Τριόπιον might be formed from either of these. On purely linguistic grounds we can scarcely deny the possibility of the opposite development, from an original place-name to a secondary eponym. It is hard to believe however that the word Τριόπιον, "Three-faced" or "Three-sided," was formed to describe the shape of the peninsula or of a part of it;[15] a less distinctive term for the Cnidian peninsula vis-à-vis other peninsulas could not well be imagined. The term was more likely applied first to the hero, or to an avatar of Apollo who became the hero. It could mean "three-sided" or "three-faced" or even "three-eyed": Hesychius *s.* τριόπην gives the last meaning.

On the strength of Hesychius' notice, the Triopas of Argive genealogy has long been compared with a peculiar object that stood on the Larisa of Argos—an ancient three-eyed *xoanon* of Zeus, invested by Pausanias with an allegorical significance which we may safely ignore (2.24.3-4.1, cf. 8.46.2).[16] This form of image was proper to the cult of Zeus *herkeios* (Agias-Dercylus *FGrHist* 305 F 7; cf. Pausanias' *aition*), the deity who stood guard in the courtyard of legendary palaces and of various corporate dwellings;[17] it thus expressed the god's vigilance and protective power. To explain the Cnidian Triopas we want a similar object associated with Apollo.

[15] So, e.g., Wilamowitz 2.35; Bean and Cook (note 7 above) 209, n. 21.

[16] Cf. Mayer, *ML* 5 (1916-1924) 1124 *s.* Triopas; Wilamowitz 2.35-36; Wüst, *RE* 7A 1 (1939) 173-74 *s.* Triopas. Mayer's fancies and Wüst's objections are equally unnecessary.

[17] For Zeus *herkeios* an altar normally sufficed, and a statue is not otherwise attested; yet the *aition* and the testimony of Agias-Dercylus seem straightforward, and there is no reason to suspect, as does H. Sjövall, *Zeus im altgriechischen Hauskult* (Lund 1931) 27-29, that the *xoanon* has been misinterpreted.

The Megarian historian Dieuchidas said that Apollo *agyieus* was a Dorian talisman recalling certain Dorian expeditions, and also that he was set up in this form at a certain place where Dorians settled (*FGrHist* 485 F 2a-b). Unfortunately schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 875 (= F 2b) is too abridged and too corrupt to show what expeditions and what place Dieuchidas had in view.[18] His remarks would certainly fit the Dorian *hexapolis* and Triopium, for the *hexapolis* was proud of being Dorian (Hdt. 1.144) and proclaimed it in the festival Dorieia; moreover, Dieuchidas is known to have described the settlement of Rhodes by the sons of Triopas, leading a party from Dotium (F 7). But whether or not he expressly referred to Triopium, it is still likely that Triopium conformed with this characteristic Dorian worship. What exactly did Dieuchidas mean by Apollo *agyieus*? The object commonly so called, a stone pillar tapering upward to a point, had a much wider range than the Dorian domain.[19] A usual form described in the lexica and seen on coins is roughly conical. At Megara, however, Pausanias reports a pyramidal stone—"a pyramid of no great size"—called Apollo καρινός (1.44.2), which perhaps figures on coins of Megara and of its colony Byzantium.[20] If this was a three-sided pyramid, we have an excellent candidate for the avatar of Apollo which gives rise to the names "Triopas," "Triopium."[21]

This explanation of the names is of course conjectural, and nothing depends on it here. The conjecture merely suggests how the hero Triopas is related to Apollo, and also—since the Apollo *agyieus* of Dieuchidas is a Dorian *Stammgott*—why Triopas is placed at the head of different genealogies. But what of Triopas' role in the Erysichthon story?

[18] In the sentence ἐν δὲ τῶι ἰατρῶι τούτωι διαμένει ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστι καὶ ὡς ἀγυιεὺς τῶν Δωριέων οἰκησάντων ἐν τῶι τόπωι ἀνάθημα. Jacoby suggests ἰαρῶι for ἰατρῶι; one might also think of Τριοπίωι for τόπωι.

[19] Cf. Wentzel and Reisch, *RE* 1.1 (1893) 909-13 *s.* Agyieus 1-2 respectively. L. Piccirilli, *Megarika* (Pisa 1975) 21-22, associates our passage with the cippi, stelae, and unworked stones used at Metapontum and elsewhere "in the Achaean world"; this is far-fetched.

[20] K. Hanell, *Megarische Studien* (Lund 1934) 168-69, thinks the coins depict Apollo *agyieus* rather than *karinos*, but the distinction is hardly justified. Call. *Aet.* fr. 114.2 Pfeiffer addresses a "polygonal" Apollo who may or may not be distinct from the Archaic Delian statue subsequently mentioned.

[21] It is of interest that at Megara the pyramidal stone was to be seen "in the old gymnasium near the so-called Gates of the Nymphs," and that at Triopium Apollo presided over an ancient agonistic festival and was associated with the Nymphs.

Whether Triopas himself offends Demeter (so Diodorus, Marcellus, Hyginus) or whether he suffers for his son's offence (so Callimachus), it is a constant feature that he flees from Dotium and arrives at Triopium as an outcast. This destitute condition is likely to be significant. As we shall soon see, another story brings Phorbas to Rhodes after his father Triopas has died, and Phorbas too is destitute. There are different reasons for their parallel misfortunes; whereas Triopas is afflicted by Demeter, Phorbas is cursed by his brother and shipwrecked; but the reasons will be secondary in both cases. Phorbas becomes a paradigm of ritual begging on Rhodes. Was it not the same with Triopas at Triopium?

Phorbas and Rhodes

Phorbas like Triopas might be regarded as in some sense a counterpart to Erysichthon. Phorbas, to be sure, never comes into the Erysichthon story, but in certain contexts he is either father or son of Triopas, and has business on Rhodes and at Dotium and Argos. It is also true that the mythical name Phorbas occurs in many other parts of Greece.[22] Yet most bearers of the name are obviously independent of each other. Φόρβας means "Grazer," "Forager"—the adjective φορβάς is used of grazing horses and cattle and of prostitutes—and the name is suitably given to various mythical shepherds and cowherds, to a rich stock-breeder, to one of Nonnus' Panes, to Theseus' groom or cavalry commander, to an outlaw preying on travellers in a remote place, and so on. Some of these instances are no doubt fictional (i.e., invented for the sake of the story); others are probably derived from cult, and one is demonstrably so derived. At Athens Phorbas goes with the shrine Φορβαντεῖον, located by Andocides near his ancestral home (1 *Myst.* 62), and so in the deme Cydathenaeum north of the Acropolis.[23] Andocides also says that here was a herm dedicated by the tribe Aegeis, and it is reasonable to suppose that the herm honoured the tribal cavalry—a

[22] See W. Roscher, *ML* 3.2 (1902-1909) 2424-30 *s.* Phorbas 1-17; Johanna Schmidt, *RE* 21.1 (1941) 527-32 *s.* Phorbas 1-13. Wilamowitz (2.35, n. 3) says that "Phorbas lässt sich überhaupt nicht fassen," a remark which presupposes that all the instances are somehow related.

[23] Cf. H. A. Thompson and R. E. Wycherley, *The Agora of Athens* (Princeton 1972) 169, n. 274. The rival view which places the Phorbanteium in or near the Agora rests on a misunderstanding of Andocides.

type of herm dedication often found in the Athenian agora—and therefore that the actual use of the shrine gives rise to the mythical vocation of its occupant, which is variously conceived but always linked with cavalry, chariots, or military exercises. Phorbas the father or son of Triopas is too solid and consistent to be a mere fiction; he too will derive from cult, and so, as in the case of Triopas, we look first for the local cult where the hero must originate.

Though details vary, it is always said that Phorbas left his home in Thessaly and settled on Rhodes, where he received heroic honours after death (Dieuchidas *FGrHist* 485 F 7; Polyzelus *FGrHist* 521 F 7; Diod. 5.58.4-5 = Zeno *FGrHist* 523 F 1). The heroic honours, of which more below, are enough to show that Phorbas belongs in the first instance to Rhodes. The details bear this out. As a Thessalian, Phorbas may be either son of Triopas (Dieuchidas and Polyzelus, who also names the mother, Ischylla daughter of Myrmidon) or son of Lapithes (Zeno), a paternity shared by Triopas himself (Diod. 5.61.3 = *FGrHist* 533 [Rhodos, Anhang] F 11). He appears at Argos as early as Pherecydes (*FGrHist* 3 F 66), presumably as father of Triopas, the view current later.[24] As already said, the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* speaks of Phorbas son of Triopas as Apollo's rival in love (line 211); a Thessalian setting is implied by the context, and indeed no other could be entertained. So Phorbas like Triopas was transplanted from the *hexapolis* to Thessaly and thence to Argos at an early date, conformably with the general disposition remarked above (p. 372). If Phorbas and Triopas are affiliated in Thessaly and at Argos, it must be that they were already affiliated in the *hexapolis*. Phorbas is not heard of at Triopium, but Triopas is heard of on Rhodes. He is one of the seven sons of Helius and Rhodos, and goes from Rhodes to the Triopium promontory (Diod. 5.56.5, 57.6 = Zeno *FGrHist* 523 F 1), or, in a more elaborate confection, he goes from Rhodes to the Rhodian Chersonnese and thence to Thessaly and back again to the Cnidian peninsula and the Chersonnese (Diod. 5.61.1-2 = *FGrHist* 533 F 11). The Rhodian view of Triopas which we find in Diodorus derives from Rhodian historians of Hellenistic date who were doubtless strengthened in their chauvinism by the Rhodian hegemony of that period. But since the three ancient cities of Rhodes predominated in the *hexapolis* or *pentapolis* of Archaic times, similar views existed long before.[25]

[24] See Jacoby on Pherecydes F 66-67 and on Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 36.

[25] As early as the sixth century, according to Wilamowitz (2.36).

It is likely that Triopas and Phorbas were first brought together in myth because they came from a similar ritual background. Triopas belongs to Triopium, a shrine of Apollo; we can safely assume, in view of his celebrity, that he had some separate standing at the shrine and received sacrifice in his own right. Phorbas was undoubtedly worshipped on Rhodes: whether in more than one city and on more than one occasion does not appear. Dieuchidas speaks of certain offerings at Ialysus that commemorated his arrival there; Zeno of "heroic honours" somewhere on Rhodes, a reward for his ridding the island of snakes and for other services; Polyzelus too says that Phorbas slew snakes and one huge snake in particular, and that his unlooked-for arrival and achievement gave rise to the custom of offering public sacrifice and prayers whenever the fleet set forth. The details overlap, so that the three sources may well refer to a single rite celebrated at Ialysus—and perhaps also at the city of Rhodes, after the synoecism; the rite will be a supplication on behalf of the community at the opening of the regular sailing season.[26] The hero Phorbas ought to be associated with a greater deity, and the indications point to Apollo The serpent slaying evokes Apollo; according to Zeno, Phorbas was summoned from Thessaly at the instance of Apollo's oracle on Delos; Lapithes, the Thessalian father now of Triopas, now of Phorbas, is a son of Apollo; Phorbas is linked with Apollo in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*.[27] The nautical rite described by Polyzelus and perhaps implied by Dieuchidas and Zeno is not unsuited to Apollo in some aspects, notably as *delphinios*. A supplication at the Delphinium of Athens on Munichion 6 was said to reenact the circumstances in which Theseus and his companions embarked for Crete (Plut. *Thes.* 18.1-2).[28]

[26] The rites for Phorbas are discussed with other results by Roscher, *ML* 3.2 (1902-1909) 2426-27 *s.* Phorbas 1d C. Blinkenberg, *Hermes* 50 (1905) 291-92; A. D. Nock, *HThR* 37 (1944) 146, n. 24.

[27] When Triopas was arrogated by Rhodes and made a son of Helius, Phorbas, his erstwhile son, took the place of Triopas in the Thessalian succession. So Phorbas son of Lapithes will be as early as Triopas son of Helius (cf. note 25 above), and Triopas son of Lapithes will be earlier still; opinion is divided, says Diod. 5.61.3 = *FGrHist* 533 F 11, between Triopas son of Canache, Aeolus' daughter, and of Poseidon (as in the Hesiodic *Catalogue*) and Triopas son of Lapithes, Apollo's son, and of Stilbe, Peneius' daughter. The poet of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* probably knew the latter genealogy.

[28] From the myth of Theseus' arrival and reception at Athens, as from much other evidence, F. Graf, *MH* 36 (1979) 2-22, rightly deduces that Apollo *delphinios* presides over the enrollment of ephebes and aliens in the community; but he need not have discounted the nautical side of the cult, for the two things go together, especially in early days; new hands are recruited for dangerous undertakings at sea.

Dieuchidas, as rendered by Athenaeus (6.82, 262E-263B), gives much the fullest description of the rites addressed to Phorbas; he is however concerned not with the collective supplication but with a popular custom which was observed at the same time. "The custom," he says, "continues at the sacrifice for Phorbas"; the term ἡ θυσία τοῦ Φόρβαντος no doubt applies to the sacrifice and prayers which Polyzelus reports. The custom is not the same as the sacrifice, nor does it take place at a shrine amid a public gathering, but in private households. Briefly, the *aition* runs thus. Phorbas son of Triopas sails onward with a few followers after his father dies and others return to Dotium; but being cursed by his brother Periergus, who founds Cameirus, he suffers shipwreck. Phorbas and his sister Parthenia swim to Ialysus, and at the place Schedia, "Boat," are met by Thamneus, "Mr. Thicket," who happens to be out hunting. Now comes the transaction perpetuated in the custom. Phorbas and Parthenia, "Forager" and "Maiden," are entertained by Thamneus in his house; he sets out food on the millstone and provides other hospitality. It is also said that Thamneus' wife failed to make ready for the visitors after being asked to do so, and that Phorbas, pleased by his reception at the hands of Thamneus, gave orders for such service to be performed always by "free men," not by slaves. These details merely explain why, in the custom observed ever after, hospitality is offered by the master of the house, not by womenfolk or servants. The custom in view is ritual begging, and indeed its most familiar form, as conducted in the cult of Apollo: boys and girls go from house to house demanding treats. Perhaps "Forager" and "Maiden" carried emblematic branches corresponding to the *eiresiōnē* at Athens and Samos, if this is the implication of their meeting "Mr. Thicket"; but the name and the encounter on the shore may only serve to show why the refugees are received in a private house.

The *aition* is as explicit as could be wished, but it may still be worth recalling that ritual begging is well attested for Rhodes. Indeed Rhodes supplies most of the material in Athenaeus' disquisition on the crow-song and the swallow-song (8.59-60, 359D-360D). The crow-song of Phoenix of Colophon is cited from an unnamed Rhodian book (*FGrHist* 533 [Rhodos, Anhang] F 7). Hagnocles of Rhodes, otherwise unknown, wrote a book on crow-songs entitled *Coronistae* (ibid.). Theognis in his work *On Rhodian Sacrifices* quoted a Rhodian swallow-song (*FGrHist* 526 F 1). The earliest mention of the swallow-song was to be found in Cleobulus of Lindus, together with an *aition* explaining its origin at Lindus. On Rhodes as elsewhere the beggars go forth on a cer-

tain day in spring,[29] and ask for food from the household stores, and cajole or threaten the master of the house.

Thus Phorbas was honoured at Ialysus and perhaps elsewhere on Rhodes with a propitiatory sacrifice at the opening of the sailing season, and on the same day boys and girls went begging from house to house. It might be conjectured that "Forager" is a projection of the begging custom, who then gives his name to all the business of the day; at all events both the rites and the myth of Phorbas disclose Apollo as the presiding deity. The combination of public ceremony and children's begging is not so very strange. Ritual begging is itself a *heilige Handlung* which mediates divine favour on the usual principle of *do ut des*; the beggars promise a fair return in the god's name. The Athenian festival of Munichion 6, when girls paraded from the Prytaneium to the Delphinium with the *eiresiōnē*, must have once included a begging tour, for the *eiresiōnē* originates as a begging emblem. At Athens, however, ritual begging on this occasion as on others was given up entirely in later days, and we are left with a few shreds of aetiology, such as the succouring of the Heracleidae (Plut. *Thes.* 22.7). (More of this in the next section.)

Erysichthon and Athens

Until lately all the sources which spoke of Erysichthon's homeland spoke of Thessaly. Nor was Erysichthon said to have departed to another quarter, like Triopas and Phorbas. And though one might point to an Athenian Erysichthon, eponym of the *genos* Erysichthonidae, there was no contact whatever with the people or events of our story. Since 1960 matters have taken quite a different turn with the publication of several papyrus scraps of the Hesiodic *Catalogue*, which join with others already known to make the third longest passage we have, some 91 lines (fr. 43a M-W; cf. frs. 44-48). While greeting this new accession, commentators have been slow to draw the full consequences. Erysichthon, it now appears, is at home in Athens, not Thessaly. Mestra is found in Athens too, providing for her necessitous father, except when briefly called away to Cos. For the moment we may consider the version of the *Catalogue* in isolation from the rest.

[29] The Rhodian month Badromius mentioned by Theognis probably corresponds to the Attic Anthesterion; cf. A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 107-10.

First the setting. The opening lines which introduce us to Erysichthon and his daughter and his ravening hunger are too fragmentary to show where they lived (fr. 43a.2-11); but the closing lines leave no doubt at all, for Mestra returns from Cos "to her native land," "to the hill of holy Athens," and there resumes her filial duties (fr. 43a.66-69).[30] Athens falls within the horizons of this part of the *Catalogue*. Right after Mestra comes the daughter of one Pandionides, who bears Bellerophon to Poseidon (fr. 43a.70-91); this is undoubtedly Eurynome, the daughter of Nisus of Megara (cf. Hyg. *Fab.* 157).[31] Sisyphus, who courts both Mestra and Eurynome on behalf of his son Glaucus, might come from either Boeotia or Corinth, or perhaps, if the poet followed the earliest tradition, from that Ephyra which was later identified with Corinth and which may have lain near Delphi, at the Mycenaean fortress of Ayios Georghios. When Sisyphus and Erysichthon dispute the marriage contract, judgment is seemingly entrusted to Athena, no doubt because the contract was entered into in her jurisdiction, the city of Athens.[32] It is true that Erysichthon's father is Triopas (fr. 43a.3), who can only be the Thessalian. Yet Triopas and Erysichthon have this in common, that both evoke the cult of Apollo. The poet of the *Catalogue* found the story of Erysichthon tied to the Athenian cult of Apollo, and he made room for it by the simple expedient of enrolling Erysichthon among the posterity of Aeolus, as son of Triopas son of Canache and Poseidon.

[30] Μήστρη δὲ προ]λιποῦσα Κόων ποτὶ πατρίδα γαῖαν | βουλῆι 'Αθηναί]ης ἱερέων ποτὶ γουνὸν 'Αθηνέων κτλ. These are West's supplements; Stiewe and Merkelbach suggest νηῖ θοῆι ἐπέρ]ησ'. Schwartz (275, 280) was puzzled by the mention of Athens; McKay (27) would bring Poseidon to Athens, Mestra to some other homeland, but the small lacunae do not allow supplements in this sense. That Erysichthon lives in Athens was firmly stated by Fehling (177).

[31] Against Hyginus may be set schol. *Il.* 6.191, giving Bellerophon's parents as Poseidon and Mestra, and Merkelbach and West accordingly ask "utrum nova Eurynomes Ehoea incipiat an Mestrae historia continuetur." This alternative is most unlikely, for the lines appear to introduce a new heroine, clever and beautiful, and to recount an adventure parallel to Mestra's; and so far as we know Erysichthon was never reckoned a descendant of either Pandion (he is certainly not to be equated with Erechtheus, as M-W propose). The Homeric scholium probably derives from some distortion of this very passage of the *Catalogue*.

[32] West, *Gnomon* 35 (1963) 754-55, plausibly regards fr. 43a.36-44 as the *aition* of an Athenian law of sale. The dispute over the defaulted contract was referred to a female arbiter whose name West restores as 'A[θήνηι (fr. 43a.38); as he says, the restoration seems unavoidable, even though the papyrus traces do not agree, and we must presume a scribal error (most likely a transposition from the following line).

The story is then told as follows. Erysichthon's ravening hunger made him a byword among men (fr. 43a.5–8); since his daughter would bring a large bride-price, and since she could elude her new husband by changing shape, they hit upon the trick of selling her repeatedly (lines 9–17, very fragmentary). Sisyphus for all his wiles was their first dupe, and Erysichthon was delighted by gifts of cattle, sheep, and goats (lines 18–25). Though possibly confined, Mestra escaped from Glaucus and went home to her father (lines 27–33; cf. fr. 45, which may fit in here); contention arose between Sisyphus and Erysichthon, and was settled by Athena, if it is she, with a few words of legal wisdom, and probably to Sisyphus' advantage after all (lines 33–50). Yet for all Sisyphus' wiles (as we hear once again), Glaucus was not destined to have children by Mestra, for Poseidon took the girl away from her father over the sea to Cos, and from this union came Eurypylus and his line, who ruled until Heracles sacked Cos while returning from Troy and the Laomedon affair, and went on to slay the giants in Phlegra (lines 51–65, a rapid sketch of large events). Mestra returned to Athens and continued to provide for her father (lines 66–69).

The foregoing summary will suffice to show that the Athenian story of Erysichthon and Mestra is presented as a farce, in which the poet exploits all the comic possibilities: the insuperable hunger and the irresistible trick, Erysichthon's delight and Sisyphus' discomfiture, the reversal which discomfits Erysichthon.[33] The hunger and the transformations are left unexplained and are indeed inexplicable, save as the stock-in-trade of folktales; there is no hint of any offence against Demeter. The Coan episode is quite extraneous and is added mainly for the pleasure of allusion. The Athenian story consists, in the simplest terms, of the bride-gifts unfairly obtained and of the ensuing dispute; the dispute is probably the *aition* of a legal rule, and (to anticipate for a moment) the bride-gifts are the *aition* of a form of ritual begging.

The name Μήστρα (i.e., Μνήστρα) means "She who is wooed"—a later variant (Ant. Lib. *Met.* 17.5) is Ὑπερμήστρα, "She who is much wooed"—and denotes the perpetual bride whose successive husbands offer rich bride-gifts. This is not a literal begging, but we must allow for

[33] Fehling (175–77) rightly spoke of "ein reiner Schwank" which gave no reason for Erysichthon's hunger; Wilamowitz (2.42–43) said almost the same. Yet Fehling should not have argued (pp. 174–85) that the next three or four centuries brought almost no changes, and that Callimachus, of all men, gave the old story a new twist with the felling of a sacred tree and Demeter's anger; for this last opinion he is rebuked by Burkert, *Struct. and Hist.* (note 2 above) 208, n. 6, and by Henrichs (88–90).

certain narrative motifs which were powerful in shaping the story in early days. One such motif is the great lady sought by innumerable suitors with enormous gifts (like Helen), and another is the reluctant fairy bride changing her shape at will (like Thetis). These two motifs are to the fore but are not a sufficient explanation in themselves. The distinctive element of our story is the renewed and indeed perpetual soliciting of gifts, an element which derives from ritual begging. As we shall soon see, the Athenian *genos* who were the reputed descendants of Erysichthon sent forth a troop of begging children, and observers said that Erysichthon himself once sent forth his daughter on a similar errand.

Enough has been said about the version of the *Catalogue*. The Athenian setting, though unattested hitherto, is after all what we should expect; for Athens is the home of the Erysichthonidae, a hieratic *genos* serving Apollo, and the *genos* is the only real-life counterpart to the mythical name Erysichthon. It is true that Erysichthon of the ravening hunger does not resemble Erysichthon the eponym of the *genos*, as we know him from later reports; but we shall see that the nature of the eponym was bound to change in the course of time. The *genos* and the eponymous hero are known from inscriptions and antiquarian comment, respectively.

To take the *genos* first, certain members who officiated in 91/0 B.C. (*IG* 2^2 4991) are listed on the back of the accounts of the Delian Amphictyons for 390/89 and 389/8 B.C. (*IG* 2^2 1634). Delian inscriptions from the last period of Athenian occupation, after 166 B.C., show that the *genos* was then active on the island (*IDélos* 2516–18; *IG* 12.5.271; cf. *IDélos* 1624 bis). According to a plausible restoration one of these texts names a lifelong priest of Apollo drawn from the *genos*; it is probably the same priesthood that appears in the heading of the membership list at Athens. In the Pythais of 98/7 B.C., the last of the four which are commemorated on the south wall of the Athenian treasury at Delphi, the personnel include an *architheōros* and three *theōroi* from our *genos* (*SIG*^{3} 728 D[1]).

The functions of the *genos* are reflected in the myths of the eponymous hero. Erysichthon came to Delos as an Athenian *theōros* and set up a primitive statue of Apollo (Phanodemus *FGrHist* 325 F 2; Plut. fr. 158 Sandbach, from Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 3.8.1) and even built the first temple of Apollo (Euseb. Hier. a. Abr. 508). Dying on the return voyage, he was honoured with a monument at Prasiae (Paus. 1.31.2), the east coast port which Pausanias knew as the last station of the Hyperborean offerings, whence the Athenians brought them to Delos. Pausa-

nias' testimony, together with the Delian inscriptions, has persuaded some scholars that the *genos* Erysichthonidae were native to eastern Attica and served an ancient local worship that is also reflected in the Pythian and Delian *thecriai* of Marathon.[34] The inference is quite unwarranted, inasmuch as the monument, μνῆμα, of Erysichthon is not said to be a hero shrine and almost certainly takes its origin from the contentious lore of the Hyperborean offerings. In fact Erysichthon is at home in central Athens, in the area east of the Acropolis which has lately been revealed as the original focus of civic business and civic ritual.

An inscription just published, a decree of the year of Polyeuctus, probably 246/5 B.C., has revolutionary consequences for Athenian topography.[35] It was posted "in the shrine of Aglauros" and discovered in situ near the foot of the steep east face of the Acropolis. Here then stood the Prytaneium (Paus. 1.18.3); here was the "front" of the Acropolis and of its eastward facing shrines (Hdt. 8.53.1); from here an ancient processional way ascended by the northeast slope to the cluster of shrines beside the "Mycenaean" entrance (cf. Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 105). Another processional way led southeast from the sanctuary of Aglauros and the Prytaneium to another cluster of ancient shrines on the right bank of the Ilissus (cf. Thuc. 2.15.3–6). The eponym Erysichthon belongs to this complex. Athenian genealogy makes him the offspring of Cecrops and Aglauros, worshipped at either end of the northeast processional way (Paus. 1.2.6; Apollodorus *Bibl.* 3 [180] 14.2.1); and "some said" that he adjudicated the dispute between Athena and Poseidon, which reflects the circumstances of their worship above the north slope of the Acropolis (Apollodorus *Bibl.* 3 [179] 14.1.4). Some way below the sanctuary of Aglauros and the Prytaneium stood a temple of Eileithyia containing three primitive *xoana*, of which the oldest of all was brought from Delos by Erysichthon (Paus. 1.18.5).[36] Plato, the next

[34] So P. Roussel, *BCH* 53 (1929) 179–84; Jacoby on Phanodemus *FGrHist* 325 F 2. F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du genos* (Lille/Paris 1976) 2.1087–91, objects as I do. The doctrine extends to other *genē* and goes back to Toepffer, but is not more convincing in a broader context

[35] See G. S. Dontas, *Hesperia* 52 (1983) 48–63. Dontas has already pointed to the most important consequences (pp. 57–63).

[36] In the past the temple of Eileithyia was thought to lie northeast of the Acropolis, perhaps near the Metropolitan church, where an inscribed dedication happened to be found. This is far from the setting otherwise attested for Eileithyia, "towards Agra" (Cleidemus *FGrHist* 323 F 1) or "in Agrae" (*IG* 2^2 5099, a theatre seat for two *hersēphoroi* of the goddess). The series of small columns and small statues (known from their bases) which parents dedicated to Eileithyia have come to light in widely scattered

after the *Catalogue* to mention the Athenian Erysichthon, gives the series "Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erysichthon" as Athens' most ancient names, so ancient that the names are preserved without the deeds (*Critias* 110A).

Such is Erysichthon eponym of the Erysichthonidae. The *genos* must be as ancient as any in Athens, even though we first hear of it in documents of the later Hellenistic period. Since in 91/0 B.C. the *genos* found it convenient to re-use a stone bearing the accounts of the Delian Amphictyons in the early fourth century, the members were doubtless concerned with Delian affairs at the earlier date as also later. Moreover, when Lycurgus prosecuted Menesaechmus on some charge arising from Athens' Delian *theōria*, he described how Apollo was honoured from of old at the Athenian festival Pyanopsia with the bearing of the *eiresiōnē* (frs. 82-83 Conomis = *FGrHist* 401 c F 1, 3); this ancient custom was the special sphere of the Erysichthonidae and lies behind the ancient story of the destitute Erysichthon. Before we turn to the direct evidence linking the *genos* and the *eiresiōnē*, it will be useful to consider two questions of etymology.

Attic *genē* quite typically bear transparent names expressing a ritual function, such as Εὐμολπίδαι, Πραξιεργίδαι. The name Ἐρυσιχθονίδαι is transparent, and the *genos* serves Apollo; it is reasonable to suppose that the name is taken from Apolline ritual. The meaning of the name Ἐρυσίχθων has however been obscured by ancient fancy and modern theory. The story of the outrageous contemner of Demeter seems to impose an agrarian interpretation; the first element is accordingly identified as ἐρύω "rend," and the "earth-render" is thought to be a ploughman;[37] in Lycophron "ploughman" is a kenning for Erysich-

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places—another was found near the Lysicrates monument, and yet another beside the Ilissus; M.-T. Couilloud, *BCH* 92 (1968) 72-75, who assembles the series, thinks of dividing them between the two putative shrines, but a single source would be more satisfactory. Our new bearings for the shrine of Aglauros turn the search for Pausanias' temple towards the southeast, for Pausanias has left the area north of the Acropolis and proceeds southeast from the Prytaneium to the sanctuary of Zeus Olympius, which comes immediately after the temple of Eileithyia. Pausanias reserves the term "Agrae" for the left bank of the Ilissus (1.19.6), but we are bound to wonder whether he did not find the temple of Eileithyia somewhere east of the Olympieium, at a point on the right bank which could be reckoned as Agrae.

[37] "Earth-render," "Erdaufreisser," is the usual choice in studies of Erysichthon. Wilamowitz (2.41), followed by Frisk, *Gr. etym. Wörterb.*, *s.* Ἐρυσίχθων, distinguishes as I do between the original sense, with which he compares σωσίπολις, and the later interpretation. Chantraine, *Dict. étym. de la langue gr.*, *s.* Ἐρυσίχθων, derives the Attic Erysichthon from ἐρύω "protect" and the Thessalian from ἐρύω "rend."

thon (*Alex.* 1396), and in a passage of Strato Comicus, or rather in a later reworking of it, *erysichthon* is a kenning for a pig or an ox (Ath. 9.29, 382E).[38] But the connection with Demeter is secondary, and in any case the analogy of ἐρυσίπτολις as an epithet of Athena forces us to recognize the first element as ἐρύω "protect." "Protect the land" is a fitting sobriquet for servitors of Apollo, since the god himself is commonly styled προστατήριος, another word for "protecting."

The Ἐρυσιχθονίδαι have charge of some ritual means of "protecting the land." This means can be equated with Apollo's "protecting" branch, εἰρεσιώνη or εἰρυσιώνη. Here too etymology has been a problem, for most authorities derive the word from εἶρος "wool";[39] yet this is unsatisfactory in respect of form and meaning alike. Plant names like ἀνεμώνη, βρυώνη, σικυώνη show a suffix -ωνη added to the stem, so that the middle part of the word remains unexplained; and although Apollo's branch was wound with pure white wool, we hardly expect to hear of "Woolly" as a ritual instrument. As to form the nearest analogue is ἰασώνη, the "healing"[25] plant (i.e., bindweed); as to the stem we may compare ἐρύσιμον, εἰρύσιμον, the "protecting" plant (i.e., hedge mustard); both plants are so called from the virtues ascribed to them by popular medicine. Εἰρεσιώνη is therefore the "protecting" branch, from ἐρύω "protect." And so it was understood in ancient times, as we see from the epigraphic spelling εἰρυσιώνη (Meritt and Traill, *Athenian Councillors* 240.12 of 140/39 B.C.; *IDélos* 2081, *s.* I *a.*).

For the *eiresionē* no thorough and up-to-date treatment is available, and this is not the place to examine the tradition in detail.[40] It must suffice to indicate briefly what can be known, adducing evidence only for a few material points. The body of evidence consists of allusions in Old Comedy and Alciphron; of the garbled remnants of antiquarian

[38] In the version of Strato in P. Cairo inv. 65445 (Page, *Gr. Lit. Pap.* 261-69; Pack, *Gr. and Lat. Lit. Texts*[2] no. 2642), which is agreed to be closer than Athenaeus to what Strato wrote, ῥηξίχθονα signifies a sacrificial animal, more likely a rooting pig than a plough-ox; ἐρυσίχθονα in Athenaeus is a later substitute, perhaps inadvertent. McKay (38, n. 4) goes into the question further.

[39] Frisk, *Gr. etym. Wörterb.*, *s.* εἰρεσιώνη is sceptical, and so was Chantraine in *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris 1933) 208 ("perhaps drawn from an epithet of Apollo, ἐρέσιος"); but he favours εἶρος in *Dict. étym. de la langue gr.*, *s.* εἰρεσιώνη. Other suggested etymologies are not worth considering.

[40] Cf. J. Pley, *De lanae in antiquorum ritibus usu* (Giessen 1911) 58-63; L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 198-201; Nilsson, *Gesch. der gr. Rel.*[2/3] 1.122-27, 530-31. Some more speculative works are cited by W. Fauth, *Der Kleine Pauly* 2 (1967) 217, *s.* Eiresione.

comment which we find in the lexica and scholia and also in Plutarch's *Theseus*, and which will derive in the main from the Attic chroniclers, although the only names cited are Lycurgus, in the speech already mentioned, and Crates and Pausanias the Atticist; and of a few inscriptions which give us either the *eiresiōnē* or officiants called *eiresiōnēs* and *pais amphithalēs*. A Samian *eiresiōnē* is described in the two principal *Lives* of Homer, and it has long been recognized that the Theban *daphnēphoria* reported by Proclus presents striking similarities with Athenian custom.

The *eiresiōnē* then is a branch wound with wool, and sometimes hung with fruits. A private *eiresiōnē* may be set up beside the house door in honour of Apollo, or a communal *eiresiōnē* may be carried round at festivals of Apollo, either as a solemn processional emblem which is finally set up at a shrine, or as an instrument of ritual begging—like the similar branches or poles carried by begging children in modern Europe—which brings the season's blessings to each household that receives the begging troop. Nilsson, following Mannhardt and Frazer, regards the *eiresiōnē* as a "May," that is, as another instance of a very large class of festive trees and branches, often personified and used in many different ways. This interpretation becomes misleading when it is further stated that the connection with Apollo is secondary and accidental. Both the *eiresiōnē* and its congener, the Theban *daphnē*, are as distinctive of Apollo as (say) a certain kind of basket is distinctive of Demeter. It is in fact the special instrument that mediates Apollo's power as protector of the community and of the individual household; so it is not restricted to a particular season but is employed at several festivals of Apollo, and the *genos* Erysichthonidae is placed in charge throughout.

The *eiresiōnē* was conspicuous at the Pyanopsia of Pyanopsion 7, when it was displayed at the house door and was carried by begging children and also by a chosen processioner. The occasion is described in all the lexical notices and in Plutarch (*Thes.* 22.6–7) and is reflected in a Hellenistic prytany decree (Meritt and Traill, *Athenian Councillors* 240.11–12, of 140/39 B.C.).[41] It was at this season, and so very likely at

[41] In the late verse epitaph mentioned below the seven-year-old *eiresiōnēs* is appointed by the Eumolpidae; the Eleusinian background may point to the Proerosia, an Eleusinian festival which coincided, or nearly so, with the Pyanopsia and which is conjoined with the Apolline festival in Lycurgus' speech (fr. 84 Conomis = *FGrHist* 401c F 3); Euripides' *Supplices* and the "sacred calendar of Eleusis," *IG* 2^2 1363, give further reason for associating these two festivals.

the festival Pyanopsia, that Samian children likewise carried round the *eiresiōnē*; for Homer, with whom the custom began, obtained provisions for the winter by this means (*Hom. Vit. Herod.* pp. 213–15 Allen, Suda *s.* "Ομηρος pp. 255–66 Allen). At Athens the chosen processioner is said to be a παῖς ἀμφιθαλής (Paus. Att. E 17 Erbse). In their record of 91/0 B.C. the *genos* Erysichthonidae names a member serving as ἀμφιθαλής (*IG* 2^2 4991); he was then about seven years old, being enrolled as an ephebe in about 80/79 B.C. (*IG* 2^2 1039.82).[42] An epitaph of the Imperial period commemorates a boy of seven who served as *eiresiōnēs* (*IG* 2^2 11674 = Peek, *Grab-Epigramme* 1029.9–10); this title had then replaced *amphithalēs*.[43] After the entry for 91/0 B.C. the *genos* goes on to name another member serving as ἀμφιθαλής in a subsequent year; this boy's father serves ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμφιθαλοῦς in 91/0 B.C. Why does a grown man serve beside the *amphithalēs* "in place of the *amphithalēs*"? The communal *eiresiōnē* was too large and awkward to be supported by a seven-year-old boy; the boy did no more than grasp or touch the *eiresiōnē* while it was effectively carried by a man; hence too the adult *eiresiōnēs* known from much later inscriptions.[44] Exactly this arrangement is attested for the Theban *daphnēphoria*: the *daphnēphoros* proper is a παῖς ἀμφιθαλής, but he merely "grasps," ἐφάπτεται, the laurel while his nearest grown relative "supports," βαστάζει, the large pole (Procl. *Chrest.* 76–77, pp. 53–54 Severyns).[45] At Athens both man and boy are recruited from the Erysichthonidae.

[42] Archon Apollodorus of *IG* 2^2 1039 is placed in 80/79 B.C. by B. D. Meritt, *Historia* 26 (1977) 189; *IG* 2^2 4991 has always been securely dated to 91/0, when Medeius was archon a second time and began a three-year tenure.

[43] The dedicator of *IG* 2^2 3190, of 126/7 A.D., is described as υἱὸς ἀμφιθαλὴς καθ' ἴσας (?); for the reading see L. Robert *HSCP Suppl.* 1 (1940) 510, n. 3 = *Opera Minora Selecta* 1 (Amsterdam 1969) 334, n. 3. He is doubtless a man or youth, and is not to be associated with the *eiresiōnē*. The agonistic *amphithalēs* whom Robert has studied seems not to be exemplified at Athens.

[44] For these inscriptions—three votive herms set up by prytanies in the second and third centuries after Christ—see S. Follet, *RPh* 48 (1974) 30–32; they have since been republished by Meritt and Traill, *Ath. Councillors* 399, 453, 476. The title *eiresiōnēs* is born by a boy in our verse epitaph and on another votive herm, both of this late period, and both mentioned by Follet.

[45] The natural understanding of Proclus, even apart from Paus. 9.10.2–4 and Pind. frs. 94b–d Snell-Maehler and the Athenian parallels, is that the *pais amphithalēs* and the *daphnēphoros* are one: so Wilamowitz, Ziehen, Sbordone, and Brelich; otherwise Severyns and A. Schachter, *Cults of Boiotia* 1 (*BICS Suppl.* 38.1, 1981) 83–85, who supplies a partial bibliography. I do not agree with Schachter's analysis, in which this straightforward Apolline festival becomes an amalgam of disparate elements, and the olive trunk a female puppet.

On Munichion 6 the *eiresiōnē* was carried in procession from the Prytaneium to the sanctuary of Apollo *delphinios* in southeast Athens, as we see from two complementary passages of Plutarch's *Theseus* (18.1-2, 22.6). This occasion has been missed by scholars who take the first passage by itself.[46] For in reporting the rite of Munichion 6—or rather, in reporting the gesture of Theseus which prefigures the rite—Plutarch speaks not of the *eiresiōnē* but of "the suppliant bough," *hiketēria*, and then describes the unusual form, a single branch of the sacred olive wound with white wool. Afterwards, in reporting the rite of Pyanopsion 7, he describes the *eiresiōnē* then employed as identical with the *hiketēria* of Munichion 6, save that it is now laden with the season's fruits, a detail which agrees with the lexica. It is clear that the *eiresiōnē* was in use on both occasions and that for the sake of the Theseus story it was interpreted as a suppliant branch in the first instance, and as a sign of thanksgiving in the second. The *eiresiōnē* is the common feature which has given the two rites their matching functions in the story; for they have nothing else in common, nor would an ordinary suppliant branch be assimilated to the *eiresiōnē*, rather than the reverse.

On Munichion 6 as on Pyanopsion 7 the procession was presumably managed by the *genos* Erysichthonidae. The rite of Munichion 6 may help to explain Mestra's journey to Cos. The processioners are girls, says Plutarch; they accordingly subserve the story of the "twice seven," the tribute of boys and girls together. The supplication of Apollo *delphinios* opens the sailing season, as did perhaps the "sacrifice for Phorbas" on Rhodes (p. 382 above); Theseus also sacrificed to Aphrodite as a well-known goddess of navigation (*Thes.* 18.3). Plutarch's source, some Attic chronicler, said that the first girls to entreat Apollo *delphinios* were about to sail to Crete as fodder for the Minotaur. Perhaps earlier observers affirmed instead that the original suppliant was Mestra, daughter of Erysichthon, when setting out for Cos.

On Thargelion 7, our third and last occasion, the *eiresiōnē* was carried in a procession honouring Helius and the Horae (schol. Ar. *Eq.* 729, *Plut.* 1054; cf. Porph. *Abst.* 2.7 = Theophr. *Piet.* fr. 2, p. 150 Pötscher; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 173). Such a procession is indeed ascribed to both the Pyanopsia and the Thargelia in the scholia to Aristophanes; but our relatively full information about the Pyanopsia leaves

[46] So F. Bömer, *RE* 21.2 (1952) 1915, *s.* Pompa 1, and all the scholars whom he cites. The correct interpretation is given by H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et courètes* (Lille 1939) 299, 312-13, 349, 359-63, and by C. Calame, *Les choeurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque* (Rome 1977) 1.229-30, 298.

no room for Helius and the Horae, and these deities, together with the precautionary rite against parching heat and drought which Philochorus describes, suit the season of the Thargelia, and not of the Pyanopsia. The scholia have conflated the two processions, on Pyanopsion 7 and Thargelion 7. In the past it has often been doubted whether the names "Helius and the Horae" are correctly reported; Theophrastus, as reproduced by Porphyry, should have been sufficient warrant, and the decree of 246/5 B.C. already mentioned now removes all doubt; for at the year's inaugural ceremony, *eisitētēria*, the priestess of Aglauros is said to have sacrificed to several deities including "Helius and the Horae" (*Hesperia* 52 [1983] 52, lines 12-13).

Like the other deities honoured at the *eisitētēria* of 246/5, Helius and the Horae are to be sought somewhere east of the Acropolis, perhaps in an area that had once formed the Agora. For present purposes the argument can be summarized as follows. The deities make a statutory group which recurs in a later decree of much the same form (*IG* 2^2 948, of 166/5 B.C.)[47] and which corresponds in outline with the list of witnessing deities adjured in the Ephebic Oath (*GHI* 204.18-20; Poll. 8.106). Hestia, who comes next after Aglauros in the Ephebic Oath, belongs to the Prytaneium nearby; she is not named in our decree, but may be subsumed in "the other gods" honoured on the same occasion (lines 13-14). For the rest, the Oath and the decree appear to give us the same cults in the same order. Ares is common to both groups, and in the Ephebic Oath is accompanied by related deities of war including Enyalius, and is followed by Zeus. Elsewhere we find (1) the same priest serving both these deities of war and Zeus Geleon (*IG* 2^2 1072.5-6, of 117/8 A.D.); (2) the Polemarch worshipping Enyalius after Artemis Agrotera ([Arist.] *Ath.* 58.1), and so doubtless on Boedromion 7, at the festival Boedromia; and (3) Theseus sacrificing to Phobos in the month

[47] For the dating formula of *IG* 2^2 948 see Meritt, *AE* (1968) 95, and *Historia* 26 (1977) 182. Of this inscription only a small piece of the upper right side is preserved, with the remnants of the first 13 lines; yet the line endings match those of the new inscription very closely, so that the same pattern was followed in the drafting and the inscribing of both decrees, though at an interval of 80 years. In the later decree a male relative of the priestess of Aglauros again reports to the Council; earlier editors caught the gist of this, but the supplements required in lines 10-11 are now seen to be slightly different from Kirchner's. Ares and Apollo again appear near the ends of lines 12 and 13, respectively, showing that the list of gods did not change in the interval. The later fragment came to light long ago "between the theatres of Dionysus and Herodes," and was doubtless carried thither from the sanctuary of Aglauros; when this sanctuary is fully excavated, we may expect to see a rich harvest of such decrees.

Boedromion before the battle with the Amazons, when his right wing was posted to the east of the Acropolis (Plut. *Thes.* 27.3-5). Next comes Helius and the Horae in our decree, and the triad Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone in the Ephebic Oath. Although the names and the number of the Athenian Horae were matter for inquiry or dispute (cf. Paus. 9.35.2), it seems reasonable to identify the triad of the Oath with the Horae of the decree. Last of all comes Apollo in the decree, and Heracles in the epigraphic version of the Oath; both may appertain to the Lyceium, the original exercise ground for the ephebes. On this showing Helius and the Horae are at home in eastern Athens, in a very old quarter of the city. A single piece of topographic evidence can be cited in support. A dedication to the Horae and the Nymphs conjointly was found at the Church of St. John east of the Acropolis (*IG* 2^2 4877); it undoubtedly derives from the shrine of the Horae, since Philochorus tells us that the Nymphs had an altar here (*FGrHist* 328 F 5b).

On Thargelion 7 the *eiresiōnē* was carried in procession to the sanctuary of Helius and the Horae. No doubt the ceremony also did honour in some fashion to Apollo, whose day this is; it may be that after worshipping Helius and the Horae the processioners went on to a shrine of Apollo, whether at the Lyceium or elsewhere, and there deposited the *eiresiōnē*. Since the eponym of the *genos* Erysichthonidae is sprung from Cecrops and Aglauros, we might also conjecture that the procession started from the Acropolis and proceeded eastward.

So much for the *genos* Erysichthonidae and for the custom of bearing the *eiresiōnē*.[48] One further point needs to be made. The *eiresiōnē* and the eponym Erysichthon were once synonymous with ritual begging, but in historical Athens the begging custom had disappeared, and the eponym lost his original nature. In the Samian rite children go from door to door carrying the *eiresiōnē* and singing the *eiresiōnē* song. The details recorded in the *Lives* of Homer converge with our fullest account of ritual begging in ancient Greece, the Rhodian material collected by Athenaeus (p. 381 above), and also with customs prevailing down to the twentieth century in various parts of Europe.[49] Yet at Ath-

[48] Since Burkert traces the Erysichthon story to a rite of "bringing in the tree," albeit in the cult of Demeter, and also compares the Theban *daphnēphoria* (note 2 above), it may be as well to say that I can see no connection between the *eiresiōnē* and the violation of Demeter's grove; Erysichthon's offence is treated on pp. 387-88.

[49] See A. Dieterich, *ArchRW* 8 (1905) 82-117 = *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig 1911) 324-52. K. Meuli, *Schweiz. Arch. für Volksk.* 28 (1927-28) 1-38 = *Gesammelte Schriften* (Basel 1975) 1.33-68, adds some further instances, but his view of the beggars as representing the spirits of the dead seems misguided.

ens none of our sources for the *eiresiōnē* expressly mentions the children's begging. The Athenian song quoted by Plutarch and the lexica is much shorter than the Samian song quoted in the *Lives* of Homer; it promises abundance, however, like the middle portion of the Samian, and must once have ended with a similar appeal for treats. It may be that at Athens the begging custom was suppressed by law (as much later forms of ritual begging were sometimes curtailed or suppressed by law) and that the *eiresiōnē* song was bowdlerized as an act of policy.

Begging is indeed presupposed by an *aition* of the *eiresiōnē*, which Plutarch records as an alternative to the Theseus story: "Yet some say that this is done in memory of the sons of Heracles, who were thus nurtured, οὕτως διατρεφομένοις, by the Athenians" (*Thes.* 22.7). The Theseus story—which does not reflect begging but rather supplication and thanksgiving—is favoured by the majority, says Plutarch. The Heracleidae were therefore connected with the bearing of the *eiresiōnē* at a time when children still went round begging from door to door—most likely in a lost tragedy; later, when the begging had lapsed, the sons of Heracles were superseded by Theseus and his companions—doubtless at the hands of the Attic chroniclers, who did so much for the Theseus story.

The begging custom prefigured by the Heracleidae belongs to Pyanopsion 7 and thus corresponds to the autumn begging on Samos. On Rhodes, however, the beggars were typically about on a day in spring. The Theban *daphnēphoria* also fell at this time, for one of Pindar's *daphnēphorika* announces the advent of Apollo and the end of winter storms (fr. 94b 3–5, 16–20 Snell-Maehler); in the same song the little girl who is Pindar's mouthpiece speaks of being entertained by a number of men and women and of wishing them prosperity (lines 33–37), so that here too the begging custom prevailed.[50] At Athens the nearest counterpart to the Theban *daphnēphoria* is the rite of Munichion 6, in which the girl processioners were very likely led by a boy, another *pais amphithalēs*, corresponding to Theseus in Plutarch's *aition* (*Thes.* 18.1).[51] It is not adventurous to suppose that begging went with

[50] The opening of Pindar's *daphnēphorikon* was likened to a begging song by Dieterich (note 49 above) 101–2 = *Kl. Schr.* 339–40.

[51] We also expect the male sex to take precedence in the worship of Apollo. It is sometimes suggested that the rite of Munichion 6 was actually addressed to Artemis *delphinia*, or to Apollo *delphinios* and Artemis *delphinia* together; but these notions are excluded by Plutarch, as by the evidence at large for Apollo *delphinios*, for which see Graf's study (note 28 above) 4.

the Athenian rite as well. Begging, be it noted, was no less conducive to the Theseus story than the later supplication, if observers spoke of provisions for the journey to Crete. In a relatively late version the provisions for the journey are said to be reflected in the picnic supper of the Oschophoria, a rite occurring at the time of the return (Plut. *Thes.* 23.4–5, citing Demon *FGrHist* 327 F 6); such a lame suggestion was perhaps intended to replace an earlier view of the provisions that was no longer feasible, the begging custom having lapsed.

To sum up, ritual begging at Athens explains both the original Erysichthon story of the Hesiodic *Catalogue* and the later deviations. The evidence amply proves that the begging custom once existed at Athens; indeed it must have lasted into the fifth century, to be imprinted in the story of the destitute Heracleidae. Then the custom was dropped, and only the solemn and fashionable usage of the *pais amphithalēs* remained. The Erysichthonidae continued to serve Apollo, as we might expect, but the eponym of the *genos* was no longer represented as an insatiate cadger. Conversely, Erysichthon the cadger was uprooted from Athens; no source after the *Catalogue* is aware of the Athenian setting, and Hellanicus, though well acquainted with Athens, places Erysichthon in Thessaly (*FGrHist* 4 F 7).

Aethon, Mestra, and Poseidon

Thus far we have dealt with the names and natures of the destitute Triopas and Erysichthon and of the destitute Phorbas as a parallel figure outside the Erysichthon story. The elements of the story which have yet to be explained are the peculiar name "Aethon" and the daughter's peculiar nature—her nubility, her liaison with Poseidon, her power of transformation—and the insult to Demeter. There is reason to think that these elements belong together and derive from a separate ritual background.

Αἴθων, "Fiery," is said to be a surname of Erysichthon which refers to his "fiery" hunger ([Hes.] *Cat.* frs. 43a.5–8, 43b–c; Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 7; cf. Lyc. *Alex.* 1396); if the surname is not given, the "fiery" hunger may be mentioned allusively (Call. *H. Cer.* 66–67; Ov. *Met.* 8.828–29). Αἴθων is also used as a name in its own right, as if in place of Erysichthon ([Hes.] *Cat.* fr. 43a.37; Ant. Lib. *Met.* 17.5; Suda *s.* Αἴθων; cf. Lyc. *Alex.* loc. cit.). Moreover, Odysseus chooses to call himself Αἴθων (*Od.* 19.183), and still other instances come later: Αἴθων

as the title of a satyr play by Achaeus (*TrGF* 20 F 5a–11), and the Argive kinship group Αἰθωνίδαι appearing in a single inscription (W. Vollgraff, *BCH* 27 [1903] 270), and the Suda's entry Αἰθωνίδης· ὄνομα κύριον. From this evidence most scholars deduce that the Aethon of the Erysichthon story was once an independent figure who came to be identified with Erysichthon.[52] They are undoubtedly right; although it may be disputed whether any trace of the independent figure survives in the above notices, no other conclusion is possible.

The weird daughter is regularly linked with Aethon, either with the composite Erysichthon Aethon ([Hes.], Lyc. *Alex.*, Ovid), or with Aethon *simpliciter* (Ant. Lib.). On the other hand the lad Erysichthon appears without Mestra in Callimachus, and of course she is not mentioned when Triopas is the central figure (p. 374 above). From the *Catalogue* onwards we often hear how Mestra would fetch a bride-price for her father and then elude the husband by assuming animal shapes ([Hes.]; Palaeph. *Incred.* 23 Festa, whence Apost. 11.21; Lyc. *Alex.* 1393–95; Ovid *Met.* 8.738–39, 871–74; Ant. Lib.). Sisyphus, acting for his son Glaucus, was thus defrauded ([Hes.]), and Autolycus too (Ovid *Met.* 8.738), unless we suppose that Autolycus' magic powers enabled him to counter Mestra's and thus to keep his wife.[53] In any case the god Poseidon had his way with Mestra ([Hes.] fr. 43a.55–68; Ovid *Met.* 8.849–51), and according to Ovid she received the power of transformation in return; her first disguise was not as an animal but as a fisherman, conformably with Poseidon's domain (*Met.* 8.852–70). Ovid may well have invented the immediate circumstances in which Mestra appeals to Poseidon and is turned into a fisherman, but he was assuredly not the first to make Poseidon the author of her powers, or to speak of the fisherman's guise;[54] for in Greek myth it is characteristic of Poseidon to con-

[52] So Zielinski (146), Wilamowitz (2.41), McKay (9). McKay (8–15, 19–26, 104–6, 193) is fullest on Aethon.

[53] In describing Mestra as *Autolyci coniunx, Erysichthone nata*, Ovid need not in fact mean that she stayed with Autolycus any longer than with Sisyphus and Glaucus. For other views see Zielinski (152), Schwartz (278, n. 1, 601), McKay (27, 33, 45–47), Fehling (179, n. 35). Bömer (237) proposes to "annul this marriage" and to understand the phrase as "a female Autolycus"; this would be a very stilted use of language, especially for Ovid, and no such interpretation was envisaged by Crusius and others, as Bömer implies. There has also been some discussion of whether Mestra could attract suitors after yielding to Poseidon, and hence of the chronology of her affairs; yet the sequence in the *Catalogue*, fr. 43a.55–69, where Mestra returns to her old ways after the Coan interlude, shows that we may not insist on this kind of realism.

[54] Ovid's originality is exaggerated by Wilamowitz (2.43–44) and by Fehling (179–81).

fer strange powers upon his favourites, and Antoninus knows that "Hypermestra" not only obtained bride-gifts, but also "provided sustenance for her father Aethon when she was changed to a man" (*Met.* 17.5), a version which presupposes a livelihood like fishing.

The violation of Demeter's grove is mentioned by Callimachus, Lycophron, Ovid, and the Suda *s.* Αἴθων. In other sources a like offence is imputed to Triopas (p. 374 above).[55] These testimonies do not suffice to show when the offence came into the story, or indeed whether it was there from the start. Callimachus, the earliest witness, was not the man to invent such a sensational episode.[56] It may or may not have been known to the poet of the *Catalogue* and to Hellanicus: as already said, the *Catalogue* treats the hunger and the imposture as a farce, and Demeter's wrath is irrelevant, which is not to say that the wrath had not been spoken of as yet, either in the poet's milieu, or in some other quarter. On the available evidence the violation of the grove cannot be firmly associated with any of the other elements in the story. But since Demeter is entirely absent from the ritual background of Triopas and Erysichthon, as delineated above, it is reasonable to ask whether she does not belong rather with Aethon and Mestra.

The best clue is the peculiar name Aethon. Why should a man be called "Fiery"? It is one of Homer's "speaking" names, being assumed by Odysseus in the tale of Cretan origins which he tells Penelope. Since Odysseus is poor and hungry, and since feasting and provisions are of concern in Penelope's household, it is by no means impossible that Homer looks to our very story, and to "fiery" hunger; but if he does not, further speculation is vain. Either Erysichthon or Odysseus might be the subject of Achaeus' satyr play, or perhaps, if the name or the epithet could be transferred, someone else again, such as Heracles. As for the Argive kinship group, the name certainly derives from some local phenomenon, not from the mythical Erysichthon or Odysseus (a little more will be said below). In short, we do not know how our Aethon is related to any other bearer of the name, but in this old story the use of the name is likely to be primary.

We must therefore ask what the name Αἴθων really meant in the context of the story. Most scholars are ready to accept the ancient view,

[55] The substitution of "temple" for "grove" in Marc. Sid. *IG* 14.1390 II 37 and Hyg. *Astr.* 2.14 is perhaps no more than inadvertence; if so, we need not look for a particular source of misunderstanding, as do McKay (15-19) and Fehling (181-82).

[56] Against Fehling's treatment of Callimachus, see H. Herter, *RE Suppl.* 13 (1973) 242, *s.* Kallimachos 6; Burkert (note 2 above) 208, n. 6; Henrichs (88-91).

that Aethon was named for his "fiery" hunger. Two objections have been largely overlooked. First, it is hard to believe that "fiery hunger" was a natural phrase in itself; it occurs only twice outside our story (Hes. *Op.* 363; Aeschines 3 *Ctes.* 184 = Page, *Further Gr. Ep.* 847, one of the Eion herms), and so the story may inspire these instances too; for the rest, a Greek did not say, "My belly is afire," or "I am burning for supper." Second, it would be very odd for an epithet to be transferred from a common noun to a person so as to serve as a personal name. This objection also makes it idle to inquire after other objects which are describable as "fiery." Instead we look for circumstances in which a fire might be personified under the name Αἴθων, and in which this person might seem to be afflicted by extreme hunger, so that the name could be taken to signify the hunger as well. The circumstances are likely to be found in ritual, the usual source of Greek myth. The analogy of the feminine name Αἴθουσα is instructive. The name is borne by a daughter of Poseidon and Alcyone who consorts with Apollo to bear Eleuther, eponym of Eleutherae (Apollodorus *Bibl.* 3 [111] 10.1.2; Paus. 9.20.1; cf. [Hes.], *Cat.* fr. 185 M-W); Eleuther has a son Ἰασίων or Ἰάσιος ([Hes.], Paus. locc. citt.). The latter name, meaning "Healer," is redolent of ritual, and Aethusa probably comes from the same background; indeed both the mother and the son of Eleuther may derive from a local rite of purification which is implied by an *aition*, or rather by two alternative *aitia*, in Plutarch (*Quaest. Gr.* 39, 300A-B).[57]

This presumption about the meaning of the name gives special interest to the Suda's account of Aethon, which, if correctly transmitted, is different from any other. Αἴθων· ὁ βίαιος λιμός. ἀπὸ Αἴθωνος Ἡλίου τινός· ὃς τὸ Δήμητρος ἄλσος κατέκοψε καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑπέστη ἀξίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλίμωττεν αἰεί. "Aethon: violent hunger. From a certain Aethon son of Helius, who cut down Demeter's grove and suffered a fitting punishment, and on this account was forever hungry." The Greek phrase rendered as "a certain Aethon son of Helius" is, despite

[57] In one of the *aitia* (= Architimus *FGrHist* 315 F 1) a party passing through Eleutherae "was overtaken by rain and thunder and other portents in the sky," a detail which may point to weather magic, often allied with purification, and to the winter season, and therefore to fires like those which we shall find reason to associate with Aethon. This is merely guessing, however; Plutarch tells us no more about the rite, except that it was resorted to by Arcadians. Eleutherae lay on an ancient processional route to Delphi—cf. A. Boethius, *Die Pythais* (Uppsala 1918) 46-51—and so local usage was bound to attract attention, at least at certain seasons.

Wilamowitz' peremptory objection, altogether normal; and of course there is no likelihood that one of the familiar names in the story, Erysichthon or Triopas, has been deformed to this result. Nothing is gained by substituting Ἡλείου for Ἡλίου, and by postulating an "Eleian" version of the Erysichthon story; indeed something is lost, since Helius is the most appropriate of fathers for a "fiery" son.[58] So we may readily suppose that the Suda draws on some source unknown to us, perhaps a Hellenistic poet. The paternity alleged by this source helps us to recognize Aethon's resemblance to certain other figures of myth. Let us consider the sons of Helius.

1. Triopas as one of the seven sons of Helius and Rhodos (Diod. 5.56.6 = Zeno *FGrHist* 523 F 1; Diod. 5.61.1 = *FGrHist* 533 [Rhodos, Anhang] F 11) is not to our purpose, if the Rhodians thrust him into this company without any prior warrant; but just because he seems so ill assorted with the other Heliads of Rhodes, who all have some local flavour, we may wonder whether Triopas was not already known elsewhere as the son of Helius.

2. Another bearer of the common name "Phorbas," quite unrelated to Phorbas of Rhodes, is said to be son of Helius and father of the eponym Ambracia (Steph. Byz., *s.* Δεξαμεναί, citing Arist. fr. 477 Rose). Ambracia may also be reckoned a daughter of Augeas (Steph. Byz., *s.* Ἀμβρακία, citing Phileas; whence Eust., Dionys. Per. 492), himself another son of Helius. Phorbas of Ambracia cannot be other than "Phorbas the Thesprotian"—for the eponym Ambrax is sometimes said to be son of the eponym Thesprotus (Steph. Byz., *s.* Ἀμβρακία, whence Eust. loc. cit.)—who, "lusting for Demeter and assaulting the goddess, was struck down by Zeus with his lightning" (Anon. Mythogr., p. 347 Westermann).

3. Augeas king of Elis is nearly always said to be a son of Helius, otherwise of Poseidon or Phorbas of Thessaly (who emigrated to the south). The name Αὐγέας is formed from αὐγή "light of the sun" and thus means "Shining." He was rich and overweening and outrageous, so that even his son Phyleus went away (*Il.* 2.629). He had a weird daughter, either Agamede (*Il.* 11.740–41, etc.) or Perimede (Theocr. 2.16;

[58] After denouncing "the silly itacism Ἡλίου," Wilamowitz (2.40) spoke of Demeter *chamynē* as clinching the argument for Elis and the supposed agrarian background. All this is scarcely intelligible save as a reaction to Zielinski, who made much of Aethon son of Helius. Other "emendations" of the Suda are equally misguided.

Prop. 2.4.8), who consorted with Poseidon and bore a son Dictys (Hyg. *Fab.* 157).[59]

4. According to "Eumelus," Aloeus and Aeetes were sons of Helius who received Sicyon and Corinth as their respective portions (*FGrHist* 451 F 1–2, from Pausanias). Both were great potentates; and Aloeus was so insufferable that his son Epopeus removed to Attica; Aeetes had the weirdest of all daughters, Medeia. Aloeus is a name associated with Poseidon through the Thessalian Aloadae. Now Aeetes and Medeia were drawn into the Corinthian story from a different background (*Od.* 10.135–39; Hes. *Theog.* 956–62), which does not concern us here; but it is obvious, however we assess the tangled evidence for Corinthian cult, that certain native figures corresponded to these great names.[60] So this instance is worth noting beside the others.

On this showing a son of Helius is likely to be a rich and insolent king. The names Αἴθων and Αὐγέας evoke fire and light; Φόρβας, Ἀλωεύς, and Αἰήτης suit the rulers of bountiful domains. Phorbas like Aethon insults Demeter. The king's daughter is likely to be a witch, like Mestra, Agamede/Perimede, and Medeia; Ambracia is only known for her genealogy, but since she is reckoned a daughter of Augeas as well as of Phorbas, we may suspect that she too had strange gifts. The daughter is also rather likely to succumb to Poseidon, like Mestra and Agamede. It should be further noted that according to a likely emendation Mestra bore to Poseidon not only Eurypylus but also Ogygus (Ἀλίστρας Tzetz. on Lyc. *Alex.* 1206; Μήστρας Wilamowitz), and that another of Poseidon's flames, Iphimedeia, was daughter of Triopas the Thessalian, himself son of Poseidon ([Hes.] *Cat.* frs. 19, 117.7–8 as restored by West; Apollodorus *Bibl.* 1 [53] 7.4.2).

Such are the figures who most nearly resemble Aethon and Mestra. It is true that all these figures have further affinities, mostly with sons or lovers of Poseidon.[61] Many a princess was loved by Poseidon, in early days a far more lustful god than Zeus or Apollo; some, like Iphimedeia and Tyro, are said to have welcomed his liquid embrace. Po-

[59] For Augeas' genealogy see C. Robert, *Die griechische Heldensage* (Berlin 1920–1926) 453, n. 6; for the circumstances of his son's departure, W. Kullmann, *Die Quellen der Ilias* (Wiesbaden 1961) 161. The passage of Hyginus is flawed, and Actor may be another son of Agamede and Poseidon.

[60] For wide-ranging speculation about the Corinthian Medeia and her children, see E. Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris 1955) 80–129.

[61] Poseidon's lovers and offspring are conveniently listed by E. Wüst, *RE* 22.1 (1953) 462–78, *s.* Poseidon.

seidon often endued his favourites with magic power, whether lovers like Caenis (changed to a man, as Mestra to a fisherman, and made invulnerable), or sons or grandsons like the Aloadae (growing to enormous size), Periclymenus (capable of taking any shape), Eumelus (the lightest and swiftest of runners), Iphiclus (also the lightest and swiftest of runners), and Pterelaus (made invulnerable). A mythical pattern generally reflects a ritual pattern, and does so undoubtedly in this case, where the myths are as ancient and colourful as any we know of; a mere repetition of narrative motifs is out of the question. A study of the myths of Poseidon could restore something of his ritual; indeed the myths are essential to the purpose, since the old worship of Poseidon had largely fallen away in the historical period; his cults are mostly relics, and his festivals no more than names in the calendar. At the moment we are concerned only with the form of ritual which stands behind the myths surveyed above, of the sons of Helius and their resourceful daughters.

These old myths do not point to actual cults of Helius, which in most parts of Greece, at Athens and Corinth for example, are relatively late.[62] Helius' role points rather to a season at which the sun had some ritual significance, that is, to the solstices. Now the winter solstice is precisely when Poseidon was honoured; his festivals, more than those of any other god, fall at just this time.

Several month-names of rather wide distribution—Geraestius, Hippodromius or Hippius *vel sim.*, Taureon—are formed from festivals of Poseidon occurring at different seasons. Yet his premier festival will be that which takes his name, Poseidea *vel sim.*, and which gives rise to one of the commonest of all month-names, Poseideon *vel sim.* At Mantinea and in Laconia the agonistic festivals so called doubtless took place in clement weather, but for the most part the festival and the month belong to early winter. The Attic month Poseideon answers to December/January; at several Ionian cities, and also at Epidaurus, it demonstrably comes at about the same place in the calendar; nor do we find any contrary indications. At still other places Poseidon's worship if not his festival is attested for this time of year. The evidence can be summarized as follows.

[62] See F. W. Hamdorf, *Griechische Kultpersonifikationen der vorhellenistischen Zeit* (Mainz 1964) 18-21, 126-27. His survey, though neither accurate nor complete, is not seriously misleading. At Athens we find two avatars of "Helius" in civic ritual—at the Thargelia (p. 391) and at the Scira (Lysimachides, *FGrHist* 366 F 3), where the name is probably a literary rendering of Zeus *hypatos*, worshipped at the Erechtheium beside the other deities of the Scira.

Either the month-name or, much less often, the festival itself is on record throughout the Ionian, the Aeolian, and the Dorian domains: at Athens (the festival also in rural Attica), on Ceos, Tenos, Myconos, Delos, Paros, Thasos, Chios, and Samos; at Smyrna, Erythrae, Teos, Ephesus, Miletus, and Magnesia-on-the-Maeander; at Perinthus, Cyzicus, and Sinope; at Mytilene and Dardanus and on Samothrace; at Iasus and Halicarnassus; at Epidaurus and Aegina.[63] The fullest information comes from Delos and Aegina, which illustrate respectively the Ionian and the Dorian versions of the festival. On Delos the accounts of the period of independence, 314–166 B.C., record expenses for sacrificial victims—ox, rams, pigs—and for a large-scale banquet, probably accommodating the whole population of the island.[64] On Aegina the festival-name "Poseidonia" used by Athenaeus (13.55, 588E, 13.59, 590F) may well be the literary rendering of a Doric form *Posidaia* or the like, corresponding to the month *Posidaios* at Epidaurus; a winter date is implied by Plutarch's *aition*, which speaks of soldiers returning from Troy and beset, as usual, by storms (*Quaest. Gr.* 44, 301D–F); Plutarch and Athenaeus together draw a picture of opulent feasting conducted by *thiasoi*, but attended by pleasure-seekers and hetaerae from all quarters, with a culminating revel called *aphrodisia* by Plutarch.[65] Finally, rites for Poseidon without the festival name, but sometimes with kindred detail, are scheduled for this season in a number of sacrificial cal-

[63] For the month-name see Samuel (note 29 above) index, *s.* Poseideon *vel. sim.*, with the corrections of J. and L. Robert, *REG* 86 (1973) 69, 72. The festival-name occurs in rural Attica (*IG* 1^3 255 A 10 = *LSCG* A 8), on Delos (note 64 below), on Thasos (*LSCG Suppl.* 69.1), at Smyrna (Ael. Arist. *Or.* 47.6 Keil), at Sinope (*SIG*^{3} 1017 = *LSAM* 1.10–11), at Mytilene (*IG* 12.2.71.6), and on Aegina (note 65 below).

[64] See P. Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique et à l'époque impériale* (Paris 1970) 260–64: the banqueters may have numbered 1500 and may have gathered in the Hypostyle Hall.

[65] Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig 1906) 73–74, 375–76; W. R. Halliday, *The Greek Questions of Plutarch* (Oxford 1928) 183–85. The *thiasoi* which organize the feasting are traced by Plutarch to the circumstances of the *nostos*, when instead of a collective celebration each family welcomed its own, so as not to offend those who were bereaved. Although the *thiasoi* reflect the family groups of the *aition*, they are not such themselves. Nilsson and Halliday, however, are misled by the *aition* and by Attic *thiasoi* as subdivisions of a phratry, and regard the Poseidonia as a *Geschlechtsfeier* comparable to the Apaturia or to parts of the Anthesteria. Phryne's bathing in the sea (Ath. 13.59, 590F) is not a form of recreation suited to the season, as Halliday supposes; it is a ritual act.

endars on stone: at Athens, perhaps at Marathon, on Myconos, and on Rhodes at both Lindus and Cameirus.[66]

The festival Poseidea and the other rites of the season are certainly not addressed to Poseidon as the sea-god, who has no power to help or harm at a time when sailing is avoided. All the details which we have reflect the agrarian milieu. At Athens Poseidon's title is *chamaizēlos*, "earth-bound"; at Lindus *phytalmios*, "procreant"; on Delos *themeliouchos*, "sustaining the foundations," *scil.* of embankments and terrace walls; on Myconos he is worshipped in a rural precinct; on Delos and at Cameirus and Lindus the victims include pigs; more important still, on Myconos Demeter *chloē* receives a complementary sacrifice on the same day. Poseidon is here the god of rushing waters who fructifies the fields in winter and spring. We should therefore cast our net a little wider, so as to take in the Haloea of Eleusis, celebrated on Poseideon 26.[67] This festival bears a name unheard of elsewhere and is also unique

[66] In an Athenian private calendar of early Imperial date Poseidon is honoured on Poseideon 8 (*IG* 2^2 1367 = *LSCG* 52.16-18); in the calendar of Marathon a male deity whose name is lost, but who receives rich offerings at the beginning of the entry for Poseideon, is very likely to be Poseidon, to judge from the season, the victims, and the female company who follow (*IG* 2^2 1358 = *LSCG* 20 B 7-10); in a calendar of Myconos Poseidon is honoured in two separate quarters on Poseideon 12, once as the fisherman's god, but also in a rural setting, and no doubt to the same purpose as Demeter, who comes next (*SIG*^{3} 1024 = *LSCG* 96.5-15); at Lindus Poseidon is honoured on *Theudaisios* 6 (*IG* 12.1.905 = *SIG*^{3} 1030 = *LSCG* 1040), at Cameirus on *Theudaisios* 1 (*LSCG Suppl.* 94.1-7).

[67] For the Haloea see Deubner (note 40 above) 60-67; H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 98-100; E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica* (Madison 1982) 35-37. "A procession for Poseidon" is attested only by Pausanias the Atticist (a 76 Erbse), but this is quite sufficient; Pausanias also comes nearest the true meaning of the festival name, in saying, inter alia, that "they sported on threshing-floors." Both literature and documents describe or presuppose an occasion of general merrymaking; much the fullest account of the ritual, including the women's lewdness, is schol. Luc. *Dial. Meretr.* 7.4 (pp. 279-81 Rabe), a piece of learned theorizing from the same source as the notorious scholium on the Thesmophoria (pp. 275-76 Rabe)—possibly Theophrastus, at any rate someone well acquainted with Athenian festivals. The outlook here is in broad agreement with other sources, and the details are plausible. The women's use of *phalli* is also seen on the red-figure vases adduced by Deubner, and Dionysus is also to the fore in [Dem.] 59 *Neaera* 116-17, where a misdemeanour at the Haloea is described as an outrage to "this same god," viz. Dionysus. Both Dionysus and Poseidon are scanted by Deubner, Parke, and now Simon, who treat the Haloea as another seasonal festival of Demeter; yet Demeter is seldom worshipped at this time of year, save in conjunction with Poseidon.

in addressing Demeter, Dionysus, and Poseidon together; we may regard the Haloea as a special development drawing on Eleusis' special renown. All our sources depict the Haloea as an occasion for general merriment, with large-scale feasting (as on both Delos and Aegina) and licentious revelry (as on Aegina). It is also worth noting the adjacent sanctuaries of Demeter and Poseidon in the agora of Argos (Paus. 2.22.1, 3-4), inasmuch as Poseidon's epithet *prosklystios*, "of the lapping water," points to the winter season and to agrarian concerns, as does also a rite noticed by Pausanias, to be considered below.

At Eleusis and on Aegina the feasting leads up to scurrility and indecent gestures. These elements occur also in festivals of Demeter, notably the Thesmophoria, where they plainly serve as fertility magic.[68] The normal worship of Demeter, however, is conducted by women alone, indeed by women in seclusion from the rest of the community. When Pausanias describes a festival of Demeter *Mysia* near Pellene which takes place in a rural setting with abundant springs, and in which men and women come together and exchange scurrilities (7.27.9-10), we recognize the pattern of our solstice festival, and may safely assume that Demeter has a male partner, either Poseidon or another god concerned with springs.[69] With the scurrilities and mimic childbirth of the Thesmophoria the matrons' purpose is to make the earth bear corn as *they* do children. What then is the purpose of the lascivious teasing between the sexes at Poseidon's festival? Surely it is to arouse Poseidon and to bring the rushing waters. The culminating action of the women is probably described in an anecdote of Athenaeus (13.59, 590F); at the Poseidonia of Aegina, Phryne drew admiring attention from a Panhellenic crowd when "she removed her mantle and unbound her hair and waded into the sea"; the same pretence of yielding to Poseidon appears to be enacted by such mythical heroines as Tyro and Iphimedeia.

There is one feature still missing from our picture of the solstice festival. The Eleusinian accounts of 329/8 B.C. refer twice to the Haloea (*IG* 2^2 1672.124-26, 143-45), and the first entry is for a very large quan-

[68] See, e.g., H. Fluck, *Skurrilen Riten in griechischen Kulten* (Endingen 1931) 11-33, 52-59, 66-69; N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 213-17; F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit* (Berlin 1974) 165-69, 194-99. Graf, following Diels, sees that Baubo's *anasyrma* mimics childbirth; it has not been observed, however, that this can only be the culminating rite of the Thesmophoria, otherwise known as Calligeneia.

[69] Nilsson (note 65 above) 327, was plainly misguided in aligning this festival with the Thesmophoria.

tity of firewood. We naturally think of bonfires, which are lit the world over at the winter solstice; the Haloea included a *pannychis* (Alciphr. 4.6.3). Moreover, bonfires will explain the peculiar name Ἁλῶια. This Attic festival is of course named from the Attic word ἅλως meaning "threshing-floor," not from the Ionic word ἀλωή meaning "cultivated field," so that the name cannot have the agrarian significance which Nilsson and Deubner imagined. But at this season the threshing-floor was not used for threshing (the Attic threshing festival is the Scira). It was very likely used for the bonfires, just as the "Threshing-floor" at Delphi was used for the construction of the wooden "palace" that was burnt up in the Delphic fire festival Septerium (Plut. *De Def. Or.* 15, 418A-B). At Eleusis "the so-called threshing floor of Triptolemus" lay close to the Outer Court of the sanctuary (Paus. 1.38.6); the Outer Court, with its *eschara* and temple of Poseidon *patēr*, was undoubtedly the setting of the Haloea (cf. [Dem.] 59 *Neaera* 116; *IG* 2^2 1299.28, 78).[70] Finally, in the agora of Argos, next to the sanctuaries of Demeter and Poseidon, Pausanias reports a custom of throwing flaming torches into a pit (2.22.3); the custom, which has puzzled commentators, is plausibly explained as another fire festival.[71]

The foregoing details explain the story of Aethon and Mestra and other stories of the same kind. The festival comes at the winter solstice

[70] The temple of Roman date in the Outer Court is occupied jointly by Poseidon *patēr* and Artemis *propylaia*; Poseidon and Artemis are also named successively in the fifth century decree prescribing certain sacrifices at Eleusis (*IG* 1^3 5 = *LSCG* 4; Poseidon's name being restored with near certainty). In both cases the juxtaposition will be dictated by convenience: the two deities are worshipped in the same area, but for different reasons; they do not share any ritual function that we know of. The title *patēr* belongs to a series of titles expressing Poseidon's procreant power—*phytalmios, genethlios, genesios, patrogeneios*. It has nothing to do with the mythical paternity of Eumolpus, which derives rather from the Athenian festival Scira and the cult of Poseidon on the Acropolis; the conflict between Eumolpus and Erechtheus, "Fine-singer" and "Thresher," is the *aition* of this festival and of the ceremonial threshing at Scirum (cf. Pap. Sorb. 2328 = Eur. *Erechtheus* fr. 65 Austin). Two other avatars of Poseidon at Eleusis, *prosbatērios* and *themeliouchos* (K. Clinton, *The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries* [*TAPS* 64.3, 1974] 50-52, lines 16-17, a decree of 20/19 B.C. naming the priest in question), can be associated with the winter season, when terraces and water courses and also boundary stones received attention.

[71] Nilsson (note 65 above) 361-62, supposes that the pit was a *megaron*, as used by women at the Thesmophoria; but the agora is not the place for a *megaron*, nor are torches wanted beside the butchered pigs, and the Argive rite, reputedly instituted by one Nicostratus, was conducted by men. At another Argive festival bonfires were lit on Lyrcea and Larisa (Paus. 2.25.4).

and entails extravagant feasting; so Helius is father to a shameless potentate—to Aethon with his insatiable hunger, to Augeas with his unbounded wealth, to Triopas, Phorbas, Aloeus, and Aeetes. The celebrants, especially young women, resort to ribald jesting and mimicry in order to summon up the fertilizing power of Poseidon's springs and rivers; so the potentate has a daughter who is both artful and wanton (Mestra, Agamede/Perimede, Medeia) and who succumbs to Poseidon as to other suitors (Mestra, Agamede/Perimede). The fertility magic works upon the fields; so Phorbas assaults Demeter outright, and Aethon and Triopas violate her sacred grove. Bonfires are lighted; hence the name Aethon, "Fiery," which may equally signify the hunger behind the feasting. And since trees must be felled for the bonfires, Aethon has a motive for invading Demeter's grove.[72]

This interpretation of our story is further warranted by the ritual nomenclature at Argos. Demeter's shrine in the agora of Argos, adjoining the shrine of Poseidon *prosklystios*, was traced to Pelasgus son of Triopas, whose grave was shown nearby, and from whom Demeter received the epithet *Pelasgis* (Paus. 2.22.1). In the Messenian *archaeologia* recounted by Pausanias, Pelasgus son of Triopas has a rather similar role as father of the eponym Messene; for Messene, as we are told many times, first instituted the ancient and mysterious cult of Demeter at Andania (4.1.5, 9, 4.2.6, 4.26.8).[73] And whereas in olden days men lived on cornmeal, this same Pelasgus, who gave his name to *Pelasgikon Argos*, invented the baking of bread (schol. Eur. *Or.* 932); that is, like Triptolemus, he introduced another of Demeter's gifts to mankind. Thus, the Thessalian Triopas kept his association with Demeter when transplanted to Argos, together with his father Phorbas and his son Pelasgus. These "Pelasgian" antecedents were then attached to the worship in the agora, where it seems that Demeter and Poseidon were jointly honoured at a festival of the winter solstice. Finally, we have the Argive kinship group Αἰθωνίδαι. This name belongs to a series of names for such groups, 37 by present count, which are often conjoined with

[72] This sort of offence is characteristic of myths of Poseidon and reflects the god's unruly nature. At Athens his son Halirrhothius took an axe to Athena's sacred olives (Et. Magn., *s. moria*); at Argos Poseidon himself flooded the land in a pique, and was therefore called *prosklystios* (Paus. 2.22.4).

[73] For our purpose it does not matter how late this story is, nor whether Demeter was really at home in the Mysteries of Andania; the only point of interest is the reputation attaching to Pelasgus son of Triopas.

personal names in Argive documents, from the fifth century onwards.[74] Nothing is known and little can be conjectured about the origin and function of these groups; yet whether the kinship is entirely fictive (as with the ten Attic tribes) or perpetuates some authentic connection of the past (as with Attic phratries and demes), the various people and places that give their names to the groups must be distinctive of the local background at Argos. There is no likelihood at all that the eponym Αἴθων comes from the general store of myth, from the *Odyssey*, say, or from the Erysichthon story in its Athenian or Thessalian setting. Αἴθων was native to Argos, and if our argument is right, the name arose from ritual—most likely from the solstice festival of Demeter and Poseidon.

So much and no more can be said in support of the contention that the names and characters of Aethon and Mestra belong together and derive from rites addressed to Poseidon as the god of fresh water, closely allied with Demeter. The results are less secure and less precise than those obtained for the other elements of the story. The reason is simply that no direct evidence exists to establish the ritual background. Triopas, Phorbas, and Erysichthon are firmly tied to Triopium, Rhodes, and Athens, respectively, and we even have some knowledge of the local cults of Apollo where these figures originate. Aethon and Mestra on the other hand have only been assigned to a mythical and a ritual pattern. That they too are projected from a local cult may be safely assumed, but where was it? Although the transparent name "Aethon" was in use at Argos, nothing else points to this quarter; at the shrine in the agora the lore of Pelasgus is secondary. Athens is much the likeliest place of origin. Suppose that the story of Aethon and Mestra was the *aition* of the Athenian Poseidea, a festival which in the historical period had either lapsed entirely or so nearly that no trace remains; no doubt it was effectively superseded by the Eleusinian Haloea. Then the hungry

[74] The 34 names then known were listed by M. Wörrle, *Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte von Argos im 5. Jahrhundert vor Chr.* (Munich 1964) 17, n. 32. Three new names have been added since, and an old name corrected: see C. Kritsas, Στήλη (Athens 1980) 506; M. Piérart and J.-P. Thalmann, *BCH Suppl.* 6 (1980) 261, 264, 272-73; M. Piérart, *BCH* 105 (1981) 611-13. Wörrle like most others thinks of these groups as phratries, but his discussion (pp. 16-31) shows that *pentēkostyes* are by no means excluded. The name *Aithonidai* is traced to Erysichthon by Vollgraff, *BCH* 27 (1909) 194-96, and again by M. Guarducci, *L'istituzione della fratria* 2 (*MemLinc*^{6} 8.2, 1938) 88; to Odysseus by Hiller von Gaertringen on *SIG*^{3} 735; McKay (193) is doubtful. Wörrle (22, n. 46) appears to think it possible that a few names are taken from familiar mythical figures.

GREEK AND LATIN EPISTOLARY FORMULAE: SOME LIGHT ON CICERO'S LETTER WRITING

In an article in *AJP* of 1935, Clinton W. Keyes[1] examined the terminology and phraseology of the Greek letter of introduction with a view to discovering the relationship between the letters from actual life and the two manuals of letter writing from antiquity which have reached us: the Τύποι Ἐπιστολικοί attributed wrongly to Demetrius of Phaleron[2] and the Περὶ ἐπιστολιμαίου χαρακτῆρος (or Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι χαρακτῆρες) assigned variously to Proclus or Libanius.[3] He singled out the letter of introduction since he felt that it was "the most distinctive in purpose and character" of all the types mentioned in the two manuals.[4]

No one would quarrel with Keyes' observation that the traditional formulae and set phrases in actual letters of introduction from Egypt fail to show the influence of the earliest extant manual, the Τύποι Ἐπιστολικοί,[5] although the Egyptian provenance of the latter has been sufficiently proven by Brinkmann.[6] However, the recurrence of set phraseology and traditional formulae in the actual letters suggested to Keyes that "there were other manuals for letter writing which were more popular" and that these are lost to us.[7] The same line of reasoning led him to conclude that "Cicero used some conventional Greek forms in his letters of introduction" and that "probably he was acquainted with Greek handbooks of letter writing";[8] for the "cumulative weight" of some of the correspondences between the Greek and Ciceronian formulae seemed to him to go beyond "a mere coincidence": "It seems quite

[1]C. W. Keyes, "The Greek Letter of Introduction," *AJP* 56 (1935) 28-44.

[2]See A. Brinkmann, "Der älteste Briefsteller," *RhM* n.f. 64 (1909) 310-17.

[3]Under the first title it is attributed to Proclus, whereas the recension bearing the other title is attributed to Libanius; cf. Sykurtis, *RE Suppl.* V (1931) 191-93; H. Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (1956) 56-57, for further bibliography.

[4]Keyes (note 1 above) 32; cf. also H. Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften. 9. Griechische Briefsteller," *RhM* n.f. 64 (1909) 296: "die συστατική ist eine der wenigen, die schon lange fest bestimmt waren."

[5]Keyes (note 1 above) 31.

[6]Brinkmann (note 2 above) 311-12.

[7]Keyes, op. cit. (note 1 above) 31; cf. also Rabe, loc. cit. (note 4 above). For other manuals, see Koskenniemi (note 3 above) 57-59.

[8]Keyes (note 1 above) 44.

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clear that Cicero knew and adapted some Greek formulae for letters of introduction."[9]

It is with this conclusion that the present article wishes to join issue, not least because it has often gone unchallenged by editors of papyrus letters of introduction both in Latin and in Greek.[10]

The case for postulating Greek influence on Cicero's letters of introduction seems to have been settled conclusively for Keyes by the "particularly striking ... similarity between the expressions ἔχειν αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον and *habeas tibi commendatissimos*."[11] The similarity is indeed striking, and Keyes could have strengthened his case by pointing out that not only the expressions cited above but the entire turn of phrase follow an identical pattern. Both expressions depend on, or follow on, a word of request: ἐρωτῶ[12] or παρακαλῶ in Greek and *peto* or *rogo* in Latin.[13]

However, Keyes is careless about chronology: all the instances for the recurrence of the formula in the Greek letters of introduction on papyrus which he cites are later in date than Cicero's. P. Oxy. 787 (Keyes, no. 23) belongs to ca. A.D. 16; P. Oxy. 292 (Keyes, no. 24) to ca. A.D. 25; P. Giess. 71 (Keyes, no. 26) to A.D. 113/4-20.[14] Three more letters of introduction containing the same formula and published since Keyes' article appeared all belong to a post-Ciceronian date: P. Merton 62 to A.D. 6; P. Hermo. 1 to the first century of our era and P. Cornell Inv. No. I, 64 to A.D. 136.[15] The evidence does not support the case for Greek influence on Cicero.

[9]Ibid.

[10]See the comments of C. H. Roberts and E. G. Turner ad P. Ryl. 608 (Latin) and of H. I. Bell and others ad P. Merton 62 (Greek).

[11]Keyes (note 1 above), 44.

[12]For ἐρωτῶ in the sense of "to request" see A. Deissmann, *Bibelstudien* (1895) 45; *Neue Bibelstudien* (1897), 23-24.

[13]For the Latin, see Cic. *Fam.* 10.8.7; 21a (Plancus); 12.12.2 (Cassius), cited below, p. 422, and Pliny *Ep.* 10.58.6; P. Ryl. 608, cited below, p. 422. For the Greek see note 15.

[14]The Giessen papyrus comes from the archive of Apollonius, the *strategos* of Apollonopolite Heptakomiae in those years; see U. Wilcken, *Die Bremer Papyri* (1935) 9.

[15]The last-named papyrus was published by N. Lewis, "A Veteran in Quest of a Home," *TAPA* 90 (1959) 13-46 = *Sammelbuch*, VI, 9636. These are to my knowledge the only occurrences of the formula in Greek letters. We shall cite them in the order in which they are mentioned in the text. P. Oxy. 787 (a fragment of a letter): ἐρωτῶ σε οὖν ἔχειν αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον; P. Oxy. 292: διὸ παρακαλῶ σε μετὰ πάσης δυνά|μεως ἔχειν αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον; P. Giess. 71: Ἀχιλλέα τὸν ἀναδιδόντα σοι τὴν ἐπι|στολήν μου ταύτην ἐρωτῶ ἔχειν συν|εσταμένον; P. Merton 62: ἐρωτηθεὶς ἔχε αὐτὸν | συνεσ-

It is altogether surprising, therefore, that Chan-Hie Kim in his exhaustive treatment of the familiar Greek letter of recommendation, while rightly observing that the Greek formula was first introduced in the Roman period,[15] does not use the opportunity to rectify Keyes' erroneous reliance on this formula to postulate Greek influence on Cicero's letter writing. However, the late appearance of the Greek formula does not in itself imply—or at least not without further examination of the evidence—that it is a Latinism, as Kim, following others, maintains.[17] The last-mentioned claim is probably based on the assumption that the construction of *habere* with the direct object predicated by the passive perfect participle is more at home in the Latin language than the parallel construction in the Greek. But if the Greek formula was modelled on the Latin one, then one would expect the meaning of συνίστημι in it to resemble that of *commendo* in its Latin counterpart. Yet Kim argues that "the formula *clearly* uses the verb συνίστημι in the sense of 'to introduce' [italics mine]."[18] This is not necessarily, as we shall see below, the meaning that *commendo*[19] has in the formula. And for reasons to be given below, Kim's designation of the formula as a periphrasis[20] rules out, in fact, such a sense.

The present discussion will attempt a clarification of both Greek and Latin terms of introduction; it will also explore the case for unilat-

ταμένον; P. Hermo 1: ἐρωτῶ σε συνεσταμένον | ἔχειν Διόσκορον τὸν ἀ[ναδώ]|σοντί σοι τὴν ἐπιστο[λήν]; P. Cornell Inv. No. I, 64: λοιπὸν οὖν σε ἐρωτῶ συνεστα|μένον μεσσίκιν. In a slightly different form (using the present medio-passive participle instead of the perfect: ἔχε με συνιστάμενον) it appears in a magical text found on an unnumbered page attached to P. Holm, and therefore cannot be safely dated with the rest of the papyrus to the fourth century A.D.; see O. Lagercrantz, *Papyrus Graecus Holmiensis (P. Holm): Recepte für Silber, Stein und Purpur* (1913) 54;246 with B. Olsson, "Zwei Papyrusstellen besprochen" *Aegyptus* 12 (1932) 256.

[16]*Form and Structure of the Familiar Greek Letter of Recommendation (Society of Biblical Studies: Dissertation Series* 4) (1972) 68.

[17]It certainly does not follow from the reason adduced by Kim that he "found four such expressions in Latin letters"; P. Ryl. 608, Cic. *Fam.* 12.26.2, 13.64.1 and St. Polycarp's *Epistle to the Philippians*, ch. 14 (Kim, op. cit., 69-70). The last-named example is worthless (see note 70 below). But even with the addition of Pliny, *Ep.* 10.58.6, overlooked by Kim, the formula is documented more times in the *formal* Greek letter of introduction than in the Latin one.

[18]Kim (note 16 above) 7.

[19]For the connotation of the Latin term, *commendo*, see below, pp. 418 f.

[20]For a neat and convenient definition of which see W. Dietrich, "Der periphrastische Verbalaspekt im Griechischen und Lateinischen," *Glotta* 51 (1973) 192; cf. also below, pp. 412 f.

eral or mutual influence between them. Since the key to the discussion lies in the above-mentioned formulae, a digression on the parallel constructions, *habere* / ἔχειν with the direct object predicated by the passive participle, is called for: a better understanding of their history and properties may help us to gather their precise meaning as formulae of introduction (or recommendation.)[21]

Both grammatical constructions have generally been studied within the context of their future development into periphrastic exponents of perfectivity in their respective languages.[22] *Habere* and ἔχειν in this later development lost their original sense of "possessing" and "holding" and became auxiliaries. Together with the passive perfect participle, they express an elementary verbal conception which once was expressed by the monolectic perfect.

Although the combination of ἔχειν with the passive perfect participle has become one of the two ways of expressing perfectivity in modern Greek, "there is no question of this periphrastic usage in the Koine."[23] In fact, wherever it occurs in the Koine its usage cannot be distinguished from that of classical Greek: thus no one can argue convincingly for a difference of nuance between Homer's πεπταμένας ἐν χερσὶ πύλας ἔχετ' (*Il.* 21.531)[24] and Plutarch's τὰς πύλας εἶχον ἀνεῳγμένας (*Cam.* 34.5), or Xenophon's εἶχον ... τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκλυμμένας (*Anab* I.2.16) and Plutarch's τοὺς μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ἀφ' ἡμέρας εἶχε πλησίον ἐν οἴκοι τινὶ κεκρυμμένους (*Pelop.* 35.5)[25] to mention only phrases with similar meaning.[26] But leaving Plutarch and the Atticists aside, none of the seventeen occurrences of the construction

[21]For the distinction between the two see below, pp. 416 f.

[22]For a recent discussion see R. Coleman, "Greek Influence on Latin Syntax," *TPhS* 1975 (1977) 113-16.

[23]W. J. Aerts, *Periphrastica: An Investigation into the Use of* εἶναι *and* ἔχειν *as Auxiliaries or Pseudo-Auxiliaries in Greek from Homer to the Present Day* (1965) 166.

[24]See also *Il.* 12.122.

[25]It has been argued, however, that here as well as in other cases the construction is used as a periphrastic perfect: cf. A. N. Jannaris, *An Historical Introduction to Greek Grammar* (1897) §2193, p 498; J. Vendreys, "Sur l'emploi de l'auxiliaire 'avoir' pour marquer le passé," *Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie offerts à J. van Ginneken* (1937) 86. But see Aerts' convincing arguments against a periphrastic interpretation.

[26]See also Herodotus 1.50.1; Euripides, *Trag. Grae. Fr.*, 775 (Nauck); Diod. Sic. 2.32.4, 53.7, 3.36.5; Plutarch *Tit. Flamin.* 20.4; Galen *De diagnoscendis pulsis* 3.2 (Kühn, VIII, p. 892). With the help of the *Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus* (ed. K. H. Regnstorf, 1973), s. ἔχω I have been able to find nine examples of ἔχω + object + passive perfect participle, in none of which the ἔχω has to be construed as an auxiliary. Even *Vita* 360: πρὸ γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶχες γεγραμμένην (*scil.* ἱστορίαν) can be translated so as to bring out the original force of ἔχειν and as the Loeb translation

in the New Testament need be construed as a periphrasis, let alone a periphrastic perfect.[27] The case of Luke 14:18–19, ἔχε με παρῃτημένον—often mentioned together with the commendatory formula—may be considered below in conjunction with the latter. We may turn now to the parallel Latin construction.[28]

There are those who trace the development of the periphrastic perfect in Latin as far back as the old Roman Comedy.[29] They consider the *missa habeo* in "illa omnia missa habeo, quae ante agere occepi" (Plautus *Pseud.* 602) as equivalent to *misi*, and the *relictas habeo* in "immo omnis res relictas habeo prae quod tu velis" (Plautus *Stich.* 362) as equivalent to *reliqui*.[30] Yet even if this interpretation is correct, it does not follow that from Plautus onwards the combination of *habere* and the passive perfect participle became the usual way of expressing perfectivity in Latin, which so far lacked a form to express this notion unambiguously. The contrary is true, as demonstrated long ago by Thielmann in a masterly article written in preparation for the *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, where he reviewed one by one the manifold and varied usages and meanings conveyed by the numerous combinations of *habere* with the passive perfect participle.[31] In most cases the *habere* retained

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does in fact: "you had it written twenty years ago" rather than: "you had written it twenty years ago."

[27]I have been able to add six more passages to the list cited by Aerts (note 23 above) 161–62: Luke 12:19; Heb. 5:14, 9:4, 12:11; II Pet. 2:14; Apoc. 9:11.

[28]The rise of periphrastic substitutes for the monolectic Greek perfect is closely tied up with the later development of the perfect. P. Chantraine argued that as a result of the great expansion of the Greek perfect system in the fourth century B.C. and the development of the resultative perfect, the ruin of the perfect set in; the resultative perfect no longer describes the present state of the subject, but rather that of the object (*Histoire du parfait grec* [1927] 164 f., esp. 189–96). Consequently the perfect tended to become confused with the aorist, not only semantically but also morphologically (ibid., 214–52). Periphrastic conjugations emerged as substitutes for the now much weakened monolectic perfect (ibid., 250 f.). This view has recently been challenged by K. L. McKay in "The Use of the Greek Perfect down to the Second Century A.D.," *BICS* 12 (1965) 1; "On the Perfect and Other Aspects in the Greek Non-Literary Papyri," *BICS* 27 (1980) 23; "On the Perfect and Other Aspects in New Testament Greek," *Novum Testamentum* 23 (1981) 19.

[29]E.g., A. Ernout, *Morphologie historique du Latin*[3] (1953) 305; J. Vendreys (note 25 above) 86; *Thes. Ling. Lat.* VI, 2427, 15 f.

[30]But see the reservations of Ph. Thielmann, "Habere mit dem Part. Perf. Pass.," *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie* II, 535–36, and E. J. Tammelin, *De Participiis Priscae Latinitatis Quaestiones Selectae* (1889) 98–104. Ch. E. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin* I, 439, takes the periphrasis to be the equivalent of *mitto* and *relinquo*, respectively.

[31]Thielmann (note 30 above) 372–423, 509–49.

its original force of "holding" and "possessing."[32] It is true that in cases in which the finite verb (i.e., *habere*) is identical with the agent of the participle, the chances for the emergence of a periphrasis will increase.[33] However, in such cases the periphrasis does not necessarily express the notion of perfectivity:[34] as in compounds of *habere* with an adjective, the *habere* with the passive perfect participle may constitute a new lexical unit related to the present.[35] It often seems that the finite verb and the participle coalesce into one idea and govern the object as a direct object of both.[36]

Whether or not conditions were favourable for the emergence of a new lexical unit whose meaning is in the combination of the two elements (i.e., *habere* / ἔχειν and *commendatum* / συνεσταμένον) depends to a large extent on the meaning of the participle in question. Hence one should look more closely both at the Greek and at the Latin verb of introduction/recommendation.

Keyes rightly observed that the verb συνίστημι was used from Xenophon onwards in the sense of "to introduce."[37] It need hardly be said that it does not necessarily appear in connection with a letter of introduction, or any formal introduction at all.

The survey which follows will attempt to record—though not to exhaust—the various contexts and collocations in which the verb tends

[32]Thielmann (note 30 above) passim; see for example his observations on pp. 404-6.

[33]As often pointed out by Thielmann (note 30 above) e.g., pp. 390-91, 422, 509 f., and postulated as a sine qua non condition by E. Herzog, "Das -to- Partizip im Altromanischen. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom syntaktischen Wandel," *Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* 26 (1910) 106-23.

[34]The notion of perfectivity emerges especially in those cases which resemble most the original Greek perfect (on which see Chantraine [note 28 above] chs. 1-2), namely when the compound expresses the effect a past act or process has produced on the subject itself; in other words, when the compound describes the state—generally state of mind—reached by the subject: e.g., *cognitum, exploratum, compertum habeo*; cf. R. Lucot, "Remarques sur l'emploi de *habeo* avec le participe en -to," *Mélanges de philologie, de litterature et d'histoire anciennes offerts à E. Ernout* (1940) 247-49; Thielmann (note 30 above) 509 f. Thus *cognitum habeo* conveys the idea of ἔγνωκα, leaving it to *cognovi* to express that of ἔγνων; cf. Thielmann, ibid.

[35]Cf. Thielmann (note 30 above) 376 f. In these cases, as observed rightly by Herzog (note 33 above) 123, the *habui* + part. perf. pass. will serve as a perfect.

[36]Cf. Th. K. Sidey, *The Participle in Plautus, Petronius and Apuleius* (*Diss. Chicago,* 1909) 18 f. Together the compound may govern an *accusativus cum infinitivo* or a subordinate clause.

[37]Keyes (note 1 above) 39.

to appear; these are not irrelevant to the determination of shades of meaning and their connotations.

As early as Plato we find it in the context of the introduction of a student to a teacher: ἵνα τῳ τούτων τῶν σοφιστῶν δοκούντων εἶναι συνστήσω τουτονί (*Theages* 122A);[38] or vice versa, that is, introducing/recommending teachers to a student: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἑκάστοτε συνίστησιν (*Laches* 200D). In order to exculpate himself from the charge of corrupting the youth, Isocrates points out that parents introduce—or rather *entrust*—their children to him (συνιστᾶσι).[39] A poem of Lucillius (first century A.D.) tells of a woman who has entrusted her son (συνεστακέναι) to Menander, the grammarian (*Anth. Palat.* 9.139). Finally, in a papyrus from A.D. 155 someone introduces/entrusts a slave to a shorthand writer so that he could teach him the skill: συνέστησά σοι Χαιράμμωνα δοῦλον πρὸς μάθησιν σημείων ὧν ἐπίσταται ὁ υἱός σου (P. Oxy. 724).

Another context where we find the verb is that in which a patient is introduced to a doctor (or rather entrusted to him): βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἰατρῷ συστῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας (Plato *Charmides* 155B). One may introduce—or again entrust—passengers to the captain and crew of a ship: τοῦ δὲ Μενύλλου . . . συστήσαντος τῷ ναυκλήρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιβάταις ἐκτενῶς (Polyb. 31.14.12); σύστησον οὖν αὐτοὺς [ ] / εἰς τὸν κέλητα ὅπως πλέωσι (P. Cair. Zen. 59002).

The same verb is used to express the act of presenting a person before a king: ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ παραγένῃ—writes a son to his father—πέπεισμαι ῥαιδίως με τῶι βασιλεῖ συσταθήσεσθαι (P. Flind. Petrie 2.11.1).[40] Xenophon was introduced to Cyrus at Sardis—συνεστάθη Κύρῳ (*Anab.* 1.3.8)—by their common friend, Proxenus.[41] Likewise a man could be recommended to the Roman Emperor: Καίσαρι (Augustus) δὲ πολλάκις γράφων (Herod) ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ (Antipater) καὶ ἰδιᾷ συνίστη σπουδαιότερον (Jos. *Antiq.* 16.85). A client king, such as Attalus, son of Eumenes, king of Pergamon, came to Rome in order to be presented to the Roman Senate: χάριν τοῦ τῇ τε συγκλήτῳ συσταθῆναι (Polyb. 33.18.2).

On two different occasions we find a ruling king recommending his son and heir to the army or the people. Thus Antigonus, king of

[38] See also 123B.

[39] 15 (*Antidosis*) 240: νῦν δ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν συνιστᾶσι τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς αὐτῶν.

[40] = Witkowski, *Epist. Priv. Graec.*[2] (1911) no. 3. For comments and translation of this letter see Wilamowitz, *Reden und Vorträge*[3], 366.

[41] Cf. *Anab.* 6.1.23: καὶ ὅτε ἐξ Ἐφέσου ὡρμᾶτο Κύρῳ συσταθησόμενος.

Macedonia, before the battle τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέδειξε τῷ πλήθει καὶ συνέστησέ διάδοχον (Plut. *Demet.* 28.4);[42] similarly, Antiochus, king of Syria, reminds the people of Judaea in his letter that he had often recommended his son and heir, Antiochus, to them before: παρεκατετίθεμην[43] καὶ συνίστων (II *Macc.* 9.25).

The Greek historians of the Roman Empire use the verb in order to render the idea of *commendatio* by the princeps.[44] Augustus, according to Cassius Dio, posted a bulletin in which he commended (συνίστη) to the plebs and the people those he wished to be elected to the magistracies (55.34.2); Tiberius, under whom the elections were transferred to the senate, used to recommend (συνίστας) to this body as many as he wished of those who had been allowed to stand for office, whereupon these people were chosen unanimously (Cass. Dio 58.20.3).

The examples given above already suggest that συνίστημι acquired the extended meaning of "to commend," "to recommend," and even "to praise."[45] But originally the verb meant, probably, no more than its individual components imply, namely "to bring people together" and "to introduce people unknown to each other"—a meaning that is still apparent in the usage of the Attic orators. Συνίστημι is used here in the context of monetary transactions involving the introduction of a third person to whom money should be paid in the name of another person. The latter either deposited the money with a banker or borrowed it from him for this very purpose. In fact we are told that it was customary for the bankers to jot down in their ledgers the name of the person ὅς ἂν μέλλῃ συστήσειν καὶ δείξειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν ἂν δέῃ κομισάσθαι τὸ ἀργύριον (Dem. *Or.* 52.3).[46]

[42]"Appointed" or "nominated as a successor" are perhaps more likely renderings of συνέστησε in the context (see LSJ *s.* συνίστημι A.IV.e for this sense); otherwise the διάδοχον will have to be taken together with ἀπέδειξε—a less attractive alternative.

[43]In letters of recommendation/introduction from the second century A.D. onwards this verb, or rather παρατίθεμαι, is sometimes used to replace συνίστημι: P. Bremen 7 (113/4–120); P. Giess. 38 (113/4–120); P. Oxy. 1663 (second or third century); *PSI* 96 (fifth century); cf. Libanius-Proclus, Περὶ ἐπιστολιμαίου χαρακτῆρος (Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, p. 8): Συστατικὴ ἐστι δι' ἧς συνιστῶμεν τινα παρά τινι· ἡ δ' αὐτὴ καὶ παραθετικὴ καλεῖται. It is this verb which is closer in sense to the Latin *commendare*; cf. below, pp. 418 f.

[44]On which see B. Levick, "Imperial Control of the Elections in the Early Principate: Commendatio, Suffragatio and 'Nominatio'," *Historia* 16 (1967) 207.

[45]Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.6.14: καὶ, ἐάν τι σχῶ ἀγαθὸν, διδάσκω καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι, παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν; Plut. *De Exilio* 603c: τὰς δὲ νήσους ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ὑμνῶν καὶ συνιστὰς ὁ ποιητής.

[46]Despite the legal context there is as yet no trace of the technical sense of "nominating a representative" which the verb evolved later on. On the development of this

The extended meaning of συνίστημι is a natural development: an introduction is almost invariably accompanied by some word of commendation. The best commentary on this extended meaning of συνίστημι is to be found in Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians. Since the community is already well acquainted with Paul, who had sojourned there for a year and a half (Acts 18:11), the συστατικαὶ ἐπιστολαί of II Cor. 3:1 can hardly refer to letters which introduce Paul to the community for the first time.[47] Indeed they must mean here letters of recommendation, credentials testifying to Paul's qualities and accomplishments. Paul's deprecation of this social device implies that his opponents did indeed resort to it. In fact Paul uses the verb συνίστημι throughout this epistle as a kind of leitmotif in order to draw a distinction between the true apostle whose recommendation is self-evident and those who stand in need of one.[48] For our particular interest it is highly significant that Paul chooses to use the verb συνίστημι in order to express his true mission and election;[49] his very argument stands on the larger meaning of the verb.

Unfortunately it cannot be safely claimed that in the papyri letters which have reached us the verb συνίστημι has more than its primary, literal sense of bringing together two (or more) people. The verb may denote the act of writing a letter of introduction: καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιοῖς μὴ ἀφοκνῶν γραφεῖν | πρός τε Νικανόρα καὶ πρὸς Ἑκαταῖον ἵνα τὴν ἐπιμελείαν ἡμῶν ποιῶνται, | ἐὰν ὦμεν ἄξιοί σου τοῦ συστησάντος (P. Col. Zen. 64, 257-55 B.C.), or alternatively it may refer to an oral introduction: πολλάκις μὲν γέγραφά σοι παραγενέσθαι καὶ συστῆσαι με, ὅπως τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ | παρόντος σχολῆς ἀπολυθῶ (P. Flind. Petrie 2.11.1 = Witkowski[2] no. 3). Sometimes we simply do not know which of the two manners of introduction is meant: Λεο]ντίσκος ὁ ἀποδιδούς σοι |

technical sense see in detail E. Rabel, Σύστασις, *Archives d'histoire du droit oriental* I (1937) 213. His examination of the Serapeum Papyri clarifies the transition to a technical sense (see esp. his comparison of the introduction of Apollonios, Ptolemaios' brother, — *UPZ* 24.8 f., 39.19 f., 40.14, 51.18 f., 52.7 f., 53.7 f. — and that of Demetrios' son of Sosos — *UPZ* 20.31 f., 25.17 f., 26.12 f., 27.4 f. — on pp. 219-24). At least in the third and second centuries B.C. the technical sense does not inhere in the verb itself, but depends entirely on the context, Rabel, ibid., 217. For similar observations cf. J. Partsch's review of L. Wegner, *Die Stellvertretung im Rechte der Papyri* in *Archiv* IV (1907-8) 499-500.

[47] Ἀρχόμεθα πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνειν; ἢ μὴ χρῄζομεν, ὡς τινες, συστατικῶν ἐπιστολῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐξ ὑμῶν; ἡ ἐπιστολὴ ἡμῶν ὑμεῖς ἐστε, ἐγγεγραμμένη ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

[48] See II Cor. 4:2, 5:12, 6:4, 7:11, 10:12, 18, 12:11.

[49] Cf. *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, ed. G. Friedrich (1964) *s.* συνίστημι, vol. VII, 895-96, and *s.* καυχάομαι, vol. III, 650-51.

τὴν ἐπιστολὴν συ[νεστάθ]η μοι ὑπό τινων φίλων (P. Cair. Zen. 59853 = *PSI* 376, 250 B.C.). How in fact was Leontiskos introduced to the writer of this letter?[50]

In one literary letter of introduction the extended sense seems to be excluded. Isocrates, writing to Antipater about Diodotus, regrets not being able to do what is implied by the verb συνίστημι (*Ep.* IV):[51] μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐβουλόμην ἂν αὐτὸν συσταθῆναί σοι δι' ἡμῶν. Failing this he will write a *testimonium* on behalf of the man: ἐπειδὴ δὲ δι' ἑτέρων ἐντέτυχηκέ σοι, λοιπόν ἐστί μοι μαρτυρῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ βεβαιῶσαι τὴν γεγενημένην αὐτῷ πρὸς σὲ γνῶσιν. No doubt can be entertained about the very restricted sense in which the verb συνίστημι is used here; the fact that the man is already known to Antipater excludes the act it conveys.

On the other hand when Octavian writes to the people of Rhosus about their fellow citizen, Seleucus,[52] τοῦτον οὖν ὑμεῖν συνίστημι, the verb has perforce its extended sense, for Octavian cannot be said to be introducing Seleucus to the people of Rhosus. One wonders whether the verb συνίστημι has since Isocrates' day totally shed its literal meaning or if the writer of the letter to Rhosus (possibly Octavian himself) assumed that it was synonymous with the Latin *commendare*.[53]

At this point we may turn to the Latin verb. The jurists point out the primary and concrete meaning of the verb *commendare*: "Quid est enim aliud commendare quam deponere," states Papinian in his *Quaestiones* (*Dig.* 16.3.24).[54] In the sense of "to entrust to one's charge," the verb can be applied to people as well as to inanimate objects. Hence also the idiomatic collocation *commendare et tradere* in recommendations: "L. Genucilio Curvo iam pridem utor familiarissime.... Eum tibi penitus commendo atque trado" (Cic. *Fam.* 13.53.1); "nunc Orestillam commendo tuaeque fidei trado" (Sall. *Cat.* 35.6).[55] Fustel de Coulanges believed that some force inhered in the words themselves: "Ces mots ('Ei

[50]Cf. P. Flind. Petrie II, 2.4 = Witkowski 12 (260 B.C.); P. Lond. 2026 (third century B.C.); P. Col. Zen. 115b + P. Mich. Zen 93 (third century B.C.)

[51]On the question of authenticity—which does not really affect the argument here—see G. Mathieu, *Isocrate: Philippe et Lettres à Philippe, à Alexander et à Antipatros* (1924) 43-46.

[52]Text in Sherk, *RDGE* no. 58, iv, p. 298.

[53]Octavian's letter dates from 30 B.C.

[54]Cf. *Dig.* 50.16.186.

[55]Perhaps some distinction is implied in Cic. *Att.* 5.13.2; cf. D. R. Shackleton Bailey ad loc.: "*tradidi* seems to imply personal introduction as opposed to recommendation in absence. The terms are, however, often combined, as in *Fam.* 7.17.2."

te commendavi et tradidi')[56] étaient apparement les termes consacrés pour cette sorte de transfert de clientèle."[57] As a result of these acts and words, a tie of *fides* was established between a patron and a client: a form of patronage which is distinct from others in being extra-legal, nonreligious, and engaging merely the conscience of the parties concerned.[58]

The frequent occurrence in letters of recommendation of the request formula "eum in tuam fidem recipias" seems at first sight to bear out this interpretation. However, the assumed power of this formula is considerably weakened by the pendant phrase which often follows; while giving the formula a more specific content, the adjunct suggests its intrinsic hollowness: for example, "Peto a te ... ut eum in tuam fidem recipias eiusque rem famamque tueare" (Cic. *Fam.* 13.51), or: "Peto igitur a te ut ... recipias in tuam fidem, polliceare omnia te facturum mea causa" (*Fam.* 13.78.2).[59] Moreover, this formula seems to be interchangeable with similarly structured formulae in which the word *fides* fails to occur altogether: "Caput illud est ut Lysonem ... recipias in necessitudinem tuam" (*Fam.* 13.19.3); "Qua re pergratum mihi feceris, si eum in amicitiam tuam receperis" (*Fam.* 13.23.2).[60] Gelzer is right, therefore, in observing that, "It would be quite perverse to look for a tie of *fides* behind every recommendation."[61] In fact *tradere* and *commendare* in letters of recommendation have lost their literal meaning and are used loosely and even metaphorically. The same, for that matter, is true of the term *fides*. These are relics and fossilized phrases divested of the obligatory and moral connotation which they once possessed, and they can be bandied about in a way which will recall their original meaning, as they are in the recommendation of C. Trebatius Testa mentioned above: "totum denique hominem tibi ita trado, 'de manu,' ut aiunt, 'ad manum.' "[62] One should also bear in mind that the

[56] *Fam.* 7.17.2 refers to the recommendation of the jurisconsult C. Trebatius Testa to C. Iulius Caesar in *Fam.* 7.5.

[57] Fustel de Coulanges, *Institutions politiques de l'ancienne France: Les origines du système féodale* (1890) 212, n. 4.

[58] Fustel de Coulanges, 217-25; R. Heinze, "Fides," *Vom Geist des Römertums* (1960) 56-86; M. Gelzer, *The Roman Nobility* (1968) 65-69; E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (1958) 1-14.

[59] Cf. *Fam.* 13.19.2, 49, 51; 67.2; 69.2; 78.2.

[60] Cf. *Fam.* 13.21.2, 35.2, 8.8.4.

[61] Gelzer (note 58 above) 67.

[62] *Fam.* 7.5.3. A. Watson ("Cicero *ad fam.* 7.5.3," *Klio* 52 [1970] 473-75) sees here "a humorous reference to *mancipatio*." But the clause "de manu in manum," as he admits, does not appear in the *mancipatio*-ceremony.

results envisaged in most letters of recommendation are limited in scope, restricted to a definite period, a particular place, and to the matter at hand. The nexus of *fides*, if brought about, is the corollary of the favours conferred rather than of the words written (or pronounced).[63]

At an early stage the verb *commendare* not only went through a process of abstraction perceptible in such collocations as "ego me tuae commendo et committo fidei" (Ter. *Eun.* 886), or "totum me tuo amori fideique commendo" (Cic. *Att.* 12.20.2), but also developed new meanings: to commend, to procure favour for; or in the words of the *Thes. Ling. Lat.*: "favorem, gratiam addere, conciliare, gratum facere, insinuare, acceptum reddere" (col. 1884, 11.26-27). Numerous examples of these extended meanings could be cited from letters of recommendation: "Ego te commendare non desisto" (Cic. *Fam.* 7.7.1); "Sic tibi eum commendo, ut neque maiore studio quemquam neque iustioribus de causis commendare possim" (*Fam.* 13.17.3); "Iulium Aquilinum ... commendo tibi quam possum studiosissime" (Fronto *Ad Am.* 1.4).[64]

The participle *commendatus* when used in this extended sense approaches the meaning of *gratus* and *acceptus*. Like the latter it has become adjectivized and can be used in the comparative and the superlative forms: "Quis est enim nostrum cui non illa civitas sit huius studio, cura, diligentia commendatior?" (Cic. *Balb.* 43); "causa communis ordinis mihi commendatissimi fecit amicitiam nostram firmiorem" (*Fam.* 13.10.2).[65] In both cases the datives, *cui* and *mihi*, are of the same nature as the datives with *gratus* and *acceptus* in the following instance: "eamque rem senatui populoque Romano gratam acceptamque esse" (Cic. *Phil.* 13.50). If *commendatus* is used in this extended sense in the combination with *habere*, then the meaning of the compound as a whole may approach that of *acceptus* or *gratus* with *habere*. Moreover, as in the phrase "quorum mihi dona accepta et grata habeo" (Plaut. *Trunc.* 617), in "Nysaeos ... habeas tibi commendatissimos" (*Fam.* 13.64.1), too, the two interrelated conditions for the emergence of a periphrastic construction may be fulfilled: (1) the subject of the finite verb is the same as the agent of the participle, and (2) the dative has ceased to function as an indirect object but is the so-called *dativus auc-*

[63]Badian (note 58 above) 8-9.

[64]Cf. Pseudo-Acron ad Hor. *AP* 225-26 ("verum ita risores, ita commendare dicaces / convenient satyros"): "'commendare' Insinuare, dicere; 'commendare' Scilicet spectatoribus: omnia enim, quae dicuntur a poetis, ita debent dici, ut commendari videantur, id est ut libenter accipiantur...."

[65]Cf. *Thes. Ling. Lat.*, *s.v.*, col. 1853, ll. 45-64.

toris or *Graecus*. In fact the dative is superfluous and can be construed as a mere reminder that the formula is an inversion of "Nysaei . . . tibi commendatissimi sint."[66] The compound is a periphrastic expression of a single notion: "to favour," "to show favour to," "to be benevolent towards," etc. Admittedly this interpretation falters in those instances in which the *a/ab* with the ablative appears: "ceterisque omnibus rebus habeas eos a me commendatissimos" (*Fam.* 12.26.2) or: "regem Ariobarzanem, cuius salutem a senatu . . . commendatam habeam" (*Fam.* 15.4.6).[67] In these two instances a periphrastic construction is ruled out, since the subject of the finite verb is not the same as the agent of the participle.

Thielmann draws attention to the fact that by using the formula *aliquem commendatum habeto* or *habeas* (or *habe* or *habebis*), the Latin letter writer hit on the most efficient and appropriate manner of putting forward a recommendation: it puts the person of the recipient in the foreground, whereas *aliquem tibi commendo* or *aliquis tibi commendatus sit* or *esto* shift the emphasis to one of the two other people involved in the recommendation, namely to the recommender or the person recommended, respectively.[68] Hence Thielmann declares the formula to be "ein stehender Ausdruck der Empfehlungsbriefe."[69] However, there are, to my knowledge, only four examples of the formula's being used in the formal letter of recommendation—one which is devoted exclusively to this purpose—before it reappears in the letters of recommendation of Gregory the Great.[70]

Two instances occur in Cicero's letters of recommendation: "deinde Nysaeos, quos Nero in primis habet necessarios diligentissimeque tuetur ac defendit, habeas tibi commendatissimos" (*Fam.* 13.64.1)

[66]Cf. Thielmann (note 30 above) 379 f., 386, 511 f.

[67]Cf. Thielmann (note 30 above) 513.

[68]Thielmann (note 30 above) 512.

[69]Ibid.

[70]The formula occurs in a late Latin translation of St. Polycarp's *Epistle to the Philippians*, ch. 14, for which we do not possess the Greek original. This Latin version, found on Mss. together with the spurious and interpolated letters of Ignatius, was made between the end of the sixth century A.D. and 874; cf. J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers* II, 1 (1973, reprint of the 2nd edition, 1889) 125-26, 550 f. Since "the translation is very loose at times" (Lightfoot, 551) and "paraphrastic" even if made from an older form of the Greek than the extant Greek Mss. (Lightfoot, II, 3, p. 317), we cannot be certain that the "sororem . . . eius habebitis commendatam" reflects an original Greek: τὴν δὲ ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ ἕξετε συνιστανομένην as proposed by Lightfoot (II, 3, p. 350).

and "Caput autem est meae commedationis ne patiare Erotem Turium ... hereditatem avertere ceterisque omnibus rebus habeas eos [i.e., the legitimate heirs] a me commendatissimos" (*Fam.* 12.26.2). We find the formula again in a recommendation written by the Emperor Domitian to the governor of Pontus and Bithynia, A. Bucius Lappius Maximus Norbanus, in 83/4,[71] cited by Pliny in a letter to Trajan: "Archippum philosophum, bonum virum et professioni suae etiam moribus respondentem, commendatum habeas velim" (*Ep.* 10.58.6). Finally, it appears in a papyrus letter of recommendation from the second half of the first century A.D.:[72]

— [···]ónem· domini nostri· imper a-
tores serum· hominem· mih[i
domesticum· et cárum· rogo
domine· commendatum hab[eas[73]

The formula occurs seven more times in the Ciceronian corpus in recommendations contained within letters which were not written for this purpose alone. Twice the object of the recommendation is the writer's *dignitas*. L. Munatius Plancus and C. Cassius Longinus express themselves in almost identical terms in their letters to Cicero: "A te peto ut dignitatem meam commendatam tibi habeas" (Cassius *Fam.* 12.12.2), and "Meam dignitatem commendatam habeas rogo" (Plancus *Fam.* 10.21a). Once the object is the *salus* of a person (*Fam.* 15.4.6, cited above, p. 421). The other occurrences of the formula relate to people: "meque totum et mea et meos commendatos habebis" (*Fam.* 3.9.4); "satis tamen habeto commendatam (Tulliam)" (*Att.* 11.9.3); "eos vero, qui meam auctoritatem et multo magis vestram fidem secuti ... ut commendatos habeatis petendum videtur" (Plancus *Fam.* 10.8.7); "vale et matrem meam meosque tibi commendatos habe" (Trebonius *Fam.* 12.16.4).[74]

[71]Cf. Syme, *Tacitus* (1958) II, App. 14, no. 28; W. Eck, *Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian* (1970) 133.

[72]P. Ryl. 608 (*Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester* IV [1952] 95); for the date, see J. Mallon, "Notes paléographiques à propos de CIL II 5411," *Emerita* 13 (1945) 272; *Paléographie romaine* (1951) 66, 177 (plate IX, no. 1); J. R. Rea, *Chron. Eg.* 43 (1968) 374; and in general see H. Cotton, *Documentary Letters of Recommendation in Latin from the Roman Empire* (*Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 132) (1981) 28-33.

[73]The text is reproduced from *Chartae Latinae Antiquiores* IV, no. 245

[74]The formula is absent, however, from Pliny's own letters of recommendation, from Fronto's, from Symmachus' Bk. IX "commendaticias continens," as well as from other letters scattered elsewhere in the collection, and from Sidonius Apollinaris'.

Not entirely unrelated to letters of recommendation is the appearance of the formula in sepulchral inscriptions, in what might be regarded as recommendation of the dead or the living. Thus, in an inscription from Macedonia, the dead boy commends his parents to the passersby: "rogo per superos | et inferos ut patrem et matre(m) | commendatos habeatis" (*CIL*, III, 14206[21]). A bereaved young wife in Rome recommends her dead husband to the *manes*: "Ita peto vos, [ma]nes sanctissimae | commendat[um] habeatis | meum ca[ru]m . . ." (*CIL*, VI, 18817).

Finally, the formula is used by the jurists, but not as a technical term. Ulpian states categorically that a letter containing the formula "rogo te, commendatum habeas Sextilium Crescentem amicum meum" does not put the recipient under the obligation of a *mandatum*, "quia commendandi magis hominis quam mandandi causa scripta est" (*Dig.* 17.1.12.12).[75] Nor does it seem that the formula carried any binding legal force in itself when used in wills in the context of legacies and *fideicommissa* concerning minors or slaves who are to be manumitted,[76] for "'relinquo' et 'commendo' nullam fideicommissi pariunt actionem" (Paul *Sent.* 4.1.6).

Our investigation seems to indicate that even if, already at an early date, the grammatical construction of ἔχειν with the passive perfect participle was not foreign to the Greek language,[77] nevertheless the particular formula under discussion—ἔχειν αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον—played a much less important role in Greek than its counterpart—*habere eum commendatum*—did in Latin. Its occurrence in Latin was not restricted to the formal letter of recommendation, for, as has been shown above, it appeared in other contexts as well. Moreover, as far as we can tell, although the verb συνίστημι did indeed acquire the extended sense of "to

[75]Although a *mandatum* could be brought about by a letter; cf. *Dig.* 17.1.1.1.

[76]Cf. *Dig.* 33.1.18.1: "fidei tuae committo, Sempronia soror, uti legata, quae alumnis meis reliqui, ex medio recipias et apud te habeas, quoad usque commendatos habeas"; 33.1.21.2: "ab ea (noverca) autem petit, ut infirmitatem filii commendatam haberet"; 40.5.41.15: "Herede filio suo ex asse instituto libertatem dedit in haec verba: 'December dispensator meus, Severus vilicus et Victorina vilica . . . in annos octo liberi sunto: quos in ministerio filii mei esse volo: te autem Severe fili carissime, peto, uti Decembrem et Severum commendatos habeas.'"

[77]The absence of a special study devoted to the Greek construction on the same lines as Thielmann's on the Latin (note 30 above and p. 412) may have tilted the balance in favour of the latter; however, the lack of a study may in itself be significant. Thielmann himself wrote on the so-called *schema attikon*—i.e., ἔχω + the active aorist participle in the nominative case—as the typical Greek construction, "ἔχω mit Particip," *Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft W. V. Christ dargebracht von seinen Schülern* (1891) 294-306.

commend," "to praise," etc., nevertheless the participle συνεσταμένος does not seem to have been adjectivized,[78] unless of course the formula itself is taken as evidence for its having occurred. Hence it seems unlikely that a new lexical unit whose meaning rests on the combination of the two elements, συνεσταμένον and ἔχειν, should have emerged before the encounter with the Latin formula.[79]

Thus we may conclude the linguistic analysis by reversing Keyes' judgment as to the direction in which influence was exercised. The late appearance of the Greek formula may now legitimately be utilized to reinforce the linguistic evidence.

It was not the aim of this study to deny any Greek influence on Cicero's letter writing. The case for such influence need not—and perhaps cannot—rest on the "striking similarity" between Greek and Latin epistolary formulae. It is perhaps the quest for evidence of the exercise of such influence in the wholesale adaptation of ready-made formulae that is misconceived. This quest rests on the unsound assumption that Cicero was the first writer of letters of introduction in Latin. However, it does not need a sociologist to point out that no society—and certainly not the expanding Roman society of the generations before Cicero—could dispense with the service of such letters.

It might have been argued that the primitive and crude Latin letter of recommendation had to have recourse to Greek patterns when the complexity and sophistication of Roman civilization came to match those of the Greek and Hellenistic worlds. The arid and schematic quality of the extant papyrus letters does not lend much force to this supposition, as any reader of the texts in Kim's dissertation will discover. Yet, even if there was a Roman adaptation of Greek formulae at this stage, that would antedate Cicero considerably. In fact the economic and social forces which these letters utilize, the atmosphere and the milieu in which they seem to thrive, and the political framework in which they operate had existed in Rome, even if in a less developed form, long before the first century B.C. The practice of writing recommendations must have already taken deep roots in Cicero's Rome. He may well have

[78] ὁ συνεσταμένος appears in the technical sense mentioned above, n. 46, e.g., P. Oxy. 329, 330, 331, 332 (all from the second half of the first century A.D.).

[79] The NT formula (Luke 14:18-19) ἔχε με παρῃτημένον preceded by ἐρωτῶ σε and cited as a parallel to Martial's "Excussatum habeas me rogo" (2.79.2) may constitute a very similar case: not that Paul knew Latin, but that his Greek reflects some Latin influences on the forms of one or two phrases; cf. H. Mclachlam, *St. Luke: The Man and His Work* (1920) 49; H. M. Meecham, *Light from Ancient Letters* (1923) 122.

had a stock of traditional formulae at his disposal. The Latin terminology of recommendation examined above is further proof for this independent development of the Latin letters of recommendation.

However, aside from these general considerations there is ample proof in Cicero's letters of recommendation themselves that far from Cicero's being the inventor of the genre in Latin, his difficulties consisted precisely in the effort to free himself from the straitjacket imposed by a tradition of writing recommendations.[80] But this is a subject worthy of a special study.

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[80]It is here that he may have availed himself of a general Greek theory of letter writing systematically formulated in the schools of rhetoric. However, the very existence of such a theory is disputed (see Rabe [note 4 above] 289-90, and H. Koskenniemi, "Cicero über die Briefarten [*genera epistularum*]," *Arctos* n.s. I [1954] 97). It cannot be denied, however, that Cicero often has recourse to rhetorical devices in composing his letters of recommendation, see R. Andrzejewski, "Quo modo Cicero commendandi doctrinam in Epistulis servavit," *Eos* 63 (1975) 43 (in Polish with a resumé in Latin. For a translation of the Polish I am grateful to my father, Mr. G. Kalach. I would also like to thank Dr. J. Geiger, Dr. D. Wasserstein, the unknown reader, and the editor of this journal for criticism of an earlier version of this paper).

HORACE *SATIRES* 2.5: RESTRAINED INDIGNATION*

Horace's *Satire* 2.5 is a dialogue between Tiresias and Ulysses, represented as a continuation of their interview in Book 11 of the *Odyssey*. Ulysses inquires how he can repair his fortunes, which have been wrecked by the extravagance of the suitors, and is advised by Tiresias to try his hand at legacy hunting. The body of the satire is a primer for the prospective *captator*. Despite the epic backdrop, Tiresias' advice presupposes a Roman setting, while references throughout the poem to the Homeric world draw attention to the mock heroic incongruity of characters and subject.[1]

Satire 2.5 has generally been perceived as different from the other *Satires*. This perception often takes the form of describing the satire as the most Juvenalian of Horace's *Satires*.[2] The intent of this paper is to reexamine the poem in an attempt to discover its special qualities and to analyze its uniqueness in the Horatian collection.

It will be useful to begin with an account of the structure of the satire. Transitions are frequently disguised in the *Sermones*; it is therefore difficult to claim finality for a scheme. But at lines 23 ("dixi equidem et dico"), 45 ("praeterea"), and 70 ("illud ad haec iubeo"), new sections are clearly marked. The present scheme is intended to indicate only broad divisions of scene and receives some support from the regularity of structure it reveals.[3]

*I should like to thank my colleague, Professor J. David Konstan, for his valuable criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. I have benefited also from the suggestions of the anonymous reader of this article and the editor of *AJP*.

[1]For this aspect of the poem see Niall Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge 1966) 227-32.

[2]W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Augustan Age: Horace and the Elegiac Poets* (Oxford 1892) 70, described the satire as most akin in spirit to Juvenal, a judgment with which E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 144-45, concurred. More recently Rudd (240-42) has questioned the kinship with Juvenal, though he too sees the satire as "un-Horatian" (cf. also Kiessling-Heinze ii[8] 281). K. Sallmann, "Satirische Technik in Horaz' Erbschleichersatire (s. 2, 5)," *Hermes* 98 (1970) 195, n. 1, also denies the affinity with Juvenal and in general tends to play down the "un-Horatian" nature of the satire.

The subtitle of my article is influenced by Sellar's characterization of the tone of *Satire* 2, 5 as "one of restrained but incisive sarcasm."

[3]A. Cartault, *Étude sur les Satires d'Horace* (Paris 1899) 89-91, and Sallmann (note 2 above) 182-83, provide more detailed enumerations of the individual precepts contained in Tiresias' *ars captatoria*, but in so doing they obscure the broader divisions of the poem.

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A. 1-22 Introduction
B. 23-44 Ensnarement of victim. Flattery
C. 45-69 Precautions. Failure
D. 70-98 Maintenance of hold over victim. Flattery
E. 99-110 Conclusion. Success

With the exception of the final section, the lengths of the proposed divisions are approximately equal (in the case of A and B, exactly so). There are further parallelisms between the sections. Sections B and D contain instructions on the proper use of flattery (32-41 and 91-98).[4] Section C contains the story of Nasica and Coranus, which ends in failure for the *captator* (he had already been warned of possible setbacks, 24-26); section E describes the successful outcome of his efforts. The poem ends with a reminder of the underworld setting (110), which had been established by the reminiscences of the Odyssean *Nekyia* in section A. Finally, the first section is devoted to breaking down Ulysses' resistance to the unheroic course of action he must adopt; in section D Penelope is imagined as offering similar resistance, though this time the objection is dealt with more speedily. Ulysses has no difficulty in believing that she will share his own greed for gain.

The structure of the poem tends to throw into prominence the central section (C), and in particular the story of Nasica and Coranus, which is presented as an epic of our time. Both protagonists are equipped with mock-heroic epithets ("forti . . . Corano," 64; "Nasicae metuentis reddere soldum," 65).[5] It takes a rogue to outwit a rogue. The failure of Coranus draws our attention to the preconditions for successful *captatio*: not only a persistent hunter, but a complacent victim. Nasica succeeds in slipping away, even in turning the tables. The old woman of Thebes had her revenge after death, when she sought literally to slip away (not that a true professional would be deterred from his inheritance by unpleasant conditions). Others, like Dama, never get the message. Failure, qualifed success, success—in each case the legacy

[4]Rudd (note 1 above) 232, remarks that "the theme of flattery . . . runs through the satire like a thread of gilt." Nevertheless, it is in the sections indicated that the references are largely concentrated. As Rudd notes, and Lejay, *Oeuvres d'Horace: Satires* (Paris 1911) 484-85, before him, the character of the flatterer is familiar from the Greek ethical literature and Greco-Roman comedy.

[5]For the bathos of "metuentis reddere soldum," see Kiessling-Heinze ad loc. The function of the Nasica/Coranus episode has never been adequately explained. Rudd (note 1 above) 304, n. 18, concludes, "that the tale was included simply because it was too piquant and too topical to be omitted"; Sallmann (note 2 above) 184, characterizes it as a transitional episode.

hunter relies on his ability to deceive the victim. The object of Horace's satire is the rich legator as well as the *captator*, and in particular the perversion of human values that their relationship entails.

Rudd draws attention to the central metaphor of hunting in the satire.[6] The very term *captare*, first used of legacy hunting in this satire of Horace,[7] implies this image. If the *captator* is the hunter, the rich old man is his prey. He is imagined as a fish to be hooked (24–25) or to be lured into the trap (44). The technique of hunting involved is the snare. The predator sets the bait, to which the victims are drawn by their own credulity and susceptibility to flattery (cf. 42–44). Rarely does a prospective victim flee the bait (24–25). *Captatio* is impossible without the frailty of the rich *senex*. But perhaps the most telling language used of the two parties is contained not in the image of the hunt, but rather in the various terms by which the person of the victim is described. Nothing suggests that the typical *senex* has a mind or will of his own. In this respect Coranus and the old woman of Thebes are exceptions. Their ability to see through the flattery of the *captator* serves only to point up the self-deception of the typical prey of the legacy hunter. Otherwise we hear only of "molles auriculae" which take pleasure in the most blatantly ingratiating flattery (32–33). The *senex* is to be urged to "look after his precious skin" ("pelliculam curare," 38), to be careful to "cover his dear head" ("cautus uti velet carum caput," 94).[8] In Tiresias' eyes the victim has no individuality; he is reduced to a set of physical attributes and susceptibilities the *captator* must exploit. Nor is Tiresias wrong in his assessment. It is just this appeal to blind self-esteem that works most effectively on the unreflecting senses of the legator.

Tiresias, then, recommends treating the victim as a virtual cipher to be manipulated at will. The most striking images for this dehumanization of the victim are contained in the penultimate section of the poem (D), though they pick up language already introduced in section B. To take the later, but shorter, passage first, the *senex* is imagined as inflated like a bladder by the shameless flatteries of the attentive *captator*.[9]

[6]Rudd (note 1 above) 232–33 (subsumed under hunting are fishing and fowling).

[7]The association of the word *capto* with hunting and fishing is noted by Kiessling-Heinze (on 23). For the application to legacy-hunting see *ThLL* 3.378.1–6 and 379.80–380.8 (*capto*) and 3.363.83–364.9 (*captator*).

[8]Rudd (note 1 above) 234, notes the ambiguity of this phrase; Sallmann (note 2 above) 200, discusses ambiguity (*amphibolia*) as a satirical technique.

[9]Rudd (233) comments on this passage that "the poor dupe has ceased to be even a sentient creature," but does not notice that the dehumanization of the victim has been a continuing theme of the satire.

importunus amat laudari: donec ohe! iam
ad caelum manibus sublatis dixerit, urge,
crescentem tumidis infla sermonibus utrem (96-98).

This is the culmination of Tiresias' instructions. Line 98 is in the form of a chiastic golden line, particularly striking since Tiresias usually adopts a straightforward, matter-of-fact style.[10] The word *utrem* is delayed to the end of the line to give it maximum impact. This is just how the *captator* has come to view his victim: he is a bladder, capable of being inflated by the grossest gales of flattery. Nor is this attitude undeserved. The victim has forfeited all claim to respect by the manner in which he actually courts adulation ("importunus amat laudari"). The language is well chosen. *Tumidis*, of course, is often used in a literary context of extravagant bombast, but it can also be used of winds in an active sense meaning "causing to swell," and hence reinforces the metaphor contained in *infla*.[11] *Crescere* is used earlier of the fishponds that grow as new tunny swim up ("cetaria crescent," 44). There, as here, the victims of the *captator* contribute to their own degradation. It is not simply the callousness of the predator that has reduced the prey to a skin or carcass. The prey's own concern with the immediate gratification of his own personal vanity, with "his own hide" ("pelliculam curare," 38), has made this process possible.

The fullest, and most shocking, presentation of the relationship between predator and prey comes earlier in the same section.

sic tibi Penelope frugi est, quae si semel uno
de sene gustarit tecum partita lucellum,
ut canis a corio numquam absterrebitur uncto.
me sene quod dicam factum est: anus improba Thebis
ex testamento sic est elata: cadaver
unctum oleo largo nudis umeris tulit heres,
scilicet elabi si posset mortua; credo,
quod nimium institerat viventi (81-87).

The passage is preceded by an almost Ovidian turn of wit.[12] Penelope remained chaste because the suitors were more interested in the kitchen

[10]For the style of Tiresias' address see Lejay (note 4 above) 488-90.

[11]*Tumor* is the characteristic fault of the high style (*genus grande*); cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 4.10.15, Quintilian 12.10.73, Pliny *Ep.* 9.26.5, quoted by C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* ii (Cambridge 1971) 111 (on *Ars P.* 27). Fortunatianus 3.9 (126.5 Halm) brings together the two Horatian notions of "swelling" and "inflation": "Ἀδρῷ quod est contrarium? tumidum et inflatum." For the association of flattery and literary values see note 18 below.

[12]Rudd (note 1 above) 231, makes the comparison with Ovid.

than the couch (79–80). The cynicism seems innocuous beside what follows: Penelope is described as a bitch who cannot be scared off from a greasy hide (81–83). The persistence of a dog with a hide (as we would say, a bone) is proverbial, but the application of the proverb to Penelope is startling. It is the grease that attracts the dog, just as profit (*lucellum*) attracts Penelope. The word *uncto* is particularly well chosen because it may also be used metaphorically of wealth; the connection between tenor and vehicle is thus firmly established. But as Williams has shown,[13] the proverb in question refers to a carcass, not simply a hide; the dog feeds on the lights. Penelope, and through her the whole breed of *captatores*, become feeders on carrion. The image is doubly appropriate. Their victim must of course be dead for them to taste the profit of their careful cultivation of him. It is for this reason that *captatores* are likened to birds that feed on carrion by Petronius (crows, cf. Horace 2.5.56) and Seneca (vultures).[14] But in the context of the particular poem, it also marks the natural consequence of the legacy hunter's attitude to his prey. Even when the victim was alive he was systematically dehumanized, reduced to a set of appetites, for flattery, for physical and material comfort, that were represented by his external frame: his ears, his skin, his head. It is natural that the same attitude is manifested at death. The story of the Theban old woman (84–88) thus takes on additional importance. It is ostensibly introduced by Tiresias as an illustration of the need to act carefully. Excessive zeal can have unpleasant consequences. Thus Tiresias concludes from the anecdote: "cautus adito / neu desis operae neve immoderatus abundes" (88–89). But it is impossible to read of a "cadaver unctum oleo largo" in the story (85–86) and not be put in mind of the preceding simile. The old woman, it seems, showed in her will not only that she understood the intention of her heir in his attentions to her, but also that she recognized the nature of their relationship. She forces him to make a public display of his devotion to her "greasy carcass." For Tiresias it represents simply a failure of tactics on the *captator*'s part: he had been too pressing and so is paid back appropriately. But in the context we can see its broader significance, as symbolizing an essential feature of the *captator*-legator relationship. There is no suggestion that the heir refused the terms of the will. It is hardly probable given the effort he expended on being adopted. The *captator* always has seen his victim as a "greasy carcass."

[13] G. Williams, "Dogs and Leather," *CR* 9 (1959) 97–100.
[14] Petronius 116.9, Seneca *Ep.* 95.43.

It is not too much to ask him to parade this attitude publicly to get his reward.

Central to this satire is the emphasis on the *captator*'s relationship to his victim. It is one that dehumanizes both, but for which the rich *orbi* must share the blame. The language of the satire vividly represents the degradation of human values that *captatio* involves. A human being becomes nothing more than an aggregation of bodily parts. The language culminates in the likening of the victim to a bladder to be inflated or a greasy carcass that attracts dogs, the *captatores*, who feed on carrion. The language, particularly in the latter case, is shocking (all the more so when it is applied to the model of wifely virtue, Penelope). Now such language is not typical of Horace's *Satires* elsewhere. It would be difficult to find an image of equal affective force. Anderson, in a comparative study of imagery in the satires of Horace and Juvenal, has analyzed Horace's frequent use of animal imagery.[15] He shows that typically in Horace a simile comparing a human being with an animal has an argumentative purpose. The comparison is raised only to be denied; the comparison often serves to direct attention to the very real differences between man and animal and to stimulate the intellect of the reader to make this distinction. This is not true of the comparison of Penelope with a bitch who cannot be driven off from a carcass. Rather than undermining the comparison, the whole of the surrounding context reinforces it. The image fairly represents Tiresias' attitude to the *senex*. In fact, Anderson's description of Juvenal's imagery fits our passage better. The emotional force of the language, the use of "extreme images rather than conventionally appropriate ones" and the "shocking disparity" of the two poles of the comparison all apply to the passage in question. But most particularly, Tiresias' cynical attitude to his fellow man is very like Juvenal's. I quote Anderson again: "Juvenal portrays only the bestial perversions of irrationality and leaves us with the feeling that Man has lost his highest potentialities."[16] Tiresias' speech betrays a similar derogation of man's higher potentialities.

It might be objected at this point that my discussion has laid too much weight on one simile, that of the bitch over the greasy carcass. Certainly this is the most striking demonstration of the "un-Horatian" in Horace in this satire. But that particular image is symptomatic of a consistent attitude in the speech of Tiresias, an attitude that is found

[15] W. S. Anderson, "Imagery in the Satires of Horace and Juvenal," *AJP* 81 (1960) 225-60, esp. 241-43.

[16] Anderson (note 15 above) 259-60.

nowhere else in Horace's *Satires* and approximates most closely Juvenal's view of the human race. Here, of course, we must note a distinction. Juvenal deplores and denounces this attitude. Hence his characteristic *indignatio*. Tiresias is quite complacent about the situation. He describes it with clear-eyed candor and sets out to exploit it for his (or rather the *captator*'s) advantage. In Tiresias' world there are no moral values, no good or bad. The only distinction is in degrees of insight into the realities of human existence. Nasica, the Theban *anus improba*, and Dama represent three points on this scale. This attitude is not, of course, shared by Horace. He can rely on us to react with scorn to Tiresias' teaching. Our response is one of *indignatio*, but it is an *indignatio* that is not directed by the *persona* of the satirist, but must emerge from our own reaction to the message presented. The indignation is implicit in the content of the satire. It presupposes a like-minded audience, not one that needs to be persuaded.

The theme of perversion of human values runs throughout the satire. In conclusion, a few more instances of this theme may be cited, this time presented in a more typically Horatian fashion. The very choice of an epic hero, albeit a rather ambiguous one, as the recipient of Tiresias' instructions suggests a distortion of values, a comparison between Greek heroic legend and the squalid world of contemporary Rome. The heroic virtues are distorted in the process. In a parody of Homeric language,[17] Odysseus bids his brave heart endure ("fortem hoc animum tolerare iubebo," 20). By the end of the poem the adjective *fortis* has been applied to the *captator* Coranus (64) and finally to the late lamented Dama ("unde mihi tam fortem tamque fidelem?" 102). The inversion of values also applies to the bond of friendship, which is so often central to Horace's *Satires*.[18] The *captator* laments because he has lost his good old comrade, Dama: "ergo nunc Dama sodalis / nusquam est?" (101–2). Earlier the *captator* had proclaimed himself the rich victim's friend on first acquaintance (33). He was so officious in his attentions that others too had seen him as the perfect friend: "ut patiens, ut amicis aptus, ut acer" (43). Friendship, too, is distorted into something external: a simple calculation of services rendered with no regard for motive or interest. Among other respects, the insincerity of the legacy hunter's attentions is revealed by his praise of the old man's bad poetry (74–75). By contrast Horace would have his poetry judged by the exacting standards

[17] *Od.* 20.18.

[18] On *amicitia* in Horace's Satires see the remarks of C. J. Classen, "Eine unsatirische Satire des Horaz? Zu Hor. sat. I 5," *Gymnasium* 80 (1973) 245–50.

of true friends (1.10.72-90).[19] Poetic values, like other values, are perverted by *captatio*.

Satire 2.5, then, is not without typical Horatian features. The figure of Tiresias, indeed, is one of a series of *doctores inepti*[20] employed by Horace as main speakers in the poems of Book 2. But unlike his counterparts, Tiresias is presented as unambiguously disreputable. The immorality of his advice to Odysseus is indicated by the nature of the poem's language and imagery. It is this language and imagery which gives the poem its peculiar quality and which can properly be described as Juvenalian. The indignation of 2.5 is Juvenalian, the indirection—Tiresias is not denounced by the satirist, but condemned by his own words—Horatian.

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[19]The association betwen poetic criticism and sincerity of friendship is insisted on also in the *Ars P.* 419-52. In the later work, too, Horace portrays dishonest poetic criticism as a form of flattery and hypocrisy. Brink (note 11 above) 400-1, 412-13, is unable to adduce a Greek parallel for this association, but there is some evidence of a Lucilian precedent.

[20]I borrow the phrase from W. S. Anderson, "The Roman Socrates: Horace and His Satires" in J. P. Sullivan (ed.), *Satire: Critical Essays in Roman Literature* (London 1963) 29-37.

ALLUSION AND INTERPRETATION IN *AENEID* 6.440-76*

Viktor Pöschl
zum 75. Geburtstag

In the middle of *Aeneid* 6, Aeneas and the Sibyl come to the *Lugentes Campi*, the Grieving Fields where the shades of those who have been consumed by the wasting sickness of love dwell. There he sees the glimmering form of Dido and attempts to console her; she turns away in silence and rejoins Sychaeus, who "answer'd all her cares and equall'd all her love" (Dryden). This meeting intensifies the pathos of Dido's story. She is an eternal reminder of a past Aeneas cannot recover and a wrong he cannot make right. T. S. Eliot's summation is often quoted: "...not only one of the most poignant, but one of the most civilized passages in poetry.... Dido's behaviour appears almost as a projection of Aeneas' own conscience; this, we feel, is the way in which Aeneas' conscience would *expect* Dido to behave to him."[1]

Brief though it is, this famous encounter is also of great importance for our interpretation of Dido's character in Books 1 and 4. Like other souls in this part of the underworld, she is preoccupied with her experience of life.[2] The nature of that life is reflected in the place she now occupies (the Grieving Fields), in the company she keeps (Sychaeus and other companions), and in her silent rejection of Aeneas' pleas for understanding. Lines 440-76 are at once the last chapter to the tragedy of Dido that Eliot describes, and more: in essence, an interpretation of her mortal character and a comment on the tragedy which for many readers dominates the first half of Vergil's poem.[3]

This impulse to search for deeper meanings beneath the surface of things is something Vergil demands of his reader. It is not part of the consciousness of either Dido or Aeneas, about which Eliot writes so sen-

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[1] T. S. Eliot, *What Is a Classic?* (London 1945) 20.

[2] Friedrich Solmsen, "The World of the Dead in Book 6 of the *Aeneid*," *CP* 67 (1972) 31-41.

[3] Brooks Otis, *Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1964) 264-347.

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sitively. Vergil creates his own poetry through the reminiscence of earlier poets; in the *Aeneid*, especially through constant reminiscences of Homer.[4] Whether we term this aspect of a given passage its *imitatio exemplorum*, its connection with predecessors,[5] or its intertextuality,[6] as readers of the poem we naturally expect to recognize earlier texts underlying the present one; our awareness of those earlier texts just as naturally affects the way we read the new poem. Gérard Genette has recently written a comprehensive survey of literary allusion that covers Vergil and many other writers outside Greek and Latin literature.[7] The literary exempla for *Aeneid* 6.440-76 have been recorded by commentators from Servius onwards, and the interpretation of such allusions is nothing new to readers of the poem. But a twofold challenge to Vergil's reader remains: to identify such layers as there may be, and then to determine whether they are limited in significance, or possibly more consequential.

The mythical and poetic exempla for *Aeneid* 6.440-76 have been valued in different ways. An echo of Catullus at line 460 has posed a notorious problem for some readers, but not for others. An evocation of the meeting of Odysseus with the shade of Ajax in *Odyssey* 11 has generally been cited to demonstrate how much more sensitive and civilized a poet Vergil was than any of his predecessors.

In this essay, praise of Vergil's innovations and blame of his predecessors will be left to one side. I would like to ask whether these familiar allusions to earlier myth and poetry can be better understood, or at least made to seem more plausible, if we widen the scope of our interpretation of them beyond the isolated lines quoted in commentaries on the passage. To the extent that this scene is a comment on the tragedy of Dido, a clearer grasp of the import of these allusions may yield a better perception of the events of *Aeneid* 1 and 4.

[4] Georg Nikolaus Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen 1964) 108-12, cf. 332-59.

[5] Gordon Williams, *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid* (New Haven and London 1983) 82-120.

[6] See Julia Kristeva, *Sèmèiôtikè* (Paris 1969) for the term *intertextualité* (not universally accepted in Paris; cf. the course of public lectures at the Collège de France by Jacqueline de Romilly in 1983-1984: "D'Homère à la tragédie grecque: *emprunts et transformations*").

[7] Gerard Genette, *Palimpsestes: la littérature au second degré* (Paris 1982) 451: "Cette duplicité d'objet, dans l'ordre des relations textuelles, peut se figurer par la vieille image du plimpseste, où l'on voit, sur le même parchemin, un texte se superposer à un autre qu'il ne dissimule pas tout à fait, mais qu'il laisse voir par transparence."

I

Several important articles have appeared since Jacques Perret's essay on the companions of Dido that have contributed much to the line of enquiry I am taking here,[8] particularly the work of Eckerd Lefèvre and Grace S. West.[9] Perret's article is concerned with the first part of the scene and may serve as a point of departure. He argues that the seven figures mentioned in lines 445-49 do not appear without design, but are a significant alteration of the procession of heroines in *Odyssey* 11.225-332, on which the company of Dido is modeled.[10] The myths which each of Dido's companions represents do not share a simple, common theme, though the text at first leads the reader to expect that all were victims of love ("... quos durus amor crudeli tabe peredit," 6.442). Phaedra was guilty of incestuous passions, Eriphyle like Clytaemnestra betrayed her husband, Pasiphae had a monstrous passion for a bull, and monstrous offspring, the Minotaur. But there are also women present who were more innocent victims of misfortune: Evadne threw herself on the funeral pyre of Capaneus, Procris was accidentally killed by Cephalus, and Laodamia followed her husband Protesilaus into the underworld. The seventh companion to be named is Caeneus, and she is apparently the most athematic: originally a young woman Caenis, she was raped by Poseidon, then at her own request was transformed into a man. According to Apollonius of Rhodes (*Argonautica* 1.57-64) and later poets (Ovid *Metamorphoses* 12.172 ff.), Caeneus was supposed to have died in a battle with the centaurs. Here, in Vergil's underworld, Caeneus is uniquely described as a woman once again, yet with a masculine name (6.448-49):

> ...et iuvenis quondam, nunc femina, Caeneus
> rursus et in veterem fato revoluta figuram.

Assuming we resist the emendation *Caenis*, as we should, the tension of this figure is reflected even in its clash of genders: "femina Caeneus ... revoluta." In what sense does Dido belong in his/her company? Perret explains the presence of Caeneus and her *étranges vicissitudes* by sug-

[8] Jacques Perret, "Les compagnes de Didon aux enfers," *REL* 42 (1964) 247-61.

[9] Grace S. West, "Caeneus and Dido," *TAPA* 110 (1980) 315-24; Eckard Lefèvre, "Dido und Aias. Ein Beitrag zur römischen Tragödie," *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur* (Mainz 1978) 2.

[10] Their unhomeric ἐρωτικὰ παθήματα are Hellenistic in origin; cf. Eduard Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro Aeneis Buch VI*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig 1903) 241-45.

gesting that the multiplicity of guilty and innocent women reflects various aspects of Dido's character when she was alive.[11] She was faithful to her husband's memory (like Evadne), yet not faithful (like Eriphyle); a suicide because of forbidden love (like Phaedra), but also an innocent victim (like Procris). Caeneus reflects a blurring of gender roles that Dido herself experienced.[12] In Book 1, Venus tells Aeneas that Dido's first and only husband was Sychaeus, to whom she came as an innocent young woman ("... cui pater intactam dederat primisque iugarat ominibus," 1.344-45). But the woman Aeneas meets is the *dux femina facti* who has led a refugee people and who now rules a new city (1.335-71; cf. 4.653-58). As he turns from Dido's mural with its depiction of Penthesilea, the Amazon who dared to vie with men ("bellatrix, audetque viris concurrere virgo," 1.493), he sees a comparable figure before him: like Penthesilea, Dido is a woman successfully engaged in a world of men, dispensing laws and justice ("iura dabat legesque viris," 1.507). In falling in love with Aeneas, Dido may be said to fail in her role of being a leader (*dux*); yet, as Viktor Pöschl has suggested, that very lapse in public duty also leads her to a recovery of her identity as a woman.[13] The appearance of Caeneus in the company of Dido thus causes Vergil's reader to reflect on her tragedy and to see that tragedy in a new way. West sums up the implicit meaning of Caeneus' presence with admirable precision: "Dido is the same as a shade in death as she was at the moment of death. Womanly love as well as delusions of heroic grandeur continue to co-exist in her soul, rather as Caeneus is female in shape, masculine in name."[14]

Three other points in this passage offer similar implicit comments on Dido: the simile characterizing Aeneas' dim vision of her (453-54), his speech (456-66), and Dido's silent rejection of his plea for one last exchange (469-76). In each instance, Vergil's choice of poetic and mythical exempla was not a random one. Like the mysterious Caeneus, each one may at first seem to raise associations inappropriate to the present context; but for that very reason, each allusion invites the reader to rethink and reinterpret the events of Books 1 and 4. The climax of this allusive artistry is also the climax of the scene: the parallel

[11] Perret (note 8 above) 252.

[12] A similar conclusion (about Caeneus only) was also reached by Egil Kraggerud, "Caeneus und der Heroinenkatalog," *SO* 40 (1965) 66-71.

[13] Viktor Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas," *Festschrift Karl Vretska* (Heidelberg 1970) 148-73: 158; cf. idem, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils*, 2nd ed. (Wien 1964) 115-67.

[14] West (note 9 above) 342.

drawn between Odysseus and Aeneas, and Dido and Ajax. As Eliot well knew, the meeting between Dido and Aeneas in the underworld is civilized and poignant in more than one sense.

II

Commentary on the simile at 4.453–54 has shown how Vergil shifts the focus of the simile from the uncertainty with which Lynceus caught sight of Heracles, to the feelings of Aeneas as he first glimpses the indistinct figure of Dido.[15]

> ... ἀτὰρ τότε γ' Ἡρακλῆα
> μοῦνον ἀπειρεσίης τηλοῦ χθονὸς εἴσατο Λυγκεὺς
> τὼς ἰδέειν, ὥς τίς τε νέῳ ἐνὶ ἤματι μήνην
> ἢ ἴδεν, ἢ ἐδόκησεν ἐπαχλύουσαν ἰδέσθαι. Ap. Rhod. 4.1477–80

> ....quam Troius heros
> ut primum iuxta stetit agnovitque per umbras
> obscuram, *qualem primo qui surgere mense*
> *aut videt aut vidisse putat per nubila lunam.*

The shift from daytime to nighttime (from the day of Lynceus to the darkness of the world of the dead) also makes the simile more marked and relevant to what it describes.[16] Vergil may have been attracted to Apollonius not only for his simile, but for the context in which it appears. In both poems, the people who are being perceived are of as much importance as how they are perceived, because in each instance they are major characters who are fading from the poem, never to appear again. Lynceus returns to tell his comrades that no other searcher will ever find Heracles (4.1481–82). Heracles has been missing since Book 1, and though his absence is more than once a matter of regret to Jason and the Argonauts (1.1286–89, 2.145–48, 2.774 ff.), it was not his destiny to be a part of that world or to see the voyage of the Argo to its

[15] Norden (note 10 above) 246 ad 451 ff.; R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Sextus* (Oxford 1977) 163 ad 456–57; cf. Otis (note 3 above) 294.

[16] Gordon Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 733–34; cf. Charles Rowan Beye, *Epic and Romance in the Argonautica of Apollonius* (Carbondale and Edwardsville 1982) 97: "Heracles seems to be a force to be envied and admired but never retrieved, gone from Jason's world, not unlike the bargirl, a kind of madonna figure, who waves distantly and unobtainably as Fellini's *La Dolce Vita* comes to its close."

end.[17] As Telamon once tells Jason, and with some exasperation, Heracles has his own labors to perform, and if he were present he might easily overshadow the exploits of Jason himself (1.1290-93). Heracles makes much the same point when he refuses to serve as leader of the Argonauts (1.122 ff.). The context in which Apollonius' simile occurs has then not one but two associated ideas: the difficulty of perceiving a figure and, of equal importance, that figure's symbolic departure from a poem in which as a heroic figure he is somehow out of touch, a hero in a wrong world. The contrast between Apollonius' and Vergil's similes is every bit as sharp as the commentators have noted, but the contrast need not be restricted only to the act of perceiving.

While Vergil carefully preserves the image of one "who sees or thinks he sees" the moon dimly,[18] it is now a woman, Dido (more precisely, her shade), who is so dimly perceived. For the second time in the passage, she is associated with a male figure, and the reader faces the same problem already raised by the presence of Caeneus: why has the poet appropriated a simile that describes a male hero? It could be that we are not meant to think of Apollonius' Heracles at all; this has been the course preferred by earlier commentary, and it may well be the wiser course. Then we must recall how both Heracles and Dido function as characters in their respective poems. I have already described briefly Heracles' role in the *Argonautica*. At this point in the *Aeneid*, Dido appears for the last time. Like Heracles, she may be said to represent a code of heroic behavior no longer tenable; for in the evolving moral world of the poem, Dido stands for a tragic kind of heroism that will have no place in the nation Aeneas will found.[19] The transformation of Apollonius' simile would in this way add a more pointed comment to Dido's association with the male-female Caeneus: first linked to the male through her changes in gender role, she is now linked to a hero who in his poem becomes a remote, nostalgic figure. Dido resembles the

[17] As G. Karl Galinsky has shown in *The Herakles Theme* (Totowa, NJ 1972), this Alexandrian Heracles is radically different from the Roman Hercules whom we encounter later in the poem at 7.655-79 and 8.184-279; cf. idem, 108-16 and 126-52.

[18] Compare Milton's adaptation of the phrase to another infernal context, in the belated peasant who "sees, or dreams he sees" elves in midnight revel (*Paradise Lost* 1.781-86). Dante imitates Vergil more freely in *Inferno* 15.17-19: "... e ciascuna Ci riguardava come suol de sera Guardare uno altro sotto nuova luna."

[19] Otis (note 3 above) 295; cf. Galinsky (note 17 above) 109: "Apollonius ... took pains to demonstrate that Herakles' heroism was clearly of the kind that was beyond Jason's reach." See also idem, "Virgil's Romanitas and his Adaptation of Greek Heroes," *ANRW* 31.2 (1981) 985-1010, esp. 998 ff.

Heracles described at *Argonautica* 4.1477–80 precisely because she is fading from sight in a literal sense, as a visible being, and also in a figurative sense, as a paradigm of heroic behavior.[20]

III

It is to this Alexandrian apparition that Aeneas now speaks. One would need a heart of flint (or possibly Marpessian marble) not to believe in the sincerity of his words here. But his apology is inadequate for Dido, and it poses a genuine puzzle for the reader. Aeneas' protest that he left Dido's shore unwillingly is very nearly a verbatim echo of Catullus 66.39: "invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi ~ invita, o regina, tuo de vertice cessi." In Catullus' poem, the lock of Berenice protests that not it, but a knife's blade is responsible for its unwilling departure. Some commentators have noted the echo with little or no comment,[21] while others have praised Vergil's use of Catullus' line: he is said to have ennobled a mock-heroic sentiment by transferring it from a frivolous to a serious context.[22] R. D. Williams is skeptical that even Vergil had the skill "... to do the near impossible successfully; I prefer to regard the line as a wholly unconscious reminiscence."[23] Artistic transformation, or unconscious echo? So long as the answer depends on one line of Catullus' poem, either view seems reasonable. But Vergil's reminiscence of Catullus 66 is not confined to the nearly verbatim echo of 6.460.

In Catullus 66, line 39 is actually the beginning of an extended apology by the lock of hair in which it protests its innocence:

> invita, o regina, tuo de vertice cessi,
> invita: adiuro teque tuumque caput,
> digna ferat quod si quis inaniter adiurarit:
> sed qui se ferro posse ulet esse parem?

[20] The importance of Hellenistic poets like Apollonius for our interpretation of the *Aeneid* has tended to be underestimated; cf. W. W. Briggs, "Virgil and the Hellenistic Epic," *ANRW* 31.2 (1981) 948–84.

[21] C. G. Heyne (4th ed., Leipzig 1832) 2.918 ad 460: "Ursinus comparat Catulli versum de Coma Berenices ... conveniunt saltem verba."

[22] Norden (note 10 above) 254 ad 460; Austin (note 15 above) 164 ad 460. Cf. the instructive discussion of Alexandrian *arte allusiva* by G. Giangrande, "Hellenistic Poetry and Homer," *AC* 39 (1970) 46–77, and idem, "'Arte Allusiva' and Alexandrian Epic Poetry," *CQ* 17 (1967) 85–97.

[23] R. D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Vergil* (London and New York 1972) 1.488 ad 460; cf. C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus* (Oxford 1961) ad 66.39.

ille quoque eversus mons est, quem maximum in oris
progenies Thiae clara supervehitur,
cum Medei peperere novum mare, cumque iuventus
per medium classi barbara navit Athon.
quid facient crines, cum ferro talia cedant? 66.39-48

At the risk of being prosaic about such witty poetry, let me note that Berenice's lock makes three points in its defense: it left unwillingly, it swears it is telling the truth, but it was forced to do what it did by a superior power (the blade). Compare what Aeneas says: he asks first if the news was true, that Dido was dead and that she had taken her life by the sword (*ferro*, 6.456-58). He then offers this defense, an oath and an explanation:[24]

per sidera iuro,
per superos et si qua fides tellure sub ima est,
invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.
sed me iussa deum, quae nunc has ire per umbras,
per loca senta situ cogunt noctemque profundam,
imperiis egere suis. 6.458-63

He swears a threefold oath that he left unwillingly, and, as in his last meeting with Dido at Carthage (4.356-59), he seeks to place ultimate responsibility on the gods: "sed me iussa deum . . . egere"; compare the lock's "sed qui se ferro postulet esse parem? . . . quid facient crines, cum ferro talia cedant?" In sum, Aeneas and the lock of Berenice attempt to excuse themselves by saying "I left unwillingly"; "I swear by . . . X"; "but (*sed*) X made me do it." Later in this same book of the poem, when Aeneas meets the shade of Anchises, Vergil evokes Catullus 101 unmistakably in Anchises' words:

quas ego te terras et quanta per aequora vectum
accipio! 6.692-93

It is not plausible to claim that line 460 is an unconscious echo of Catullus.

Yet Williams is surely right to say that we cannot wish that line into seriousness, simply because it occurs in a serious context. The same point could be made about all of Aeneas' speech. It is serious, all of it, including line 460, but for reasons requiring further comment. Vergil's allusion to Catullus is complex because it demands two distinct responses from his reader: first, recognition that Aeneas' words play upon lines in Catullus' poem; second, and of more substantive concern for an

[24] The order is of course slightly different from Catullus 66; cf. Norden (note 10 above) 247 ad 460 and R. D. Williams (note 23 above) 1.485.

interpretation, reflection on exactly what this echo of Catullus 66 may imply about Aeneas and what he is saying to Dido.

To begin with, if Aeneas' speech is a conscious reminiscence of Catullus 66, the first and most obvious consequence for the reader of Vergil is that, for a moment, Aeneas is speaking like Catullus' lock of hair. The poet reminds us of Catullus' poem on the rape of the lock, its stellifaction, and that poem's witty play on the rhetoric of love, loss, duty, and consolation. Aeneas' words are beyond question sincere ("demisit lacrimas dulcique adfatus amore est," 6.455), but they create a powerful tension between what he is trying to say and how he says it. As an apology for his conduct at Carthage, what he says is inadequate for Dido and, for the reader, at least initially, bewilderingly inadequate.[25] Cartault described the immediate rhetorical effect of Vergil's Catullan echo very nicely when he asked why, at a point of intense tragedy, would Vergil bring his reader so dangerously close to a burst of laughter?[26]

By way of an answer to his question, we may begin by noting that Vergil's echo of Catullus 66 is not confined to one line, but to a more substantial part of the poem. A broader look at Catullus 66 may give a different view of Catullus and the poet who is now imitating him. By this I mean a consideration of poem 66 in its own right, within its original context in the Catullan collection. On this point the reader of the *Aeneid* must refer to what Gordon Williams and Wendell Clausen have written about Catullus 66 and the particular meaning that poem acquires by virtue of its position in Catullus' poetry.[27]

While poem 66 reveals that Catullus could be a remarkably exact translator, the resulting Latin poem is much more than a translation of a Callimachean *pièce d'occasion*.[28] It is immediately preceded by Catullus' poem to Hortalus, in which the poet says that he has written a version of Callimachus, as requested, but that he has done so at a moment of intense sorrow. Poem 65 was written not long after the death of his brother:

> sed tamen in tantis maeroribus, Hortale, mitto
> haec expressa tibi carmina Battiadae
> (ne tua dicta vagis nequiquam credita ventis
> effluxisse meo forte putes animo). 65.15-18

[25] A. Cartault, *L'Art de Virgile dans L'Enéide* (Paris 1926) 457.

[26] Cartault (note 25 above) 510, n. 6.

[27] Gordon Williams (note 16 above) 252-53, 706-8; cf. Wendell Clausen, "Catullus and Callimachus," *HSCP* 74 (1970) 85-94, esp. 90-94.

[28] Fordyce (note 23 above) 328-29.

Poem 66 is a poem about separation and immortality, but it was written by a poet who was enduring the pain of genuine separation and mortality, not in the mythical and divine world of Ptolemaic queens and constellations, but in his own life. The ensemble of Catullus 65 and 66 enforces a complicated point of view on Catullus' reader and, I suggest, on Vergil's reader in turn. So far as we can tell from the fragments of Callimachus, the ΒΕΡΕΝΙΚΗΣ ΠΛΟΚΑΜΟΣ was a witty, flattering poem that turned the momentary pain of separation into an experience that led to immortality. In Catullus, that original idea acquires great poignancy because the wit and play of the πλόκαμος contrasts sharply with the very real personal sorrow and separation that the poet Catullus suffers; for his brother, there is no stellifaction, no immortality, and for him, accordingly, no consolation.

Vergil's grasp of Catullus extends far beyond line 39 of poem 66, to poems 65 and 66 in their entirety. He concentrates the grief of Catullus 65 and the rhetoric of apology in Catullus 66 into the single speech of Aeneas. His allusion to Catullus 66 then becomes more comprehensible, because after sufficient reflection on that poem and on poem 65, his reader will realize that poem is no cause for laughter. Neither are the words of Aeneas which are based on it. What remains to be explained, if possible, is why Vergil would wish to draw on these two particular poems of Catullus to create one of the most crucial speeches in the *Aeneid*.

The souls of the dead in *Aeneid* 6 generally bear the marks of their final moments in life, and such a final moment is what is evoked for the reader by Aeneas' Catullan words to Dido.[29] In Book 4, her magic rites and her suicide were designed to create a curse on both Aeneas and his descendants. The last words he hears her utter are a prayer that the news of his suffering may reach her in the underworld (4.387). Frustrated as she was in her quest for a second marriage and children, she turns her suicide into a parody of a wedding night.[30] She heaps Aeneas' arms on her bed, with an image of Aeneas at her pillow (4.504-8). She presses the pillow to her face in a last embrace, then falls not into a bridegroom's arms, but upon Aeneas' sword (4.663-65).[31] The death

[29] See 6.363-71 (Palinurus), 6.494-99 (Deiphobus), and cf. Otis (note 3 above) 290.

[30] As R. D. Williams observes, this blends motifs from the suicide of Ajax and the farewell of Alcestis (1.389, ad 360).

[31] The eroticism of this suicide is remarkable and is more than simply a combination of motifs from Greek tragedy; cf. Rubens' explicit realization of the scene in "La Morte de Didon" (1630-1635), in the Louvre.

she seeks is long in coming (4.688-92). At length Juno pities her and sends down Iris to snip off a lock of hair:

> nondum illi flavum Proserpina vertice crinem
> abstulerat Stygioque caput damnaverat Orco. 4.698-99

Then Iris discharges her duty:

> . . . dextra crinem secat; omnis et una
> dilapsus calor atque in ventos vita recessit. 4.704-5

The snipping of the lock is plainly a symbolic act, yet it is decisive; with that lock goes Dido's last conscious moment of life.[32] Vergil's reminiscence of Catullus returns the *reader*, not Aeneas, to that same moment. The association between Aeneas' speech and Catullus' poem puts both the death scene in Book 4 and the present scene in Book 6 into a Catullan perspective. The association between Aeneas' words and Dido's death carries Catullus' subversion of Callimachean rhetoric one step further.[33] In Aeneas' words to Dido, the rhetoric of consolation and the suffering it is supposed to assuage become one and the same thing. Dido is in the world of the dead and as far removed from the stellifaction and immortality of Berenice's lock as it is possible to imagine. Aeneas himself is the cause of Dido's death; it might even be said that he is her death personified and given voice. Vergil's allusion to Catullus thus must have a devastating effect on the reader of his poem because the associations created imply that the one who is trying to offer consolation is in reality only bringing still greater pain. For Dido, Aeneas is the essence of the *curae* that afflict those who dwell in the Grieving Fields: "curae non ipsa in morte relinquunt."

IV

Dido's response to Aeneas is the silence of Ajax to Odysseus: "tractum autem est hoc de Homero, qui inducit Aiacis umbram conloquia fugientem, quod ei fuerat causa mortis" (Servius). Commentators since Servius have mainly regarded *Odyssey* 11.541-67 as a formal model for

[32] Arthur Stanley Pease *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935) 532-35 ad 698.

[33] Cf. the reversal of 4.295 ff. as discussed by Norden (note 10 above) 246 ad 6.455 and R. D. Williams (note 23 above) 1.485, ad 6.426 ff.

Vergil, a model which many also believe he surpassed.[34] The contrast between Odysseus and Aeneas is very clear, and, as is generally true throughout the first half of the *Aeneid*, that contrast lies between a self-centeredness perhaps natural in the reminiscences of the Greek hero, and the *pietas* of Aeneas, his devotion to others.[35] Aeneas is shaken by Dido's unfair fate and follows her in tears for a long way:

> nec minus Aeneas casu concussus iniquo
> prosequitur lacrimis longe et miseratur euntem. 6.475-76

His pity contrasts sharply with Odysseus' response to Ajax's silence. He goes on to tell the Phaeacians that he probably could have persuaded Ajax to speak if he had taken the time to do so:

> ἀλλά μοι ἤθελε θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι
> τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς ἰδέειν κατατεθνηώτων. 11.566-67

The implicit parallel between Dido and Ajax presents us with an even more pointed contrast. There seems to be an inconcinnity as disturbing as the appearance of Caeneus, or the echo of Catullus 66. Dido is a woman who was a victim of love, not a Homeric male hero. Knauer followed Servius in his explanation of the problem: the main link between the two scenes is the guilty conscience Aeneas and Odysseus both feel in confronting the shades of people they have wronged.[36] West suggests that the parallel with Ajax is a deliberate continuation of Dido's association with male heroism first suggested by the appearance of Caeneus: "Dido is set in an ungainly parallel with the Homeric hero par excellence: her conduct is not patterned on the heroines of the Odyssean underworld nor any other female literary prototype. Even in death, then, Dido's male heroic 'image' receives emphasis: though destroyed by *durus amor* (6.442), she is nonetheless like *dura silex* in her scorn (470)."[37] Ungainly it may be. The parallel between Dido and Ajax is not confined to this scene in Book 6. We need only refer to their conduct when they were alive to see that the implied parallel between them is as significant and pervasive as the one many have already drawn between Aeneas and Odysseus. For evidence of Dido's character, we have Books

[34] Austin (note 15 above) 163 ad 6.456-76; cf. Norden (note 10 above) 249 ad 6.469 ff.

[35] Gordon Williams (note 5 above) 118.

[36] Knauer (note 4 above) 111-12.

[37] West (note 9 above) 323.

1 and 4 of Vergil's poem.[38] For Ajax, the principal literary source is Sophocles' play. Its account of Ajax's suicide and the events leading up to it have often been cited in commentaries on *Aeneid* 4. Eckerd Lefèvre has pulled together what were formerly many scattered observations into a coherent analysis of the parallels between Dido and Sophocles' hero.[39]

As Lefèvre observes, the most salient connection between Dido and Ajax is their suicides, which are identical in most respects. Consider the choice of weapons: Ajax falls on a sword given to him by the Trojan Hector. The gifts of enemies are no gifts at all: ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα κοὐκ ὀνησιμά (665). Dido also falls on a sword given by a Trojan. She hides Aeneas' sword in her deathbed, and it is a gift from a Trojan which had not been sought for such a purpose: "... ensemque recludit / Dardanium, non hos quaesitum munus in usus" (4.646-47). She resolves to die with a speed and determination comparable only to that seen in the *Ajax*; its sequence of events is followed closely in the *Aeneid* from the moment of Dido's last meeting with Aeneas until her death (4.393 ff.). From the moment the hero awakens from his fit of madness, he realizes he has been rejected by the very Greeks he had thought most honored him. His loss of τιμή is a recurrent theme in the play, because τιμή is the supreme heroic virtue that grants Ajax his right to power, respect, and the stature essential to the life of a hero (98, 426, 440, 1339, 1342). When Ajax loses it, he becomes suddenly and incomprehensibly ἄτιμος, without τιμή or standing in the eyes of others. To be ἄτιμος is to cease to be Ajax, to be destroyed: ἄτιμος Ἀργείοισιν ὦδ' ἀπόλλυμαι (440). And his situation is indeed impossible: hateful to the gods, an enemy to Greek and Trojan alike, he is barred from returning home by his own sense of shame. How could he show his face to his father Telamon, or face him without the crown of fame Telamon once won (457-65)? In Vergil, Dido poses the same question to Aeneas. She faces the same dilemma

> te propter Libycae gentes Nomadumque tyranni
> odere, infensi Tyrii. .
> quid moror? an mea Pygmalion dum moenia frater
> destruat aut captam ducat Gaetulus Iarbas? 4.320-21, 325-26

[38] For Book 1's importance for the tragedy (or story) of Dido, see Frances Muecke, "Foreshadowing and Dramatic Irony in the Story of Dido," *AJP* 104 (1983) 134-55.

[39] Lefèvre (note 9 above) 9-24.

She also has the same temperament as Ajax, for whom such humiliations are not to be endured: οὐκ ἔστι τοῦργον τλητόν (466).[40] To Tecmessa, who pleads with him to be softened (μαλάσσου), he replies: you are thinking like a fool if you mean to suppose that you can school my character at so late a date:

μῶρα μοι δοκεῖς φρονεῖν
εἰ τοὐμὸν ἦθος ἄρτι παιδεύειν νοεῖς. 595-96

Ajax is determined either to live well, or to die well: ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν, ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι (479). For one so minded, the normal associations of light with joy and safety are reversed. He longs for the darkness of death, in revulsion from the light of day:

ἰώ,
σκότος, ἐμὸν φάος,
ἔρεβος ὦ φαεννότατον.

Compare Dido, who also strives to break off as quickly as she can from the hated light of day: "... invisam quaerens quam primum abrumpere lucem" (4.631). Both Dido and Ajax contrive to die in total isolation from even their closest friends. The soliloquy becomes the Greek hero's primary mode of discourse (*Ajax* 646-92, 815-65), and the same is true of Dido (4.534-52, 590-629, 651-62). What Winnington-Ingram has termed "the mind of Ajax" is a very real presence in the mind of Dido.[41] Lefèvre suggests that these parallels must have more than merely surface meaning: "Es muss vielmehr überhaupt in dem Schicksal der beiden Personen etwas Verbindendes, Verwandtes gesehen haben, wenn es sich auch von selbst versteht, dass das sophokleische Menschenbild nicht das vergilische sein kann."[42] He concludes that Dido represents a personal tragedy typical of the Greeks' view of life, and that this is to be contrasted (favorably) with Aeneas' Roman mission, which will carry him beyond the Hellenic ideal Dido represents.[43] In what follows I shall attempt to amplify the connections he and others have drawn be-

[40] On the vocabulary characteristic of this kind of hero, see Barnard M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper. Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964) 10-23.

[41] R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles. An Interpretation* (Cambridge 1980) 11-56.

[42] Lefèvre (note 9 above) 23.

[43] Lefèvre (note 9 above) 24.

tween the characters of Dido and Ajax. More remains to be said about the extent to which the mind of Ajax is present in the mind of Dido.

When Dido confronts Aeneas in Book 4, she asks whether he is not moved by their love, or their hands once joined in trust, or by Dido, about to die a cruel death:[44]

> . . . nec te noster amor nec te data dextera quondam
> nec moritura tenet crudeli funere Dido. 4.307-8

What has driven her to this desperate point is *fama*, "rumor" or "fame" in a bad sense. *Fama* is the relationship of the individual to the many; its synonyms, *honos* and *gloria*, like its antonyms, *infamia* and *invidia*, show that its meaning always depends on context, and that even if it is a desirable attainment for any public figure, it is not in itself a virtue unambiguously good.[45] Yet *fama* is as central to Dido's view of her role in the world as τιμή is to the mind of Ajax. It is the one means whereby she might gain immortality, and because of Aeneas, she loses both her *fama* and her conscience or sense of shame (*pudor*).[46] Since Dido and Ajax both live by and for their standing in the eyes of others, their conduct is perhaps understandable after each one realizes that that standing has been destroyed. Once heroic public figures who exulted in their reputation, they become totally withdrawn from others, not only from their enemies, but even from kin like Teucer and Anna who might remind them that family ties could endure even with the loss of *fama* or τιμή.

Our convention of capitalizing personified abstractions has divided the word *fama* into several lexical categories, and this division tends to obscure how remarkably pervasive the word *fama* is in the story of Dido.[47] The Rumor (*Fama*) which flies through the cities of Libya (4.173 ff.) appears in the middle of a concatenation of *fama* that runs straight back to Book 1; *fama* is a part of Dido's relationship with

[44] *Data dextera* (4.307) and the complaint of broken *fides* (4.371-78) imply that she conceives of her affair with Aeneas as much a political alliance as a love affair; see Richard C. Monti, *The Dido Episode and the Aeneid. Roman Social and Political Values in the Epic* (Leiden 1981) 3.

[45] *ThLL* 6.206.63-207.55.

[46] As West (note 9 above) observes, *pudor* elsewhere in the *Aeneid* is a male virtue, especially in battle (321, n. 17); cf. 5.455, 9.44, 10.871, and 12.667. I must also note, however, that the female virtue *pudicitia* is an awkward word in hexameter poetry; its nominative singular cannot be used where *pudor* can be; cf. 4.27, 4.55, and *Georgics* 2.524.

[47] See W. B. Stanford's remarks on the related φάτις / Φάτις in Sophocles' *Ajax* (London 1963) 81 ad 173-74.

Aeneas from the moment they first meet, and even before that. The Trojan War had spread throughout the world through *fama* even before Dido reached Carthage (1.456-57). She caused that same war to be the subject of the murals painted inside the temple she consecrates to Juno. This same *fama*, says Aeneas to Achates, may even bring the Trojan refugees some safety: "feret haec aliquam tibi fama salutem" (1.463). *Fama* does what Aeneas hopes it will do. When Dido receives the Trojan Ilioneus, she reassures him by referring to the Trojan War which is as vividly alive in her mind as it is in the murals she commissioned:

> quis genus Aeneadum, quis Troiae nesciat urbem,
> virtutesque virosque aut tanti incendia belli? 1.565-66

When Aeneas himself is revealed to Dido, she knows his story as well as his divine parentage:

> tune *ille Aeneas* quem Dardanio Anchisae
> alma Venus Phrygii genuit Simoentis ad undam? 1.617-18

At the end of Book 1, she has not yet heard enough of Aeneas and his war, and she asks again and again of Priam, Hector, Memnon, the horses of Diomedes, and the hero Achilles (1.748-52). This is no polite request for information; Dido is plainly fascinated by heroism and war. Aeneas obliges her, even though for him it means renewing an unspeakable pain (2.3). Dido's *amor cognoscere* (2.10) suggests that she is as much in love with the *fama* of Aeneas and the Trojans as she is with Aeneas himself:

> multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat
> gentis honos; haerent infixi pectore vultus
> verbaque... 4.2-4

These same qualities, Aeneas' person and his *fama*, have equal weight in Dido's own words:

> quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes,
> quem sese ore ferens, quam forti pectore et armis!
> credo equidem, nec vana fides, genus esse deorum.
> degeneresque animos timor arguit. heu, quibus ille
> iactatus fatis! quae bella exhausta canebat! 4.10-14

When Dido exclaims over the fates that tossed Aeneas about the seas, the wearying wars he sang of, she sounds like the poet of the opening of the poem, who also sings of a man "multa quoque et bello passus," one

who is "fato profugus . . . et terris iactatus et alto." Dido is not only a character in an epic poem; she is also a person fascinated by the heroic life which is the essence of epic poetry.

Later in Book 4, Dido is unrestrained by *fama*, the very force which had attracted her to Aeneas in the first place. As she enters into her love affair, the poet speaks of both the appearance of things, and of reputation ("... neque enim specie famave movetur, ..." 4.170-72). Then *fama* appears, in a different sense, only four lines later. In modern texts this change is signaled by a shift from *f* to *F*.[48] Immediately after the poet says that Dido was moved neither by the need to maintain appearances nor by reputation, *Fama*, "Rumor," breaks forth, and Vergil makes it clear that this is *fama* in a new, sinister sense of the word.[49]

> extemplo Libyae magnas it Fama per urbes,
> Fama, malum qua non aliud velocius ullum...

As this *fama* carries the tale to Iarbas, Iarbas in his prayer to Jupiter hints none too gently that the *fama* of Jupiter himself will mean nothing unless Dido is punished.

> ... nos munera templis
> quippe tuis ferimus famamque fovemus inanem. 4.217-28

The *omnipotens* is moved to look down on Dido and Aeneas, and he finds the lovers forgetful of their reputations ("... oblitos famae melioris amantis," 4.221). Then that same *fama* (once again *Fama* in our texts) brings the news to Dido that Aeneas is about to leave; she already had clear presentiment of his departure. But it is that same *fama* that had carried the rumors of Dido and Aeneas to Iarbas ("eadem impia fama," 4.298). Hence there is no little irony in Dido's complaint to Aeneas that he destroyed her reputation (*fama*). She sought *fama* as a woman dedicated to her husband's memory,[50] and that ideal proved tragically impossible to reconcile with her ambitions to be a political

[48] When *fama* is the subject of a verb (e.g., "fama aliquid nuntiat") or when it is vividly described, as at 4.173 ff., the reader of Vergil needs nothing more to realize that the word is personified (*ThLL* 6.255.49-52).

[49] Contemporary translators of Vergil cannot render *fama* as "fame," as in Macaulay's "At the fame of his approach" (1855; cf. *OED* 53 *s.* "fame"). Cf. Mandelbaum, "Then, swiftest of all evils, Rumour runs Straightaway through Libya's mighty cities," but Dryden (1697), "The loud report through Libyan cities goes. Fame, the great ill, from small beginnings grows" (similarly, "fame" for *fama* at 4.221 and 4.323).

[50] On Dido as *univira*, see Monti (note 44 above) 40.

figure and a woman in love. Her last words to Aeneas in Book 4 cast their relationship once again into the language of *fama*, only it is the *fama* of his punishment and suffering that she hopes to hear now.

> dabis, improbe, poenas.
> audiam et haec manis veniet mihi fama sub imos. 4.386-87

As we have observed in the words Aeneas spoke to Dido in Book 6, this prayer is answered, but not in the way Dido hopes it will be.

To summarize the connection between Dido and *fama*: the Latin word can and must be translated in different ways in English, depending on its context—"fame," "rumor," "report," "story," "reputation"; the modern text may print it with upper or lower case *f*, as convention requires.[51] But Dido lives by and for *fama* in important ways. She knows of Aeneas first through *fama*, she wishes to share in his *fama*, she has her own *fama* to maintain, and when she sees that her *fama* is destroyed, she comes to realize that *fama* is something that can both exalt and destroy the person who lives by it. As any Roman politician knew, preserving one's *fama* is indispensable to the successful career of the public person; but by allowing *fama* to become integral to her definition of herself, Dido made it impossible for her to survive its loss. Her connection with Ajax is thus profound and extends far beyond the implicit parallel suggested by her behavior in Book 6. Both Ajax and Dido are destroyed by an obsession with the very quality that makes them the great heroes they are. The reader of Book 6 will see, on reflection, an association between Dido's heroism and Ajax's heroism that is deeply woven into the fabric of the poem. Dido's conduct in the world of the dead is a reflexive image of her conduct when alive. She sought to live not simply by masculine heroic ideals in a general sense, but by the ideals of the hero Ajax in particular.

* * *

Vergil's reminiscence of the meeting between Odysseus and Ajax rounds out what appears to be a pattern of allusion to myths and poetry linking Dido with male heroic figures like Caeneus, the Heracles of *Argonautica* 4, and Ajax. Throughout the scene, Aeneas is, as it were,

[51] Cf. R. B. Egan's discussion of a similar problem with the varying translations of *pietas* in "Euryalus' Mother and *Aeneid* 9-12," *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*," ed. Carl Deroux, *Collections Latomus* 168 (1980) 2.157-76: 165.

unlinked with all such figures; he acts in a way that disassociates him from Homer's Odysseus specifically. To the extent that he can be associated with any other character in myth or poetry, it would be only with the persona that speaks in Catullus 66. As we have seen, that association is as much a comment on the life and death of Dido as on the conduct of Aeneas. Vergil's allusive arts can be valued in many different ways. I would like to stress the importance such allusions can have for our interpretation of some of the most important characters and events of the *Aeneid*. Vergilian allusion can impel us to re-read and re-think earlier parts of the poem that we have already read and, perhaps, thought we understood.

In this way the meeting of Dido and Aeneas in the world of the dead is crucial to an interpretation of Books 1 and 4. Great as they surely are, they do not tell us all there is to know about Dido's character as a tragic hero; nor, for that matter, does *Aeneid* 6.440–76. To comment on any one part of this poem is to be drawn sooner or later into comment on all of it. Dido's gifts live on after her,[52] most touchingly at Book 11. There Aeneas uses a cloak she had woven for him to cover the body of Pallas; the effect, as R. D. Williams has observed, is to link the tragedy of Pallas' death with the tragic events of Book 4.[53]

> tum geminas vestis auroque ostroque rigentis
> extulit Aeneas, quas illi laeta laborum
> ipsa suis quondam manibus Sidonia Dido
> fecerat et tenui telas discreverat auro. 11.73–75

Somehow this last brief glance back to Dido happily at work is as affecting as her meeting with Aeneas in the world of the dead.

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[52] Cf. the gifts to Ascanius mentioned at 5.570–72 and 9.266.

[53] Williams (note 23 above) 2.385 ad 11.74.

INTERPRETATIONS

ON THE CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF ΕΥ ΔΙΑΒΑΣ

At the center of one of Tyrtaeus' better known battle poems stands the following couplet:

ἀλλά τις εὖ διαβὰς μενέτω ποσὶν ἀμφοτέροισιν
στηριχθεὶς ἐπὶ γῆς, χεῖλος ὀδοῦσι δακών...[1]

Even better known is this passage from another of Tyrtaeus' poems:

ἦδ' ἀρετή, τοδ' ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον
κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ νέῳ.
ξύνον δ' ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόληί τε παντί τε δήμῳ,
ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένῃ
νωλεμέως, αἰσχρῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθηται...[2]

David A. Campbell, in his widely used school anthology of Greek lyric poetry, translates the phrase εὖ διαβάς in the first of these passages as "standing with the feet well apart," and adduces as support for this translation a line from Book 12 of the *Iliad*.[3] In so doing, Professor Campbell follows the LSJ and, indeed, a lexical tradition that goes back at least as far as Guillaume Budé. The purpose of this article is to suggest that this tradition is in error and that the phrase εὖ διαβάς means, not "standing with the feet set well apart," but rather, "with a great forward stride (or leap)." Such a reading does justice both to the basic meaning of διαβαίνω and to the contexts in which the phrase εὖ διαβάς is found.

The starting point for this investigation is the lexicographical tradition that produced the reading "standing with the feet well apart." In 1572, when the great lexicon of Stephanus was first published,[4] there

[1] Tyrtaeus fr. 8 (Diehls) 21-22. All further references to the fragments of Tyrtaeus (or any other Greek lyric poetry) will be to the Diehls text and will use his numeration. The couplet quoted here is repeated verbatim at 7.31.

[2] Tyrtaeus 9.13-17. This passage, with only slight alteration, appears in Theognis (1003-6). For an interpretation and appreciation of this definition of ἀρετή, see Joachim Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios*, Zetemata 66 (Munich 1977) 154 ff.

[3] Specifically, *Il.* 12.458, which will be discussed below.

[4] H. Éstienne (Stephanus), *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (Geneva 1572). I had the privilege of examining a first edition of this seminal work in the C. L. Smith collection of rare books, which is housed in the Z. Smith Reynolds Library, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

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appears to have been some controversy over the precise meaning of διαβαίνω. Guillaume Budé, in his *Commentarii Linguae Graecae*, offered the translation *divarico* or *sto cruris divaricatis*, based, it seems, on the Homeric passage mentioned above. There Hector is described heaving a great stone at the gate of the Greek camp, εὖ διαβάς, ἵνα μή οἱ ἀφαυρότερον βέλος εἴη... (*Il.* 12.458).

J. Camerarius, on the other hand, argued that the force of διαβαίνω in the passages in question was *prodeo et consisto*—an understanding more in line, it seems to me, with what the verb διαβαίνω ought to mean, especially in the aorist participle.[5] Nevertheless, Stephanus sided with Budé, albeit somewhat half-heartedly. His entry for the verb διαβαίνω begins with the usual and obvious sense of *transeo, traicio*; then, under a second rubric, he cites Budé's *sto cruris divaricatis*, giving references from Plutarch, Xenophon, Aristotle, and others. He then goes on to say,

> Quae ego tot exemplis protuli, ut in iis diligenter considerata hac significatione iudicari possit annon, et alicui ex proxume praecedentibus locis ea convenire. Cam [Camerarius] διαβαίνειν esse dicit etiam Prodire et consistere, afferens ex Tyrtaeo ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς [etc.]. Ego εὖ διαβάς in illo [sc. 8.21-22] eiusdem verso de illa divaricatione crurum intelligi scio: an autem et in isto, aliorum esto iudicium.[6]

In fact, Camerarius' point of view not only did not prevail, but indeed disappeared: subsequent commentaries on the two passages of Tyrtaeus essentially repeat Budé's *sto cruris divaricatis*, with no apparent awareness that another reading is possible. The LSJ, as noted at the beginning of this article, gives "stand[ing] with the legs apart; εὖ διαβάς, of a man *planting himself firmly* for fighting." The citations that follow are, for the most part, those adduced by Stephanus, following Budé.

Several difficulties with all this should be immediately apparent. To begin with, is it clear exactly what posture is meant by "standing with the feet well apart"? Those who appeal to the Homeric passage seem to envision a man standing with his feet even with each other laterally and spread wide apart, throwing the stone with both hands over his head. Presumably, then, a warrior who is εὖ διαβάς would also be standing and facing his enemy directly, his shoulders on a plane perpendicular to that enemy's movement, his feet, again, spread apart later-

[5] Joachim Camerarius, *Libellus Scholasticus* (Basil 1550) ad loc.
[6] Stephanus, *s.* διαβαίνω, 643B-D.

ally. This is not, however, the posture usually assumed by a Greek warrior in battle; rather, he keeps one foot in front of the other, so as to cover as much of his body as possible with his shield and present the smallest possible target to his enemy.[7] The image at 8.21 was so understood by A. Baron; in his 1835 book on the martial poetry of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, Baron translates εὖ διαβάς "les pieds bien séparées," and explains that this means, "l'un devant, l'autre derrière."[8] This seems reasonable enough; but if we then return to the Homeric passage, fresh difficulties arise. Can one actually hurl a boulder from such a posture? Yet Homer tells us that Hector was εὖ διαβάς precisely in order to give his missile greater velocity.

These contextual difficulties are not by any means the only ones. How is it that the aorist participle of διαβαίνω can carry the sense of "standing" at all? Some sort or degree of motion must be implied by διαβάς. *Sto cruris divaricatis* seems to have too little relationship to the primary sense of the verb: *transeo, traicio*. What is called for, clearly, is some basic understanding of διαβαίνω that will easily extend to the contexts in which the phrase εὖ διαβάς occurs.

Such an understanding is not, after all, so very difficult to develop. The long stride or leap with which one crosses a stream—regularly denoted, of course, by διαβαίνω[9]—is a motion that has an obvious place on the battlefield. Hector, then, throws his stone like a shotputter: with a great forward leap, so that the inertial force of the body itself adds velocity to the missile. Similarly, Tyrtaeus' warrior leaps or strides forward; after all, the best way to meet an onrushing enemy is not to stand still, in whatever posture, but rather to gather momentum oneself by rushing forward.

Several passages cited by Stephanus to support *sto cruris divaricatis* actually help, on further examination, to support the position here

[7] Campbell's commentary on 8.24 (p. 174, directly below his comments on εὖ διαβάς, cited above) reflects some scholarly debate over the type of shield Tyrtaeus refers to there, the difficulty being that the hoplite shield actually used in Tyrtaeus' day was not large enough to cover the hoplite from shoulder to shin. If we follow the suggestions about posture soon to be advanced here (namely, turn the hypothetical hoplite 90 degrees), these difficulties are much reduced, if not altogether obviated.

[8] A. Baron, *Poésies Militaires de l'Antiquité* (Brussels 1835, reprinted Amsterdam 1971). The translation appears on pp. 156–57; the note is on p. 276. Baron translates all the fragments of the two poets three times—once into French, once into Latin prose, and once into Latin verse. His Latin prose translation of εὖ διαβάς is *bene divaricatus*, but in verse he renders it *bene progressus*.

[9] See LSJ, *s.v.*, for numerous citations.

advanced. In these passages, the perfect participle of διαβαίνω, rather than the aorist, is used to describe someone (or something) who has just completed the forward movement described above. For example, Aristophanes, in the *Knights*, thus describes the Paphlagonian:

> ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν Παφλαγόν' οὐδὲν λαθεῖν·
> ἐφορᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸς πάντ'. ἔχει γὰρ τὸ σκέλος
> τὸ μὲν ἐν Πύλῳ, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐν τῇκκλησίᾳ.
> τοσόνδε δ' αὐτοῦ βῆμα διαβεβηκότος
> ὁ πρωκτός ἐστιν αὐτόχρημ' ἐν Χαόσι
> τὼ χεῖρ' ἐν Αἰτωλοῖς, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν Κλωπιδῶν.[10]

In a similar way, Plutarch and Diodorus use the perfect participle to describe statues and paintings of warriors advancing into battle.[11] Statues and paintings, by their nature, freeze motion; the imagination derives a sense of motion from a posture or an attitude. The Greek perfect participle is, of course, admirably suited to express verbally this "freezing" of motion that takes place in the graphic arts. If, then, the perfect participle of διαβαίνω is used of a statue *standing* with one foot thrust forward,[12] it follows that the aorist participle must carry a different sense. Clearly, that sense must be of the movement διαβαίνω itself, carried out in the past, rather than of the posture resulting from that movement. In other words, διαβάς: διαβεβηκώς:: παύσας: πεπαυκώς.

In several other passages the verb διαβαίνω seems to refer to vigorous forward motion, with the sense of "crossing" attenuated or missing. Thus Alcman says of a dancer, διέβα ταναοῖς πο(σί);[13] Lucian, of men in pursuit of a fleeing enemy, says μεγάλα διαβαινόντων ἐπ' αὐτούς.[14] In both of these instances, the image of leaping or running with great strides is vivid and unmistakable.

The reading "with a great forward stride (or leap)," then, answers all the objections raised above to the more conventional reading, "standing with the feet set apart." The former does no violence to the basic sense of διαβαίνω, and allows a man throwing a stone, a warrior

[10] *Equites* 74–79.

[11] Plutarch, *Moralia* 779F; Diodorus Siculus 1.98.9.

[12] Someone might object here that the statue in Plutarch may well be standing *cruris divaricatis*. No statue or vase painting has come to my attention that would bear out such a contention; on the contrary, the hoplite is usually depicted striding forward, thrusting his spear. The passage from Diodorus refers to Egyptian paintings, in which case the point just made is even clearer.

[13] Alcman 3.70. That this sentence refers to a leap, not to a posture, should be obvious.

[14] Lucian, *Anach.* 32.

on the attack, and a dancer to be described in similar terms, as we have seen. The demands of physics and grammar are both satisfied, and our understanding of Tyrtaeus improved. The vivid, concrete image that Tyrtaeus gave us in both passages is finally assimilated to the image made familiar by countless vase paintings and statues. This, then is ἀρετή—not to stand, but to attack; not to wait for the blow, but to strike.

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PYRRHA'S GROTTO AND THE FAREWELL TO LOVE: A STUDY OF HORACE *ODES* 1.5

"Das Gedicht ist in seiner schlichten Einfachheit und klaren Gedankenführung überzeugend, dass es nicht viel Erklärung zu erfordern scheint. Aber gerade das scheinbar Einfache ist im Bereiche der Klassik ein Ergebnis höchster Kunst und raffinierter Überlegung"—so Viktor Pöschl in his elegant interpretation of Horace *Odes* 1.5 (*Horazische Lyrik: Interpretationen* [Heidelberg 1970] 18-28, at p. 20). The poem has been so many times translated that it is tempting to suggest that one way of appreciating its artful simplicity is to fix the Latin firmly in the mind and then see how far one's understanding of it differs from that of its translators.[1] But that may not suffice: R. G. M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard (hereafter cited as N&H) in their commentary assert that the ode "is not sentimental, heart-felt, or particularly pretty" and that "it may be admired for rarer virtues, which have eluded the myriad translators, wit, urbanity and astringent charm."[2] This paper seeks primarily

[1]For a collection of translations, which could now be substantially increased, see *Ad Pyrrham: A Polyglot Collection of Translations of Horace's "Ode to Pyrrha" (Book I, Ode 5) Assembled with an Introduction* by Ronald Storrs (London 1959).

[2]R. G. M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book I* (Oxford 1970) 73. Cf. also R. G. M. Nisbet, "*Romanae fidicen lyrae:* The Odes of Horace," in *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric* (ed. J. P. Sullivan, London 1962) 181-218 at p. 183: "The Pyrrha ode is remote from the lush effusions of modern translators, an anthology of whose futilities [i.e., Storrs] has recently been published."

to reexamine the sense of the poem in an attempt to define what response it may have elicited in the minds of the Roman readers to whom it was addressed.

"The essential point to be made about this poem is that all the details in it were part of the normal daily scene in Horace's Rome," David West has written in his *Reading Horace* (Edinburgh 1967, p. 101). But our knowledge of what was or was not "daily" in Rome of that time can hardly be precise. No doubt it is true that there were women and young men, grottoes and roses (though making beds of them is no easy task or spontaneous gesture) and perhaps some people may have erected *tabulae votivae* for essentially frivolous reasons (though surely not often). Far more important than any supposed normality of the mise-en-scène, which must be regarded as doubtful and unprovable, is the indisputable fact that the motifs underlying and informing the poem have—like most motifs in Latin *Liebesgedichte*, elegiac or lyric—Greek precedents immediately recognisable to an educated contemporary.[3] In any case, the idea that love is a perilous voyage and that, in theory, it is best avoided or renounced cannot be said to be, as metaphor or notion, startlingly original or (given that all poems, ancient and modern, are written by and for human beings) psychologically profound. It may be that, despite its prominence as a poetic theme, there is really not all that much that can be said about love itself, whether of pleasure or pain, but only about its attendant circumstances. These may be wholly factitious (as usually in ancient poetry) despite quasi-autobiographical accretions, or—more rarely, almost never demonstrably, and certainly never without transformation—based on some experience of the writer. Poets fall in love, to be sure; but the way they describe the experience is largely controlled by literary and cultural traditions. Motifs about love, and other universal emotions, after all become motifs because they reflect what is felt to be universally recognisable, even though the decor attached to them may, as time passes, become anachronistic, sedimented, and stylised. It would be quite fitting in principle to lend a Roman flavour to what is, at root, "an overworked topic of Greek erotic poetry" (N&H, p. 72), but it is hard to see that the flavour in *Odes* 1.5 is at all strong, far less "essential."

It is certainly Pyrrha who is best remembered by readers of this ode (perhaps by readers of Horace in general).[4] Her character is clearly

[3]See the remarks of Giuseppe Giangrande, "Hellenistic Topoi in Ovid's *Amores*," *MPhL* 4 (1981) 25–51, esp. at p. 25.

[4]Nisbet (note 2 above) 181: "Everybody knows Pyrrha. . . ."

and finely captured in lines 1-3: "Quis multa gracilis te puer in rosa / perfusus liquidis urget odoribus / grato, Pyrrha, sub antro?" *Quis* here implies two things: first, that a name is required or should be imagined as possible in reply, and second that Pyrrha might well be enjoying herself with any one of a number of *graciles pueri*.[5] The sense is: "Tell me just which of your slim boys. . .?" As has been often noted, the encirclement of *te* by the words *gracilis* and *puer* and the whole group by *multa . . . in rosa* cleverly suggests in itself close physical propinquity. The verb *urget* is specifically—and not especially genteelly—sexual; Orelli rightly saw it is as an equivalent to the Greek θλίβω, but it also has the sense of *urgere* ⟨*ad coitum*⟩ by euphemistic suppression.[6] We are to infer that Pyrrha is playing hard to get, but that got she will certainly be. Foreplay of a heavy kind is in progress.[7]

We must turn for a time to the *puer*. He is *gracilis*: "the word refers objectively to the slight figure of an adolescent boy," according to N&H (p. 73). This attunes well with the modern Western notion, carried often to extremes, that slimness is a sexually desirable attribute. It is indeed an attribute of youth. The picture changes radically if we replace *gracilis puer* by *obesus senex*, its opposite; much of the significance of the "slim boy" depends on this occulted antithesis, which suggests the less pleasing aspects of aging such as putting on weight and waning sexual powers. But N&H, as they uneasily recognise (p. 74), may not be quite correct about *gracilis*, or at least their interpretation may not be the whole truth. West lists the epithet—doubtfully—among those words in the ode that are not "poetic" (op. cit. 101); *OLD* (IV.769, *s.v.* 1) provides examples of its use in a pejorative or scornful sense. N&H admittedly consider this facet of the word, but only to dismiss its relevance: yet the passage they cite (Ovid *Amores* 2.10.23) actually implies that a man who is *gracilis* might be expected to be *sine viribus* (but in this case was not). N&H add that "in girls *gracilitas* was much admired" (p. 74). It is quite reasonable to say, therefore, that a Roman reader might well have seen in the word *gracilis*, linked with the

[5]For *quis*, see *OLD* VII.1559, *s.v.* 1; most translations miss the point that a *specific* answer to the question is envisaged as possible.

[6]J. C. Orelli, 4th ed., rev. J. G. Baiter and W. Hirschfelder (Berlin 1886) ad loc., 41.

[7]It is to be noted that the verb *urget* contains within itself not only the boy's eagerness for copulation and the woman's (feigned) resistance to it, a normative situation, but equally the woman's pleasure in her lover's eagerness and in her own ability to defer his desire to increase her own, a notion usually suppressed in polite society.

often condescending *puer*, not the connotations "slim and sexy" (the two not in their view being as inevitably linked as in ours, at least as far as men were concerned) but rather "skinny and girlish." This makes the proclivities of Pyrrha, whose age is not directly indicated, something quite other than charming, tender, or romantic. *Gracilis*, too, is placed next to *multa*; according to Storrs, the latter is to be seen as "enhancing (though not 'qualifying')" the former.[8] But neither "enhancement" nor "qualification" is at issue. If *gracilis* suggests a certain effeminate meagreness of physique, then *multa*, attached to the sexually symbolic *rosa*, evokes abundance and excess: and, as the rest of the poem leaves in no doubt, it must be Pyrrha's abundance and excess that is enveloping the boy as he plays the role of insistent lover for her gratification.

The boy is also "perfusus liquidis ... odoribus." N&H remark (p. 74): "in ancient as in modern Italy young men in love paid inordinate attention to their hair"; whether this (Anglo-Saxon) generalisation be true or not, it is hard to see why, despite the passages they cite,[9] the hair alone should be suggested by the phrase. It has been generally taken to mean that the *puer* has "thoroughly drenched himself in perfumes." This was, in the traditional Roman view, an unmanly habit; Jasper Griffin has asserted that by Augustus' time "men ... used perfumes discreetly"[10]—but he sees this as part of a "life of luxury" that provides a realistic background to elegy and lyric of the period, an argument that is of doubtful value in that it freely uses evidence from the very poetry it seeks to explain in support of its premises and because it underestimates the continuity and coercive power of motifs inherited by the Romans from Greek poetry, to which "real life," even if it were in any way ascertainable, has little or no relevance.[11] But here we have not discretion but unrestraint. This might be taken as mockery of the extremism of youth in the pursuit of love, for Romans were not prone to sentimentality in such matters. Be that as it may, the whole phrase, with the intensive prefix *per-* and the plural *odores*, carries on the idea that is inherent in *gracilis*, that of a certain effeminacy about Pyrrha's *puer*. Pyrrha is a cradle-snatcher.

[8] Storrs, op. cit. 27.

[9] Propertius, 2.4.5, Ovid *Ars amatoria* 3.443, Aristaenetus 1.27.

[10] Jasper Griffin, "Augustan poetry and the life of luxury," *JRS* 76 (1976) 87–104 at p. 93.

[11] Indeed, the realism of "realistic" literature in modern times evaporates before close analysis: cf. Roland Barthes, *S/Z: Essai* (Paris 1970); the quest for verisimilitude is in itself a fantasy, as is well brought out by J. Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (London 1981) 61–62.

We must glance at the setting. "Multa . . . in rosa" is rightly taken by N&H (p. 74) to refer to a "bed of roses" (not to garlands as some have believed), adding that the motif "comes from Greek erotic writings" and that "to lie on roses was the height of hedonism." The roses heaped under Pyrrha and the boy are hardly to be included, as West (op. cit. 102) seems to believe, among the "familiar details from the daily life of ancient Rome"; they are clearly part of the decorative apparatus of love-scenes in literature (the rose was Venus' flower)[12] and divorced from reality. So too with the *antrum*, about which commentators have agitated themselves to no good purpose. N&H comment (p. 75): "caves are commoner in Italy than in England, yet the scene belongs to pastoral . . . or novelette rather than to real life." It is highly likely, need one add, that *antra*, whether natural or of human construction, were popular trysting places in Rome: but, however strong the likelihood, Horace needed no such impetus to choose one as the venue for his imagined amatory encounter; the *antrum*, like the bed of roses, is a recognisable piece of literary decor.

Often overlooked, however, is the word *grato*. It is right to consider to whom and in what way the grotto is *gratum*. Certainly it is to Pyrrha who is no novice in love, and presumably to the boy on this occasion: but surely more to the former, with *grato* containing a suggestion of permanent pleasure[13] and conveying the notion "habitually welcome to her" or "her frequent resort for sexual enjoyment." Eyes blinded by a wish to see an idyll where nothing is in fact idyllic find it necessary to ignore the significance of *grato* and to devalue it into little more than an *epitheton ornans*.[14]

The following sentence also demands close scrutiny: "cui flavam religas comam, / simplex munditiis?" (4–5). As with *quis*, so *cui* should be taken to have the meaning "for whom ⟨on this occasion⟩ . . .?", as this is not, for Pyrrha, a new or unparalleled situation. The epithet *flavam* is, as N&H note (p. 75), "meant to suggest Pyrrha's own name," in that the Greek πυρρός was taken as equivalent to the Latin *rufus* or *flavus*, meaning "reddish-gold." But this *jeu de mots* is insufficient to explain why so careful a poet as Horace should have stressed the colour

[12]On beds of roses, cf. Orelli (note 6 above). The association between the rose and love is perhaps the most persistent image in European love poetry.

[13]See *OLD* IV.774, *s.v.* 4, for this aspect of the meaning of *gratus*.

[14]Storrs' "straight" English rendition by A. D. Godley comes up with the notably inadequate "in the pleasant bower" (op. cit., p. xi), an adjective often repeated in other versions.

of Pyrrha's hair. The word can hardly be purely descriptive, and we must ask ourselves what this particular colour of hair would suggest to his readers about Pyrrha's hair. Obviously girls with reddish-gold hair existed, but in such a lyric this is not to the point. One relevant factor is contained in Fordyce's note on *flavo* in Catullus 64.63: "Fair hair conventionally belongs to the heroes and heroines of legend."[15] Pyrrha is a name taken from mythology (though used in Greek poetry to typify girls of a type certainly not dwelling in the age of legend);[16] so hair of a colour appropriate to a heroine is a pleasing touch—but not in any way chosen to suggest that this Pyrrha has the distant and alluring status of an Ariadne or a Dido (Virgil *Aeneid* 4.590). Far from it: because the colour was comparatively rare and much admired, "the deficiencies of nature were sometimes made good by art or even by purchase" (N&H, p. 75). The suspicion lingers to this day in countries where blonde hair is not the norm (including England) that those who have it have obtained it out of a bottle and are black at the roots. Ovid (*Amores* 1.14) has some fun with the dangers of dyeing the hair, an indication that allusions to the practice were a topos. Indeed, women's obsession with their hair was a stock theme in rhetorical and satirical ψόγοι γυναικῶν.[17] It surely follows that Horace's emphasis on the *flavus* colour of Pyrrha's hair would lead to a presumption on the part of his readers that it is dyed hair—and that she is no better than she should be, lax in morals or pretending to be younger than she is (more probably the latter in view of her penchant for *graciles pueri*). It is worth adding that it was from the time of Pyrrha, wife of Deucalion, that moral corruption was conventionally held to have spread throughout mankind.[18] Her namesake proves it.

What of "simplex munditiis"? This "translator's despair"[19] has been unnecessarily obfuscated. *Simplex* is certainly intended to point a contrast with Pyrrha's true nature: "die *simplicitas* der Pyrrha . . . ist von Absicht nicht frei," remarks Pöschl, understating the case (op. cit. 21). Pyrrha's *simplicitas* is to be recognised as an aspect of her—to the *puer*—still latent complexity. *Munditiis* means not so much "neatness,"

[15]C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus: A Commentary* (Oxford 1961) 287.

[16]N&H, p. 74: "It [the name Pyrrha] was probably favoured by hetaerae . . ."; as a literary instance they cite Marcus Argentarius, *AP* 9.161 (= A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip* [Cambridge 1968] I, p. 155, no. XV).

[17]On which, see E. Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 253.

[18]See Propertius 2.32.49 ff., Juvenal 1.81 ff.

[19]Storrs, op. cit. 21.

far less "cleanliness," as "in the way it [the hair] is arranged"; and "uncomplicated" will serve to render *simplex*: the contrast is with the highly ornate hairstyles denounced by Propertius and Juvenal, for quite different reasons but both reworking the same topos.[20] The fundamental point is that an elaborate coiffure is hardly conducive to passionate lovemaking of the kind that is in progress *grato sub antro*; Pyrrha has dressed her hair not *ad ostentationem* but *ad lasciviam*, as suggested by the verb *urgere*. For this reason, West's tentative opinion (op. cit. 106–7), tempting at first sight, that the verb *religare* should here be taken as "unbind" (a rare, if not unparalleled usage)[21] rather than "bind up" is not needed to explain Horace's train of thought.

It is remarkable that, in so few words, Horace should have fixed the nature of the encounter in the grotto, and of its participants, with a dispassionate precision. It is even more remarkable that the lines have been so often misunderstood and mistranslated: and, without understanding the opening lines, we are bound to take a distorted view also of the rest of the ode. This comprises a comment on the deceptiveness of love and on the wisdom of renouncing it. Both these themes may be said to go back to the beginnings of erotic poetry. The comparison between women and the sea may be traced back at least to Semonides of Amorgos[22] (and still lives on), and, as an image, it provides scope for subtle variation, while remaining identifiably within poetic tradition. So too the motif of the abandonment of love had ample precedent in poetry and philosophy;[23] and the renunciation symbolically objectified in the *tabula votiva* too has parallels in Greek poetry (N&H, p. 73). This literary background, of the fullness of which our knowledge remains imperfect, follows naturally on the largely motif-bound vignette with which the ode begins.

Venus was born from the sea. When the sea is calm, it is beautiful and alluring, but at other times fraught with peril. Like a woman (so male poets assumed), the sea is mutable and untrustworthy. The *gracilis puer* is envisaged by Horace as a voyager, who must inevitably come

[20] Propertius 1.2 (probably the poem that is parodied by Ovid *Amores* 1.14 as an exemplar of a stock amatory theme); Juvenal 6.486 ff. (with Courtney's note and bibliographical reff., op. cit. 326).

[21] *OLD* VI.1606, *s.v.* 5, cites—doubtfully—only Catullus 63.84, where the meaning is inferred from *resolvens* in line 76.

[22] 7.37 ff.: N&H, p. 72. For the origins of this long-lived image, see R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought* (Cambridge 1953) 230.

[23] N&H, p. 73. The remarks of Cephalus (citing the aged Sophocles) at Plato *Republic* 329 may be seen as a philosophical *point de départ* for a topos, which, handled by philosophers, poets, and rhetoricians alike, was to amuse Ovid in the *Remedia*.

to grief and disillusion. Pyrrha is his sea,[24] on which he has rashly set sail; and we have already deduced from lines 1-5 what kind of woman she is and how inevitable is his doom. Once again, a closer examination of the words used by the economical Horace will aid us in following his development of the theme.

Lines 5-12 contain an extended sentence, which has been generally admired for interplay of nuance and for verbal patterning. In 5-6 we find the opening "heu quotiens fidem / mutatosque deos flebit." N&H (p. 76) quite properly mention the use of *fides* in "lover's language" (Catullus being the first poet known to us thoroughly to explore it in such a context) and opine that "it seems best to understand *mutatam* with the noun." This is surely true, and indeed *mutatam* may be said to be implicit in the masculine plural *mutatos*. It is, however, important to recognise how closely ⟨*mutatam*⟩ *fidem* and *mutatos deos* are related, for they form a single idea, almost a hendiadys. *OLD* (V.1150, *s.v.* 13, *b*) provides instances of *fidem mutare* in the sense of "to transfer allegiance" or "change sides," comparing the phrase *sacramentum mutare*. Such a "transference of allegiance" must be from one person or side to another, and covers more than a simple breach of faith. As it is here Pyrrha's *fides* (in the matter of love) that is in question, the sentence may be expanded as "how often he will bewail the fact that she has transferred her allegiance . . . from himself to another." As for *mutatos deos*, N&H (p. 76) compare Propertius 1.1.8: "cum tamen adversos cogor habere deos," but this is hardly an exact parallel; to have the gods against one is not the same as lamenting the fact that they are *mutati*. *Mutatos* must here be taken with a similar force to the *mutatam* which is understood with *fidem*; so that the whole sentence runs "how often he will bewail the fact that she has transferred her allegiance and the gods from himself to another." To transfer one's *fides* was in Roman eyes a serious matter, for the gods presided over *fides* and it had a cardinal importance in the moral order.[25] To play fast and loose with *fides* is to play fast and loose with the gods that are its guardians. What the *puer* will lament is the transference of an allegiance that he believed to have a divine sanction sacrilegiously away from himself; Pyrrha is foresworn and he will feel that the gods too, the guarantors of her oaths,

[24]Cf. H. Musurillo, *Symbol and Myth in Ancient Poetry* (New York 1961) 144, with n. 24.

[25]Of the many treatments of *fides*, see now J. H. G. W. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford 1979) 42 ff. On *fides* in Catullus, D. W. T. Vessey, "Thoughts on two poems of Catullus: 13 and 30," *Latomus* 30 (1971) 45-55 at pp. 53-54.

have abandoned him along with her. It is not so much a belief that the gods have turned against him as that they have forsaken him altogether. Pyrrha, it seems, carries her own gods around with her.

The ideas of betrayal and mutability lead neatly into the marine imagery that follows and may, in a sense, be said to suggest it; the comparison of a woman to the sea was, as has been remarked, a well-established one in poetry, and behind it lies the still more familiar topos that the sea is in itself hazardous and to be avoided.[26] Admiration has been expressed for the skill with which Horace has deployed his adjectives in lines 6-12, with their various balances and antitheses:

> . . . et *aspera*
> *nigris* aequora ventis
> emirabitur *insolens*,
>
> qui nunc te fruitur *credulus aurea*,
> qui semper *vacuam*, semper *amabilem*
> sperat, *nescius* aurae
> *fallacis*.

The descriptive words applied to the *puer* (*insolens*, *credulus*, *nescius*) all relate to his naiveté and inexperience; those found in the comparison of Pyrrha to the sea stress her cruelty, darkness, and deceit (*aspera*, *nigris*, *fallacis*). In between them, in the two relative clauses, we find presented the false picture of Pyrrha, which the boy—while in the grotto or perhaps until her *fides* is transferred elsewhere—forms of her (*aurea*, *vacuam*, *amabilem*). Three words pertain to each category, for there may be said to be three characters in this part of the ode: the boy, the real Pyrrha, and the imaginary Pyrrha. The adjectives applied, metaphorically, to the real Pyrrha overwhelm and cancel both those applied to the boy and those that serve to mark out his naive vision of her: deceit in place of ignorance and credulity, harshness instead of availability and affection, blackness instead of gold. But there is more: whereas the boy and his imagined Pyrrha remain as human beings, with adjectives applied to them befitting their humanity, the real Pyrrha is presented only in terms of the violent, uncontrolled, and uncontrollable elements—it is they that sweep away and obliterate the human figures, one of which is indeed only the product of the other's fantasy.

The verb *emirabitur* "may well be a coinage of Horace's" (N&H, p. 76), one of the "long prosaic compounds" that "help to build the monumental masonry of a Horatian line." Bentley, seeing a logical con-

[26]For a collection of passages, see K. F. Smith, *The Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (repr. Darmstadt 1964) 246-47.

flict between *quotiens* and *insolens*, sought to eliminate it from the text.[27] That the sound of the pentasyllabic verb excellently evokes the state of long and stunned amazement which is in store for the *puer* is apparent, and N&H (p. 76) are probably right to suggest a parallel—or specific but unidentified echo—with a Greek compound verb such as ἐκθαυμάζω; the transformation of the sea from calm and fair to stormy and savage will take his breath away with shock and bewilderment. *Insolens* presents no real problem or inconsistency. N&H (p. 77) suggest that it "refers to the present time . . . and not to the future time of the boy's surprise," but this view is not wholly satisfactory. Horace surely implies that, when the boy is confronted by an angry and faithless Pyrrha, he will often, ingenuous as he is, be amazed; this is not an event that occurs once and then becomes familiar (or acceptable), but rather something that will continue to bewilder him until he has ceased to be *insolens* and has dedicated his own valedictory *tabula votiva*.

If there is any reference to "present time," by which is presumably meant the time envisaged in the first stanza, it is more likely to be contained in the secondary sense of *insolens*: "in his vanity" or "in his arrogant triumph."[28] The boy who now glories in his (supposed) conquest will later have to learn that he is quite unversed in the ways of women. This idea is clearly brought out in lines 9–11. These provide, as it were, a glimpse into the boy's thoughts while in the grotto, when he foolishly sees a Pyrrha who is *aurea* and always *vacua, amabilis*. West, while noting (op. cit. 101) that *amabilis* is an "unpoetic" word, asserts that these lines "call up a benign and empty sea at sunset before the impending storms and black winds . . ." (ibid. 104). This extrapolation misses the point. *Aurea* is a "lover's word" (N&H, p. 77, cf. *OLD* I.217, *s.v.* 5) and an inflation of *flavam* in 4 (Storrs, op. cit. 27); *vacua* ("available") and *amabilis* ("lovable," "gorgeous") are both words without high poetic force: indeed, all three are epithets that a boy might well, quite conversationally, use to himself or to friends about a girl. Lines 9–11, with their normal, slightly mundane vocabulary, give the reader an *aperçu* into the working of the boy's mind and are an index of his credulity. They contrast with the complex, *literarisch* imagery that surrounds them. The boy is naive but Pyrrha is not; he responds to her in a simple and trusting manner—his "golden, willing and gorgeous girl"—without foreseeing at that point her tempestuous, destructive nature. Horace's

[27] N&H, pp. 76–77; see also Storrs, op. cit. 13–15 for an amusing eighteenth century reply to Bentley.

[28] *OLD* IV.926, *s.v.* 4 Horace *Odes* 1.16.21; 3.29.50.

choice of vocabulary enables him subtly to turn aside from the traditional metaphor and give his readers a short but unmistakable change of tone and mood; what a Roman would recognise as normal, if not everyday language, expressing authentically what the thoughts of such a boy might be in the depicted circumstances, disrupts the development of the traditional imagery, which is picked up again in 11–12 ("nescius aurae / fallacis"). The choice of *aura*, which at first glance seems a weaker word than *venti* in line 7 (cf. *OLD* I.216, *s.v.* 2), is made poignant by its responsion in sound to *aurea*, the "lover's word" in line 9. All of these nuances attune perfectly with the characterisation of Pyrrha and the boy so deftly established in the first stanza.

That the *puer* is only one among many on whom Pyrrha has preyed and will prey again is confirmed by the brief exclamatory interjection that follows: "miseri, quibus intemptata nites" (12–13). *Miser* is a quasi-technical word for those suffering through love.[29] Of the remark Pöschl writes: "Der Satz *miseri* etc. enthält die Quintessenz alles bisherigen. Er klingt beinahe wie eine Sentenz" (op. cit. 23). Yet the words are not really gnomic, and the *miseri* comprise a specific group: all the *pueri* who join Pyrrha in her *antrum* of passion. The verb *nites* glances back, almost in mockery, to *aurea* (and so to *flavam*). As, for example, in Catullus 2.5, *nitere* "suits a beautiful girl" (N&H, p. 77, comparing *Odes* 1.19.5). It is less certain, however, that "it also suggests the treacherous glitter of a shining sea" (ibid. pp. 77–78). No parallel is adduced for this usage. *Nitere* is commonly used of gleaming and resplendent surfaces (*OLD* V.1180, *s.v.* 2, 3), including metallic ones. It is more likely to be intended to pick up the image contained in *aurea*, "golden," for the exclamation refers to the shattering of the illusory dream-world of lines 9–11, of the hope the boys entertain about Pyrrha. *Intemptata* would then mean "unassayed," "untried" in a metallurgical sense, not "unpenetrated as a route" (cf. *OLD* IV.937, *s.v.* 1 *b*). Gold was normally tried by fire in antiquity,[30] and this is entirely suitable to the context in view of the frequent comparison made in love-poetry between *ignis* and *amor*. All those who "assay" Pyrrha in the fire of love find her base metal, despite the superficial sheen that captivates them. The sentence forms a closure of the ode as a comment on the relationship between Pyrrha and her *puer*, leading into the renunciation-topos with which it is formally ended.

[29]R. Pichon, *De sermone amatorio apud Latinos elegiarum scriptores* (diss. Paris 1903) 203 (*miser* specifically of love-sickness at Lucretius 4.1076).

[30]Cf. Cicero *Ad. fam.* 9.15.2; Ovid *Tristia* 1.5.25; Pliny *N.H.* 33.126.

Me in line 13 is in emphatic contrast to *miseri* in 12. It is sometimes rashly treated as if it referred to Horace himself; in fact it serves as a cover for a definable category of men: former lovers of Pyrrha (and, by extension, of her like), who have had enough of venturing on such faithless seas:[31]

> . . . me tabula sacer
> votiva paries indicat uvida
> suspendisse potenti
> vestimenta maris deo.

Walter Wili has perceptively commented on these lines: "Man sehe wie diesseits und jenseits des tragenden Verbums indicat je zwei Wortpaare gesperrt und zugleich unter sich verschränkt sind und so der ganze Satz selbst gleichsam eine symmetrisch ausgewogene *tabula votiva* wird."[32] The juxtaposition of motifs is subtle and striking. Just as a craftsman might dedicate the tools of his trade on retirement (cf. N&H, p. 73 on this as a literary topos), so the nameless lover has hung up his dripping garments on escaping from the tempestuous waters of love. The traditional image of "woman as sea" is suddenly given an almost mischievous specificity; because lovers are sailors only within poetry, so the votive tablet, commemorating the renunciation of love symbolised by the *uvida vestimenta*, is itself a part of the ode, is inscribed within it. The noun *vestimenta*, rightly classified as "unpoetic," aptly evokes what is a down-to-earth and practical act, far from the world of grottoes, perfumes, and roses. A life on shore is safer.

The ode begins and ends with enclosed spaces. The *antrum* of Pyrrha is a suitable venue for erotic disportment; the temple of Neptune bears on its "holy wall" the imagined objectification of love renounced. Pyrrha herself, the golden Pyrrha, has the *gracilis puer* in her arms at the outset of a voyage that must prove disastrous to him, though not to her; neither she nor the sea ever changes or disappears. Only experience can teach her victims that all that glisters is not gold so that, soaked and buffeted by the waves of her perfidy, they at last retire from the life of love, moving, as it were, from grotto to temple. From a relatively small number of motifs and by a careful choice of word and image, Horace presented to his Roman readers—and to later ones—a fine statement on

[31] N&H's advocacy (pp. 79–80) of Zielinski's emendation *deae* in the last line has—and rightly—not met with approval, though they have made what Jasper Griffin (*JRS* 70 [1980] 185) terms "a new and improbable attempt" to justify their view in *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II* (Oxford 1978) 91.

[32] Walter Wili, *Horaz und die augusteische Kultur* (Basel, Stuttgart 1965) 249.

how the *ingénieux* should regard the *ingénu*. Love is not a bed of roses, when there is a Pyrrha to lie on it.[33]

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[33]It is, all the same, the love of such as Pyrrha that has been renounced—a passing misfortune perhaps for *graciles pueri*—and not necessarily love as such.

DOMITIANUS DOMINUS: A GLOSS ON STATIUS *SILVAE* 1.6.84*

In *Kalendae Decembres* Statius writes:

> tollunt innumeras ad astra voces
> Saturnalia principis sonantes
> et dulci dominum favore clamant:
> hoc solum vetuit licere Caesar.[1]

Post-Domitian opinions contrast sharply with Statius' comment. Pliny, for example, in his *Panegyric* to Trajan emphasizes the differences between Trajan's principate and Domitian's dominate:

> Discernatur orationibus nostris diversitas temporum, et ex ipso genere gratiarum agendarum intellegatur, cui quando sint actae. Nusquam ut deo, nusquam ut numini blandiamur: non enim de tyranno sed de cive, non de domino sed de parente loquimur.[2]

Pliny's younger friend Suetonius made what has become the most well-known comment about Domitian's inordinate claims:

> Pari arrogantia, cum procuratorum suorum nomine formalem dictaret epistulam, sic coepit: "Dominus et deus noster hoc fieri iubet." Unde institutum posthac, ut ne scripto quidem ac sermone cuiusquam appellaretur aliter.[3]

*Research for this gloss was made possible by a grant from NEH during the academic year 1981-82.

[1]*Silvae* 1.6.81-84.

[2]*Panegyricus* 2.3. Cf. also *Pan.* 33.4, 52.7, and Dio Chrys. *Or.* 40.12, 45.1, and 50.8.

[3]Suet. *Dom.* 13. See also Dio Cass. 67.4.7, 67.13.4.

In order to reconcile these contrasting points of view, Kenneth Scott proposes a standard temporal explanation that the longer Domitian reigned the more tyrannical he became:

> If we suppose that the emperor first used the title [*dominus*] in edicts issued in the name of his procurators about 86, we probably shall not be much in error. This action on the part of Domitian apparently indicates a complete change in his policy; he no longer pretends to be a *princeps*; he has gone over to absolutism and made this clear by using the phrase *dominus et deus* in his edicts....[4]

Scott then explains the reference from Statius quoted above as follows:

> It would seem ... that at the time of the banquet mentioned by Statius Domitian wished to be considered a *princeps*, a constitutional ruler. Our sources, however, prove conclusively that this did not continue to be the case.[5]

The sources are not, however, as conclusive as Scott suggests. Statius, for example, whom Domitian commissioned to write several poems, does not use the *dominus et deus* terminology that according to Suetonius Domitian required. In a poem celebrating Domitian's seventeenth consulship in 95 C.E. (one year before his death), Statius refers to the emperor as *Caesar*, *Germanicus*, *parens*, *Augustus*, and *dux*, but never as either *dominus* or *deus*.[6] In the same year Statius writes a poem for the opening of the Via Domitiana by celebrating Domitian with similar titles: *Caesar*, *dux*, *maximus arbiter*, and *parens*.[7] At the beginning of the *Achilleid*, published in 95–96 C.E., Statius addresses Domitian simply as *vates* and *dux*.[8] Like Statius, Quintilian, honored educator in the Flavian period and official tutor for Domitian's heirs, does not use any title that suggests a shift from principate to dominate by Domitian in the latter years of his reign. In the Preface to Book 4 of the *Institutio*

[4] Kenneth Scott, *The Imperial Cult under the Flavians* (repr. New York 1975) 109. For problems in dating such a shift, cf. Brian Jones, *Domitian and the Senatorial Order* (Philadelphia 1979) 34.

[5] Scott (note 4 above) 102–3.

[6] *Silv.* 4.1.

[7] *Silv.* 4.3. On the building of the road see Dio Cass. 67.14.1. Toward the end of Statius' poem the Sybil does give a lofty title to Domitian: "hic est deus, hunc iubet beatis pro se Iuppiter imperare terris."

[8] *Achil.* 1.14–19. Dilke, in *Statius: Achilleid* (Cambridge 1954) 81, notes that A. W. Verrall used the absence of divine epithets as evidence "to try to show why Dante thought Statius a convert to Christianity."

Oratoria, Quintilian acknowledges the honor which he feels at being chosen tutor:

> Cum vero mihi Domitianus Augustus sororis suae nepotum delegaverit curam, non satis honorem iudiciorum caelestium intelligam, nisi ex hoc oneris quoque magnitudinem metiar.[9]

He refers to Domitian as *sanctissimus censor* and *princeps*, but not as *dominus* or *deus*.[10] Thus, neither Statius nor Quintilian, each of whom was writing as an official close to the throne at the end of Domitian's reign, uses those titles which we would expect of an emperor who "has gone over to absolutism."[11]

Martial, on the other hand, according to Scott supplies "unmistakable" evidence for a shift in Domitian's reign to an absolutist dominate; for in *Liber Spectaculorum*, Martial's earliest work, he "thinks of the title *dominus* as a term of reproach, as connoting a tyrant, . . ." whereas later in the Fifth Book of epigrams, published about 89 C.E., he uses both *dominus* and *deus* as titles for Domitian.[12] Moreover, in the second edition of Book 10, published in the early reign of Trajan, Martial writes:

> Frustra, Blanditiae, venitis ad me
> adtritis miserabiles labellis:
> dicturus dominum deumque non sum.
> iam non est locus hac in urbe vobis;
> ad Parthos procul ite pilleatos
> et turpes humilesque supplicesque

[9] *Inst.* 4. Preface 2.

[10] *Inst.* 4. Preface 3. In his invocation to the Muses, Quintilian does give Domitian a kind of divine status: ". . . nunc omnes in auxilium deos ipsumque in primis, quo neque praesentius aliud nec studiis magis propitium numen est, invocem. . . ." Here Quintilian refers to Domitian the way Pliny the Younger urges Caninius Rufus to speak of Trajan: "Proinde iure vatum invocatis dis, et inter deos ipso, cuius res opera consilia dicturus es. . ." (Pliny *Ep.* 8.4.5). This topos can provide no evidence for a shift in Domitian's reign to an absolutism.

[11] Nor can Scott marshal any evidence from inscriptions, coins, or medallions from the Domitianic era. Cf. Peter Viscusi, *Studies on Domitian* (Ann Arbor 1973) 94. The meaning of *DNImperator* in *CIL* 2.4722 is uncertain. The *dominus et deus* formula does occur later in reference to Antoninus Pius in an inscription from Tauric Chersonesus (Crimea), no. 71 in *Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae Per Annos 1885–1900 Repertae*, Basilius Latyschev, ed. (Hildesheim 1965).

[12] Scott (note 4 above) 107, 109. Cf. Mart. 5.5, 8; 7.2, 5, 34; 8.2, 82; 9.28, 66.

pictorum sola basiate regum.
non est hic dominus sed imperator,
sed iustissimus omnium senator,
. . . hoc sub principe, si sapis, caveto
verbis, Roma, prioribus loquaris.[13]

Scott interprets this repudiation of earlier usage of *dominus et deus* as an indication that here "Martial . . . revealed his true sentiments" about Domitian's dominate.[14] Implicit in Scott's remarks is the assumption that Martial uses the dominate terminology in the latter years of Domitian's reign because of official pressure from the crown, a point difficult to maintain in the face of the evidence cited above from Statius and Quintilian.

There is at least one alternative explanation for Martial's use of *dominus* and *deus* which better accounts for the evidence in Statius and Quintilian, including *Silv.* 1.6.84. As Keith Hopkins has pointed out, "power is a two-way process; the motive force for the attachment between the king and the gods does not come from the ruler alone."[15] Martial, a poet who sought but never gained entrance into Domitian's inner court, approaches power from below. As a potential beneficiary, Martial probably uses extravagant titles to show his devotion to Domitian.[16]

Other potential beneficiaries approaching power from below also probably used titles such as *dominus* and *deus* and were eager to display their zeal for Domitian. *Epigram* 7.34 gives a clue to the political situation in c. 92 C.E. Martial poses the question:

Quo possit fieri modo, Severe,
ut vir pessimus omnium Charinus [a builder under Nero]
unam rem bene fecerit, requiris?
dicam, sed cito. quid Nerone peius?
quid thermis melius Neronianis?

[13]Mart. 10.72.

[14]Scott (note 4 above) 110.

[15]Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge 1978) 198.

[16]For Martial's relation to Domitian, cf. Hanna Szelest, "Domitian und Martial," *Eos* 62 (1974) 106-7. Szelest points out that Martial also twits issues supposedly sensitive to Domitian, e.g., the Lex Julia (cf. Mart. 6.7; 2.60; 6.2, 22, 45, 91) and baldness (Mart. 5.49, 6.57, 12.45, 10.83; cf. Suet. *Dom.* 18.2). Martial also refers favorably to people like Paetus Thrasea (cf. Mart. 1.8, 4.54, 1.13). Those elements in Martial's writings witness to the freedom in Domitian's reign to laud the opposition and to evaluate critically Domitian and his social program.

The point of the epigram centers upon ironic connections between *malus* and *bonus*, evoked by reflections on Nero's warm baths. It has nothing to do with Domitian, but Martial goes on to say:

> non dest protinus, ecce, de malignis
> qui sic rancidulo loquatur ore:
> "Quid tu tot domini deique nostri
> praefers muneribus?" Neronianas
> thermas praefero balneis cinaedi.

Martial concerns himself not with Domitian but with the malicious crowd who are also the ones calling Domitian *dominus deusque*. The danger lies not with imperial policy but with popular opportunism among those seeking benefits from Domitian. From a climate of quick accusations made by people approaching power from below, we cannot assume imperial repression and tyrannical madness.[17]

Martial's repudiation of Domitian in the early reign of Trajan (10.72 quoted above) probably reflects the poet's continued opportunism, for in the rhetoric and propaganda of that period praise of Trajan involved condemnation of Domitian. As Pliny writes in the *Panegyricus*:

> Alioqui nihil non parum grate sine comparatione laudatur. Praeterea hoc primum erga optimum imperatorem piorum civium officium est, insequi dissimiles; neque enim satis amarit bonos principes, qui malos satis non oderit.... Quo constantius, patres conscripti, et dolores nostros et gaudia proferamus; laetemur his quibus fruimur, ingemiscamus illis quae patiebamur; simul utrumque faciendum est sub bono principe (*Pan.* 53).

Domitian and Trajan are related so as to form a binary set in which each member shapes reciprocally the other. Domitian has to be the opposite of Trajan. Domitian's evil tyranny displays the life of liberty under Trajan, just as Trajan's humanness requires Domitian's exaggerated divinity. Similarly Trajan's *principatus* requires of Domitian a *dominatio*, for Domitian is Trajan's foil. As a result those post-Domitian writers of Trajan's time cannot develop Domitian into a com-

[17]In Mart. 11.33 Martial belies from another angle the notion of Domitian's repressive tyranny when he notes that Domitian's colors won the chariot races after as well as before his death. To rival charioteers Martial comments: "vicit nimirum non Nero [= Domitian], sed prasinus." Several scholars have contributed to a revised view of Domitian's reign; for extensive bibliography, see Jones (note 4 above) 1-6 and McDermott and Orentzel, *Roman Portraits* (Columbia, MO 1979) 160-61.

plex figure composed of a variety of attitudes and motivations. He is presented as a flat character: a tyrant and megalomaniac.

The rhetoric of contrast also shapes the presentation of biographical elements from Domitian's time. Previous, close relations between Domitian and Trajan are transformed by binary oppositions. Trajan is a trusted military leader under Domitian, but Pliny presents their relationship as one of enmity and distrust.[18] In order to present his own career as "checked" under Domitian and "advanced" under Trajan, Pliny has to leave out the fact that Domitian had appointed him to the important post of *praefectus aerari militaris* in 93 C.E.[19] Tacitus managed a successful career under Domitian: praetor and member of the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis* in 88 and consul designate in 96, most likely selected by Domitian.[20] Yet retrospectively from Trajan's reign he characterizes his earlier career as a time of submissive silence, "adempto per inquisitiones etiam loquendi audiendique commercio. memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci quam tacere."[21] The rhetoric of Trajan's time is reflected in all those examples: to enhance through contrast, to break with the Domitianic past in order to gain favor in the Trajanic present, to interpose a change of eras between Domitian and Trajan.[22] Martial's retrospective condemnation of Domitian in 10.72 reflects the same rhetorical topoi. Scott's explanation that Martial "revealed his true sentiments in the seventy-second epigram of the Tenth Book," with the implication that he had been holding back those sentiments throughout the reign of Domitian, does not reckon adequately with the shaping power of that rhetoric.[23] Present commitments—especially if they involve binary sets and fluid, pliable terms such as *libertas* and *princeps*—shape perceptions of the past in decisive ways.

Interpretations of Statius' comment about Domitian in *Kalendae Decembres* need not—indeed should not—be controlled by retrospec-

[18]Cf. *Pan.* 94.3, 14.5.

[19]Cf. Pliny *Epp.* 3.11 3-5, 4.24.4-5, 7.27.14, 5.14.5, 10.8.3; *Pan.* 90.5-6, 91.1. For Pliny's *cursus honorum*, cf. *ILS* 2927 and A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny* (Oxford 1966) 732-33, and p. 75. Ronald Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958), comments about Pliny's failure to mention this post as follows: "...the correspondence is mute, the author of the Panegyricus (cf. 95.3f.) far from honest" (2:657).

[20]Syme 1:70.

[21]*Agr.* 2. The contrast comes in *Agr.* 3. Cf. also *Agr.* 45 and *Hist.* 1.1. Pliny uses the same binary device of loss and gain of voice in *Ep.* 8.14.3.

[22]Even Dio Chrysostom recasts his past to fit better the Trajanic times, cf. C. P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge 1978) 50-51.

[23]Scott (note 4 above) 118.

tive assessments of Domitian's reign from the time of Trajan. It is important to remember that there was no radical shift in imperial management under Domitian's near successor, Trajan: administrative personnel remained much the same;[24] imperial policy continued along the same lines;[25] and the imperial cult developed uninterruptedly.[26] Only subtle differences ever distinguished emperors and dynasties in their shifting mix of liberty and stability, of republican forms and imperial control. When newness is announced—as was the case under Trajan—one can never be sure who, if anyone, has switched sides.[27] The sharp break which writers in the early second century C.E. make between Domitian and Trajan belongs to the history of rhetoric and propaganda rather than social, political history.[28] There is no evidence contemporary with Domitian to support the post-Domitian claims that he required titles appropriate to a tyrant or that he shifted from principate to dominate.[29] In fact the titles used by Statius and Quintilian are strikingly similar to those in Pliny's *Panegyric*. Therefore, Statius' comment on Domitian's reticence to being called *dominus* is probably an accurate reflection of Domitian's view throughout his reign.

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[24]"Trajan's most powerful allies" were sought "among the consuls of the last decade of Domitian's reign" (Syme 1:50-51). See also Brian Jones' prosopographical study in *Domitian* (note 4 above).

[25]Kenneth Waters, "Traianus Domitiani Continuator," *AJP* 90 (1969) 385-405.

[26]See Kenneth Scott, "The Elder and Younger Pliny on Emperor Worship," *TAPA* 63 (1932) 164. Pliny *Pan.* 89; *Ep.* 10.96.5, 10.8-9, 8.4.5, 10.83; Dio *Or.* 45.4.

[27]For an example of claims to newness under Trajan, cf. *Digesta Iustiniana* 48.22.1. On switching sides, recall the famous dinner party of Nerva (Pliny *Ep.* 4.22).

[28]The effectiveness of their propaganda in shaping the history of both Domitian's and Trajan's reigns can be seen in ancient works such as (the Epitome of) Dio Cassius, Books 67-68, and Eusebius' *Hist. Eccl.* 3.17-20; 3.21,33; 4.2, and in modern texts such as Garzetti's *From Tiberius to the Antonines* (London 1976) 265-373.

[29]Waters observes that both terms, along with the related words, *princeps* and *dominus*, were in use as early as the reign of Tiberius and as late as Constantine. There was no "sudden retroversion from the Dominate of Domitian to the Principate of Trajan" (note 25 above, p. 399. Waters is quoting from Beranger). See, for example, Suet. *Galba* 9.2: Jupiter's priest at Clunia predicts: "Quorum carminum sententia erat oriturum quandoque ex Hispania principem dominumque rerum."

AMELIUS-AMERIUS: PORPHYRY *VITA PLOTINI* 7 AND EUNAPIUS *VITAE SOPH.* 4.2

In chapter 7 of his life of Plotinus, Porphyry gives an annotated list of Plotinus' most important students. He deals first with Amelius:

> Ἔσχε δὲ [sc. ὁ Πλωτῖνος] ἀκροατὰς μὲν πλείους, ζηλωτὰς δὲ καὶ διὰ φιλοσοφίαν συνόντας Ἀμέλιόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς Τουσκίας, οὗ τὸ ὄνομα ἦν Γεντιλιανὸς τὸ κύριον, αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ τοῦ ρ̄ Ἀμέριον *αὐτὸν* καλεῖν ἠξίου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμερείας ἢ τῆς ἀμελείας πρέπειν *αὐτῷ* καλεῖσθαι λέγων.[1]

Before the publication of Henry's and Schwyzer's critical edition, students of Porphyry's *Vita Plotini* had been divided concerning who called Amelius Amerius: was it Plotinus or Amelius himself? Thus, for example, Creuzer, Kirchhoff, Bouillet, Müller, Cilento, and others thought that it was Amelius. In so doing, they were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the MSS had been (mis)reported as reading αὐτὸν ... αὐτῷ. On the other hand, Brehier and Harder,[2] among others, reading αὐτὸν ... αὐτῷ, considered that it was Plotinus who proposed to call his student Amerius. At the time, however, the reading αὐτὸν ... αὐτῷ was considered to be an emendation of Cobet. Now Henry's and Schwyzer's critical apparatus leaves no doubt about the fact that αὐτὸν ... αὐτῷ is the reading of all the primary MSS, with the exception of the corrector of A who "emended" αὐτὸν to αὐτόν. And so at present the reading of the majority of the MSS is generally followed and hence the proposed change of name is ascribed to Plotinus.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that in a matter of breathings the MSS have no authority; Porphyry almost certainly wrote AYTON ... AYTΩ, which words are then open to interpretation. And the reading αὐτὸν ... αὐτῷ is in all probability much older than any of the extant MSS, as is to be inferred from the following statement of Eunapius:

> Συμφοιτηταὶ μὲν οὖν, ὡς αὐτὸς [sc. ὁ Πορφύριος] ἀναγράφει, κράτιστοί τινες ὑπῆρχον, Ὠριγένης τε καὶ Ἀμέριος καὶ Ἀκυλῖνος, κτλ.[3]

[1] Porphyry *Vit. Plot.* 7.1-5 (Henry-Schwyzer). My references are to the *editio maior* of *Plotini Opera*, I (Paris-Bruxelles 1951).

[2] In the first edition of his translation, cf. *Plotins Schriften*. Übersetzt von Richard Harder. Band V (Leipzig 1937) 175.

[3] Eunapius *Vit. Soph.* 4.2 (p. 9.4-5 [Giangrande]).

Since there is no variant in the text of Eunapius, and since his statement is based, as he himself says, on Porphyry, we must infer that Eunapius in all probability wrote Ἀμέριος and that he did so because he interpreted Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 7.4-5 as αὐτὸν . . . αὐτῷ. For if it was Amelius himself who thought that he ought to be called Amerius rather than Amelius, it is intelligible that Eunapius considered that he too must do so.[4]

However that may be, if one believes, as I for one do, that Porphyry really meant to say that it was Plotinus who proposed to call Amelius Amerius, then better arguments must be found than mere reliance on the authority of the MSS. The only scholar who has argued the case is Harder, in the second edition of his translation. In his note on the passage of Porphyry he says:

> Ich gehe vom sprachlichen Befund aus, durchgehend ist hier Plotin grammatisches Subjekt. Sachlich wäre beides möglich. Doch ist das grammatisch Näherliegende zugleich das Feinere. Der Hellenist Plotin macht sich den lateinischen Namen seines alten Schülers scherzend mundgerecht. Ein hübsches Schulgeschichtchen, Vertrautheit und Fremdheit zugleich zwischen dem so verschiedenen Paar.[5]

I should like to challenge this interpretation on several grounds and at the same time advance more persuasive reasons for thinking that it was Plotinus who proposed to call Amelius Amerius. The grammatical argument Harder adduces is not at all decisive, since the sentence αὐτὸς . . . λέγων is *in thought* subordinated to ἔσχε . . . τὸ κύριον. This is the more so in that the relative clause οὗ τὸ ὄνομα ἦν Γεντιλιανὸς τὸ κύριον immediately precedes αὐτὸς . . . λέγων. And so αὐτός could refer either to Plotinus or to Amelius. In fact, Harder failed to understand the import of the relative clause and also made a not unrelated mistake, that of thinking that "Amelius" is a Latin name. It is, however, a Greek name, which (as well as other Greek names) was employed in the Western part of the Empire as a *signum*, one of the two

[4]Eunapius is probably relying on his memory here, since Porphyry does not say that Aquilinus was his fellow student but implies that he was a Christian Gnostic (*Vit. Plot.* 16). And faulty memory also suffices to explain similar anomalies in Eunapius' reports of Porphyry (cf. Giangrande's note on p. 7.9 of his edition). Nevertheless, the fact that he wrote Ἀμέριος shows he must have interpreted Porphyry as meaning that Amelius himself considered he ought to be called Amerius.

[5]Cf. *Plotins Schriften*. Übersetzt von Richard Harder. *Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen*. Band V^c: Anhang. *Porphyrios, Über Plotins Leben und über die Ordnung seiner Schriften* (Hamburg 1958) 92.

main kinds of *supernomina*.[6] A *supernomen* is a personal name separated from, and added to, the other names of a person by the word "*signum*" or "*signo*," and there is epigraphical evidence that "Amelius" was used as a *signum*.[7] Moreover, in some cases *signa* were used as mere nicknames without the word "*signum*."[8] Now, though we do not know why Amelius was given that name, even what has just been said would suffice to infer that "Amelius" (who was a native of Tuscany in Etruria[9]) was not his proper name, and Porphyry makes that doubly clear by telling us in the relative clause that Amelius' real name (τὸ ὄνομα . . . τὸ κύριον), that is, his family given name, was Gentilianus, which is a Latin name.[10]

Consequently, it ought to be clear that the proposal to change "Amelius" to "Amerius" makes better sense if we suppose, as we must, that "Amelius" was merely a nickname given to Gentilianus. And the context suggests that this proposal was (in all probability) made by Plotinus rather than by Amelius himself. For if Amelius had really wished to be called Amerius, there was nothing to prevent his being called by that name. And yet it is noteworthy that Porphyry always calls him Amelius, and so do all our other sources with the exception of Eunapius, who depends on the passage of Porphyry under discussion.

The proposed change of name was made, as Harder himself says, facetiously. Nevertheless, it was based on the connection of Amerius with ἀμέρεια (= "indivisibility," "without parts"), and so implies praise in that it connects the proposed new name, Amerius, with the first Neoplatonic hypostasis, the One. The context and Porphyry's whole attitude toward Amelius would make it incongruous for him here to ascribe the proposed change of name to Amelius himself, since it would imply self-praise. But there is no incongruity if that change had been proposed by Plotinus as a facetious way of praising his student. Moreover, nick-

[6]Cf. I. Kajanto, *Supernomina. A Study in Latin Epigraphy* (Helsinki-Helsingfors 1966. *Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, Societas Scientiarum Fennica*, vol. 40, Nr. 1). I am grateful to Alan Cameron for calling this study to my attention.

[7]Cf. Kajanto, op. cit., pp. 5-6 and 76.

[8]Cf. Kajanto, op. cit., pp. 6, 42 ff., 57 ff.

[9]The *Suda*'s calling Amelius Ἀπαμεύς (*s.v.* Ἀμέλιος) is probably mere inference from Porphyry's statement (*Vit. Plot.* 2.31-33) that at the time of Plotinus' death Amelius was at Apamea in Syria.

[10]It is noteworthy that when Longinus refers to Amelius he calls him either Amelius or Gentilianus Amelius, which is another indication that Amelius was a nickname or an added name (cf. Longinus *ap.* Porph. *Vit. Plot.* 20).

names are usually given (and changed) by others,[11] not by the person involved. Furthermore, in a context where Porphyry is enumerating Plotinus' students, it is appropriate for him to tell an anecdote about Plotinus' relation to Amelius, whereas it would have been rather inappropriate to tell at that point a story in which neither Plotinus nor anybody else (except Amelius himself) plays any role at all.

In short, it was probably Plotinus who proposed to call Amelius Amerius. The grammatical ambiguity, common in Greek sentences of this type, is more than counterbalanced by the context in which the passage occurs and by the content of the passage itself.

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[11]Thus in the lines immediately following those under discussion, Porphyry says that Amelius used to call Paulinus of Scythopolis "Mikkalos."

REVIEWS

DOUGLAS E. GERBER. Pindar's *Olympian One*: A Commentary. Toronto, Buffalo, London, University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xx + 202. $47.50.

In 1962 Elroy L. Bundy presented a reading of two Pindaric odes that claimed to invalidate much if not all previous interpretation. Reacting against the tradition that Pindar expressed his personal feeling and opinions, Bundy declared that the odes were in fact what they pretended to be: encomiastic poems written to glorify the man who had commissioned them. David C. Young in 1964 and again in 1970 welcomed Bundy's work as a fruitful development but expressed a number of important reservations. He found Bundy's insistence on the encomiastic nature of the ode too narrow. Pindar's poetry, according to Young, has more to do than praise the victor. The single intention whose fulfilment from line to line constituted the unity of an ode for Bundy left out, for Young, too many other factors that also went into the making of this complex and coherent poetry.

Over the past twenty years, particularly in America, Pindaric criticism has oscillated between these two poles. While the unity of the Pindaric ode seems to be agreed upon, its precise nature remains in dispute. Some are content with a strictly rhetorical coherence; others go beyond to note uses of imagery and recurrent patterns of word and thought which suggest that Pindar worked, consciously or unconsciously, in a symbolic vein. Developments such as these moved W. J. Verdenius to declare in 1972 that the "right approach" to Pindar had not been "definitely established." Alarmed by what he felt to be the dogmatic tenor of recent scholarship, Verdenius determined to curb its excesses by showing how poorly it could withstand scrutiny in a commentary on an individual ode (*Pindar's Seventh Olympian Ode. A Commentary* [Amsterdam and London 1972]). A similar if less sharply focused polemic inspires Douglas E. Gerber's exhaustive treatment of *Olympian 1*. Disturbed, as Verdenius had been, by the plethora of easy solutions to the problems of reading Pindar, Gerber set out to sift good from bad in the most effective way: through detailed commentary on a single ode (vii).

Two questions come to mind: does Gerber have a particular approach to Pindar, and how well does he elucidate the ode? The first question is of special interest to the Pindaric scholar anxious to know where this new commentary fits in the ongoing debate over critical methods. The answer, however, is not simple. Combining the resources of bibliographer and critic, Gerber has combed the secondary literature with amazing thoroughness and, more amazing still, he has kept his critical faculties intact throughout the process. The result is a kind of variorum commentary in which virtually every idea that has ever been presented with some degree of plausibility is recorded and evaluated. The sheer exhaustiveness would tend to obscure the author's own critical premises if he had not provided a five-page introduction in which he discusses the structure and meaning of the myth of the ode. This, combined with constant cross-reference within the commentary itself, goes a long way toward making the book read like an essay in interpretation. It also places the book, for all its adherence

to traditional philology in the elucidation of details, squarely within the new movement in Pindaric criticism.

Gerber sees the myth, and the ode in its entirety, as a glorification of Hieron. No one need accuse him, on that account, of reducing the ode to a merely rhetorical encomium. If anything meets with reserve it is likely to be his habit of interpreting the ode through inferences drawn from word-echoes and repeated imagery. The method, somewhat reminiscent of Mezger and Bury, comes to the fore at crucial moments. On page xi we read that Pindar has put Poseidon's love of Pelops "at the very beginning because . . . the analogy will be drawn later between the divine favour received by Pelops and by Hieron." The implication is that Pindar himself draws the analogy described. In fact, we have to draw it ourselves, and we are invited to do so from suggestions evoked less by the overt meaning of Pindar's words than by their position or resonance in the ode (xiv, 117, 121, 128, 129, 142, 151-52). Similarly, on page xii Gerber writes that "the emphasis placed on the orderly nature of the banquet at which Poseidon fell in love with Pelops provides us with the first of a series of comparisons and contrasts with other banquets, a theme which by its presence both outside and inside the myth contributes to the unity of the ode as a whole." If we turn to the commentary for the evidence supporting this view we find that it derives mainly from symmetrical placing of phrases, repeated imagery, word-echoes, and the like (38-39, 98, 142-43, and, especially, 149). The "comparisons and contrasts with other banquets" are never made overtly by Pindar, always left to be inferred by us. Most of the subtleties noted by Gerber no doubt form part of the poetic texture of *Olympian 1*, and we are greatly indebted to him for pointing them out. What I miss is a reason for Pindar's peculiar procedure. We are dealing with the point of the myth, a point whose failure to register would assure major misunderstanding. Why, then, does Pindar impart it by such subtle, if not devious, methods? Until we have an explanation for his reticence, or at least an assessment of what he gains by it, the kind of close reading Gerber engages in will seem to lack a critical foundation.

The second question, how well he elucidates the ode, is easier to answer. The reader will find numerous previously stubborn problems solved by a combination of insight and erudition. Gerber proves once and for all that ἐπεί in v. 26 is temporal, not causal—no minor point, since the emphasis in Pindar's retelling of the Pelops myth is lost if we get it wrong. At v. 60 he identifies the proverb hidden in Pindar's phrase μετὰ τριῶν τέταρτον πόνον. This last example is typical of the way he can dispel a mystery that persisted even after the correct solution had been offered. Schroeder had seen the proverb but had failed to carry conviction. Gerber first demonstrates that the proverb itself tends to appear in manifold guises, so Pindar's recasting of it need not alarm; he then goes on to show how aptly it suits the context. The commentary is studded with notes like that on ἀώτῳ in v. 15, χάρις in v. 18, and ἱππίῳ νόμῳ in v. 101, all of which glean the results of research in many areas and present them in such a way as to throw new light on Pindar's text. There are countless formal observations—alliteration, assonance, chiasmus repeatedly brought to our attention—which have the effect of making the poem come alive as an aesthetic experience. But the most valuable thing about this commentary is the discriminating homage it pays to the criticism of the past. No reader can come away from it unimpressed

by the record of ingenuity and labor that it embodies. The debate over the proper approach to Pindar will continue. The outcome is unpredictable; what seems assured is that Gerber's commentary, with its critical review of what has been thought and its own bold ideas, is bound to play a part in that debate. Its thoroughness alone makes it an important contribution to the study of Pindar.

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RUTH SCODEL. The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides (Hypomnemata, 60). Pp. 152. Gottingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1980. Pp. 152. DM. 28.

The goal of this monograph is to revitalize the once popular theory that the Euripidean tetralogy of 415 B.C. was connected. The title is, by the author's own admission, a misnomer, since the work discusses not only the tragedies of that year, the lost *Alexander* and *Palamedes* and the extant *Troades*, but also the lost satyr play *Sisyphus*, which was not originally to be included in the study. The author justifies the use of "trilogy" instead of "tetralogy" in her title because "it has the merit of recalling one of Gilbert Murray's essays on these plays" (p. 7) and her debt to Murray is great. Murray's essay, most accesible in *Greek Studies* (Oxford 1946), presented the view that Euripides' group of 415 was connected by *paracharaxis*, the "restamping" of conventions, a view which held nearly universal acceptance until Koniaris' study (*HSCP* 77 [1973]) argued for more caution about seeing connections where none may have existed. Scodel dismisses Koniaris' important work out-of-hand as "poorly argued and simplistic in its assumptions" (p. 15), but then proceeds to make some simplistic assumptions of her own. While Scodel does make the ghost of Murray's theory walk again, it is uncertain whether she has brought it back to life.

The issue of trilogic unity in Greek tragedy is, of course, an old one. Influenced by the striking unity of the only extant tragic trilogy, the *Oresteia*, scholars have often been tempted to seek further unity in other known groups. Webster's *Tragedies of Euripides* (London 1967) perhaps has carried this tendency the furthest in an attempt to arrange the plays of Euripides according to hypothetically unified groupings. Yet it appears that fifth century playwrights generally produced unconnected tragedies and that the production of a unified group was an innovation, perhaps by Aeschylus, which was rarely, if ever, imitated. In fact, the only *known* connected groups are by Aeschylus, and too little evidence survives about the few other candidates for trilogic unity (on which, see Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals*^{2} [Oxford 1968] 80–81) to speak with any certainty about their unity. Much of the problem, as Scodel rightly notes in her introduction, hinges on terminology, especially on the absence of the terms τριλογία and τετραλογία in the fifth century, as well as on the uncertainty as to whether attested collective titles, such as Ὀρεστεία and Λυκουργεία, *always* indicate trilogic unity. Scodel's own use of the terms "trilogy" and "tetralogy" is inconsistent. She admits to employing "trilogy" at times "even where a group may have formed part of a tetralogy" (p. 12, n. 2). While she

always implies some sort of unity in her use of the terms, in her introduction, at least, Scodel sporadically uses the terms "connected trilogy/tetralogy/group." Such inconsistent terminology could have been avoided by a more cautious semantic usage of the terms for fifth century drama. Indeed, if "trilogy" and "tetralogy" are to be applied at all to fifth century tragedy, it appears to this writer that they should be used to indicate number only, not unity, and should mean simply "the three [or four] plays in a dramatic group by one author and performed at the same dramatic festival." Only the terms "connected trilogy/tetralogy/group" should be used for groups, like the *Oresteia*, where some sort of unity is evident or hypothesized.

Even then the terms "connected trilogy/tetralogy/group" are problematic. The question "How are these plays connected?" is extremely subjective when the only solid evidence and criteria are the unities of plot, chronology, and theme which exist in the *Oresteia*. Critics such as Murray and Webster, who have sought connections within other known groups, have generally had to resort to a looser, more subjective interpretation of unity than fits the *Oresteia*. Because enough is known of the Trojan tetralogy of 415 to show that the plays were *not* unified in the strict unity of plot and chronology found in the *Oresteia*, Scodel, too, has had to resort to a loose interpretation of "connected tetralogy" and has argued that the unity of the Euripidean group is based not on a "close-knit and comprehensible structure" but rather on "a pattern of allusion and avoidance" (p. 79). How loose must this pattern become before it ceases to create trilogic unity? This is a question which Scodel does not—indeed cannot—answer.

Scodel's study is divided into six chapters, three of which are devoted to reconstructing the three lost plays of the tetralogy; the other three chapters deal with an exposition of the themes which are said to unify the four plays. It is the latter, thematic discussion which is perhaps the more valuable portion of the book. Scodel here considers several recurring elements in the dramatic group, including the use of trial scenes (pp. 80–100) and references to Odysseus (pp. 72–73), the torch (pp. 76–79) and the Judgement of Paris (pp. 100–104). These are all critical points which remain legitimate whether or not Scodel's connected tetralogy based on "a pattern of allusions" exists, and the obvious interaction which Scodel notes among the plays of this group marks a significant stage in Euripidean dramaturgy.

It is perhaps significant, however, that, while more than a third of this study is devoted to hypothetical reconstructions of lost plays, there is no chapter specifically on an analysis and interpretation of the extant *Troades*. Scodel rather discusses passages from this play out of the dramatic context of the play itself and only from the perspective of thematic connections with the *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, and *Sisyphus*, for which there is only fragmentary evidence. One blatant example of this is the τὸ κλεινὸν Ἴλιον motif. Scodel (pp. 141–42) has rightly noted the verbal repetition of this phrase in the first line of *Alexander* and at *Tr.* 25 and 1278 and has discussed the motif in the context of Hecuba's famous speech at *Tr.* 1242–45, where the queen states that fallen Troy will at least achieve immortality through song. Yet Scodel's trilogic myopia apparently inhibits placing the queen's consoling statement into dramatic perspective, for Hecuba's optimism is swiftly and dramatically contradicted by the cho-

rus who call themselves ἀνώνυμοι (*Tr.* 1319) as they watch the city burn and *Troades* clearly ends on this note of despair. All too often this powerful play has been approached only inductively, from the assumption of a connected group toward an interpretation of the individual play. Rather, *Troades* must be interpreted first as a coherent drama and only then in the context of its group. This is the main flaw of Scodel's work.

Overemphasis on the other plays in the tetralogy leads inevitably to a distorted view of *Troades*. From the *Alexander* is derived a theme of Trojan guilt and from the *Palamedes* a theme of Greek guilt which simply do not function significantly in the last tragedy of the group. Yet, again and again, the advocate of a connected group must sacrifice the intense pathos of *Troades* in favor of neat allusions to the other plays. For example, Scodel sees Cassandra in *Troades* as simply a mirror image of the Cassandra of the *Alexander*: "In *Alexander* she prophesizes disaster from what was in a moment about to be seen as great joy; in *Troades* she prophesizes victory from what appears to be absolute defeat" (p. 69). This is Murray's *paracharaxis* all over again. Yet, in the context of *Troades* itself, the dramatic emphasis is not on the veracity of Cassandra's prophecies but rather on their incredibility. Cassandra's predictions of future vengeance and glory bring the Trojan women no consolation or hope, but only further sorrow (see *Tr.* 462 ff.). While characters in this play do repeatedly debate whether there is any hope for Troy, a threnodic tone prevails throughout *Troades*, which climaxes in the intense lament over the dead Astyanax and the burning city. Yet, for Scodel, this extremely emotional play becomes, as part of a connected group, merely "a series of arguments and counterarguments" (p. 121). Scodel has thus reduced to a mere rhetorical debate a drama which, apart from its tetralogy, is rather a lament for Troy and a dramatic depiction of the horrors of defeat.

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BERNARD FRISCHER. The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1982. Pp. 340 + 34 halftones. $30.00.

This is not a book for the reader easily distracted. Nor is it a book for the reader faint in imaginative powers. It springs from a single experience—the author's confrontation with the bust of Epicurus in the Stanza dei Filosofi in the Capitoline Museum in Rome (Figure 1)—and it offers an explanation of the fascination exerted by that portrait and a hypothetical reconstruction of its role in the recruitment of converts to Epicureanism. But as Bernard Frischer acknowledges, this explanation and reconstruction follow a tortuous path (xiv). On his way, the reader will follow several detours: a long discourse on fetishism (92–118); a fascinating history of the Ludovisi throne (131–48); a dissertation on Samos as the hypothetical home for the original of this throne (182–92); a digression on the source of Lucretius' 5.22–54 in Metrodorus' treatise *On Wealth* (223–31); another on an imagined dialogue between the incubating

Epicurus and the god Asclepius (236–40); and finally speculation on the setting and purpose of the Elgin throne, now in Malibu (250–61).

Many of these digressions show the influence of that great speculative thinker, Per Ignotius. And there are obstacles which will turn some readers back from following this tortuous path: among them the assumption that Epicurus and his followers exemplify "the extraverted thinking-sensation-intuition [Jungian] type, with feeling the inferior function" (p. 7, n. 10); the presentation of Thales as propounding "the new ideology of the tyrant's [here, Thrasyboulos'] new dominant class" (18); of Thales and Democritus as "high cultural fetishists" (and one could add Gabriel Naudé, who sensed the inner spirit animating the Ludovisi Epicurus, p. 111 and p. 139, n. 30); and of Epicurus himself as a "qualified" fetishist (119). In the analysis of fetishism we encounter the terms *emic* and *etic* and wonder if there is a name for a synthesis of these two ill sounding approaches to the phenomenon (103).

But this book has a central, sustained argument, and it is essential to keep it in sight. The Epicureans who were responsible for the seated portrait of Epicurus, which is now represented by the Ludovisi throne, devised a method of recruitment never attempted before or after in the history of philosophy. Because of what the author argues was an "administrative policy of passivity," the Epicureans responsible for recruitment into their small, alternate community drew inward and attempted to attract adherents by designing an image of Epicurus capable of attracting a convert to the spiritual message of their philosophy. This argument is based on the reconstruction of a policy for which we have no direct confirmation, and it entails the subsidiary argument that just as the Epicurean sage was powerfully attracted by the image of divinity, so the "uninitiate" could be attracted by the godlike image of Epicurus; it also entails an assumption that these images were placed in some public place, first in Athens and then elsewhere.

Frischer gives a helpful summary of the paths which he takes to this conclusion in the *Preface* to his book (xiv–xviii), and he has since given a brief and somewhat different account of his project in a study he entitles "A Socio-Psychological and Semiotic Analysis of Epicurus' Portrait" (*Arethusa* 16 [1983] 247–65). Here I can only review the book within *The Sculpted Word.* In Chapter 1, Frischer attempts to set the Epicurean community in Athens within the three century history of philosophy and society in Greece; Chapter 2 is devoted to a hypothetical reconstruction of the Epicurean "policy" of recruitment and conversion. It is only once the reader has been convinced that the Epicureans were committed to a program of "passive" recruitment of members from the dominant culture of Athens that the next three chapters make sense. Frischer's reconstruction of the original of the Ludovisi Epicurus (Figures 5, 6, and 7; Statue 1 in G. M. A. Richter, *The Portraits of the Greeks* 2 [1965] 198 and Figures 1212–13) and his typological studies of the complex associations he discerns in the head of Epicurus in the Capitoline Museum (Figure 1 in Frischer, 1153 in Richter) and the body and throne on the grounds of the American embassy in Rome are designed as confirmations of the central argument of the book. They are interesting for other reasons as well.

But to the argument of the book. It springs from its central hypothesis, and the architecture of this hypothesis needs testing. The reader will find scat-

tered throughout the book references to the Epicureans and their "rules limiting contact with the outside world" (xiv); their "basic existential method of withdrawal from the world" (5); their "practical secession into a nearly autonomous alternative community" (35); their "flight from mankind" (47; cf. 70); and, indeed, even of their "administrative policy of passivity" (71-72; cf. 77). Professor Frischer even goes so far as to claim that the Epicureans were "forbidden" to spread their message of salvation "by more obvious and active measures" (197)—more obvious and active than the creation of the seated statue of Epicurus (and presumably other Epicureans) on which their hopes of reaching converts in the outside world rested exclusively.

On this hypothesis a very heavy weight settles on the Epicurean policy of the "sculpted word." But how much weight will this hypothesis bear itself? There are in fact no texts which explicitly attest this "unwritten administrative policy" (67). To produce texts, as Frischer does (49 and 250 of the *Arethusa* article) to show Epicurus' sense of danger in the world outside his small, secure community of "fellow philosophers" is not to establish a policy of passive recruitment. Two texts prepare for Frischer's hypothetical reconstruction of this policy in Chapter 2: one is the evidence of Epicurus' will (preserved in DL 10.16-21) for the legal status of the Epicurean school; the other an epigram of Hieronymous of Rhodes describing Timon of Phlius (DL 9.117 = fr. 7 Wehrli). To ask why Epicurus avoided "incorporating" his school as a θίασος (42-44) is both to revive the hypothesis Wilamowitz advanced on the legal position of the Athenian schools of philosophy in his *Antigonos von Karystos* (*Philologische Untersuchungen* 4 [Berlin 1881] 263-91, for which the criticisms of J. P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution* [Berkeley 1972] 112-34, are fatal) and to ask a question that has no answer and therefore requires no theoretical justification. This was clear to Ruschenbusch in his publication of the testimonia for Solon's law permitting free association of groups within the state of Athens, and he was right to insist on *Vereinsautonomie* within Athens (Σόλωνος Νόμοι, *Hermes Einzelschriften* [1966] 98F 76a; confirmed by Peter Hermann in his article on Greek associations, *RAC* 73/73 [Stuttgart 1976] 98-99). As a result of one of the theoretical answers Frischer provides as an explanation for something that requires no explanation, he can declare impressively that "Epicurus' philosophical school was the first purely secular institution of higher education in history" (45). It was not. One can agree with Frischer that Epicurus could not embrace the superstition of most θίασοι, but still see in his last will and testament evidence for a hero cult to himself and the members of his community who had died before him within his own lifetime (see my presentation of the evidence in ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: *Studi sull' epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante* [Naples 1983] 270-79). As for the epigram Hieronymos applied to the technique by which Timon "hunted" students by fleeing from them, Frischer does have an interesting reflection of attitudes toward recruitment in roughly the age of Epicurus; and he has the term in Greek for "recruitment" (θηρῶσι; cf. Plato *Sophist* 231D) and a suggestive term for the policy of the Pythagoreans and the attraction of becoming one of those "within the curtain." But the thread by which Frischer connects Timon to Epicurus by attachments to Pyrrho and Nausiphanes snaps on being pressed (48 and the evidence of DL 9.93-94).

It could be that Epicurus shared Pyrrho's distaste for the public displays of the sophists. NF 24 of Diogenes of Oenoanda (in the new text of M. F. Smith, *AJP* 99 [1979] 329-32) gives a vivid expression to the contrast between the public world of oratorical display and the harmonious inner world of Epicurus and his group, and there are many reflections of this attitude (e.g., DL 10.120a; *Pap. Herc.* 1234 col. VIII 12-15 Vogliano, and fr. 187 Us.). Yet to go beyond this and to claim that there was a policy of passive recruitment and that the Epicureans were "forbidden" to pursue recruits by active contacts in the outside world and the publication of their message of salvation is not only to outstrip the evidence; it is to ignore massive evidence dead to the contrary. Frischer produces two arguments to support his case: (1) we hear nothing about "public lectures, appearances, and proselytizing by Epicurus or his followers" in the sources that usually purvey such information; and (2) he invokes the "inacessibility of Epicurean books to the general reading public" (50). (In his *Arethusa* article, Frischer actually seems to take DL 10.120 as evidence that Epicurus ruled out "even the seemingly innocent practice of publishing books," [250]. Actually, the text says "the sage will leave writings behind him.") One thinks immediately of Lucretius and the monumental public inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, as does Frischer. But they are "exceptions proving the rule" that Epicurean books were inaccessible to the general public (p. 50, n. 97). As for the publication of Epicurus' books, it seems that he took the extraordinary measure of depositing them in the Metroon or State Archives of Athens (as I argue in "Epicurus in the Archives of Athens," *Hesperia Supplement* XIX [Princeton 1982] 17-26). That Epicurus meant his thought to be accessible to the world outside his garden is apparent from the opening paragraphs of his letters to Herodotus and Menoeceus. We know that Epicurus wrote a *Protreptikos*, but to save himself from the damaging appearance of a work with such a title Frischer considers this an internal document, unlike Aristotle's famous work of the same title and Plato's *Gorgias* (p. 68, n. 3).

Then there are texts, neglected by Frischer, which show how important what I would call Epicurus' "acts of the epistle" (the basis of Philodemus' Πραγματεῖαι) and even travels were to his evangelism. Plutarch in his treatise agains the Epicurean maxim Λάθε βίωσας turned known Epicurean praxis against theory and admonished: "Do not write letters to your friends in Asia, nor enlist recruits from Egypt, nor escort the youth of Lampsacus as if under armed guard, nor send off books to all and sundry, men and women alike, to make a display of your wisdom" (*Moralia* 3.1129). Here we have two more striking metaphors for active, and indeed, aggressive recruitment: ξενολογεῖν and δορυφορεῖν. Plutarch also knew of the anger of the mob which Epicurus seems to have stirred up early in his career (*Moralia* 1090E), perhaps, as Bignogne suggested (*l'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* [Florence 1928] II 117), in Mytilene. This bit of evidence could, of course, confirm a latter policy of withdrawal from the world, yet we have evidence that, once established in Athens, Epicurus traveled two or three times to Ionia to join his "friends" there and that as a result these "friends" came from all quarters to live with Epicurus in his garden (DL 10.10). It could be that Epicurus failed to make a single convert during these trips, but the fact remains that he made the trips, and to communities already established. This text does not support a the-

ory of recruitment by flight from the world. Nor does the exuberant Vatican saying which describes Friendship (*Philia*) in her dance around the inhabited world giving to all of us the message "awake to a state of blessedness" (*SV* 52, misunderstood by Frischer on 76 who translates "announces to those who are awake" and omits the introductory phrase).

As still other examples of Epicurus' policy of active recruiting in the outside world come to mind, one asks why Professor Frischer, who has pursued other evidence with such resourcefulness and determination, has failed to pursue this. The answer would seem to be that the weight of responsibility he places on "the sculpted" word of Epicurus would ease and that the striking use of images by the Epicureans would need to be placed in still another context than that of this book. But to keep the argument of this book in mind and to dismiss for a moment thought of another possible book on this problem of recruitment, the reader asks: Just how did this policy of passive recruitment through the sculpted word work? First we need a decision by a group of Epicureans (the plural is important, cf. 200, 233, 235, 243, 260 and contrast the singular "Epicurus" of the *Arethusa* article, 252) to have a seated figure of Epicurus founded by an unknown sculptor. According to their conception of the silent iconographical message of this statue, it must convey, often with polemical allusions, a complex image of the seated figure as a philosopher, father, culture hero in the type of the Farnese Hercules, savior in the image of the Asclepius of Melos, great-spirited man, and finally a god (Chapter 5). *Ex hypothesi*, this image was to be placed in some public place in Athens (182–98), and, indeed, there is evidence that some statues of Epicurus were. For the sake of argument, let us place it near the Pompeion just outside the Dipylon gate, facing the road flanked by grave reliefs (208). Inscribe the base of this statue with ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ and perhaps the text *Kyria Doxa* 2 (208 and 275–76). The right arm of this figure should be (and here Frischer is unquestionably right) outstretched, and his body should be "tense with animation and attentiveness in the presence of potential recruits" (222). Then let us have a potential recruit pass by, a "socially alienated, extraverted, thinking-sensation type" (273; cf. p. 7, n. 10). Then imagine the effect of this "six-personed" god on the beholder. The sixfold message of this statue and throne, "I am a philosopher, father, culture hero (recall the statues of Hercules you have seen at Sicyon and Tarentum), savior, *megalopsychos* of leonine personality, and god," is qualified by "polemical allusions" and is one of incredible complexity, even as received "subliminally" by the "liminal" convert (280–81 and 69). So we revert to the Jungian types: Wise Old Man and God. What then? Would our potential recruit turn to the "local branch of the Epicurean school" (Frischer's phrase, 279, forgetting we are still in Athens). We finally do not need to ask this question, for the argument only requires that he might have wanted to (279).

If so, one wonders how Epicureanism was able to establish itself first in Lampsacus and Ionia, then in Athens, and spread to Cyprus (cf. 180), Egypt, take control of all Italy (in Cicero's phrase, *Tusculans* 4.7), penetrate to Oenoanda in the high mountain planes of Lycia and Amastris on the Black Sea? The only real analogue Professor Frischer can provide for such conversion is Saul's vision of a flash of light outside Damascus (274). But at least Saul re-

ceived instructions from a divine voice, and once in Damascus he received both sight and further instruction from Ananias (Acts 9.3-19). We have no idea what the fate of Frischer's Epicurean convert might have been.

So stated, the governing hypothesis of this fascinating book seems implausible to say the least. In terms of its support in what little ancient testimony we have for the image of Epicurus there is a key passage in Diogenes Laertius, which the author exploits to show that the original of his sculpted word must have been placed in Athens and not Samos (as Richter suggested, 182-98). In Diogenes' general characterization of Epicurus' life, he speaks of Epicurus' goodwill, to all men, and to his native land, "which honored him with statues of bronze" (ἥ τε πατρὶς χαλκαῖς εἰκόσι τιμήσασα, 10.9). These are public images of Epicurus and they would have been placed in public places, like the image of Socrates (DL 2.43). But they are not the work of a committee of Epicureans at the highest level. This passage cannot be put to use in supporting Frischer's frail hypothesis, and there is now archaeological evidence, which Professor Frischer cites, to suggest that the Epicureans did in fact have a gallery of seated figures of the "leaders" of their community within their garden (cf. George Dontas, Εἰκονιστικὰ Β', *Ἀρχ. Δελτ.* 26 [1971] 16-33).

What then can be said about the enormous effort spent on this book? To Professor Frischer's question: "Are we making too much of the statue of Epicurus?" (273) there is only one answer: yes. He is also making too little use of the uncomfortable evidence that stands obdurately in the path of his hypothetical reconstruction of the policy of Epicurean recruitment by the sculpted word. He himself seems to waver when it comes to facing the consequences of his hypothesis. When it comes to the "polemical allusions" he discerns in the seated portrait of Epicurus, he admits that "fresh recruits" would have been unlikely to have seen them; "they were presumably designed for the psychagogical exercises for the more advanced students of his school" (p. 201, n. 3). What is one to imagine then? A field trip to the Pompeion for advanced study of the portrait? And in the final pages of his argument, the author surrenders for a moment to doubt. He asks if the Epicureans could have been so "foolhardy" as to place all their hopes for attracting new converts by placing statues of Epicurus in public places (272) and then admits that the statues were a "subsidiary, not a principal recruitment aid" (273). One cannot help wonder what a book on *Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece* would have been like. Its faint outlines are visible in this book, with its first chapter on Philosophy and Society in Greece—to my knowledge the first attempt at such a history; its fine remarks on "network recruiting" and the kind of person likely to be attracted to the alternate communities and culture of the Epicureans (46, 61-63), the simulated kinship of the society in Athens (64, and 203-8). There are many valuable observations on the importance for the Epicureans of the images of their "leaders," but as it is, what stands out, and out of context, is a single seated figure of Epicurus, whose expressive face is capable of bearing more weight than the hypothesis of this book.

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CHRISTIAN HABICHT. Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit (*Hypomnemata*, Heft 73). Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982. Pp. 215. DM 52.

W. S. Ferguson's *Hellenistic Athens* has long been the standard account for Athens after Alexander. New discoveries in the Athenian agora and elsewhere have diminished the usefulness of Ferguson's work and made desirable, necessary even, a new survey of the topic. The work under review is the second offering in the prolegomena to such a new history of Hellenistic Athens by Christian Habicht (i.e , the first was his *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3 Jahrhundert v. Chr.* [1979]). It presents new interpretations of old problems and questions soundly based on prudent evaluation of the sources, especially the large corpus of epigraphic testimony.

The core of the work consists of three essays focusing on Athens from the Chremonidean War to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War (i.e., Chs. I, IV, V). Essays on specific topics, such as problems in Athenian military organization after the Chremonidean War (Ch. II), the chronology of Athenian archons, and leading families of Athens in the later third and early second centuries B.C. (and an appendix on proposers of popular decrees) round out the discussion (i.e., Chs. VI, VII).

Defeat in the Chremonidean War brought Athens another period of Macedonian hegemony (261-229 B.C.) much like that after the Lamian War. Macedonian garrisons controlled Athens and Attica, and H is certainly right to note the infringement of Athenian freedom. Constitutional changes, such as the appointment of generals by the king and the *ecclesia* and the elimination of the hoplite *strategos*, restricted further Athenian independence (pp. 19-20). Amid this domination, however, H points to clear signs that Athens recovered some measure of independence. The *ecclesia* convened regularly and enacted routine legislation and, as Macedonian dominance waned, Athens managed to assert itself, as in its honoring of Aristomachus of Argos for his aid in buying off Alexander of Corinth ca. 250/49 B.C. (pp. 21-25).

One of the more vexing problems in this period concerns the matter of Athenian coinage. Many, including Ferguson and more recently J. H. Kroll, have argued that Antigonus Gonatas deprived Athens of the right to coin. H argues, prudently it seems, that Antigonus could have intervened here, but that the evidence for such action is unclear. An unanswered question that H raises is what Antigonus could have gained from such a measure. Perhaps in his forthcoming survey of Athens, H will answer this question and comment as well on the hard times the Athenians faced during the Macedonian occupation. The distressed economic condition of Attica seems to be reflected in the *epidosis* of 244/3 B.C. in which the Athenians could raise only four to six talents for the defense of Attica, and the necessity of outside contributions to meet the demands of the Macedonian Diogenes to gain the city's freedom in 229 B.C. These measures suggest that Athens' economic base was so weak that coinage may not have been possible.

Perhaps no other Athenian figured so largely in Athens' liberation in 229 B.C. as Eurycleides of Cephisia. H notes Eurycleides' role in the new construction that followed, but more importantly the revival of the hoplite *strategos* by Eurycleides himself (p. 82). Eurycleides also established a new cult, that of

Demos and the Charites. There have been numerous discussions of this cult, but H's explanation that it was a political expression of gratitude for the city's salvation to the outside world is convincing (pp. 87-91).

Under the leadership of Eurycleides, Athens maintained a precarious independence by avoiding conflict with Macedon (and continuing to honor the Macedonian kings and retaining the Macedonian tribes) and seeking close ties with Ptolemy III. Such ties were established and numerous honors were granted Ptolemy, including a new tribe named in his honor and a new festival (pp. 107-12). These honors, H argues, followed Ptolemy's guarantee of Athenian independence against the growing power of Macedon in 225 B.C.

The policy of neutrality that Eurycleides adopted (much to Polybius' later disdain!) was doggedly continued through the Social War and to the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War (cf. Polyb. 5.106.6-8 and H, pp. 93-96). This H shows clearly in the epigraphic testimony, that is, the honors for the embassies of the general Demainetus (pp. 134-35) and in Athenian participation in the negotiations that sought to end the Social War. H argues that Athens' neutrality ended when the ambitions of Philip V finally overcame Athenian resources. An Athenian declaration of war against Philip and alignment with Attalus, Rhodes, and then Rome followed. Reaction to this momentous change in Athens is evident in the simultaneous elimination of the Macedonian tribes and the condemnation of Philip and his house on public monuments toward the end of 201 B.C. (pp. 147-50).

In the final two chapters H examines certain problems in the list of archons and several leading Athenian families in the later third and early second centuries B.C. Careful analysis characterizes the discussion here. For example, H shows that the two archons Dionysii ca. 202/1 B.C. and 194/3 B.C. are in fact one and the same man; Dionysius' archonate should be placed probably in 194/3 B.C. (pp. 165-68). Similarly, H studies five leading families of Hellenistic Athens (e.g., the family of Eurycleides and Micion of Cephisia), identifying the offices they held (e.g., the *strategia*) and their prominence in the later history of Athens. These chapters are rich in source materials and information useful to all researchers in this field of Greek history.


The present collection of essays discusses many important topics of Hellenistic Athens with acuity and insight. The anticipated survey of Athens that H plans thus promises to be a valuable contribution that will justly deserve to succeed Ferguson's *Hellenistic Athens*.

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J. N. ADAMS. The Latin Sexual Vocabulary. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 272.

The mores of the nineteenth century largely excluded the sexual from scholarship, but recent years have seen interest revive as inhibitions weaken. Into this forum J. N. Adams now brings *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary*.



The book breaks down Latin sexual vocabulary by subject: male genitalia, female genitalia, the anus, sexual acts, and excretion. For each group Adams distinguishes basic, metaphorical, and euphemistic terms, as Henderson did first in *The Maculate Muse*, which Adams slights (p. 1, n. 2; but cf. p. 6, n. 2, p. 86, n. 1). Adams does not translate obscenities, hence not only awkwardness ("he does not *fellat*," 126), but confusion, as with *vissire* (249), which is never defined. The book lacks a full bibliography and *index locorum*, but has six pages of addenda and corrigenda, though showing few typographical errors.

Adams states no principle of selection. Students of sexual language in the *Mulomedicina Chironis* will find the book a godsend, but this comes at the expense of completeness for satire and epigram. Focus on usage leads Adams to treat as evolution cases of direct influence ("Lucilius anticipated Horace," 83), and to bounce from the second century B.C. to the twelfth century A.D. as if 1400 years harbored no discontinuities.

It is useful to have sexual terms categorized, with examples from different periods, and there are a few complete discussions (the personified phallus, 29–30; *vena*, 35; *uterus/vulva/matrix*, 100–9; *stuprum*, 200–1; the left hand, 209; *mingo/meio*, 245–46). Those interested in Roman sexuality, provided they have a reading knowledge of Latin, will enjoy browsing through this book.

But scholars will find the book often unreliable and insufficient. Adams not only excludes major areas of sexual life but omits things well within his scope. Space permits only a partial list: no mention of *lascivio/lascivus* ("lust after"/"lusty"); for *prurio/prurigo/pruriosus*, two citations, when there are seven examples in Martial alone; no mention of the elliptical euphemisms *do*, *nego*, *nolo*, *possum*, *soleo*, *volo*, *cupio*. (Adams expects the reader to look up his articles on the anus, euphemisms, and [forthcoming] *pars pro toto*; otherwise some comments, as on Catull. 8.6 [p. 162], are unintelligible.) No discussion of *modus* = "sexual position" (Mart. 9.67.3, 12.65.2; Juv. 6.406) or of the *puerile corollarium* at Apul. *Met.* 3.20; on *amplector* = "have intercourse with" Adams cites only Donatus *ad* Terence *Andr.* 430, though it is so used nine times in Petronius, Martial, and Juvenal. No mention of the range of metaphors from "burn." A discussion of animal metaphors (p. 207) is strong on veterinary terms but leaves out *subare* ("be in heat") (Hor. *Epod.* 12.11). For *palaestra*, Adams omits its use of homosexual intercourse at Lucilius 1267 Marx. No mention of *arrigere* "get it up for," common in Martial, and the complex *rigidus/rigeo*. No mention of semen at Catullus 80.8 and *Priap.* 48, or of menstrual fluid at Lucilius 1186 Marx (quoted only vis-à-vis pederasty). No discussion of the vocabulary for circumcision; Adams does offer an opinion on *verpus* (p. 13), based on Juvenal 14.104 without the highly pertinent Mart. 11.94. Although personification of the *mentula* is discussed, personification of the *cunnus* (Hor. *S.* 1.2.69–71, 1.3.107; *Priap.* 68.9–10, Mart. 6.45.1, 7.35.8, 11.61.9; Diehl 1031) is not; nor is *cunnus* = "intercourse" (Mart. 3.81.4, 11.78.10; *Priap.* 68.27–28). Buttocks (treated in an article) are not in this book at all, nor are breasts. Discussion of the vast vocabulary of Latin sexual roles is inadequate: we get *cinaedus* and *pathicus*, but not *draucus*, *exoletus*, *paelex*, *spintria*. The discussion of the *os impurum* only touches on this wellspring of Roman humor; Adams notes, as if it were idiosyncratic, Martial's use of *purus* in this context (199), but jokes on *purus* pervade classical literature. No vocabulary on prostitutes (forthcoming)

or on kissing. No discussion of the terminology of infibulation, or of eunuchs and castration (only p. 70, n. 1). Of noted cruces, the following receive summary or indecisive treatment: *bracchia macra* at *Priap.* 72.4 (p. 37, retracted in an addendum); *sopio* (64–65); *glubere* (74, 168); *trusare* (p. 146 n. 1). Others are altogether absent; I miss particularly a responsible discussion of the entire Oxford fragment (dismissed in passing, 221).

Any lexicographer must be respected for courage in making so many pronouncements when it is so likely that a few will be wrong. Adams misreads or ignores evidence on: *criso*, pp. 136–37 (from Mart. 14.203, with its other attestations, its meaning must be "move the hips *as if* in intercourse," not "*in* intercourse"); *laxus*, which does not mean "ready for sex," as Adams implies (173), but "stretched-out" (Mart. 11.21.1; *Priap.* 18.2, 46.5); *lumbi*, which Adams doubts can signify "the sexual organs" (48), although it regularly does (Lucil. 278, Catull. 16.11, Petron. 140.6, Juv. 9.59, cf. *delumbis* at Pers. 1.104). *Colei*, "balls," never appears in Latin as *coleus* but is discussed as if it did. Quartilla's proverb at Petron. *Sat.* 25.6 takes its vocabulary not from either seafaring or animal husbandry (so Adams, p. 167), but from the story of Milo of Crotona (Quint. *Inst.* 1.9.5). *Chiam* at Petron. 63.3 presumably refers to the association of Chios with luxury goods (e.g., Mart. 13.23); Adams states, without support, "The Chians were notorious for pathic behaviour" (p. 202).

Worse errors stem from Adams' insensitivity to language. Sometimes he ignores style or context (p. 13 on *verpus*, esp. on Mart. 7.55; 115 on Pers. 4.36; 140 on Juv. 6.126; 163 on Sen. *Contr.* 4.*pr.*10; 183 on *Priap.* 83.34); sometimes he ignores all but one layer of meaning (most notably p. 141, interpreting Mart. 9.63, but also 148 on Catull. 59.5 *tundo*; 171–72 refuting Housman on *Priap.* 69.3–4). Repeatedly he insists on the "neutrality" of hostile sexual terms when applied to women (120, on Catull. 32 and graffiti; 128, on *irrumare* in private; 131, adducing the graffito *Murtis bene felas* as an example of "praise of female practitioners of the art," to argue that, where *fellat* is an "emotive term of abuse" for a man, it is a compliment for women in graffiti). He also believes that words taboo in public are "emptied of their emotive content" in private, between man and wife (12, 121, 128, 217), yet labels such usage "titillating" (217). Literal-mindedness leads him to insist on a linguistic phenomenon of "weakening"; if this existed in Latin, Adams' examples do not show it. The argument begins at 124–25, explaining that the graffito *pedicatur qui leget* cannot be meant "seriously," because (1) the reader is not actually being sodomized, and (2) the graffitist cannot know if his readers will be homosexuals. The rest of the discussion (128–30, 132–34) remains at this level, flattening several poems of Catullus (e.g., p. 133 on *c.* 42, "only if the subject of the poem was known to Catullus' readers as a *moecha* could the word have any cognitive force"). Adams has no sense of the function of multiple meanings in humor.

In the book as a whole it is precisely any coherent theoretical overview that we miss; Adams' chronological summaries usually end, as they must, inconclusively, and he does not link the social analysis of the brief Introduction (1–8) with the lexical chapters. Of the discussions of genres in the Conclusion, those on oratory and elegy (222–25) are adequate. The "sociolinguistic" section (214–17) rarely defines its terms or gives support. "Sociolinguistic" surely implies analysis of the relation between the content of what is spoken and interact-

ing classes of speaker, but of this we hear nothing. Why is the imagery of Latin sexual language so violent? Adams does not pose the question.

A final word on courtesy. Adams wastes time on the practice, which no one can afford, of sneering at other scholars' work. Whatever the faults of Adams' book, we would never say of it, as he says of others, that it is: "totally implausible" (p. 29, n. 2), "absurd" (71, n. 3; 100, n. 1), "fanciful" (155, n. 1), "far-fetched" (171), "an absurdity" (172), "quite unacceptable, . . . ludicrous" (210), "bizarre" (211), or "so inaccurate that I have chosen not to refer to it" (1, n. 2). Such rudeness is beside the point.

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SABINE G. MACCORMACK. Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1981. Pp. xvi + 417, 63 plates. $39.50. (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 1)

After the trailblazing works of Alföldi, Schramm, Kantorowicz, and Treitinger, the study of late antique ceremonial and the symbolism of power needs no apology. But ceremonial so pervaded the late Roman experience that few ancient writers consistently described rituals in the detail that a modern scholar requires. At best, the evidence is incomplete and widely scattered. To this difficult subject, M has devoted a learned and innovative book.

The objective is ambitious: to study how late Romans made sense of their changing world by means of the transformations and continuities in three great ceremonies of the Roman emperors between the tetrarchs and Heraclius: arrivals (*adventus*), divinizations (and, later, Christian funerals), and accessions. The scope is also ambitious: M exploits a broad range of written sources—especially the panegyrics—in conjunction with the rich legacy of the visual arts. Substantial discussion is devoted to Ambrose of Milan's funeral orations, Ammianus Marcellinus, Claudian, Corippus, the fifth- and sixth-century protocols of the Byzantine *Ceremony Book*, Eusebius of Caesarea's *Life of Constantine*, Julian, Libanius, the *Latin Panegyrics*, Sidonius Apollinaris and Themistius, not to mention some sixty works of art. In so doing, the author attempts, and in my opinion, demonstrates that the panegyrists can be used to expound late imperial iconography.

M believes she detects in the transformations of these three ceremonies from the fourth to the seventh century the disintegration of a classical consensus and the formation of a post-classical and Christian one on what it meant to live in the Roman world, and how the human was related to the divine. In particular, the changing ways in which contemporaries perceived these ceremonies reveal the transition. To tackle this elusive issue, M analyzes, in rough chronological order, how writers described and artists depicted the three ceremonies. She compares and contrasts individual descriptions or depictions, seeking to uncover their harmonies and discords. She argues convincingly that the panegyrists shifted their focus from the narration of imperial deeds to that of imperial rituals.

About one quarter of the book treats imperial arrivals (pp. 17-89) and another quarter, divinizations and funerals (pp. 93-158). The remaining half discusses imperial accessions. Each part unfolds in two main phases. The first sketches the ceremony's classical background and then follows its literary and iconographic trail well into the fourth century. The second examines the Christian and Byzantine metamorphoses of each ceremony in the fifth, sixth, and early seventh centuries. In each case, M argues for pivotal changes in the consensus or "modes of perception" of the governing elite concerning the ceremonies and the issues which lay behind them. According to the author, these disruptions generally came to a head and were resolved late in the fourth and early in the fifth century.

Among the many interesting and useful contributions of this book, I would single out the first chapter, "The World of the Panegyrists" (pp. 1-14). This methodological essay is valuable reading for anyone interested in the fourth-century governmental apologists. M insists on the need to understand the "concrete circumstances" of a panegyric if one is correctly to interpret its content (pp. 3, 10). She also illuminates the consensual and political significance of performing or listening to a panegyric (p. 9). Equally arresting are her suggestions that an idea appeared in visual art before it was worked out in literature (85) and that the formal divinization of deceased emperors declined under the first tetrarchy because rulers had already attained divine status during their lifetimes (106 ff).

Clearly, the book addresses important, complex issues and sometimes resolves them. The footnotes are loaded with learning and, excepting occasional lapses in Greek citations (e.g., p. 313, n. 352), meticulously corrected. Considering their quality and interest, it is regrettable that they must be sought at the end of the volume. Illustrations are abundant, well-chosen, and armed with thought-provoking descriptions. The many translations of primary sources included in the text seem generally commendable for their accuracy.[1] A remarkable bibliography, an index of cited primary sources, and a good general index conclude the book. It is one of the merits of a pioneering study to spark discussion and provoke renewed consideration of the issues it raises. That the remainder of this review addresses some of these questions in no way diminishes the book's significant contributions to the history of imperial ceremonial. Some of the difficulties raised by the book concern questions of presentation; others, problems of interpretation.

The way M reasons is sometimes hard to follow. She tends tacitly to shift from how an event was staged to how it was seen and interpreted by contemporaries, in a fashion that may mislead even an informed reader. For instance, we

[1] Note however that in Themistius *Orationes* 188c, ἀνεκήρυξεν means "proclaimed," not "greeted," as translated on 212. The sixth-century phrase ὁ τῆς θείας λήξεως, κόμης ὢν ἐξκουβιτόρων τηνικαῦτα, preserved in *De ceremoniis* 1, 93, Reiske 426.9-10, is mistranslated "he who was divinely elected but then count of the excubitors" (247). This is unfortunate, since it immediately precedes the section of *Art and Ceremony* entitled "Divine Election as a Regular Theme in and Definition of Accession." In fact, τῆς θείας λήξεως is a common formula of reverence in that era's governmental parlance, akin to our "late" or "of blessed memory." It refers to the late emperor's undoubted "portion" of celestial beatitude (cf., e.g., *De cer.* 426.3-4, 6-7, 14).

are told that "the *ceremony* [my italics] of *adventus* underwent a fundamental change under Constantine; one might even say that it became one of the means of differentiating Constantine from his Tetrarchic predecessors" (35). Then, instead of showing how the ceremony itself changed, the evidence presented shows that the symbols which accompanied the *representation* of that ceremony on the Arch of Constantine and a medallion of 313 A.D. shifted. "With that [the appearance of Sol in these representations], a fundamental theme of the Tetrarchy—the association of the emperors with Iuppiter and Hercules, with all that could result from this, in the interpretation, for instance, of victory—was dismissed. Instead, Constantine is linked to Sol-Apollo, not only theoretically but also in his appearance" (56). This is undoubtedly correct. But this reasoning shows that, when imperial art recorded the emperor's *adventus*, it changed the divinities with which he desired to be associated, not that the ceremony itself "underwent a fundamental change." The reader's perplexity is not lessened when the next page implies that the ceremony had not changed after all. The example could easily be multiplied.

Infelicitous expression sometimes leads M into questionable statements. When she describes Justinian's funeral procession as it is depicted by Corippus, she maintains that the "only feature that distinguished *adventus* and *pompa funebris* was the mourning of the participants" (155). But it is obvious that more than just mourning participants distinguished an emperor's arrival from his funeral. If the point is that Corippus' account of an imperial funeral evokes the language of *adventus* descriptions, she could have made it more effectively by buttressing her observation on Corippus' use (III, 40) of the topos "every age and sex participated" (p. 340, n. 289), with the poet's reminiscence of Claudian *IV cons. Hon.* 565 (referring to Honorius' arrival in Italy), noted in Averil Cameron's *apparatus fontium*.[2]

Shortcomings of interpretation and method detract from some of the book's most valuable insights. Too frequently, M ignores her own judicious precept on the importance of concrete circumstances. For example, the attractive idea of comparing how Themistius and Claudian, near contemporaries, described imperial accessions (205 ff.) founders precisely on this issue. Concerning Themistius' mention of Theodosius' investiture with imperial insignia, for instance, she contrasts Themistius' view of the accession "in part as a coronation of the junior emperor by the senior" (212) with that of Claudian, who gives several accounts of Honorius' *adventus* but no description of a ritual in which the empire was handed over. She attributes this to Claudian's use of outdated

[2]The argument from the topos needs buttressing for, while M is quite right in pointing out that the topos occurs in Claudian's descriptions of imperial arrivals and is, as she shows elsewhere, a major theme of *adventus* imagery, it is just as much a major theme of ruler panegyric in general. See, e.g., E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern 1948) 167, citing, among others, this very passage of Corippus. Furthermore, Theophanes Continuatus' tenth-century account of the highly unusual rehabilitation and translation of the remains of Michael III (842-867) (not Manuell p. 340, n. 291) from an ignominious grave in the suburbs to the imperial mausoleum scarcely suffices to prove the point, particularly since M notes elsewhere the difficulty of using middle Byzantine evidence for late antiquity (13).

concepts. She explains that *adventus* terminology could still be used to express the idea of accession and then concludes that the poet's description "seems out of date when it is compared to the emerging accession ceremonial." This is important because M is looking for shifts in the associations and expectations which accompanied imperial ceremonies (13). But Claudian lays no claim to discuss the investiture of Honorius. In *III cons. Hon.* 111 ff and *IV cons. Hon.* 565 ff., he is talking about the physical arrival of the boy emperor in the territory he was to rule, two years *after* his investiture with the purple; in *VI cons. Hon.* 361 ff. and 640 ff., Claudian discusses the trip to Rome honoring the emperor's sixth consulate. In all three poems, Claudian's *adventus* imagery corresponds to the real historical circumstances he was describing. Unlike Themistius' reference to Theodosius' elevation to the throne, none of these passages concerned Honorius' accession to the purple.

The author's interesting analysis of the Madrid *missorium* commemorating Theodosius' tenth regnal anniversary (January 19, 388) might have been deepened in much the same way. When she connects Themistius' positive presentation of barbarians with the *missorium*'s depiction of Germanic bodyguards, she again reveals the strength of her method. She uncovers the plate's theme of imperial victory and emphasizes how the *putti* portray the "felicity of the times"; Tellus reinforces this motif. By lying under the palace, the goddess conveys the concept of imperial "dominion over the whole earth" (219). The civilian garb of the enthroned emperors promotes an image of peace (220). All this is convincing, but it could have been further connected to the Theodosian government's real situation. In the preceding twelve months, a usurper had invaded Italy and forced the legitimate emperor to flee to the East. Africa had defected and the terrible riots had shaken the great city of Antioch. Even as the *missorium* promoted an image of Theodosian success, peace, prosperity, and universal dominion, Theodosius prepared a dangerous counter-invasion of the lost western provinces.[3]

The interpretation of the famous diptych portraying Honorius as a warrior-emperor and honoring the consulate of Fl. Anicius Petronius Probus might also have been enhanced or even altered by a closer consideration of the visual statement's historical context. Thus far M has stressed—correctly, I believe—nonmilitary components in imperial imagery of the Theodosian age. In this sculpture, however,

> The emperor is depicted as being victorious, and, because of his victoriousness, is in majesty, but he has neither the pagan nor the Christian attributes and settings which could make that majesty rich and colourful. Artistically refined, the image has little content. The imagery of Claudian, which in a more moderate version appears also on Theodosius' *missorium*, had been discarded, and little had as yet taken its place. Four years before the sack of Rome, as is to be seen from this diptych, there was little to be communicated about the emperor, withdrawn as he was behind the safety of the marshes and walls of Ravenna. (221)

[3] See, e.g., E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* 1 (Bruges 1959) 204-7.

The diptych's two full-length portraits show Honorius as nimbate and diademed, each time wearing a sword, military footgear, armor, and the *cingulum* of military command. In one he holds a shield and in the other, a standard inscribed "In nomine Christi vincas semper," where the subjunctive points to future hopes rather than present achievements. The abrupt appearance of Honorius in full combat gear had little to communicate to the citizens of Italy only if one ignores the diptych's concrete circumstances. While the Romans who first saw this portrait did not know that Rome would be sacked four years later, they could not be unaware that, as the consulate of 406 began, the barbarian horde of Radagaisus was overrunning and sacking their cities (*PLRE* 2.934). I am inclined to suspect with Delbrück that the invasion influenced the appearance of military iconography, lending it very precise and meaningful content.

Much work needs to be done on the actual development of ceremonies, and some of M's conclusions will need to be revised in the light of new evidence. For instance, her description of Heraclius' triumphal entry after the Persian wars as old-fashioned and antiquarian allows her to differentiate the actual performance of the ceremony from Theophanes' biblicizing description (perhaps derived from a lost work by George of Pisidia) in most interesting fashion (86–89). But to prove that Heraclius' naming one son consul and another one Caesar on the occasion of his return was really in accord with ancient custom, she needs to find more precedent than a possible instance of 198 A.D. A second old-fashioned component, she argues, was the presence of captured elephants in the celebrations. Their antiquarian character is documented by their appearance in (classical) Roman triumphs and their emergence almost as "a topos of Roman victory and triumph" by the fourth century. "In parading his captured elephants, Heraclius was therefore not merely providing an entertainment that lay ready to hand, but was conforming to a very old tradition of enacting a Roman victory under the eyes of the citizens of the capital" (87). In fact, I believe it can be shown that Persian elephants had figured in a sixth-century triumph of Caesar Tiberius. During circus shows for some time thereafter, the beasts continued to perform the sign of the cross and bow before the imperial loge.[4] In other words, an understanding of the triumph ceremony's historical development argues against the antiquarian character of Heraclius' victory celebration over the Persians.

In sum, *Art and Ceremony* makes a valuable contribution to an important new area in the history of ancient civilization. Like many innovative works, it raises more questions than it answers. Its pioneering contribution would, however, have been significantly enhanced by clearer presentation and more rigorous attention to the specific historical circumstances which conditioned the "modes of perception" that M seeks to illuminate.

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[4] See my forthcoming *Eternal Victory. Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Early Medieval West* (Cambridge University Press) ch. 2, n. 119, and ch. 3, 6.

M. Sordi (ed.). Religione e politica nel mondo antico (Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica 7). Milano, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni della Università Cattolica, 1981. Pp. ix + 277.

Religion and politics is a subject timely and difficult: it requires a mind open and erudite. It is a subject even the shrewdest scholars find disconcerting. It invites shallow profundity.

The collection under review consists of nineteen articles spanning the whole of antiquity from the Mycenaean *wanax* to Aetius. If it is tilted in any direction it is toward antiquarianism, which is not the worst fare we could be served. The individual articles, often useful, seldom inspiring, are footnoted extensively though erratically. We cannot discuss critically all of them; and as this is an amoeboid collection—any article could be dropped or replaced by another without any visible difference to the whole—an arbitrary selection will offer a fair representation.

Professor M. Sordi presents the collection as dealing with three major themes: *il divino come fondamento del potere; la divinizzazione del potere umano; la politica religiosa* or *la religione . . . come strumento di lotta politica* (pp. viii-ix). As to the last point we have to be on our guard: one is too easily inclined to see in the manipulation of religion a sign of decay. The best example is the famous fourth chapter in L. R. Taylor's celebrated *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley 1949). This attitude presupposes the existence of epochs when religion stood pure and pristine, free of corrupting influences of social matter—a noble illusion, for religion itself is a social matter. If there is no golden age there is no corruption, only change. Progress and decay are interchangeable notions. In other words, when we study religion we do not deal with absolutes but only with points of view.

What was the point of view of ancient intellectuals as to the social role of religion? C. Bearzot takes Isocrates as her example (pp. 97-114). He was a person "di scarsa sensibilità religiosa" (p. 97), but at the same time in his *Busiris* he presented religious piety as the bulwark of the state. A dilemma? Scarcely. For Isocrates "è . . . buono non ciò che è vero, ma ciò che è utile" (p. 102). The diagnosis is correct, but it does not go beyond what one can read in E. Mikkola, *Isokrates* (Helsinki 1954) 118-59. The ideas of Isocrates resemble the *theologia tripertita* of Varro and Mucius Scaevola (cf. G. Lieberg, *ANRW* I 4 [1973] 63-115); the concept of religious utilitarianism awaits a comparative study (an auspicious beginning has been made by K. Döring, "Antike Theorien über die staatspolitische Notwendigkeit der Götterfurcht," *Antike u. Abendland* 24 [1978] 43-56).

Anthropology is now the fad; classical erudition appears quaint and superfluous. G. Amiotti (pp. 131-40) proposes to study the assumption of the *toga virilis*, or the *iniziazione romana*, as she calls it, in the light of A. Van Gennep's grand work, *Les rites de passage* (Paris 1909). A laudable undertaking but marred by a grievous error: the author imagines that on the assumption of the *toga pura* the young Roman was liberated from the *patria potestas*! The legal passages she quotes have nothing in common with the assumption of the *toga virilis*: they refer to the minors *sui iuris*. The author will be well advised to consult the standard textbooks of Roman law, such as M. Kaser, *Das römische Privatrecht* (München 1971) 60-71, 341-52, or A. Watson, *The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic* (Oxford 1967) 77-101. And as to the *toga*

praetexta and *toga pura*, one ought not to miss the studies by W. Warde Fowler, "On the *Toga Praetexta* of the Roman Children," *Roman Essays and Interpretations* (Oxford 1920) 42-52, and L. Bonfante, "Roman Costumes," *ANRW* I 4 (1973) 590-92.

Negativism is a bad habit. I am happy to be emphatically positive with respect to the article by M. Sordi "La sacrosanctitas tribunizia e la sovranità popolare in un discorso di Tiberio Gracco" (pp. 124-30), which means I do not think much of recent work on this subject in England and America. She points out that the tenor of Tiberius' speech in Plutarch *Tib.* 15, runs counter to the basic tenets of Roman sacral law. By its vote the plebs elects the tribunes, but the tribunician sacrosanctity does not derive from this act: it stems from the original *lex sacrata*. As it is not given by the plebs, the plebs cannot delete it (unfortunately her remarks on the *lex curiata* are confused: the *lex curiata de imperio* was not a *lex sacrata*, the sworn law). The moral of the story is this: in the study of *sacrum*, faith and rationalism are the twin and disparate obstacles. The admiration for Polybius of the British and American authors is politically quite understandable, but the trust they place in his analysis of the tribunate is quite misplaced: the tribunate was a political institution, but it rested on a sacral foundation. The superstitious Livy is a much more reliable guide to the Roman mind than the rationalist Polybius.

The senseless collecting of bizarre footnotes is a high ideal of antiquarianism. Too many articles in our collection come close to this ideal. To describe them *spatium, voluntas et vires desunt*.

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LUCIA CRISCUOLO. Bolli d'anfora greci e romani. (La collezione dell'Università Cattolica di Milano.) Bologna, CLUEB, 1982. Pp. 179. L. 16,000. (Studi di Storia Antica 6)

This volume, the work of a young Italian ancient historian with experience in both epigraphy and papyrology, contains 203 amphora stamps purchased in Egypt (found probably in the Fayum). An eighth of them are from Italy, the remainder from Greek cities, and Rhodian stamps account for two-thirds.

Criscuolo points out three peculiarities of the collection: (1) Rhodian stamps account for a smaller part of the total than the 82 percent in the Benaki collection; (2) the percentages for Kos (8 percent) and Knidos (3 percent) almost reverse the Benaki proportions (Kos 2 percent, Knidos 9 percent); and (3) the number of Italian stamps is far larger than the 1 percent in the Benaki collection. The first two characteristics she attributes to chance. The relatively high Italian contingent, however, she attributes to increased Italo-Egyptian relations in the second and first centuries B.C.; the stamps in question come from the area of Brindisi (pp. 25–26).

The book provides the following: a rather extensive bibliography; an introduction to each of the groups represented; the edition of each stamp; com-

plete photographic documentation; and an index of Greek names (both those in the texts and those mentioned in the commentaries), one of Latin names, and indexes of months, titles, and pictorial motifs in the stamps. The commentaries to the individual stamps are very full, with extensive citation of parallels.

Publishing a small collection like this one requires a great deal of effort and space per stamp because of the comparatively small number of duplicates in a sample of this size; and the editor must devote nearly as much learning to a few as to many. (Compare the 61 pages devoted to 26 stamps in G. Nachtergael's publication of the Hombert collection with the 179 pages for 205 stamps here.) The reader is tempted to ask whether the apparatus is not too grandiose for the material. Given the existence of a discrete collection, however, and the remoteness of any possibility of treating these as part of a true corpus, I believe that Criscuolo has chosen wisely in making these stamps as accessible and well-documented as she has. Moreover, proportionately to the vast numbers found, relatively few stamps discovered in Egypt have been published and even fewer found in the Fayum (as Criscuolo remarks, p. 18).

This is a model edition: clear, well documented, amply and usably illustrated, with a commentary containing what a reader needs to know, fully indexed, and accurately and attractively produced at a modest price.

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